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  1.  47
    Nenad Miščević (1992). Mental Models and Thought Experiments. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (3):215-226.
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  2. Nenad Miščević (2003). Explaining Modal Intuition. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):5-41.
    The paper defends causal explanationism concerning our modal intuitions and judgments, and, in particular, the following claims. If a causally explainable mirroring or “pre-established harmony” between our mind and modal reality obtains, we are justified in believing it does. We do not hold our modal beliefs compulsively and blindly but with full subjective and objective justification. Therefore, causal explanation of our modal beliefs does not undermine rational trust in them. Explanation and trust support each other. In contrast, anti-explanationists , claim (...)
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  3.  7
    Nenad Miščević (2003). Kathleen V. Wilkes (1946-2003). Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):327-328.
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  4.  60
    Nenad Miščević (2004). The Explainability of Intuitions. Dialectica 58 (1):43–70.
    Explaining intuitions in terms of "facts of our natural history" is compatible with rationally trusting them. This compatibilist view is defended in the present paper, focusing upon nomic and essentialist modal intuitions. The opposite, incompatibilist view alleges the following: If basic modal intuitions are due to our cognitive make-up or "imaginative habits" then the epistemologists are left with a mere non-rational feeling of compulsion on the side of the thinker. Intuitions then cannot inform us about modal reality. In contrast, the (...)
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  5.  15
    Nenad Miščević (2006). Intuitions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):523-548.
    In Devitt’s view, linguistic intuitions are opinions about linguistic production of products, most often one’s own. They result frorn ordinary empirical investigation, so “they are immediate and fairly unreflectiveernpirical central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena”, which reactions are, moreover, theory-laden, where the ‘theory’ encompasses all sorts of speaker’s beliefs. The paper reconstructs his arguments, places his view on a map of alternative approaches to intuitions, and offers a defense of a minimalistic “voice-of-competence” view. First, intuitions are to be identified with the (...)
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  6.  92
    Nenad Miščević (1996). Should Reason Be Fragmented? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1):23-36.
    Abstract Cognitive relativists?pragmatists (Stich, Churchland) claim that human cognitive strategies, lacking a common goal, are in addition divergent to the point of incommensurability. They appeal to the study of reasoning heuristics for evidence on cognitive diversity and incorrigibility. It is here argued that no such evidence is offered by the research, which, on the contrary (1) presents heuristics as uniform across great variations; (2) offers advice for correcting and improving human reasoning; and (3) very often postulates a uniformity of core (...)
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  7.  4
    Nenad Miščević (2003). Years of the Philosophy of Science Course in Dubrovnik. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):215-215.
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  8.  53
    Nenad Miščević (2007). Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.
    The paper argues that there is such a thing as luck in acquisition of candidate a priori beliefs and knowledge, and that the possibility of luck in this “armchair” domain shows that definitions of believing by luck that p offered in literature are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not- p. When p is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to variation in belief, not in the fact believed. (...)
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  9.  51
    Nenad Miscevic (2007). Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology). Acta Analytica 22 (3):239--266.
    A strong, strictly virtue- based , and at the same time truth-centered framework for virtue epistemology (VE) is proposed that bases VE upon a clearly motivating epistemic virtue, inquisitiveness or curiosity in a very wide sense, characterizes the purely executive capacities-virtues as a means for the truth-goal set by the former, and, finally, situates the remaining, partly motivating and partly executive virtues in relation to this central stock of virtues. Character-trait epistemic virtues are presented as hybrids, partly moral, partly purely (...)
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  10.  27
    Nenad Miščević (2007). Modelling Intuitions and Thought Experiments. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):181-214.
    The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view of thought experiments (TEs) and raises several questions. One of them concerns the initial, particular judgments in a TE. Since they seem to precede the general insight, Brown’s Platonic intuition, and not to derive from it, the question arises as to the nature of the initial particular judgment. The other question concerns the explanatory status of Brown’s epistemic Platonism. The second, constructive descriptive-explanatory part argues for an alternative, (...)
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  11.  7
    Nenad Miscevic (1998). The Aposteriority of Response-Dependence. The Monist 81 (1):69-84.
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  12.  8
    Nenad Miscevic (1998). The Rationalist and the Tortoise. Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2):175 - 179.
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  13.  3
    Nenad Miscevic (2001). Apriority and Conceptual Kinematics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):21-48.
    The paper critically discusses the Chalmers and Jackson strategy of accounting for the dynamics of conceptual intuitions. In contrast to this strategy, it is argued that concepts alone do not determine in advance rational responses to new evidence. An initial concept is often revised in the light of new data, the revision being guided by the goal of detecting the deep causal structure of the domain investigated. Using examples from the history of science (concept Reflex Arc) as an illustration, it (...)
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  14.  36
    Nenad Miščević (2006). Moral Concepts: From Thickness to Response-Dependence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (1):3-32.
    The paper examines three tenets of Dancy’s meta-ethics, finds them incompatible, and proposes a response-dependentist (or response-dispositional) solution. The first tenet is the central importance of thick concepts and properties. The second is that such concepts essentially involve response(s) of observers, which Dancy interprets in a way that fits the pattern of context-dependent resultance: thick concepts are well suited for the particularist grounding of moral theory. However, and this is the third tenet, in his earlier paper (1986) Dancy forcefully argues (...)
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  15.  4
    Nenad Miščević (2005). Introduction. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):1-1.
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  16.  9
    Nenad Miscevic (2000). Intuition as a Second Window. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):87-112.
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  17.  20
    Nenad Miščević (2005). Is Apriority Context-Sensitive? Acta Analytica 20 (1):55-80.
    The paper argues that the use of epistemic terms, prominently “… knows” and even “… knows a priori/a posteriori” is context-sensitive along several dimensions. Besides the best known dimension of quality of evidence (lower quality for less demanding context, and higher one for more demanding), there is a dimension of depth (shallow justification for superficial evaluation, and deeper justification for deeper probing evaluation contexts). This claim is illustrated by context-dependent ascription of apriority and aposteriority. The argument proposed here focuses upon (...)
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  18.  33
    Nenad Miščević (2011). Slurs & Thick Concepts-is the New Expressivism Tenable? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):159-182.
    Mark Richard in his book offers a new and challenging expressivist theory of the use and semantics of slurs (pejoratives). The paper argues that in contrast, the central and standard uses of slurs are cognitive. It does so from the role of stereotypes in slurring, from fi gurative slurs and from the need for cognitive effort (or simple of knowledge of relevant presumed properties of the target). Since cognition has to do with truth and falsity, and since the cognitive task (...)
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  19.  34
    Nenad Miscevic (1997). Secondary and Tertiary Qualities: Semantics and Response--Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):363-379.
    Secondary and tertiary qualities are plausibly explained along dispositionalist lines. Concepts of such qualities are response-dependent, denoting properties that are partly mind/brain-dependent. Unfortunately, dispositionalism is hard to square with extant versions of naturalistic theories of representation. In particular the standard naturalistic (indicational) semantics of representational content cannot handle the question from either the subjectivist or the dispositional viewpoint. The paper proposes a remedy: the problem can be solved in a smooth and natural way, provided that we revise and supplement the (...)
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  20.  12
    Nenad Miscevic (2003). Explaining Modal Intuition. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):5--41.
    The paper defends causal explanationism concerning our modal intuitions and judgments, and, in particular, the following claims. If a causally explainable mirroring or “pre-established harmony” between our mind and modal reality obtains, we are justified in believing it does. We do not hold our modal beliefs compulsively and blindly but with full subjective and objective justification. Therefore, causal explanation of our modal beliefs does not undermine rational trust in them. Explanation and trust support each other. In contrast, anti-explanationists , claim (...)
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  21.  46
    Nenad Miscevic, Intuitions: A Naturalistic Approach.
    Part one: physical thought-experiments 1) Introduction: some famous examples 2) Problems 3) Process: reasoning in mental models 4) Virtues explained Part two: spatial imagination and the seeing of possibilities 5) Two stages of geometrical thought-experiments 6) The neuro-epistemology of imagination 7) From possibility to necessity 8) Objections and hurdles..
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  22.  54
    Nenad Miscevic (2005). Rescuing Conceptual Analysis. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):447-463.
    Rey’s project of rescuing conceptual analysis within a naturalistic computationalist framework, equipped with a Putnamian account of reference, is an interesting and valuable project. However, his extremepessimism about fundamental philosophical concepts, according to which they mostly tended to be empty, amounts to sacrificing philosophical analysis after having it rescued from the Quineans. An alternative is proposed, which accepts most of the naturalistic computationalist Putnamian framework, rejects the traditional view of analyticity, but secures more space for a constructive, as opposed to (...)
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  23.  10
    Nenad Miscevic (2001). Science, Commonsense and Philosophy: A Defense of Continuity (a Critique of "Network Apriorism"). International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):19 – 31.
    A popular line in philosophy championed by Jackson and his followers analyses concepts as networks of propositions. It takes even network-propositions characterizing ordinary empirically applicable concepts to be a priori, in contrast to statements of empirical science. This is meant to guarantee both the autonomy of conceptual analysis, and its substantial and informative character. It is argued here, to the contrary, that empirically applicable and entrenched concepts owe the acceptability of their own network precisely to its empirical pedigree. Promoting an (...)
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  24.  51
    Nenad Miscevic, Deep and Superficial Apriori.
    The paper challenges the entrenched equation of conceptual with apriori. It develops the idea of at least dual justification of a single piece of belief, at a deep, ultimate level and at the surface, immediately accessible to the thinker. Apriori justification then also admits of different degrees of depth. A proposition is deeply apriori for a cognizer if its ultimate ground is apriori, otherwise it is only superficially apriori . In the case of empirically applicable concepts, some of their concept-analyzing (...)
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  25.  51
    Nenad Miscevic, A Telescope for Modal Landscapes.
    How do we know what is metaphysically possible? Many philosophers agree that conceivability is our main, if not the only, guide to possibility. And attempts at conceiving various philosophically relevant scenarios lie at the heart of much of philosophical method. No wonder that the link between the epistemic and the modal has attracted a lot of attention. The present collection documents it on more than five hundred pages of densely argued text authored by some of the most creative philosophers in (...)
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  26.  26
    Nenad Miščević (2012). Wisdom, Understanding and Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Proposal. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (2):127-144.
    Reaching understanding is one of our central epistemic goals, dictated by our important motivational epistemic virtue, namely inquisitiveness about the way things hang together. Understanding of humanly important causal dependencies is also the basic factual-theoretic ingredient of wisdom on the anthropocentric view proposed in the article. It appears at two levels. At the first level of immediate, spontaneous wisdom, it is paired with practical knowledge and motivation ( phronesis ), and encompasses understanding of oneself (a distinct level of self-knowledge having (...)
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  27.  15
    Nenad Miscevic (2013). In Search of the Reason and the Right—Rousseau's Social Contract as a Thought Experiment. Acta Analytica 28 (4):509-526.
    For Rousseau, social contract is a hypothetical one; the paper claims that it is, in contemporary terms, a political thought-experiment (TE). The abductive way of thinking, looking for the best normative pattern in the data, finds its counterpart in the historical abduction in the Second Discourse; the analogy between the two secures the methodological unity of Rousseau’s political philosophy. The proposed reading of the work as a TE shows that it fulfills the necessary requirements put by (hopefully) intuitively acceptable definition (...)
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  28.  17
    Nenad Miščević (2012). Plato's Republic as a Political Thought Experiment. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):153-165.
    Plato’s Republic is a political thought experiment, claims the present paper. Thought-experimenting is announced in the story of the Ring of Gyges, and done in a thorough and systematic way through a series of political scenarios: community of goods, of women and children, educational system and the philosopher rule? The paper considers the longstanding issue of plausibility, putting it in the context of current debates about thought-experiments, and the issue of replaceability: can a given political thought experiment be replaced by (...)
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  29.  8
    Nenad Miščević (2013). An Uncomfortable Armchair. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):5-28.
    The paper addresses Williamson’s original and challenging proposal for understanding of thought experiments . First, it puts it on the map of positions, describing it as “ordinarism”, the view that sees thinker’s reaction to the thought-experimental question as nothing extraordinary, let alone mysterious. Then, it passes to Williamson’s proposal to use counterfactuals in order to understand TEs, agrees with the main idea, but proposes a more structured view of capacities or “competences” active in the understanding and answering. Intuitions are important, (...)
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  30. Nenad Miscevic (2001). Painting the Manifest Picture. Acta Analytica 16 (26):75-96.
     
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  31.  14
    Nenad Miščević (2006). Devitt's Shocking Idea and Analyticity Without Apriority. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):69-95.
    Natural kind terms don’t have descriptive meanings, Devitt claims. The paper argues that this claim is tantamount to denying the existence of natural kind concepts, in the usual sense of “concept”, since concepts are predicate meanings. The denial is counterintuitive, and has bad epistemological consequences, since natural kind concepts are among the building blocks of our understanding of the world. The paper ends with a positive proposal, featuring a bold claim: if the standard Kripke-Putnam, line on semantics of natural kind (...)
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  32.  36
    Nenad Miscevic (2007). Is Color-Dispositionalism Nasty and Unecological? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):203 - 231.
    This article is a brief presentation and defense of response-dispositionalist intentionalism against a family of objections. The view claims that for a surface to have an objective stable color is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal-color experience. The objections, raised recently by M. Johnston, B. Stroud, and by Byrne and Hilbert, claim that any dispositionalist view is unfair to the naive perceiver-thinker, saddles her with massive error and represents her as maladaptated to (...)
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  33.  24
    Nenad Miščević (2011). No More Tears in Heaven: Two Views of Response-Dependence. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (1):75-93.
    The paper defends a neo-Lockean view of secondary qualities, in particular color, according to which the being of a given color amounts to having the disposition to produce in normal viewers under normal circumstances the response of seeing an objective manifest simple color. It also defends the view that the naïve color-concept, the simple color concept, so to speak, is a fully objective property. The defense of this view is carried against its nearest cousin , the view proposed and defended (...)
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  34.  10
    Nenad Miscevic (1996). Computation, Content, and Cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-63.
  35.  6
    Nenad Miscevic (2004). Response-Intentionalism About Color: A Sketch. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):179-191.
    Building on Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view of colors. To be of a color C is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal C-experience. The view is dubbed “response-intentionalism”. It follows from the following considerations, with the red of a tomato surface taken as an example of color C. Full phenomenal red is being visaged as being on the surface of the tomato. Science tells us that full phenomenal (...)
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  36.  19
    Nenad Miščević (2005). Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):289-315.
    Merely conceptual knowledge, not based on specific sensitivity to the referential domain, is not seriously a priori. It is argued here that it is either weakly and superficially a priori, or downright a posteriori. This is done starting from the fact that many of our definitions (or concepts) are recognizably empirically established, and pointing out that recognizably empirical grounding yields superficial apriority. Further, some (first-order) concept analyzing propositions are empirically false about their referents and thus empirically refutable. Therefore, our empirical (...)
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  37.  17
    Nenad Miščević (2012). Learning About Wisdom From Lehrer. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):59-68.
    The paper discusses Lehrer's pioneering approach to the topic of wisdom. His pithy proposal, that wisdom is preference of merit justified by an evaluation system and undefeated by error, fits well within the grand philosophical tradition of thinking about wisdom, offering a very clear and original formulation of its target. The first part of the paper puts it on a map of philosophical options concerning wisdom (anthropo-, theo- and cosmo-centric ones) and then raises questions about it: does preference have to (...)
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  38.  32
    Nenad Miscevic, Nationalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  39.  29
    Nenad Miscevic, Conceptualism and Realism.
    Wiggins’ third book on substance Sameness and Substance Renewed is renewing his second one, Samenes and Substance, from 1980. The renewal is substantial, and is summarized by author himself in the Preface: completely new chapters are added, like the one on vagueness and identity; some important ones are completely rewritten, and fertile ideas from Putnam and Kripke are incorporated into the argument, bringing it in line with mainstream views on meaning and reference. The book deserves to be reviewed as a (...)
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  40.  26
    Nenad Miščević (2008). Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke's Referential Turn and its Challenges. Acta Analytica 23 (3):233-256.
    The paper is a critical examination of Peacocke’s pioneering work on concepts as grounding the possibility of a priori knowledge. It focuses upon his more recent turn to reference and referential domain, and the two enlargements of the purely conceptual bases for apriority, namely appeal to conceptions and to direct referential sensitivity. I argue that the two are needed, but they produce more problem for the strategy as a whole than they solve. I conclude by suggesting that they point to (...)
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  41.  3
    Nenad Miščević (2007). Pavel Gregorić, Filip Grgić i Maja Hudoletnjak Grgić (ur.), Helenistička filozofija: epikurovci, stoici, skeptici. Prolegomena 6 (1):85-92.
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  42.  15
    Nenad Miščević (2005). Rescuing Conceptual Analysis. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):447-463.
    Rey’s project of rescuing conceptual analysis within a naturalistic computationalist framework, equipped with a Putnamian account of reference, is an interesting and valuable project. However, his extremepessimism about fundamental philosophical concepts, according to which they mostly tended to be empty, amounts to sacrificing philosophical analysis after having it rescued from the Quineans. An alternative is proposed, which accepts most of the naturalistic computationalist Putnamian framework, rejects the traditional view of analyticity, but secures more space for a constructive, as opposed to (...)
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  43.  6
    Nenad Miščević (2002). Sameness and Substance Renewed. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):229-233.
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  44.  11
    Nenad Miščević (2007). Epistemic Virtue and Epistemology. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):309-314.
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  45.  14
    Nenad Miščević (2008). Apriority, Copernican Turn and Objectivity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):367-384.
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  46.  14
    Nenad Miščević (2009). Grounding Concepts. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):252-257.
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  47.  22
    Nenad Miščević (1996). Computation, Content and Cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-263.
  48.  13
    Nenad Miščević (2004). Conceivability and Possibility. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):301-305.
  49.  12
    Nenad Miščević (2004). Response-Intentionalism About Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):179-191.
    Building on Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view of colors. To be of a color C is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal C-experience. The view is dubbed “response-intentionalism”. It follows from the following considerations, with the red of a tomato surface taken as an example of color C. Full phenomenal red is being visaged (intentionally experienced) as being on the surface of the tomato. Science tells us that (...)
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  50.  12
    Nenad Miščević (2001). Apriority and Conceptual Kinematics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):21-48.
    The paper critically discusses the Chalmers-and-Jackson strategy of accounting for the dynamics of conceptual intuitions. In contrast to this strategy, it is argued that concepts alone do not determine in advance rational responses to new evidence. An initial concept is often revised in the light of new data, the revision being guided by the goal of detecting the deep causal structure of the domain investigated. Using examples from the history of science (concept REFLEX ARC) as an illustration, it is argued (...)
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