In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does not (...) provide mere criteria for noting sameness and difference in things, but instead reflects the inner nature of things. Its form consists in the self-consciousness of a capacity to judge (i.e. the Concept is the ‘I think’). (shrink)
This paper looks at a central issue with embodiment theories in cognition: the role, if any, they provide for mental representation. Thelen and Smith (1994) hold that the concept of representations is either vacuous or misapplied in such systems. Others maintain a place for representations (e.g. Clark 1996), but are imprecise about their nature and role. It is difficult to understand what those could be if representations are understood in the same sense as that used by computationalists: fixed or long-lasting (...) neural structures that represent the sensory stimuli that caused them (e.g. neural response patterns in the visual cortex), or whose “meaning” is fixed innately or in early development for particular functions (e.g. the body schemas for Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993). The paper proposes a distinctions between, on the one hand, neural patterns, traces of sensory activation that while not in themselves representations are available for representational activity, and on the other the act of representing, which is what gives representational content to neural patterns. (shrink)
Background: Both the Council for International Organization of Medical Sciences and the Helsinki Declaration emphasize that the potential benefits of research should outweigh potential harms; consequently, some work has been conducted on participants' perception of benefits in therapeutic research. However, there appears to be very little work conducted with participants who have joined non-therapeutic research. This work was done to evaluate participants' perception of benefits in a genetic epidemiological study by examining their perception of the potential benefits of enrollment.Methods: In-depth (...) interviews lasting between 45 and 60 minutes were conducted with a convenient sample of 25 ill patients and 25 healthy accompanying relatives enrolled in a genetic epidemiological study of tuberculosis. Recorded interviews were transcribed and analyzed using content analysis.Results: Participants perceived that research was beneficial and some of the benefits included the generation of new knowledge, finding the cause of diseases, as well as the control, eradication and prevention of disease. Some thought that research was risky whilst others thought that the benefits outweighed the risks.Conclusion: Participants perceived research to be beneficial and most of them thought that, though it was risky, the benefits outweighed the risks. It is our view that researchers need to give serious consideration to participant's perception of benefits in designing their consent forms, to see to the fulfillment of achievable goals. (shrink)
The contributors to this volume cover a wide range of philosophers, from Simplicius to John Wyclif, and philosophical problems, including: the harmony of ...
From Clockwork to Crapshoot provides the perspective needed to understand contemporary developments in physics in relation to philosophical traditions as far ...
Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) left a voluminous legacy of writings. Despite his influence on the early modern period, his correspondence, manuscripts, and publications in natural philosophy remain scattered throughout many disparate editions. In this volume, Newton's principal philosophical writings are for the first time collected in a single place. They include excerpts from the Principia and the Opticks, his famous correspondence with Boyle and with Bentley, and his equally significant correspondence with Leibniz, which is often ignored in favor of Leibniz's (...) later debate with Samuel Clarke. Newton's exchanges with Leibniz place their different understandings of natural philosophy in sharp relief. The volume also includes 'De Gravitatione', offered here in a corrected translation, which is crucial for understanding Newton's relation to his great predecessor Descartes. In a historical and philosophical introduction, Andrew Janiak examines Newton's philosophical positions and his relations to canonical figures in early modern philosophy. (shrink)
We argue that the goal of natural excellence, discoverable by scientific observation of the species, is appropriately called good, and the proper object of human development and education. That affirmation stands, but we are forced to acknowledge several conceptual difficulties (in the deliberate creation of “natural” excellences, for example, and in cases of plurality of excellences) and a final inability to reconcile human freedom—surely part of the natural excellence of human life—with the need to prevent humans from using that freedom (...) to sacrifice it (through, for instance, drugs, self-indulgence, and emotional enthusiasms). (shrink)
Accountability is viewed as a civilizing element in society, with professional accountability formalized in most cases as duties dating to the Greeks and Socrates; journalists must find their own way, without formal professional or government regulation or licensing. Three scholars look at the process in a line from the formal professional discipline to suggesting problems the journalism fraternity faces without regulation to suggesting serious internal ethics conferences as 1 solution to the problem.
In this paper, I examine Scotus’s claim that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science. In order to see the significance of this claim, I first trace the development of the idea that the categories are the subject of a science from Martin of Denmark, Peter of Auvergne, and Simon of Faversham. I then turn toDuns Scotus’s account of the categories as the subject of a propter quid science. Throughout the discussion, I concentrate on the fundamental problems (...) confronting anyone who claims that there is a science of the categories: namely, how they, being ten, can have an appropriate unity. Scotus, as we will see, will answer this problem by claiming that the intellect causes a greater unity in second intentions than the corresponding unity that exists in the world. As a consequence, Scotus contends that the categories are the subject of a propter quid science, one that is radically different from the science of metaphysics. (shrink)
Grush makes an important contribution to a promising way of viewing mental representation: as a component activity in sensorimotor processes. Grush shows that there need be no entities in our heads that would count as representations, but that, nevertheless, the process of representation can be defined so as to include both natural and artificial (e.g., linguistic or pictorial) representing.
The promise of virtual reality is that it may eventually lead us to a "third state of consciousness" transcending the objective reality of our embodied beings and opening up to us a world of expanded realization. However, the recurring themes of our hero myths, both religious and secular, remind us of the importance of remaining grounded in the real world of embodied people and phenomenal perception. Advances in neuroscience even suggest that unconscious processing of perceptual stimuli may guide our behaviors. (...) Thus, the journey from the phenomenal to the noumenal is a round-trip ticket. We take with us the strength of our moral convictions to serve us on our journey and bring back the spiritual expansion that always comes of travel. (shrink)
Individual differences are indeed an important aid to our understanding of human cognition, but the importance of the rationality debate is open to question. An understanding of the process involved, and how and why differences occur, is fundamental to our understanding of human reasoning and decision making.
In all the criticisms that have shadowed the financial industry in recent years, the burden seems to be, that the reckless (as opposed to malicious) bankers too often took money of which they were the appointed stewards, and used it for speculation, especially in junk bonds. AsShaheen Borna and James Lowry argue in their "Gambling and Speculation" (the only article on gambling that I was able to raise on my computer) business speculation is probably wrong, since it is very like (...) gambling, which everyone knows is wrong. But why is gambling wrong? Ifwe, as the ethicists of business, are to adopt an uncharacteristically judgmental posture toward the most venerable American institutions, occupying the tallest and closest of American buildings, by calling their residents "gambIers," then surely we ought to be able to provide an account of the blameworthiness of gambling itself. That, at any rate, is the challenge I set myself for this paper. (shrink)
Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires firm and nuanced arguments to (...) support it. Here Maxwell's work is weakest; his arguments for contingent mind-body identity and for free will, on which his larger theory depends, are inadequate. The book is valuable both for its comprehensive view of the human condition and its mysteries, and for its demonstration of the difficulties in making such a view coherent. (shrink)
Does “business ethics,” as we have developed it in the United States, apply without change when business goes abroad? We argue that we cannot assume, in foreign nations (especially in the developing world), that the assumptions of U.S. business practice and business ethics hold without modification. An attempt to find a universally applicable ethic for global business results in the tentative formulation of “ten commandments” to guide the practice of business in the nations of the world.
Abstract: It is not too early to suggest that the attempts to place medical care in private hands (through group insurance arrangements) has not fulfilled its promise—or better, the promises that were made for it. Yet history has not been kind to plans to make government the single payer, and the laudable progress in medical technology has placed high-technology medical care beyond the reach of most private budgets. In this paper I suggest that the major problem of the U.S. health (...) care system as presently conceived is a failure of legitimacy, and I put forward a proposal that purports to solve that problem. The proposal is to localize health care, on the model of a public school system, on the argument that such localization will answer most of the questions of legitimacy at the core of the private insurance imbroglio, provide a brake for medical costs, while preserving our ability to take advantage of the most advanced medical interventions. I present some initial arguments for the proposal, but await its proof in the dialogue emerging as the present insurance system collapses. (shrink)
Editors’ note: These four interrelated discussions of the role of the cerebellum in coordinating emotional and higher cognitive functions developed out of a workshop presented by the four authors for the 2000 Conference of the Cognitive Science Society at the University of Pennsylvania. The four interrelated discussions explore the implications of the recent explosion of cerebellum research suggesting an expanded cerebellar role in higher cognitive functions as well as in the coordination of emotional functions with learning, logical thinking, perceptual consciousness, (...) and action planning. (shrink)
Thelen et al. present a convincing explanation of the A-not-B error, but contrary to their own claims, their explanation essentially involves mental representations. As is too common among cognitive scientists, they equate mental representations with representations of external physical objects. They clearly show, however, that representations of bodily actions on physical objects are central to the dynamical system producing the error.
CHAPTER 1 Integrating the Physiological and Phenomenological Dimensions of Affect and Motivation Ralph D. Ellis Clark Atlanta University A neglected but ...
Everyone knows that somehow we must protect the natural environment as part of the ethical imperatives of doing business, especially in the era of globalization of business. But where, actually, do we find the structure of ethical imperatives that will support that “must”? The drawbacks of several candidates, some of them discussed in papers elsewhere in this volume, are considered, then supplemented with the Japanese concept of kyosei as supplying a missing link between ethics and the land. In the end, (...) some questions are raised about the possibility of success of the entire environmental enterprise in face of the provisions of global trade agreements. (shrink)
The decade in which the Business Ethics Quarterly has flourished has been a good one for business and business ethics, in which new guiding theories (like stakeholder theory), new interpretations of older ethical concepts (trust, virtue, and the social contract, for instance), and whole new paradigms of doing business (the Triple Bottom Line) have entered the literature. But practice has not kept up with theory, and the theoretical gains seem to be offset by terrible losses in the temperance of greed, (...) the fostering oftrustworthiness, and sensitivity to the natural environment. (shrink)
O'Brien & Opie hold that phenomenal experience should be identified with “stable patterns of activation” across the brain's neural networks, and that this proposal has the potential for closing the ‘explanatory gap' between mental states and brain processes. I argue that they have too much respect for the conceivability argument and that their proposal already does much to close the explanatory gap, but that a “perspicuous nexus” can in principle never be achieved.
The notion of introspection is unparsimonious and unnecessary to explain the experiential grounding of our mentalistic concepts. Instead, we can look at subtle proprioceptive experiences, such as the experience of agency in planning motor acts, which may be explained in part by the phenomenon of collateral discharge or efference copy. Proprioceptive sensations experienced during perceptual and motor activity may account for everything that has traditionally been attributed to a special mental activity called “introspection.”.
Examines the aims and tools of science for creating theories and explanations of phenomena, with an eye to answering the question of whether or not science ...
In all the criticisms that have shadowed the financial industry in recent years, the burden seems to be, that the reckless (as opposed to malicious) bankers too often took money of which they were the appointed stewards, and used it for speculation, especially in junk bonds. AsShaheen Borna and James Lowry argue in their "Gambling and Speculation" (the only article on gambling that I was able to raise on my computer) business speculation is probably wrong, since it is very like (...) gambling, which everyone knows is wrong. But why is gambling wrong? Ifwe, as the ethicists of business, are to adopt an uncharacteristically judgmental posture toward the most venerable American institutions, occupying the tallest and closest of American buildings, by calling their residents "gambIers," then surely we ought to be able to provide an account of the blameworthiness of gambling itself. That, at any rate, is the challenge I set myself for this paper. (shrink)
Robert Solomon has usefully set forth the outlines of an ontology of ethics for the employee. I seize upon three of the insights in his paper-specifically, relating to employee role, social nature, and virtue-and develop them along Aristotelean lines, showing along the way how classic "dilemmas" of the business ethics literature can be recast as problems of employee character and virtue.
There is a distinction between phenomenal properties and the "phenomenality" of those properties: e.g. between what red is like and what it is like to experience red. To date, reductive accounts explain the former, but not the latter: Nagel is right that they leave something out. This paper attempts a reductive account of what it is like to have a perceptual experience. Four features of such experience are distinguished: the externality, unity, and self-awareness belonging to the content of conscious experience, (...) and the phenomenon of awareness itself. It is argued that these features are accounted for in the work of recent scientists, including F. Crick, G. Edelman, C. Koch and V. Mountcastle. This account reinforces a common way of treating the "knowledge problem.". (shrink)
Applications of Artificial Intelligence, particularly Expert Systems, are rapidly increasing. This science promises to give computer-based systems the capability of reasoning and decision making in near human-like fashion. Whether used for farm management or intelligent machine control, Expert Systems will find many agricultural applications. Much of the development and distribution of such systems will probably take place in the public sector, particularly the Cooperative Extension Service. A major nontechnical factor affecting the development and extensive use of Expert Systems is the (...) legal issue of products, liability, and negligence. The legal issues surrounding Expert Systems have not yet been fully tested and defined by the courts. Developers and users of Expert Systems must consider these factors for each particular application. (shrink)
John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...) component. I argue that the intentional state of a symbol's being meaningful to a subject is a functionally definable relation between the symbol and certain past and present states of the subject, and that a machine could bear this relation to a symbol. I sketch a machine which could be said to possess, in primitive form, the intentional component of understanding. Even if the machine, in lacking consciousness, lacks full understanding, it contributes to a theory of understanding and constitutes a counterexample to the Chinese Room argument. (shrink)
Except for a small clutch of academic shark-defenders, everyone seems to know that hostile takeovers are wrong, destructive of people and industries, and damaging to the long-term competitiveness of corporate America. But analysis of the takeover process, absent insider trading, fails to identify any injury that is not replicated elsewhere in the business system. Current suggestions for remedying the situation seem inadequate, ill-fitted to the problem, or hostile to the entire capitalist system. Could it be that it is that system (...) as a whole, or the assumptions underlying it, that is at fault? (shrink)
Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays (...) the role of external reality in discourse about physical objects. Discourse about any sort of entity or property can be viewed as involving a domain or frame of reference which constrains what can be said about the entities; this view is related to Johnson-Laird''s theory of mental models. On my approach evidence, including sensory evidence, may be involved in decisions about one''s mental states. I conclude that while Shoemaker may well be right about different roles for sense impressions in introspection and perception, the exact differences and their significance remain to be established. (shrink)
John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...) component. I argue that the intentional state of a symbol's being meaningful to a subject is a functionally definable relation between the symbol and certain past and present states of the subject, and that a machine could bear this relation to a symbol. I sketch a machine which could be said to possess, in primitive form, the intentional component of understanding. Even if the machine, in lacking consciousness, lacks full understanding, it contributes to a theory of understanding and constitutes a counterexample to the Chinese Room argument. (shrink)
