9 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Neal Judisch [8]Neal D. Judisch [1]
  1. Neal Judisch (forthcoming). Meticulous Providence and Gratuitous Evil. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Neal Judisch (2009). Descartes' Revenge Part II : The Supervenience Argument Strikes Back. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Neal Judisch (2009). Sanctification, Satisfaction, and the Purpose of Purgatory. Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):167-185.
    Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the doctrine of purgatory among Christian philosophers. Some of these philosophers argue for the existence of purgatory from principles consistent with historic Protestant theology and then attempt, on the basis of those principles, to formulate a distinctively Protestant view of purgatory—i.e., one that differs essentially from the Catholic doctrine as regards purgatory’s raison d’etre. Here I aim to show that Protestant models of purgatory which are grounded in the necessity of becoming (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Neal Judisch (2008). Theological Determinism and the Problem of Evil. Religious Studies 44 (2):165-184.
    (Forthcoming in Religious Studies) Abstract I argue that the Free Will Defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz., that (i) God intentionally necessitates all human actions and (ii) no human has it within their power to causally influence God’s will – is entailed (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Neal Judisch (2008). Why 'Non-Mental' Won't Work: On Hempel's Dilemma and the Characterization of the 'Physical'. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 140 (3):299 - 318.
    Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Neal Judisch (2007). Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):357 - 375.
    John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Neal Judisch (2005). Responsibility, Manipulation and Ownership: Reflections on the Fischer/Ravizza Program. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):115-130.
    John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have constructed a theory of moral responsibility according to which agents are responsible only if they take responsibility in a particular way. Crucial to taking responsibility is coming to adopt a certain set of beliefs about oneself, such as the belief that one is a legitimate target of attitudes like gratitude and resentment, praise and blame. Moreover, agents must come to adopt this belief in a way that is 'appropriately based' upon their evidence, if (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael J. Almeida & Neal D. Judisch (2002). A New Cosmological Argument Undone. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 51 (1):55-64.
    There is an intriguing recent effort to develop a valid cosmological argument on the basis of quite minimal assumptions.1 Indeed, the basis of the new cosmological argument is so slight that it is likely to make even a conscientious theist suspicious – to say nothing of our vigilant atheists. In Section 1 we present the background assumptions and central premises of the new cosmological argument. We are sympathetic to the conclusion that there necessarily exists an intelligent and powerful creator of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation