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  1.  25
    Norton Nelkin (1989). Unconscious Sensations. Philosophical Psychology 2 (March):129-41.
    Having, in previous papers, distinguished at least three forms of consciousness , I now further examine their differences. This examination has some surprising results. Having argued that neither C1 nor C2 is a phenomenological state?and so different from CN?I now show that CN itself is best thought of as a subclass of a larger state . CS is the set of image?representation states. CN is that set of CS states that we are also C2 about. I argue that CN states (...)
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  2. Norton Nelkin (1993). The Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell
     
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  3. Norton Nelkin (1986). Pains and Pain Sensations. Journal of Philosophy 83 (March):129-48.
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  4.  41
    Norton Nelkin (1989). Propositional Attitudes and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.
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  5.  37
    Norton Nelkin (1990). Categorizing the Senses. Mind and Language 5 (2):149-165.
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  6.  57
    Norton Nelkin (1993). What is Consciousness? Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34.
    When philosophers and psychologists think about consciousness, they generally focus on one or more of three features: phenomenality , intentionality , and introspectibility . Using examples from empirical psychology and neuroscience, I argue that consciousness is not a unitary state, that, instead, these three features characterize different and dissociable states, which often happen to occur together. Understanding these three features as dissociable from each other will resolve philosophical disputes and facilitate scientific investigation.
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  7.  91
    Norton Nelkin (1994). Phenomena and Representation. Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-47.
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  8.  28
    Norton Nelkin (1996). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with Empiricists who believe that all knowledge arises from experience and that perception is a non-cognitive state, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive, and proposition-like. Further, as against Externalists who believe that our thoughts have meaning only insofar as they advert to the world outside our minds, he argues that meaning is determined 'in the (...)
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  9.  44
    Norton Nelkin (1987). What is It Like to Be a Person? Mind and Language 2 (3):220-41.
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  10.  32
    Norton Nelkin (1987). How Sensations Get Their Names. Philosophical Studies 51 (May):325-39.
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  11.  32
    Norton Nelkin (1997). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Mind and Language 12 (2):178–180.
    This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with Empiricists who believe that all knowledge arises from experience and that perception is a non-cognitive state, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive, and proposition-like. Further, as against Externalists who believe that our thoughts have meaning only insofar as they advert to the world outside our minds, he argues that meaning is determined 'in the (...)
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  12.  30
    Norton Nelkin (1994). Reconsidering Pain. Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):325-43.
    In 1986, I argued that pains are essentially not phenomenal states. Using a Wittgen-steinian son of argument, I showed that the same sort of phenomena can be had on different occasions, and on one occasion persons be in pain, while on another occasion persons not be in pain. I also showed that very different phenomena could be experienced and, yet, organisms have the same sort of pain. I supported my arguments with empirical data from both laboratory and clinical studies. There (...)
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  13.  56
    Norton Nelkin (1987). What is It Like to Be a Person? Mind and Language 2 (3):220-41.
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  14. Norton Nelkin (1995). The Dissociation of Phenomenal States From Apperception. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh
  15.  31
    Norton Nelkin (1994). Patterns. Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.
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  16.  10
    Norton Nelkin (1995). Searle's Argument That Intentional States Are Conscious States. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.
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    Norton Nelkin (1972). Mr. Roberts on Strawson. Mind 81 (323):405-406.
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  18. Norton Nelkin (1988). Internality, Externality, and Intentionality. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer
  19. Norton Nelkin (1969). Perception and Language. Dissertation, University of Kansas
     
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  20. Norton Nelkin (1994). Phenomena and Representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-547.
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  21. Norton Nelkin (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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