Search results for 'Neurophenomenology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Antoine Lutz (2002). Toward a Neurophenomenology as an Account of Generative Passages: A First Empirical Case Study. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):133-67.
    This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of neurophenomenology in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure (...)
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  2. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do (...)
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  3. Evan Thompson (2004). Life and Mind: From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology. A Tribute to Francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):381-398.
    This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis.
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  4. Paweł Gładziejewski (2010). Neurophenomenology: An Invitation to Discussion. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1):179–189.
    No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain (...)
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  5.  59
    Charles D. Laughlin & C. Jason Throop (2009). Husserlian Meditations and Anthropological Reflections: Toward a Cultural Neurophenomenology of Experience and Reality. Anthropology of Consciousness 20 (2):130-170.
    Most of us would agree that the world of our experience is different than the extramental reality of which we are a part. Indeed, the evidence pertaining to cultural cosmologies around the globe suggests that virtually all peoples recognize this distinction—hence the focus upon the "hidden" forces behind everyday events. That said, the struggle to comprehend the relationship between our consciousness and reality, even the reality of ourselves, has led to controversy and debate for centuries in Western philosophy. In this (...)
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  6.  97
    Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Embodiment, Consciousness, and Neurophenomenology: Embodied Cognitive Science Puts the (First) Person in Its Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  7. Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli (2005). Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press 40.
    • An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (i) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ii) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (iii) are neurobiologically realized.2 • The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanadum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness (...)
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  8. Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson (2003). Neurophenomenology - Integrating Subjective Experience and Brain Dynamics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    The paper presents a research programme for the neuroscience of consciousness called 'neurophenomenology' and illustrates it with a recent pilot study . At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the neurophysiology of consciousness . At a methodological level, the neurophenomenological strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale neurodynamics of consciousness . The paper focuses on neurophenomenology (...)
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  9. Shaun Gallagher, Neurophilosophy and Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology 2005.
    I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
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  10. Antoine Lutz & Evan Thompson (2003). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.
    _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The (...)
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  11.  7
    M. D. Kirchhoff & D. D. Hutto (2016). Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346-353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Problem: Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes (...)
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  12.  5
    M. Bitbol & E. Antonova (2016). On the Too Often Overlooked Radicality of Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):354-356.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: We point out that the significance of the neurophenomenological approach to the “hard problem” of consciousness is underrated and misunderstood by the authors of the target article. In its original version, neurophenomenology implies nothing less than a change in our own being to dispel the mere sense that there is a (...)
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  13.  37
    S. A. J. Stuart (2013). The Union of Two Nervous Systems: Neurophenomenology, Enkinaesthesia, and the Alexander Technique. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):314-323.
    Context: Neurophenomenology is a relatively new field, with scope for novel and informative approaches to empirical questions about what structural parallels there are between neural activity and phenomenal experience. Problem: The overall aim is to present a method for examining possible correlations of neurodynamic and phenodynamic structures within the structurally-coupled work of Alexander Technique practitioners with their pupils. Method: This paper includes the development of an enkinaesthetic explanatory framework, an overview of the salient aspects of the Alexander Technique, and (...)
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  14.  21
    G. Colombetti (2013). Some Ideas for the Integration of Neurophenomenology and Affective Neuroscience. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):288-297.
    Context: Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem: I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method: This paper is theoretical. (...)
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  15.  2
    K. Miyahara (2016). Missing Out On the Radicalism of Neurophenomenology? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):368-370.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: An exegetical worry about Kirchhoff and Hutto’s exposition of neurophenomenology is pointed out. Combining this exegetical critique with an examination of the “strict identity” in the strict identity thesis, I argue that there is more affinity between neurophenomenology and REC than they think.
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  16.  2
    A. Rosales-Lagarde (2016). Neurophenomenology’s Epistemological Locus and the Need to Consider Its Primitive Sources: Internal Processing and Development. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):427-429.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Neurophenomenology requires a first-person report at the sub-personal level. Thus, the neurophenomenology of dreaming and sleep can be figuratively located in a model of perspectives and levels of analysis. Even when Solomonova and Sha do admit creativity to explain bizarreness and emphasize dreams’ enaction and, especially, dreams’ perception-dependence, an innate and (...)
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  17.  2
    E. Solomonova & X. W. Sha (2016). Authors’ Response: Towards a Neurophenomenology of Embodied, Skillful Dreaming. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):432-442.
    Upshot: A successful program for an enactive view of dreaming would have to clarify phenomenal and neurophysiological similarities and differences between waking perception, imagination, and dreaming. An embodied and skillful view of the dream process would require careful investigation of somatic sources of dream content, including sensory incorporation, and global, indirect ways in which dream content reacts metaphorically to changes in bodily states. Neurophenomenology of dreams would benefit from developing dreaming-specific approaches to training researchers and participants in phenomenological methods.
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  18. Lauren Reinerman-Jones, Brandon Sollins, Shaun Gallagher & Bruce Janz (2013). Neurophenomenology: An Integrated Approach to Exploring Awe and Wonder. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):295-309.
    Astronauts often report experiences of awe and wonder while traveling in space. This paper addresses the question of whether awe and wonder can be scientifically investigated in a simulated space travel scenario using a neurophenomenological method. To answer this question, we created a mixed-reality simulation similar to the environment of the International Space Station. Portals opened to display simulations of Earth or Deep Space. However, the challenge still remained of how to best capture the resulting experience of participants. We could (...)
     
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  19.  1
    S. Vörös, T. Froese & A. Riegler (2016). Epistemological Odyssey: Introduction to Special Issue on the Diversity of Enactivism and Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):189-204.
    Context: In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have been rapidly gaining in recognition and have become an integral part of various disciplines. Problem: Recently, however, questions have been raised as to whether, and to what degree, these different approaches actually cohere with one another. Specifically, it seems that many of them endorse mutually incompatible, perhaps even contradictory, epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions. Method: By retracing the roots of an alternative conception of mind and (...)
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  20.  8
    Stanley Krippner & Allan Combs (2002). Stanley Krippner and Allan Combs, The Neurophenomenology of Shamanism: An Essay Review. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (3):77-82.
    Michael Winkelman, who is a senior lecturer in the department of anthropology, Arizona State University, and director of its ethnographic field school, has provided a rich overview of the neurophenomenology of shamanism in his book, Shamanism: The Neural Ecology of Consciousness. Written in the tradition of Laughlin, McManus, and d'Aquili's 1992 classic, Brain, Symbol, and Experience: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Consciousness, Winkelman considers shamanism in many of its facets. He explores shamanism's social and symbolic content, and the implications (...)
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  21.  26
    M. Beaton, B. Pierce & S. A. J. Stuart (2013). Neurophenomenology – A Special Issue. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):265-268.
    Context: Seventeen years ago Francisco Varela introduced neurophenomenology. He proposed the integration of phenomenological approaches to first-person experience – in the tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty – with a neuro-dynamical, scientific approach to the study of the situated brain and body. Problem: It is time for a re-appraisal of this field. Has neurophenomenology already contributed to the sciences of the mind? If so, how? How should it best do so in future? Additionally, can neurophenomenology really help (...)
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  22.  30
    M. Bitbol (2012). Neurophenomenology, an Ongoing Practice of/in Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 7 (3):165-173.
    Context: In his work on neurophenomenology, the late Francisco Varela overtly tackled the well-known “hard problem” of the (physical) origin of phenomenal consciousness. Problem: Did he have a theory for solving this problem? No, he declared, only a “remedy.” Yet this declaration has been overlooked: Varela has been considered (successively or simultaneously) as an idealist, a dualist, or an identity theorist. Results: These primarily theoretical characterizations of Varela’s position are first shown to be incorrect. Then it is argued that (...)
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  23.  81
    F. Varela (1995). Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.
    This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...)
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  24. Francisco Varela (1999). The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness. In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press 266--314.
  25.  73
    Tom Froese & Thomas Fuchs (2012). The Extended Body: A Case Study in the Neurophenomenology of Social Interaction. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):205-235.
    There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature (...)
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  26. Charles D. Laughlin (1990). Brain, Symbol & Experience: Toward a Neurophenomenology of Human Consciousness. New Science Library.
  27.  21
    A. Lutz (2007). Neurophenomenology and the Study of Self-Consciousness☆. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):765-767.
  28. Lutz Antoine, A. Thompson E., Lutz & D. Cosmelli, Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers in Cognition and the Brain : The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.
  29.  69
    Shaun Gallagher (2003). Phenomenology and Neurophenomenology: An Interview with Shaun Gallagher. Aluze 2:92-102.
  30.  69
    Natalie Depraz (2002). Confronting Death Before Death: Between Imminence and Unpredictability. Francisco Varela's Neurophenomenology of Radical Embodiment. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):83-95.
  31.  50
    Evan Thompson (2006). Neurophenomenology and Contemplative Experience. In Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford Univ Pr 226-235.
    Accession Number: ATLA0001712130; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 226-235.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 234-235.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.
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  32.  28
    Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson (2003). Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):133-162.
  33.  13
    R. Hawes (2013). Art & Neurophenomenology: Putting the Experience Before the Words. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):332-338.
    Context: Current theories of art, particularly those developed from a neuroscientific perspective, fail to take adequate account of the role, methods or motivations of the artist. The problem is that the lack of the artist’s voice in interdisciplinary theoretical research undermines the basis of current theoretical models. Problem: How can artists purposefully engage with contemporary consciousness studies? The aim of the research was to develop new methodologies appropriate for cross-disciplinary research and to establish what value, if any, neuroaesthetic or phenomenological (...)
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  34.  9
    Aaron Prosser (2013). Siddhartha, Husserl, and Neurophenomenology An Enquiry Into Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):151 - 170.
  35. Tom Feldges (2013). Neurophenomenology--Current Problems and Historical Baggage A Review of the CEP Annual Conference on Neurophenomenology Bristol, Wills Hall, September 2012. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
     
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  36.  6
    Charles D. Laughlin (1992). Time, Intentionality, and a Neurophenomenology of the Dot. Anthropology of Consciousness 3 (3‐4):14-27.
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  37.  3
    Michael J. Mackenzie, Linda E. Carlson, David M. Paskevich, Panteleimon Ekkekakis, Amanda J. Wurz, Kathryn Wytsma, Katie A. Krenz, Edward McAuley & S. Nicole Culos-Reed (2014). Associations Between Attention, Affect and Cardiac Activity in a Single Yoga Session for Female Cancer Survivors: An Enactive Neurophenomenology-Based Approach. Consciousness and Cognition 27:129-146.
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  38.  11
    J. Cole (2007). Wittgenstein's neurophenomenology. Medical Humanities 33 (1):59-64.
    Wittgenstein, despite being considered an analytical philosopher, has been quoted extensively by neurologists like Oliver Sacks. This paper explores how Wittgenstein, despite suggesting that science was antithetical to philosophy, made observations relevant to cognitive neuroscience. His work on the inner and the outer, the relation between language and sensation or perception, and on the embodied nature of emotion and its communication, is important for an understanding of neurological impairment beyond our experience. In some of his enigmatic short writing his insights (...)
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  39.  4
    Charles D. Laughlin (1999). Biogenetic Structural Theory and the Neurophenomenology of Consciousness. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press 459--473.
  40. Gilla Cauli (2008). Neurophenomenology and Metacognition. Encyclopaideia 23:77-96.
     
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  41. A. Lutz (forthcoming). Neurophenomenology: How to Combine Subjective Experience with Brain Evidence. Science and Consciousness Review.
     
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  42.  30
    Gregory M. Nixon (forthcoming). Luminescent Physicalism, A Book Review of Evan Thompson's *Waking, Dreaming, Being*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    This is a fine book by an extraordinary author whose literary followers have awaited a definitive statement of his views on consciousness since his participation in the important book on biological autopoiesis, The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and his recent neurophenomenology of biological systems, Mind in Life (2007). In the latter book, Thompson demonstrated the continuity of life and mind, whereas in this book he uses neurophenomenology as well as erudite renditions of Buddhist philosophy and (...)
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  43.  38
    M. Beaton (2013). Phenomenology and Embodied Action. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):298-313.
    Context: The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms – including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors – but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. Problem: I aim to reject this internalism and defend an alternative analysis. Method: The paper presents a direct-realist, externalist, sensorimotor account of perceptual experience. It uses the concept of counterfactual meaningful action to defend this view (...)
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  44.  67
    Michel Bitbol (2002). Science as If Situation Mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):181-224.
    When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum (...)
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  45.  11
    M. Beaton (2016). Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):265-276.
    Context: Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. Problem: I aim to show that the sensorimotor theory and (...)
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  46.  74
    Thomas Desmidt, Maël Lemoine, Catherine Belzung & Natalie Depraz (2014). The Temporal Dynamic of Emotional Emergence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):557-578.
    Following the neurophenomenological approach, we propose a model of emotional emergence that identifies the experimental structures of time involved in emotional experience and their plausible components in terms of cognition, physiology, and neuroscience. We argue that surprise, as a lived experience, and its physiological correlates of the startle reflex and cardiac defense are the core of the dynamic, and that the heart system sets temporally in motion the dynamic of emotional emergence. Finally, in reference to Craig’s model of emotion, we (...)
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  47.  59
    Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys (2013). The Phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-Induced Changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Patients: An Enactive Affordance-Based Model. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
    People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...)
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  48. Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
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  49.  5
    M. Beaton (2016). Author’s Response: The Personal Level in Sensorimotor Theory. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):289-297.
    Upshot: I offer responses to the commentaries on my target article in five short sections. The first section, about the plurality of lived worlds, concerns issues of quite general interest to readers of this journal. The second section presents some reasons for rejecting “enabling” as well as “constitutive” representational approaches to understanding the mind. In the remaining three sections, I clarify aspects of sensorimotor direct realism relating to the self, qualia, counterfactuals, and the notion of “mastery.”.
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  50. Natalie Depraz (2008). The Rainbow of Emotions: At the Crossroads of Neurobiology and Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):237-259.
    This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a continuous phenomenal field: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence. We hope to recast the debate about the explanatory gap by suggesting a new way to approach the mind-body and Leib/Körper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain-centered model. By asking how the physiological dynamics of heart and (...)
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