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Profile: Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
  1. John N. Williams & Neil Sinhababu (2015). The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and Safety. Journal of Philosophy 112 (1):46-55.
    We present Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge, which works differently from other putative counterexamples and avoids objections to which they are vulnerable. We then argue that four ways of analysing knowledge in terms of safety, including Duncan Pritchard’s, cannot withstand Backward Clock either.
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  2. Neil Sinhababu (2013). The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything. Noûs 47 (4):680-696.
    I argue that one intends that ϕ if one has a desire that ϕ and an appropriately related means-end belief. Opponents, including Setiya and Bratman, charge that this view can't explain three things. First, intentional action is accompanied by knowledge of what we are doing. Second, we can choose our reasons for action. Third, forming an intention settles a deliberative question about what to do, disposing us to cease deliberating about it. I show how the desire- belief view can explain (...)
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  3. Neil Sinhababu (2008). Possible Girls. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):254–260.
    I argue that if David Lewis’ modal realism is true, modal realists from different possible worlds can fall in love with each other. I offer a method for uniquely picking out possible people who are in love with us and not with our counterparts. Impossible lovers and trans-world love letters are considered. Anticipating objections, I argue that we can stand in the right kinds of relations to merely possible people to be in love with them and that ending a trans-world (...)
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  4. Neil Sinhababu, The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism.
    I defend hedonism about moral value by first presenting an argument for moral skepticism, and then showing that phenomenal introspection gives us a unique way to defeat the skeptical argument and establish pleasure's goodness.
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  5. Neil Sinhababu (2013). Unequal Vividness and Double Effect. Utilitas 25 (3):291-315.
    I argue that the Doctrine of Double Effect is accepted because of unreliable processes of belief-formation, making it unacceptably likely to be mistaken. We accept the doctrine because we more vividly imagine intended consequences of our actions than merely foreseen ones, making our aversions to the intended harms more violent, and making us judge that producing the intended harms is morally worse. This explanation fits psychological evidence from Schnall and others, and recent neuroscientific research from Greene, Klein, Kahane, and Schaich (...)
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  6. Neil Sinhababu (2015). Advantages of Propositionalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):165-180.
    Propositionalism is the view that the contents of intentional attitudes have a propositional structure. Objectualism opposes propositionalism in allowing the contents of these attitudes to be ordinary objects or properties. Philosophers including Talbot Brewer, Paul Thagard, Michelle Montague, and Alex Grzankowski attack propositionalism about such attitudes as desire, liking, and fearing. This article defends propositionalism, mainly on grounds that it better supports psychological explanations.
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  7. Neil Sinhababu (2013). Distinguishing Belief and Imagination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):152-165.
    Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue (...)
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  8. Neil Sinhababu (2009). The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended. Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.
    This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean theory. The essay addresses the classic (...)
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  9. Neil Sinhababu (2007). Vengeful Thinking and Moral Epistemology. In Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press 262.
  10. Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Divine Fine-Tuning Vs. Electrons in Love. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    I present a novel objection to fine-tuning arguments for God's existence: the metaphysical possibility of different psychophysical laws allows any values of the physical constants to support intelligent life forms, like protons and electrons that are in love.
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  11.  16
    Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). In Defense of Partisanship. In David Killoren, Emily Crookston & Jonathan Trerise (eds.), Ethics in Politics: New Papers on the Rights and Obligations of Political Agents. Routledge
    This essay explains why partisanship is justified in contemporary America and environments with similar voting systems and coalition structures. It explains how political parties operate, how helping a party succeed can be a goal of genuine ethical significance, and how trusting one party while mistrusting another can be a reliable route to true belief about important political issues.
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  12. Neil Sinhababu, Ethical Reductionism.
    I argue that ethical reductionism is better than nonreductionism at fitting moral properties into successful scientific explanations and doesn't face the kind of multiple realizability that threatens reductionism in philosophy of mind.
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  13.  92
    Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Imagination and Belief. In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination.
    This chapter considers the nature of imagination and belief, exploring how deeply these two states of mind differ. It first addresses a range of cognitive and motivational differences between imagination and belief which suggest that they're fundamentally different states of mind. Then it addresses imaginative immersion, delusions, and the different norms we apply to the two mental states, which some theorists regard as providing support for a more unified picture of imagination and belief.
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  14. Neil Sinhababu (2015). Zarathustra’s Metaethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):278-299.
    Nietzsche takes moral judgments to be false beliefs, and encourages us to pursue subjective nonmoral value arising from our passions. His view that strong and unified passions make one virtuous is mathematically derivable from this subjectivism and a conceptual analysis of virtue, explaining his evaluations of character and the nature of the Overman.
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  15. Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Virtue, Desire, and Silencing Reasons. In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford University Press
    John McDowell claims that virtuous people recognize moral reasons using a perceptual capacity that doesn't include desire. I show that the phenomena he cites are better explained if desire makes us see considerations favoring its satisfaction as reasons. The salience of moral considerations to the virtuous, like the salience of food to the hungry, exemplifies the emotional and attentional effects of desire. I offer a desire-based account of how we can follow uncodifiable rules of common-sense morality and how some reasons (...)
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  16.  97
    Neil Sinhababu (2014). Review: Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, Eds., Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity. [REVIEW] Ethics 124 (3):617-622,.
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  17.  57
    Neil Sinhababu (2014). Would You Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley Problem and What Your Answer Tells Us About Right and Wrong, by David Edmonds. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):818-819.
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  18.  87
    Neil Sinhababu (2011). The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-13.
    Christine Korsgaard has argued that Humean views about action and practical rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action. According to the Humean theory of action, agents do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. According to the Humean theory of rationality, it is rational for agents to do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. Thus Humeans are committed to the impossibility of practical irrationality – an unacceptable consequence. -/- I respond by developing Humean views to explain how we can act irrationally. Humeans about action (...)
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  19.  64
    Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.) (2007). Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press.
    This volume capitalizes on a growth of interest in Nietzsche's work on morality from two sides -- from scholars of the history of philosophy and from ...
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  20.  13
    Neil Sinhababu (2014). Review of Gemes and Richardson (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
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  21.  37
    Neil Sinhababu (2010). Review of Robert Pippin, Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (9).
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  22.  18
    Neil Sinhababu (2012). Sneddon , Andrew . Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral Psychology . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011. Pp. 282. [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (4):824-829.
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  23.  27
    Neil Sinhababu (2009). Review of James Luchte (Ed.), Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Before Sunrise. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
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  24.  1
    Neil Sinhababu (2014). Review Simon May, Ed.Nietzsche'sOn the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2011. X + 345 Pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-51880-2. Cloth, $86.66. [REVIEW] Journal of Nietzsche Studies 45 (2):216-218.
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  25. Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (2007). Introduction. In Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press
     
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  26. Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.) (2007). Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Nietzsche was surprisingly neglected by most English-language moral philosophers until recently. This volume capitalizes on a growth of interest in Nietzsche's work on morality from historians of philosophy and from ethical theorists. In eleven new essays, leading philosophers aim both to advance philosophical understanding of Nietzsche's ethical views and to make Nietzsche a live participant in contemporary debates in ethics and related fields.
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