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Neal A. Tognazzini [21]Neal A. . Tognazzini [1]
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Profile: Neal Tognazzini (Western Washington University)
  1. Neal A. Tognazzini (forthcoming). Grounding the Luck Objection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Many object to libertarianism by arguing that it manages to solve one problem of luck only by falling prey to another . According to this objection, there is something freedom-undermining about the very circumstances that the libertarian thinks are required for freedom. However, it has proved difficult to articulate precisely what it is about these circumstances that is supposed to undermine freedom—the absence of certain sorts of explanations has perhaps been the most common complaint. In this paper, however, I argue (...)
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  2. Neal A. Tognazzini (forthcoming). The Structure of a Manipulation Argument. Philosophical Explorations 124 (2):358-369.
    The most prominent recent attack on compatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility is the so-called manipulation argument, which presents an allegedly responsibility-undermining manipulation case and then points out that the relevant facts of that case are no different from the facts that obtain in an ordinary deterministic world. In a recent article in this journal, however, Matt King presents a dilemma for proponents of this argument, according to which the argument either leads to a dialectical stalemate or else is dialectically (...)
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  3. John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2014). Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):346-367.
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  4. Neal A. Tognazzini (2014). Reactive Attitudes and Volitional Necessity. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):677-689.
    Strawson’s Confidence-Inspiring Response to SkepticismThe varieties of philosophical skepticism purport to be pressing an intellectual challenge: what’s your justification for believing that there is an external world (or that there are other minds, etc.)? The relevant question is, of course, asked in a tone of voice which implies that a justification is needed and can’t be had. But skeptical worries also present a more personal challenge – or, at least, one that can be more disquieting. By raising doubts about whether (...)
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  5. D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.) (2013). Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.
    One mark of interpersonal relationships is a tendency to blame. But what precise evaluations and responses constitute blame? Is it most centrally a judgment, or is it an emotion, or something else? Does blame express a demand, or embody a protest, or does it simply mark an impaired relationship? What accounts for its force or sting, and how similar is it to punishment? -/- The essays in this volume explore answers to these (and other) questions about the nature of blame, (...)
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  6. Neal A. Tognazzini (2013). Blameworthiness and the Affective Account of Blame. Philosophia 41 (4):1299-1312.
    One of the most influential accounts of blame—the affective account—takes its cue from P.F. Strawson’s discussion of the reactive attitudes. To blame someone, on this account, is to target her with resentment, indignation, or (in the case of self-blame) guilt. Given the connection between these emotions and the demand for regard that is arguably central to morality, the affective account is quite plausible. Recently, however, George Sher has argued that the affective account of blame, as understood both by Strawson himself (...)
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  7. D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
    Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully understanding) the free will problem. (...)
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  8. Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):809 - 812.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 4, Page 809-812, December 2012.
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  9. John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2011). The Physiognomy of Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.
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  10. Neal A. Tognazzini (2011). Free Will. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2):239-243.
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  11. Neal A. Tognazzini (2011). Owning Up to Luck. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):95-112.
    Although libertarians and compatibilists disagree about whether moral responsibility requires the falsity of determinism, they tend to agree that moral responsibility is at least compatible with the falsity of determinism. But there is a real worry about how that can be: after all, if my actions aren’t determined, then isn’t their occurrence just a matter of luck? In this paper, I offer a suggestion for how to understand and deal with this problem by appealing to the influential and powerful theory (...)
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  12. Neal A. Tognazzini (2011). Understanding Source Incompatibilism. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):73-88.
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  13. John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2010). Blame and Avoidability: A Reply to Otsuka. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 14 (1):43 - 51.
    In a fascinating recent article, Michael Otsuka seeks to bypass the debates about the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by presenting and defending a different, but related, principle, which he calls the “Principle of Avoidable Blame.” According to this principle, one is blameworthy for performing an act only if one could instead have behaved in an entirely blameless manner. Otsuka claims that although Frankfurt-cases do undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, they do not undermine the Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this (...)
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  14. Felipe Leon & Neal A. Tognazzini (2010). Why Frankfurt-Examples Don't Need to Succeed to Succeed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):551-565.
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  15. Neal A. Tognazzini (2010). Review of George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).
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  16. Neal A. Tognazzini (2010). Why Frankfurt-Examples Don't Need to Succeed to Succeed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):551-565.
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  17. John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2009). The Truth About Tracing. Noûs 43 (3):531-556.
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  18. Patrick Todd & Neal A. Tognazzini (2008). A Problem for Guidance Control. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):685-692.
    Central to Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility is the concept of guidance control, which involves two conditions: (1) moderate reasons-responsiveness, and (2) mechanism ownership. We raise a worry for Fischer and Ravizza's account of (1). If an agent acts contrary to reasons which he could not recognize, this should lead us to conclude that he is not morally responsible for his behaviour; but according to Fischer and Ravizza's account, he satisfies the conditions for guidance control and is therefore (...)
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  19. John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2007). Exploring Evil and Philosophical Failure: A Critical Notice of Peter Van Inwagen's the Problem of Evil. Faith and Philosophy 24 (4):458-474.
    In his recent book on the problem of evil, Peter van Inwagen argues that both the global and local arguments from evil are failures. In this paper, we engagevan Inwagen’s book at two main points. First, we consider his understanding of what it takes for a philosophical argument to succeed. We argue that whilehis criterion for success is interesting and helpful, there is good reason to think it is too stringent. Second, we consider his responses to the global andlocal arguments (...)
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  20. Neal A. Tognazzini (2007). Exploring Evil and Philosophical Failure. Faith and Philosophy 24 (4):458-474.
    In his recent book on the problem of evil, Peter van Inwagen argues that both the global and local arguments from evil are failures. In this paper, we engagevan Inwagen’s book at two main points. First, we consider his understanding of what it takes for a philosophical argument to succeed. We argue that whilehis criterion for success is interesting and helpful, there is good reason to think it is too stringent. Second, we consider his responses to the global andlocal arguments (...)
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  21. Neal A. Tognazzini (2007). The Hybrid Nature of Promissory Obligation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (3):203–232.
  22. Neal A. Tognazzini (2006). Simples and the Possibility of Discrete Space. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):117 – 128.
    What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple (an object without proper parts)? According to one prominent view, The Pointy View of Simples, an object is a simple if and only if the region occupied by that object contains exactly one point in space. According to another prominent view, MaxCon, an object is a simple if and only if it is maximally continuous. In this paper, I argue that both of these views are inconsistent (...)
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