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Profile: Nicholas Silins (Cornell University)
  1. Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception. Blackwell Compass.
    In cases of cognitive penetration, the way you see the world is shaped by your prior expectations or other cognitive states. But what is cognitive penetration exactly? What are the consequences for epistemology if it sometimes happens? What are the consequences for epistemology if it never happens? This paper surveys answers to these questions and argues that cognitive penetration has implications for epistemology whether it ever happens or not.
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  2. Nicholas Silins (2011). Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'. Mind 120 (478):329-367.
    Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world — that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: Which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the following proposal: if your experience e immediately justifies you (...)
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  3. Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins (2015). The Epistemology of Perception. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford
    An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.
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  4.  63
    Nicholas Silins (2016). Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception. Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.
    If our experiences are cognitively penetrable, they can be influenced by our antecedent expectations, beliefs, or other cognitive states. Theorists such as Churchland, Fodor, Macpherson, and Siegel have debated whether and how our cognitive states might influence our perceptual experiences, as well as how any such influences might affect the ability of our experiences to justify our beliefs about the external world. This article surveys views about the nature of cognitive penetration, the epistemological consequences of denying cognitive penetration, and the (...)
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  5. Nicholas Silins (2013). The Significance of High-Level Content. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
    This paper is an essay in counterfactual epistemology. What if experience have high-level contents, to the effect that something is a lemon or that someone is sad? I survey the consequences for epistemology of such a scenario, and conclude that many of the striking consequences could be reached even if our experiences don't have high-level contents.
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  6. Nicholas Silins (2005). Transmission Failure Failure. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71 - 102.
    I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one's justification for believing a conclusion can be one's premise for the conclusion, rather (...)
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  7. Nicholas Silins (2008). Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic. In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. OUP
    My focus will be on two questions about Moore’s justification to believe the premises and the conclusion of the argument above. At stake is what makes it possible for our experiences to justify our beliefs, and what makes it possible for us to be justified in disbelieving skeptical..
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  8. Nicholas Silins (2005). Deception and Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
  9. Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
  10. Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Attention and Perceptual Justification. In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Festschrift for Ned Block. MIT Press
  11. Nicholas Silins & Susanna Siegel (2014). Consciousness, Attention, and Justification. In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Jusification. Oxford University Press
    We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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  12. Nicholas Silins (2012). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.
    This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing “anti-individualism” about the contents of perceptual states to give an account of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge’s ( 2003 ) paper, “Perceptual Entitlement”. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts (...)
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  13. Nicholas Silins (2013). Introspection and Inference. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
    In this paper I develop the idea that, by answering the question whether p, you can answer the question whether you believe that p. In particular, I argue that judging that p is a fallible yet basic guide to whether one believes that p. I go on to defend my view from an important skeptical challenge, according to which my view would make it too easy to reject skeptical hypotheses about our access to our minds. I close by responding to (...)
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  14. Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Experience and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  15.  58
    Nicholas Silins (2014). The Agony of Defeat? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):505-532.
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    Nicholas Silins (2005). Transmission Failure Failure. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71-102.
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    Nicholas Silins (2007). 5. Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic. Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2 2:108.
  18. Nicholas Silins (2008). Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. OUP.
  19.  9
    Nicholas Silins (2005). Jay Newhard/Grelling's Paradox 1–27 Michael Pelczar/Enlightening the Fully Informed 29–56 Joshua Gert/a Light Theory with Heavy Burdens 57–70. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 126:509-511.
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