Search results for 'Negative Existentials' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Dolf Rami, Non‐Standard Neutral Free Logic, Empty Names and Negative Existentials.score: 224.0
    In this paper I am concerned with an analysis of negative existential sentences that contain proper names only by using negative or neutral free logic. I will compare different versions of neutral free logic with the standard system of negative free logic (Burge, Sainsbury) and aim to defend my version of neutral free logic that I have labeled non-standard neutral free logic.
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  2. Alexis Burgess (2012). Negative Existentials in Metaphysical Debate. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):221-234.score: 210.0
    There are statements of the form “There are no Fs” that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true (at least, operating within the semantic framework of structured propositions). The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to metaphysical discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.
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  3. Christopher Hughes (1998). Negative Existentials, Omniscience, and Cosmic Luck. Religious Studies 34 (4):375-401.score: 180.0
    Suppose there are possible worlds in which God exists but Anselm does not. Then (I argue) there are possible worlds in which Anselm does not exist, but God cannot even entertain the thought that he does not. In such worlds Anselm does not exist, but God does not know that. This, I argue, is incompatible with (a straightforward construal of) the doctrine of God's essential omniscience. Considerations involving negative existentials also call into question a certain picture of creation, (...)
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  4. Lenny Clapp (2009). The Problem of Negative Existentials Does Not Exist: A Case for Dynamic Semantics. Journal of Pragmatics 41 (7):1422-1434.score: 180.0
    The problem of negative existentials arises because utterances of such sentences have the paradoxical feature of denying what they presuppose, thus undermining their own truth. There are only two general strategies for solving the problem within the constraints traditional static semantics, and both strategies attempt to explain away this paradoxical feature. I argue that both strategies are fundamentally flawed, and that an adequate account of negative existentials must countenance, and not explain away, this paradoxical feature. Moreover, (...)
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  5. Alberto Voltolini (1994). Can Negative Existentials Be Referentially Vindicated? Lingua E Stile 29:397-419.score: 180.0
    In The Theory of Objects, Alexius Meinong used true negative existentials to argue in favour of non-existent objects: in order to assert veridically that an object O does not exist, one has to refer to O itself1. From Bertrand Russell's "On Denoting" onwards, it has become a commonplace to say that this argument does not work. For every sentence apparently concerning non-existents one can provide a paraphrase which eliminates the singular term contained in it and therefore dispels the (...)
     
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  6. Karen Riley, The Problem of Negative Existentials.score: 180.0
    One way to solve the problem of negative existentials is to posit a realm of non–existent objects. Then the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ could refer to a non–existent object, and a statement of (1).
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  7. Richard L. Cartwright (1960). Negative Existentials. Journal of Philosophy 57 (20/21):629-639.score: 150.0
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  8. Kendall L. Walton (2003). Restricted Quantification, Negative Existentials, and Fiction. Dialectica 57 (2):239–242.score: 150.0
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  9. David Lewis & Gideon Rosen (2003). Postscript to ”Things Qua Truthmakers': Negative Existentials. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge. 39-42.score: 150.0
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  10. Frederick Kroon (2003). Quantified Negative Existentials. Dialectica 57 (2):149–164.score: 150.0
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  11. J. K. Swindler (1980). Parmenides' Paradox: Negative Reference and Negative Existentials. Review of Metaphysics 33 (4):727 - 744.score: 150.0
  12. Jay Atlas (2004). Descriptions, Linguistic Topic/Comment, and Negative Existentials: A Case Study in the Application of Linguistic Theory to Problems in the Philosophy of Language. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press. 342--360.score: 150.0
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  13. Thomas C. Ryckman (1988). The Millian Theory of Names and the Problems of Negative Existentials and Non-Referring Names. In. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 241--249.score: 150.0
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  14. Justin Snedegar (2013). Negative Reason Existentials. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116.score: 144.0
    (Schroeder 2007) presents a puzzle about negative reason existentials—claims like ‘There's no reason to cry over spilled milk’. Some of these claims are intuitively true, but we also seem to be committed to the existence of the very reasons that are said not to exist. I argue that Schroeder's own pragmatic solution to this puzzle is unsatisfactory, and propose my own based on a contrastive account of reasons, according to which reasons are fundamentally reasons for one thing rather (...)
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  15. Jamin Asay & Sam Baron (2012). Unstable Truthmaking. Thought 1 (3):230-238.score: 90.0
    Recent discussion of the problem of negative existentials for truthmaker theory suggests a modest solution to the problem: fully general negative truths like do not require truthmakers, whereas partially general negative truths like do. This modest solution provides a third alternative to the two standard solutions to the problem of negative existentials: the endorsement of truthmaker gaps, and the appeal to contentious ontological posits. We argue that this modest, middle-ground position is inconsistent with certain (...)
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  16. T. Parent, Conservative Meinongianism.score: 90.0
    This paper defends the Meinongian thesis that “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects,” re: fictitious and illusory objects. I first formulate the problem of negative existentials in a novel way, and discuss why this new version is more forceful against anti-Meinongians. Additional data is then raised to vex anti-Meinongians—e.g., the truth of ‘Pegasus is imaginary’, and a reading of ‘There actually are illusory objects’ where it comes out true. The Meinongian, (...)
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  17. Gilbert Plumer (1989). Mustn't Whatever is Referred to Exist? Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):511-528.score: 90.0
    Some hold that proper names and indexicals are “Kaplan rigid”: they designate their designata even in worlds where the designata don’t exist. An argument they give for this is based on the analogy between time and modality. It is shown how this argument gains forcefulness at the expense of carefulness. Then the argument is criticized as forming a part of an inconsistent philosophical framework, the one with which David Kaplan and others operate. An alternative account of a certain class of (...)
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  18. Gilbert Plumer (1988). Kaplan Rigidity, Time, and Modality. Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124):329-335.score: 90.0
    Joseph Almog says concerning “a certain locus where Quine doesn’t exist…qua evaluation locus, we take to it [singular] propositions involving Quine [as a constituent] which we have generated in our generation locus.” This seems to be either murder, or worse, self-contradiction. It presumes that certain designators designate their designata even at loci where the designata do not exist, i.e., the designators have “Kaplan rigidity.” Against this view, this paper argues that negative existentials such as “Quine does not exist” (...)
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  19. Noël Saenz (2014). The World and Truth About What Is Not. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):82-98.score: 90.0
    Truthmaker says that things, broadly construed, are the ontological grounds of truth and, therefore, that things make truths true. Recently, there have been a number of arguments purporting to show that if one embraces Truthmaker, then one ought to embrace Truthmaker Maximalism—the view that all non-analytic propositions have truthmakers. But then if one embraces Truthmaker, one ought to think that negative existentials have truthmakers. I argue that this is false. I begin by arguing that recent attempts by Ross (...)
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  20. Luke Manning (forthcoming). No Identity Without an Entity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 90.0
    Peter Geach's puzzle of intentional identity is to explain how the claim 'Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow' is compatible with there being no such witch. I clarify the puzzle and reduce it to the familiar problem of negative existentials. That problem is a paradox, of representations that seem to include denials of commitment (implicitly, here), to carry commitment to what they deny commitment to, and (...)
     
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  21. Tim Crane (2012). What is the Problem of Non-Existence? Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.score: 74.0
    It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of (...)
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  22. Alexander Skiles (forthcoming). Is There a Dilemma for the Truthmaker Non-Maximalist? Synthese:1-11.score: 66.0
    Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers—that arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one (...)
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  23. Timothy Pawl (2013). Change, Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-12.score: 60.0
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ahead of Print.
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  24. Barry Miller (1982). Negative Existential Propositions. Analysis 42 (4):181 - 188.score: 60.0
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  25. A. Zepter (2003). How to Be Universal When You Are Existential: Negative Polarity Items in the Comparative: Entailment Along a Scale. Journal of Semantics 20 (2):193-237.score: 60.0
    Fauconnier (1975a) noticed that existential quantification, if it is related to a scale endpoint, can force entailment along the scale and as such have the effect of universal quantification: assume a partially ordered set (X, ⪰) and a predicate Ø such that for all x, y ∈ X, x ⪰ y, if Ø is true of x, it is also true of y; then if there exists an element z that is ordered before all other elements and Ø(z) is true, (...)
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  26. Volker Weispfenning (1976). Negative-Existentially Complete Structures and Definability in Free Extensions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (1):95-108.score: 60.0
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  27. James A. Woodbridge & Bradley Armour-Garb (2009). Linguistic Puzzles and Semantic Pretence. In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 60.0
    In this paper, we set out what we see as a novel, and very promising, approach to resolving a number of the familiar linguistic puzzles that provide philosophy of language with much of its subject matter. The approach we promote postulates semantic pretense at work where these puzzles arise. We begin by briefly cataloging the relevant dilemmas. Then, after introducing the pretense approach, we indicate how it promises to handle these putatively intractable problems. We then consider a number of objections (...)
     
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  28. Danny Frederick, Flaws in Dummett’s Syntactical Account of Singular Terms.score: 58.0
    Dummett defines a ‘predicate’ as that which combines with one or more singular terms to form a sentence. His account of ‘singular term’ is syntactical, involving three necessary conditions. He discusses a fourth, ‘Aristotelian’, criterion before propounding a criterion of predicate quantification which he claims to be superior to it. He tentatively proposes that the three necessary conditions plus the criterion of predicate quantification yield sufficient conditions for being a singular term. I show that Dummett’s necessary conditions fail with regard (...)
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  29. Mark Schroeder, The Negative Reason Existential Fallacy.score: 50.0
    This style of argument comes up everywhere in the philosophy of practical reason, leveled against theories of the norm of means-end coherence on intention, against Humean theories of reasons, and many other places. It comes up in normative moral theory – for example, in arguments against buck-passing. It comes up in epistemology, in discussions of how to account for the rational connection between believing the premises of a valid argument and believing its conclusion. And it comes up in political philosophy, (...)
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  30. Jack Hoeksema (2008). There is No Number Effect in the Licensing of Negative Polarity Items: A Reply to Guerzoni and Sharvit. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (4):397-407.score: 44.0
    Guerzoni and Sharvit (Linguistics and Philosophy 30:361–391, 2007) provide an argument that plural, but not singular, wh-phrases may contain a negative polarity item in their restriction, and connect this with the semantic property of exhaustivity. I will show that this claim is factually incorrect, and that the theory of negative polarity licensing does not need to be complicated by taking number distinctions into account. In addition, I will argue that number distinctions do not appear to be relevant for (...)
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  31. Saul A. Kripke (2013). Reference and Existence. The John Locke Lectures. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    Reference and Existence, Saul Kripke's John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work -- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersnatches, might have existed). In treating these (...)
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  32. Jonathan Schaffer (2010). The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.score: 30.0
    I argue that the one and only truthmaker is the world. This view can be seen as arisingfrom (i) the view that truthmaking is a relation of grounding holding between true propositions and fundamental entities, together with (ii) the view that the world is the one and only fundamental entity. I argue that this view provides an elegant and economical account of the truthmakers, while solving the problem of negative existentials, in a way that proves ontologically revealing.
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  33. Anthony Everett (2007). Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.score: 30.0
    There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as “Raskolnikov doesn’t exist” are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then (...)
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  34. Katherine Hawley (2011). Trivial Truthmaking Matters. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):196 - 202.score: 30.0
    What is true and what is not depends upon how the world is: that there are no white ravens is true because there are no white ravens. That much, Trenton Merricks accepts. But he denies that principles about truthmaking can do any heavy lifting in metaphysics, and he provides powerful, sophisticated arguments for this denial. The hunt for individual truthmakers for specific truths is doomed once we consider negative existentials, and, on the other side of that coin, universal (...)
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  35. Jonathan Schaffer (2008). Truth and Fundamentality: On Merricks's Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Books 49 (4):302-316.score: 30.0
    Truth and Ontology is a lively book, brimming with arguments, and drawing the reader towards the radical conclusion that what is true does not depend on what there is. If there is a central line of argument, it is that the best account of truthmaking requires truths to be about their truthmakers, but negative existentials, modals, and claims about the past and future are not about what is, but rather about what is not, what might be, and what (...)
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  36. David Liggins (2010). The Autism Objection to Pretence Theories. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):764-782.score: 30.0
    A pretence theory of a discourse is one which claims that we do not believe or assert the propositions expressed by the sentences we utter when taking part in the discourse: instead, we are speaking from within a pretence. Jason Stanley argues that if a pretence account of a discourse is correct, people with autism should be incapable of successful participation in it; but since people with autism are capable of participiating successfully in the discourses which pretence theorists aim to (...)
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  37. G. W. Fitch (2004). On Kripke and Statements. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):295–308.score: 30.0
    I will focus on what seems to be a problem for Kripke’s position with respect to certain necessary a posteriori truths and true negative existentials. I shall tentatively suggest that within Kripke’s work a solution to the problem in question can be found provided one is willing to distinguish statements from propositions.
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  38. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Comments on Merricks'struth and Ontology. Philosophical Books 49 (4):292-301.score: 30.0
    In his Truth and Ontology,1 Trenton Merricks argues against the truthmaker principle: Truthmaker: ∀p( p → ∃xxᮀ(Exx → p)). Truthmaker says that for any true proposition, there are some things whose existence guarantees the truth of that proposition: that is, some things which couldn’t all exist and the proposition fail to be true. His main arguments against Truthmaker are that there cannot be satisfactory truthmakers for (i) negative existentials, (ii) modal truths, (iii) truths about the past (given that (...)
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  39. R. M. Sainsbury (1999). Names, Fictional Names, and 'Really': R.M. Sainsbury. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):243–269.score: 30.0
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans (...)
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  40. David Wiggins (1999). Names, Fictional Names and 'Really': David Wiggins. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):271–286.score: 30.0
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans (...)
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  41. Jonathan Tallant (2010). Not a Total Failure. Philosophia 38 (4):795-810.score: 30.0
    In this paper I offer a partial defence of Armstrong’s totality relation as a solution to the problem of so-called “negative existentials”.
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  42. Samuel C. Rickless (2012). Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition. Theoria 78 (1):6-25.score: 30.0
    There are two major semantic theories of proper names: Semantic Descriptivism and Direct Reference. According to Semantic Descriptivism, the semantic content of a proper name N for a speaker S is identical to the semantic content of a definite description “the F” that the speaker associates with the name. According to Direct Reference, the semantic content of a proper name is identical to its referent. Semantic Descriptivism suffers from a number of drawbacks first pointed out by Donnellan (1970) and Kripke (...)
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  43. Arnold Cusmariu (1978). Nonexistence Without Nonexistents. Philosophical Studies 33 (4):409-412.score: 30.0
    Platonism considers existence as well as nonexistence as genuine properties. Kant and others have denied the former and the latter seems absurd. I reply that critics have forgotten that Platonism means accepting properties that are neither exemplified (like being a unicorn) nor exemplifiable (like nonexistence). I also present a Platonist analysis of negative existentials without appealing to nonexistence.
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  44. Peter Alward, Reading, Writing, and Speech Act Theory: Prolegomena to Any Future Logic of Fiction.score: 30.0
    meaning of a proper name is simply its referent.[1] This thesis, however, brings with it a whole host of problems. One particularly thorny difficulty is that of negative existentials, sentences of the form ‘N does not exist’ (where ‘N’ is a proper name). Intuitively, some such sentences are true, but the direct reference theory seems to imply that they must be either false or meaningless. After all, if the meaning of a name is just its referent, then a (...)
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  45. Peter Hinst (1983). Quines Ontologiekriterium. Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):193 - 215.score: 30.0
    This paper consists of two parts. Part I contains a precise model-theoretic reconstruction of Quine's criterion for the ontological presuppositions of a theory. Two versions (K1), (K2) of the criterion are elaborated, (K2) being the more adequate one which is shown through a number of theorems for each version. Part II contains a critical discussion of (K2), in particular of the question wether (K2) is a criterion for ontological presuppositions, i.e. for entities existing independently of the theory. Its answer depends (...)
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  46. Jean-Paul Reding (2002). Gongsun Long on What is Not: Steps Toward the Deciphering of The. Philosophy East and West 52 (2):190-206.score: 30.0
    The Zhiwulun, chapter 3 of the Gongsunlongzi, attributed to the Sophist Gongsun Long (third century B.C.), is generally interpreted as a theoretical treatise on the relations between words and things. A new reading proceeds from the hypothesis that the Zhiwulun, like the White Horse Treatise, is another logical puzzle. Its theme is the problem of pointing out things that do not exist in the world or, put in modern terms, the problem of negative existentials. The Zhiwulun is a (...)
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  47. J. Shimoyama (2011). Japanese Indeterminate Negative Polarity Items and Their Scope. Journal of Semantics 28 (4):413-450.score: 30.0
    This article investigates scopal properties of negative polarity items (NPIs) in Japanese that are composed of so-called indeterminate pronouns and particle -mo, such as dare-mo ‘who-MO’ and dore-mo ‘which-MO’. Contrary to a commonly held view, data are presented that show that the availability of the universal interpretation of indeterminate NPIs needs to be recognized. Due to the limited licensing environment of these NPIs, which require clausemate sentential negation, a difficulty arises in teasing apart predictions made by a narrow-scope existential (...)
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  48. Ben Caplan, Review of Terms and Truth. [REVIEW]score: 30.0
    Alan Berger’s Terms and Truth covers various expressionsparticularly names and anaphoric pronouns, but also demonstratives and general termsas they occur in various linguistic contexts, including identity sentences, belief ascriptions, and negative existentials. A central thesis of Berger’s book is that all of these expressions are rigid designators. (So I assume that Berger would say, contrary to what the subtitle might suggest, that anaphoric reference is direct reference.).
     
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  49. Ray, • Show the LONG List.score: 30.0
    "Truth, Lies and Representation," University of West Florida, 2011. "Meaning and Truth", Society for Exact Philosophy, Kansas City, 2010. Colloquium, UF Department of Philosophy, 2010. Florida Philosophical Association, Gainesville, 2009. "Cantor and the Gap", with Cassandra Woolwine, Logic Seminar, UF Math Department, 2010. "The Problem of Negative Existentials, Inadvertantly Solved", American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, 2010. Non-Existence and Fictional Reference, LOGOS, Barcelona, 2009 Society for Exact Philosophy, Edmonton AB, 2009. Florida Philosophical Association, Daytona Beach, 2008. "Even-Tempered Truth", Florida (...)
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  50. Lenny Clapp (2013). Denegaciones metalingüísticas y existenciales negativos. Diánoia 58 (70):133-157.score: 30.0
    En "Existenciales negativos como denegaciones metalingüísticas" (García 2012), Eduardo García presenta una propuesta metalingüística sobre los existenciales negativos y argumenta en contra de la propuesta de la corrección dinámica (Clapp 2008). Aquí argumento que aunque la posición de García es atractiva porque satisface un criterio importante que muchas interpretaciones de los existenciales negativos no logran hacer justicia, no presenta una posición convincente en contra de la propuesta de la corrección dinámica ni a favor de su propuesta metalingüística. In his "Existenciales (...)
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