Russell brought three arguments forward against Meinong's theory of objects. None of them depend upon a misinterpretation of the theory as is often claimed. In particular, only one is based upon a clash between Meinong's theory and Russell's theory of descriptions, and that did not involve Russell's attributing to Meinong his own ontological assumption. The other two arguments were attempts to find internal inconsistencies in Meinong's theory. But neither was sufficient to refute the theory, though they do require some revisions, (...) viz. a trade-off between freedom of assumption and unhmited characterization. Meinong himself worked out the essentials of the required revisions. (shrink)
This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show that Russell, (...) in responding to a variety of different problems relating to the proposition, chose to resolve these problems in ways that continually made concessions to psychologism. (shrink)
Bertrand Russell ranks as one of the giants of 20th century philosophy. This Companion focuses on Russell's contributions to modern philosophy and, therefore, concentrates on the early part of his career. Through his books, journalism, correspondence and political activity he exerted a profound influence on modern thought. New readers will find this the most convenient and accessible guide to Russell available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Russell.
* Two important new books on Russell -/- Modern analytic philosophy was born around the turn of the century, largely through Bertrand Russell's and G. E. Moore's reaction against the neo-Hegelianism which dominated British philosophy in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It is well known that Russell had himself been a neo-Hegelian, but hitherto little has been known about his work during that period. Yet this work was important, not only for Russell's development as a philosopher, but also (...) for the development of analytic philosophy. -/- Based mainly on unpublished papers held in the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, this book is the first detailed study of this early period of Russell's philosophical career. The first three chapters are concerned with Russell's philosophical education at Cambridge in the early 1890s and his conversion to neo-Hegelianism. The remaining chapters outline his ambitious plans for a neo-Hegelian dialectic of the sciences, and the problems which ultimately led him to reject it. (shrink)
This department publishes articles on large-scale projects in which logic plays a significant role, especially editions of collected or selected works. In addition to factual and historical details, articles describe points of historiography and scholarship which are of more general interest. Articles should be submitted to the Editor.
The paper defends Meinong's theory of objects against criticism by Reinhardt Grossmann. In particular, it is argued that Grossmann fails to show that non-existent objects may not be constituents of states of affairs and fails to provide an adequate alternative analysis of states of affairs which putatively contain nonexistent items. Grossmann, in fact, is guilty of a pervasive psychologistic misinterpretation of Meinong according to which Meinong believed that objects have all the properties with which they appear before the mind. Once (...) this error is avoided, Meinong's theory not only escapes Grossmann's criticisms but has a highdegree of plausibility. (shrink)