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Neil Campbell [27]Neil A. Campbell [8]
  1. Neil Campbell, Anomalous Monism.
    identity theory , usually attributed to J.J.C. Smart (Smart, 1959) and U.T. Place (Place, 1956), claimed that kinds of mental states are identical to kinds of brain states. Sensations of pain, for instance, were said to be identical to the firing of C-fibres or some such type of neurological state. According to this view, then, pain, conceived as a _kind_ of mental state, is said to be _reduced_ to a certain kind of neurological state. The reduction envisaged here was modelled (...)
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  2. Neil Campbell (forthcoming). Kim on Reductive Explanation. Acta Analytica:1-8.
    In the light of what appear to be clear counterexamples, I argue that Jaegwon Kim’s comparative evaluation of functional reduction and reduction via necessary identities is problematic. I trace the problem to two sources: a misplaced metaphysical assumption about the explanatory role of identities and an excessively strong and narrow criterion for successful reductive explanation. Appreciating where Kim’s critique runs astray enhances our understanding of the role of necessary identities in reductive explanation.
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  3. Neil Campbell (2013). Do MacDonald and MacDonald Solve the Problem of Mental Causal Relevance? Philosophia 41 (4):1149-1158.
    Ever since Davidson first articulated and defended anomalous monism, nonreductive physicalists have struggled with the problem of mental causation. Considerations about the causal closure of the physical domain and related principles about exclusion make it very difficult to maintain the distinctness of mental and physical properties while securing a causal role for the former. Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the underlying metaphysics and ontology of the mental causation debate to gain traction on this issue. Cynthia MacDonald and Graham (...)
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  4. Neil Campbell (2013). Reasons and the First-Person: Explanatory Exclusion and Explanatory Pluralism. Dialogue 52 (1):25-42.
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  5. Christine Berberich, Neil Campbell & Robert Hudson (eds.) (2012). Land & Identity: Theory, Memory, and Practice. Editions Rodopi.
    This collection of essays aims to investigate the complex issues surrounding contemporary cultural discourses on land and identity – their production, construction, and reconstruction across a range of different texts and materials. The chapters offer disciplinary and trans-disciplinary approaches opening up discussion and new routes for research in a number of interrelated areas such as Countryside vs. City, Diaspora, Landscapes of Memory and Trauma, Migrational Spaces, and Ecology. They represent a number of innovative contemporary responses to how concepts of land (...)
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  6. Neil Campbell (2012). Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145.
    Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains.
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  7. Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or (...)
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  8. Neil Campbell (2010). Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation. Theoria 76 (3):207-220.
    Ausonio Marras has argued that Jaegwon Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion depends on an implausibly strong interpretation of explanatory realism that should be rejected because it leads to an extensional criterion of individuation for explanations. I examine the role explanatory realism plays in Kim's justification for the exclusion principle and explore two ways in which Kim can respond to Marras's criticism. The first involves separating criteria for explanatory truth from questions of explanatory adequacy, while the second appeals to Kim's fine-grained (...)
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  9. Dwayne Moore & Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or (...)
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  10. Neil Campbell (2009). Why We Should Lower Our Expectations About the Explanatory Gap. Theoria 75 (1):34-51.
    I argue that the explanatory gap is generated by factors consistent with the view that qualia are physical properties. I begin by considering the most plausible current approach to this issue based on recent work by Valerie Hardcastle and Clyde Hardin. Although their account of the source of the explanatory gap and our potential to close it is attractive, I argue that it is too speculative and philosophically problematic. I then argue that the explanatory gap should not concern physicalists because (...)
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  11. Neil Campbell & Dwayne Moore (2009). On Kim's Exclusion Principle. Synthese 169 (1):75 - 90.
    In this paper we explore Jaegwon Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion. Kim’s support for the principle is clarified and we critically evaluate several versions of the dual explananda response authors have offered to undermine it. We argue that none of the standard versions of the dual explananda reply are entirely successful and propose an alternative approach that reveals a deep tension in Kim’s metaphysics. We argue that Kim can only retain the principle of explanatory exclusion if he abandons his longstanding (...)
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  12. Neil Campbell (2008). Explanatory Exclusion and the Individuation of Explanations. Facta Philosophica 10 (1):25-37.
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  13. Neil Campbell (2005). A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Broadview Press.
    One of the most profound philosophical problems is the nature of mind and its relationship to the body. A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind provides an introduction, written in clear language, to the various theories of the mind-body relationship, as well as a host of related philosophical discussions about mind and consciousness. The central theories, such as Cartesian Dualism, parallelism, epiphenomenalism, and supervenience among others, are presented in historical order. Their claims, their strengths and weaknesses, and how they (...)
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  14. Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
    I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and (...)
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  15. Neil Campbell (2004). Generalizing Qualia Inversion. Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34.
    Philosophers who advocate the possibility of spectrum inversion often conclude that the qualitative content of experiential states pose a serious problem for functionalism. I argue that in order for the inversion hypothesis to support this conclusion one needs to show that it generalizes to all species of qualia. By examining features of touch, taste, and olfactory sensations, I show there is good reason to resist this generalization, in which case appeals to the possibility of spectral inversion are considerably less effective (...)
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  16. Neil Campbell (2003). An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 58 (2):261-266.
    I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeed in showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given the structure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim that qualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tension is that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they have causal efficacy, while his argument for the epiphenomenal (...)
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  17. Neil Campbell (2003). Causes and Causal Explanations: Davidson and His Critics. Philosophia 31 (1-2):149-157.
  18. Neil Campbell (ed.) (2003). Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Mind. Broadview Press.
    Since Descartes’s division of the human subject into mental and physical components in the seventeenth century, there has been a great deal of discussion about how—indeed, whether or not—our mental states bring about our physical behavior. Through historical and contemporary readings, this collection explores this lively and important issue. In four parts, this anthology introduces the problem of mental causation, explores the debate sparked by Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, examines Frank Jackson's knowledge argument for the view that qualia are epiphenomenal, (...)
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  19. Neil Campbell (2002). Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence: A Reply to Botterell. Dialogue 41 (1):163-167.
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  20. Neil Campbell (2001). What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.
    Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism (...)
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  21. Neil Campbell (2000). Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States. Synthese 124 (2):239-256.
    I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is nota possibility we should take seriously. The principlereason is that if someone's qualia were inverted inthe specified manner there is reason to believe thephenomenal difference would manifest itself inbehaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, Isuggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, arepartly constituted by an affective component whichwould be inverted along with the connected qualia. Theresulting affective inversions will, given theintimate connections that exist between emotions andbehaviour, likely manifest themselves in behaviour, (...)
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  22. Neil Campbell (2000). Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence. Dialogue 39 (02):303-.
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  23. Neil Campbell (1999). Putnam on the Token-Identity Theory. Philosophia 27 (3-4):567-574.
    Putnam raises two objections against the token-identity theory in his _Dewey Lectures. (1) Token-physicalism invokes a mysterious or _sui generis concept of identity between mental and physical event tokens; (2) The theory suffers from explanatory failure because it cannot individuate mental events using physical criteria. I argue that the first claim is false, since Davidson adopts the same criterion of identity Quine employs for ordinary objects which invokes a concept of identity we understand clearly enough. I then show that Putnam's (...)
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  24. Neil Campbell (1998). Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.
  25. Neil Campbell (1997). The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.
  26. Neil Campbell (1996). Aquinas' Reasons for the Aesthetic Irrelevance of Tastes and Smells. British Journal of Aesthetics 36 (2):166-176.
  27. Neil Campbell (1989). Infants, Pain and What Health Care Professionals Should Want to Know – a Response to Cunningham Butler. Bioethics 3 (3):200–210.
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  28. Neil A. Campbell (1986). Crossing the Boundaries of Science Applying Chemistry and Physics to Study Biological Molecules, Linus Pauling has Shown Us That No Discipline is an Island. BioScience 36 (11):737-739.
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  29. Neil A. Campbell (1986). Discoverer of the Double Helix After Making a Major Splash in the Scientific World More Than 30 Years Ago, James D. Watson Continues to Influence Molecular Biology. BioScience 36 (11):728-731.
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  30. Neil A. Campbell (1986). Resetting the Evolutionary Timetable Steven Stanley's Paleontological Research has Brought Him Into the Middle of Some of Evolutionary Biology's Liveliest Debates. BioScience 36 (11):722-727.
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  31. Neil A. Campbell (1986). Sowing the Seeds of Agricultural Research Kenneth Thimann's Studies, Which Strongly Influenced the Field of Plant Physiology, Are Critically Important to Agriculture. BioScience 36 (11):734-736.
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  32. Linus Pauling & Neil A. Campbell (1986). Crossing the Boundaries of Science. BioScience 36 (11):737-739.
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  33. Steven Stanley & Neil A. Campbell (1986). Resetting the Evolutionary Timetable. BioScience 36 (11):722-727.
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  34. Kenneth Thimann & Neil A. Campbell (1986). Sowing the Seeds of Agricultural Research. BioScience 36 (11):734-736.
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  35. James D. Watson & Neil A. Campbell (1986). Discoverer of the Double Helix. BioScience 36 (11):728-731.
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