Search results for 'Necessary' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two (...)
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  2. Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Necessary Connections. Synthese 161 (1):27-45.
    In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of (...)
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  3. John Danaher (2014). Necessary Moral Truths and Theistic Metaethics. Sophia 53 (3):309-330.
    Theistic metaethics usually places one key restriction on the explanation of moral facts, namely: every moral fact must ultimately be explained by some fact about God. But the widely held belief that moral truths are necessary truths seems to undermine this claim. If a moral truth is necessary, then it seems like it neither needs nor has an explanation. Or so the objection typically goes. Recently, two proponents of theistic metaethics — William Lane Craig and Mark Murphy — (...)
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  4.  5
    William Hannegan (forthcoming). Hume, Dispositional Essentialism, and Where to Find the Idea of Necessary Connection. Philosophia:1-5.
    Dispositional essentialists hold that the world is populated by irreducibly dispositional properties, called “potencies,” “powers,” or “dispositions.” Each of these properties is marked out by a characteristic stimulus and manifestation bound together in a metaphysically necessary connection. Dispositional essentialism faces an old objection from David Hume. Hume argues, in his Treatise of Human Nature, that we have no adequate idea of necessary connection. The epistemology of the Treatise allegedly rules the idea out. Dispositional essentialists usually respond by attacking (...)
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  5.  24
    Michael J. Shaffer (2015). The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis. Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):555-563.
    In this article the standard philosophical method involving intuition-driven conceptual analysis is challenged in a new way. This orthodox approach to philosophy takes analysanda to be the specifications of the content of concepts in the form of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Here it is argued that there is no adequate account of what necessary and sufficient conditions are. So, the targets of applications of the standard philosophical method so understood are not sufficiently well understood for this (...)
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  6.  36
    Carrie Figdor & Mark Phelan (2015). Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 30 (5):603-627.
    Philosophical tradition has long held that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. We report experimental results that show that the folk do not think free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Our results also suggest that experimental investigation of the relationship is ill served by a focus on incompatibilism versus compatibilism. We propose an alternative framework for empirical moral psychology in which judgments of free will and moral responsibility can vary independently in response to many factors. We (...)
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  7.  69
    Joshua Rasmussen (2010). From States of Affairs to a Necessary Being. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):183 - 200.
    I develop new paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being. These paths assume a metaphysical framework in which there are abstract states of affairs that can obtain or fail to obtain. One path begins with the following causal principle: necessarily, any contingent concrete object possibly has a cause. I mark out steps from that principle to a more complex causal principle and from there to the existence of a concrete necessary being. I offer a couple alternative (...)
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  8.  90
    Tyron Goldschmidt (2012). Metaphysical Nihilism and Necessary Being. Philosophia 40 (4):799-820.
    This paper addresses the most fundamental question in metaphysics, Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is framed as a question about concrete entities, Why does a possible world containing concrete entities obtain rather than one containing no concrete entities? Traditional answers are in terms of there necessarily being some concrete entities, and include the possibility of a necessary being. But such answers are threatened by metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there being nothing concrete is possible, and (...)
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  9.  42
    Vinit Haksar (2011). Necessary Evil: Justification, Excuse or Pardon? [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):333-347.
    The problem of necessary evil is a sub-class of the problem of moral dilemmas. In cases of genuine moral dilemmas the agent cannot avoid doing evil whatever he does. In some cases of genuine moral dilemmas, the options facing the agent are incommensurable. But in some other cases of genuine moral dilemmas, though wrong doing is inescapable, there is a rationally best course of action. These are cases of necessary evil. There are several views regarding the doing of (...)
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  10.  87
    Joshua Rasmussen (2009). From a Necessary Being to God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (1):1 - 13.
    Not a lot of work on theistic arguments has been devoted to drawing connections between a necessary being and theistic properties. In this paper, I identify novel paths from a necessary being to certain theistic properties: volition, infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite goodness. The steps in those paths are an outline for future work on what William Rowe (The Cosmological Argument, 1975, p. 6) has called “stage II” of the cosmological argument.
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  11.  57
    Graham Oppy (1994). Salmon on the Contingent a Priori and the Necessary a Posteriori. Philosophical Studies 73 (1):5 - 33.
    This paper is an examination of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori. In particular, it considers -- and assesses -- the criticisms that Nathan Salmon makes of the views of Saul Kripke.
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  12.  2
    M. J. Garcia-Encinas (2013). On Necessary but External Relations. Review of Contemporary Philosophy 12:93-101.
    I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of (...)
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  13.  10
    Alan Schwerin (1989). The Reluctant Revolutionary: An Essay on David Hume's Account of Necessary Connection. Peter Lang Publishing.
    Hume's contributions to discussions on causality and necessary connection are significant and influential. Yet they remain a source of ongoing debate among philosophers. The analysis in my book is an attempt to dissipate some of the perplexities that surround these issues. The arguments here support what I call a subjectivist interpretation of Hume's views on necessary connection. My central thesis is the suggestion that Hume identifies necessary connection or power with a specific psychological dispositon of the mind (...)
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  14.  69
    Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson (forthcoming). Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap.
    (August 2015 final pre-publication version!) In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are (...)
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  15. Andreas Hüttemann (2014). Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections. Theoria 79 (1):29-39.
    In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open.More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by openfuture- Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails to explain why (...)
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  16.  47
    Jonathan Tallant (2015). Presentism, Truthmaking and Necessary Connections. Theoria 80 (4):211-221.
    Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism. I claim that, by Cameron's own lights, the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby past objects are derivative and depend for their existence upon present objects. I argue that this view should be rejected.
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  17. Penelope Mackie (2002). Deep Contingency and Necessary a Posteriori Truth. Analysis 62 (3):225-236.
  18.  36
    Graham Oppy (2008). Review of Timothy O'Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).
    This paper is a review of the cosmological argument that Tim O'Connor defends in "Theism and Ultimate Explanation".
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  19. Scott Soames (2006). Kripke, the Necessary a Posteriori, and the Two-Dimensionalist Heresy. In Garc (ed.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press 272--292.
  20.  27
    Roland Puccetti (1975). Is Pain Necessary? Philosophy 50 (July):259-69.
    Many writers have been struck by what Ronald Melzack, a leading investigator of pain mechanisms, calls the ‘puzzle’ of pain. Thus the surgeon Leriche, often quoted in this connection, says: Defence reaction? Fortunate warning? But as a matter of fact the majority of illnesses, even the most serious, attack us without warning. Sickness is nearly always a drama in two acts, of which the first takes place, cunningly enough, in the dim silence of bur tissues, with the lights out, before (...)
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  21. Christopher Menzel (2015). Logic, Essence, and Modality Bob Hale. Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, & the Relations Between Them. Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-19-966262-3 ; 978-0-19-874803-8 ; 978-0-19-164834-2 . Pp. Ix + 298. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):407-428.
    Bob Hale’s distinguished record of research places him among the most important and influential contemporary analytic metaphysicians. In his deep, wide ranging, yet highly readable book Necessary Beings, Hale draws upon, but substantially integrates and extends, a good deal his past research to produce a sustained and richly textured essay on — as promised in the subtitle — ontology, modality, and the relations between them. I’ve set myself two tasks in this review: first, to provide a reasonably thorough (if (...)
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  22. Kelly Trogdon (2013). Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.
    Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse‐grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions (...)
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  23. Thomas M. Hughes (2012). Is Political Obligation Necessary for Obedience? Hobbes on Hostility, War and Obligation. Teoria Politica 2:77-99.
    Contemporary debates on obedience and consent, such as those between Thomas Senor and A. John Simmons, suggest that either political obligation must exist as a concept or there must be natural duty of justice accessible to us through reason. Without one or the other, de facto political institutions would lack the requisite moral framework to engage in legitimate coercion. This essay suggests that both are unnecessary in order to provide a conceptual framework in which obedience to coercive political institutions can (...)
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  24.  77
    Peter Fritz (forthcoming). First-Order Modal Logic in the Necessary Framework of Objects. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
    I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes (...)
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  25. Nils Kürbis (2015). Review of Bob Hale's Necessary Beings. [REVIEW] Disputatio (40).
    Review of Bob Hale's "Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them". Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, ISBN 9780199669578.
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  26. Lucas Angioni (2014). Aristotle on Necessary Principles and on Explaining X Through X’s Essence. Studia Philosophica Estonica 7 (2):88-112.
    I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum. This explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each (...)
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  27. Tyler Hildebrand (2013). Tooley's Account of the Necessary Connection Between Law and Regularity. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):33-43.
    Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong accept a theory of governing laws of nature according to which laws are atomic states of affairs that necessitate corresponding natural regularities. Some philosophers object to the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong theory on the grounds that there is no illuminating account of the necessary connection between governing law and natural regularity. In response, Michael Tooley has provided a reductive account of this necessary connection in his book Causation (1987). In this essay, I discuss an (...)
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  28. Robert D. Rupert (2006). Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.
    The recent literature on mental causation has not been kind to nonreductive, materialist functionalism (‘functionalism’, hereafter, except where that term is otherwise qualified). The exclusion problem2 has done much of the damage, but the epiphenomenalist threat has taken other forms. Functionalism also faces what I will call the ‘problem of metaphysically necessary effects’ (Block, 1990, pp. 157-60, Antony and Levine, 1997, pp. 91-92, Pereboom, 2002, p. 515, Millikan, 1999, p. 47, Jackson, 1998, pp. 660-61). Functionalist mental properties are individuated (...)
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  29.  98
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.
    Seemingly one of the most prominent issues that divide theorists about free will and moral responsibility concerns whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. I defend two claims in this paper. First, that this appearance is illusory: everyone thinks an ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The central issue is not whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility but which abilities to do otherwise (...)
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  30. Nora Berenstain (2014). Necessary Laws and Chemical Kinds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):631-647.
    Contingentism, generally contrasted with law necessitarianism, is the view that the laws of nature are contingent. It is often coupled with the claim that their contingency is knowable a priori. This paper considers Bird's [2001, 2002, 2005, 2007] arguments for the thesis that, necessarily, salt dissolves in water; and it defends his view against Beebee's [2001] and Psillos's [2002] contingentist objections. A new contingentist objection is offered and several reasons for scepticism about its success are raised. It is concluded that (...)
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  31.  19
    Timothy O'Connor (2008). Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency. Blackwell Pub..
    An expansive, yet succinct, analysis of the Philosophy of Religion --from metaphysics through theology. Organized into two sections, the text first examines truths concerning what is possible and what is necessary. These chapters lay the foundation for the book’s second part -- the search for a metaphysical framework that permits the possibility of an ultimate explanation that is correct and complete.
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  32. C. Haufe (2013). From Necessary Chances to Biological Laws. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):279-295.
    In this article, I propose a new way of thinking about natural necessity and a new way of thinking about biological laws. I suggest that much of the lack of progress in making a positive case for distinctively biological laws is that we’ve been looking for necessity in the wrong place. The trend has been to look for exceptionlessness at the level of the outcomes of biological processes and to build one’s claims about necessity off of that. However, as Beatty (...)
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  33. Harvey Friedman, Finite Trees and the Necessary Use of Large Cardinals.
    We introduce insertion domains that support the placement of new, higher, vertices into finite trees. We prove that every nonincreasing insertion domain has an element with simple structural properties in the style of classical Ramsey theory. This result is proved using standard large cardinal axioms that go well beyond the usual axioms for mathematics. We also establish that this result cannot be proved without these large cardinal axioms. We also introduce insertion rules that specify the placement of new, higher, vertices (...)
     
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  34. Katalin Farkas (2015). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
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  35. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept (...)
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  36.  21
    Jordan Stein (forthcoming). Tharp’s Theorems of Metaphysics and the Notion of Necessary Truth. Synthese:1-13.
    Leslie Tharp proves three theorems concerning epistemic and metaphysical modality for conventional modal predicate logic: every truth is a priori equivalent to a necessary truth, every truth is necessarily equivalent to an a priori truth, and every truth is a priori equivalent to a contingent truth. Lloyd Humberstone has shown that these theorems also hold in the modal system Actuality Modal Logic, the logic that results from the addition of the actuality operator to conventional modal logic. We show that (...)
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  37. Nicholas Maxwell (1968). Can There Be Necessary Connections Between Successive Events? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):1-25.
    THE aim of this paper is to refute Hume's contention that there cannot be logically necessary connections between successive events. I intend to establish, in other words, not 'Logically necessary connections do exist between successive events', but instead the rather more modest proposition: 'It may be, it is possible, as far as we can ever know for certain, that logically necessary connections do exist between successive events.' Towards the end of the paper I shall say something about (...)
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  38. Timothy Williamson (2002). Necessary Existents. In A. O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 269-87.
    It seems obvious that I could have failed to exist. My parents could easily never have met, in which case I should never have been conceived and born. The like applies to everyone. More generally, it seems plausible that whatever exists in space and time could have failed to exist. Events could have taken an utterly different course. Our existence, like most other aspects of our lives, appears frighteningly contingent. It is therefore surprising that there is a proof of my (...)
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  39. Max Kistler (2005). Necessary Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature’s Principles. Springer 201-227.
    In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals (...)
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  40. Alik Pelman (2014). Theoretical Identities May Not Be Necessary. Analysis 74 (3):412-422.
    Following insights from the New Theory of Reference, it has become widely accepted that theoretical identities like ‘water = H2O' are necessary. However, some have challenged this claim. I propose yet another challenge in the form of a sceptical argument. The argument is based on the contention that the necessity of theoretical identities is dependent upon criteria of identity. Thus, a theoretical identity is necessary given one criterion of identity but contingent given another. Since we do not know (...)
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  41. William Seager (2006). Is Self-Representation Necessary for Consciousness? Psyche 12 (2).
    Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. (...)
     
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  42. Alexander Bird (2002). On Whether Some Laws Are Necessary. Analysis 62 (3):257–270.
    In 'Necessarily, salt dissolves in water' (Analysis 61 (2001)), I argued that because the laws required for the existence of salt entail the laws that ensure dissolving in water, there is no possible world in which salt exists but fails to dissolve in water. In this paper I respond to criticisms from Helen Beebee and Stathis Psillos (Analysis 62 (2002)). I also introduce the 'down-and-up' structure, generalising the case. Whether or not this structure is instantiated is a matter for a (...)
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  43. Scott Soames (2011). Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility: Two Routes to the Necessary Aposteriori. In Alan Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press 167-188.
    Saul Kripke’s discussion of the necessary aposteriori in Naming and Necessity and “Identity and Necessity” -- in which he lays the foundation for distinguishing epistemic from metaphysical possibility, and explaining the relationship between the two – is, in my opinion, one of the outstanding achievements of twentieth century philosophy.1 My aim in this essay is to extract the enduring lessons of his discussion, and disentangle them from certain difficulties which, alas, can also be found there. I will argue that (...)
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  44.  25
    Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler (2012). Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's Axioms Are Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality. [REVIEW] Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
    Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing (...)
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  45.  17
    Michael Poznic (forthcoming). Representation and Similarity: Suárez on Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Scientific Representation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-17.
    The notion of scientific representation plays a central role in current debates on modeling in the sciences. One or maybe the major epistemic virtue of successful models is their capacity to adequately represent specific phenomena or target systems. According to similarity views of scientific representation, models should be similar to their corresponding targets in order to represent them. In this paper, Suárez’s arguments against similarity views of representation will be scrutinized. The upshot is that the intuition that scientific representation involves (...)
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  46. Nicholas Stang (2011). Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori? Noûs 45 (3):443-471.
    It is commonly accepted by Kant scholars that Kant held that all necessary truths are a priori, and all a priori knowledge is knowledge of necessary truths. Against the prevailing interpretation, I argue that Kant was agnostic as to whether necessity and a priority are co-extensive. I focus on three kinds of modality Kant implicitly distinguishes: formal possibility and necessity, empirical possibility and necessity, and noumenal possibility and necessity. Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience; empirical (...)
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  47. Gilbert Plumer (1999). Necessary Assumptions. Informal Logic 19 (1):41-61.
    In their book EVALUATING CRITICAL THINKING Stephen Norris and Robert Ennis say: “Although it is tempting to think that certain [unstated] assumptions are logically necessary for an argument or position, they are not. So do not ask for them.” Numerous writers of introductory logic texts as well as various highly visible standardized tests (e.g., the LSAT and GRE) presume that the Norris/Ennis view is wrong; the presumption is that many arguments have (unstated) necessary assumptions and that readers and (...)
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  48. Johanna Wolff (2013). Are Conservation Laws Metaphysically Necessary? Philosophy of Science 80 (5):898-906.
    Are laws of nature necessary, and if so, are all laws of nature necessary in the same way? This question has played an important role in recent discussion of laws of nature. I argue that not all laws of nature are necessary in the same way: conservation laws are perhaps to be regarded as metaphysically necessary. This sheds light on both the modal character of conservation laws and the relationship between different varieties of necessity.
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  49. V. Halbach & P. Welch (2009). Necessities and Necessary Truths: A Prolegomenon to the Use of Modal Logic in the Analysis of Intensional Notions. Mind 118 (469):71-100.
    In philosophical logic necessity is usually conceived as a sentential operator rather than as a predicate. An intensional sentential operator does not allow one to express quantified statements such as 'There are necessary a posteriori propositions' or 'All laws of physics are necessary' in first-order logic in a straightforward way, while they are readily formalized if necessity is formalized by a predicate. Replacing the operator conception of necessity by the predicate conception, however, causes various problems and forces one (...)
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  50. Gilberto Gomes (2009). Are Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Converse Relations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):375 – 387.
    Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, (...)
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