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Neil C. Manson [25]Neil Campbell Manson [6]
  1. Neil C. Manson (2007). Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Informed consent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informed consent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informed consent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They argue that consent (...)
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  2. Neil Campbell Manson (2001). The Limitations and Costs of Lycan's 'Simple' Argument. Analysis 61 (4):319-323.
  3. Neil C. Manson & Onora O'Neill (2007). Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Informed consent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, first published in 2007, Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informed consent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informed consent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They argue that consent needs distinctive (...)
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  4.  87
    Neil C. Manson (2011). Why “Consciousness” Means What It Does. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):98-117.
    Abstract: “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the history of philosophy and psychology, and some resources from semantic theory, univocalism about consciousness is shown to be implausible. This finding is important, for if we accept the univocalist (...)
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  5.  2
    Neil C. Manson (forthcoming). Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    There is an ongoing debate about the “ontology” of consent. Some argue that it is a mental act, some that it is a “hybrid” of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act; others argue that consent is a performative, akin to promising or commanding. Here it is argued that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others. We begin with the question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind alone. Standard (...)
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  6.  17
    Neil C. Manson (2003). Freud's Own Blend: Functional Analysis, Idiographic Explanation, and the Extension of Ordinary Psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):179–195.
    If we are to understand why psychoanalysis extends ordinary psychology in the precise ways that it does, we must take account of the existence of, and the interplay between, two distinct kinds of explanatory concern: functional and idiographic. The form and content of psychoanalytic explanation and its unusual methodology can, at least in part, be viewed as emerging out of Freud's attempt to reconcile these two types of explanatory concern. We must also acknowledge the role of the background (...)
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  7.  71
    Neil Campbell Manson (2000). State Consciousness and Creature Consciousness: A Real Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):405-410.
    It is widely held that there is an important distinction between the notion of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, the notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states. McBride has recently argued in this journal that whilst there may be a grammatical distinction between state consciousness and creature consciousness, there is no parallel ontological distinction. It is argued here that whilst state consciousness and creature consciousness are indeed related, they are distinct (...)
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  8.  27
    Neil C. Manson (2006). What is Genetic Information, and Why is It Significant? A Contextual, Contrastive, Approach. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):1-16.
    Is genetic information of special ethical significance? Does it require special regulation? There is considerable contemporary debate about this question . Genetic information is an ambiguous term and, as an aid to avoiding conflation in the genetic exceptionalism debate, a detailed account is given of just how and why genetic information is ambiguous. Whilst ambiguity is a ubiquitous problem of communication, it is suggested that genetic information is ambiguous in a particular way, one that gives rise to the problem of (...)
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  9.  20
    Neil C. Manson (2004). Reason Explanation a First-Order Rationalizing Account. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):113 – 129.
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to 'why' questions that assuage agents' puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
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  10.  15
    Neil C. Manson (2006). What is Genetic Information, and Why is It Significant? A Contextual, Contrastive, Approach. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):1–16.
    Is genetic information of special ethical significance? Does it require special regulation? There is considerable contemporary debate about this question (the genetic exceptionalism debate). Genetic information is an ambiguous term and, as an aid to avoiding conflation in the genetic exceptionalism debate, a detailed account is given of just how and why genetic information is ambiguous. Whilst ambiguity is a ubiquitous problem of communication, it is suggested that genetic information is ambiguous in a particular way, one that gives rise to (...)
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  11.  32
    Neil C. Manson (2012). Epistemic Restraint and the Vice of Curiosity. Philosophy 87 (02):239-259.
    In recent years there has been wide-ranging discussion of epistemic virtues. Given the value and importance of acquiring knowledge this discussion has tended to focus upon those traits that are relevant to the acquisition of knowledge. This acquisitionist focus ignores or downplays the importance of epistemic restraint: refraining from seeking knowledge. In contrast, in many periods of history, curiosity was viewed as a vice. By drawing upon critiques of curiositas in Middle Platonism and Early Christian philosophy, we gain useful insights (...)
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  12.  48
    Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap. Inquiry 45 (4):521-540.
    Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes an (...)
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  13.  36
    Neil Campbell Manson (2000). 'A Tumbling-Ground for Whimsies'? The History and Contemporary Role of the Conscious/Unconscious Contrast. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge
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  14.  18
    Neil C. Manson (2012). Making Sense of Spin. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):200-213.
    “Spin” is a pejorative term for a ubiquitous form of communication. Spin is viewed by many as deceptive, and by others as bending or twisting the truth. But spin need not be deceptive and the metaphors are less than clear. The aim here is to clarify what spin is: spin is identified as a form of selective claim-making, where the process of selection is governed by an intention to bring about promotional perlocutionary effects. The process of selection may pertain to (...)
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  15.  19
    Neil C. Manson (2012). First-Person Authority: An Epistemic-Pragmatic Account. Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199.
    Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon's ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon's ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies (...)
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  16.  7
    Neil C. Manson (2015). Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal. Bioethics 29 (2):66-73.
    In many jurisdictions, adolescents acquire the right to consent to treatment; but in some cases their refusals – e.g. of life-saving treatment – may not be respected. This asymmetry of adolescent consent and refusal seems puzzling, even incoherent. The aim here is to offer an original explanation, and a justification, of this asymmetry. Rather than trying to explain the asymmetry in terms of a variable standard of competence – where the adolescent is competent to consent to, but not refuse, certain (...)
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  17.  26
    Neil Campbell Manson (2005). Consciousness-Dependence, and the Conscious/Unconscious Contrast. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126 (1):115-129.
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  18.  4
    Neil C. Manson, Contemporary Naturalism and the Concept of Consciousness.
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  19.  22
    Neil C. Manson (2009). Epistemic Inertia and Epistemic Isolationism: A Response to Buchanan. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3):291-298.
    abstract Allen Buchanan argues that conventional applied ethics is impoverished and would be enriched by the addition of social moral epistemology. The aim here is to clarify this argument and to raise questions about whether such an addition is necessary about how such enrichment would work in practice. Two broad problems are identified. First, there are various kinds and sources of epistemic inertia, which act as an obstacle to epistemic change. Religion is one striking example and seems to pose a (...)
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  20.  16
    Neil C. Manson (2004). Brains, Vats, and Neurally-Controlled Animats. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (2):249-268.
    The modern vat-brain debate is an epistemological one, and it focuses on the point of view of a putatively deceived subject. Semantic externalists argue that we cannot coherently wonder whether we are brains in vats. This paper examines a new experimental paradigm for cognitive neuroscience—the neurally-controlled animat (NCA) paradigm—that seems to have a great deal in common with the vat-brain scenario. Neural cells are provided with a simulated body within an artificial world in order to study the brain both in (...)
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  21.  12
    Neil C. Manson (2010). Consent in the Law – by Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2):215-217.
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  22.  12
    Neil C. Manson (2009). Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences – by Karsten R. Stueber. Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):187-191.
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  23.  9
    Neil C. Manson (2005). How Not to Think About Genetic Information. Hastings Center Report 35 (4):3-3.
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  24.  2
    Neil C. Manson, Rights, Wrongs and Neurons.
  25. Neil C. Manson (2004). Brains, Vats, and Neurally-Controlled Animats. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):249-268.
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  26. Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Epistemic Consciousness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.
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  27. Neil C. Manson, Freud's Own Blend : Functional Analysis, Idiographic Explanation and the Extension of Ordinary Psychology.
    If we are to understand why psychoanalysis extends ordinary psychology in the precise ways that it does, we must take account of the existence of, and the interplay between, two distinct kinds of explanatory concern: functional and idiographic. The form and content of psychoanalytic explanation and its unusual methodology can, at least in part, be viewed as emerging out of Freud's attempt to reconcile these two types of explanatory concern. We must also acknowledge the role of the background theoretical context (...)
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  28. Neil C. Manson (2013). Normative Consent Is Not Consent. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 22 (1):33-44.
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  29. Neil C. Manson, Reason Explanation:A First-Order Normative Account.
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to why questions that assuage agents puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
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  30. Neil C. Manson & Onora O'Neill (2012). Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Informed consent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, first published in 2007, Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informed consent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informed consent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They argue that consent needs distinctive (...)
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  31. Neil C. Manson & O. O'Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics.
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