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Nicholas Stang [12]Nicholas F. Stang [3]
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Profile: Nicholas Stang (University of Miami)
  1. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Adickes on Double Affection. In Proceedings of the XIth International Kant Congress. De Gruyter.
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  2. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Bodies, Matter, Monads and Things in Themselves. In Brandon Look (ed.), Leibniz and Kant.
    In this paper I address a structurally similar tension between phenomenalism and realism about matter in Leibniz and Kant. In both philosophers, some texts suggest a starkly phenomenalist view of the ontological status of matter, while other texts suggest a more robust realism. In the first part of the paper I address a recent paper by Don Rutherford that argues that Leibniz is more of a realist than previous commentators have allowed. I argue that Rutherford fails to show that Leibniz (...)
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  3. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Indeterminacy and Transcendental Idealism. British Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as (...)
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  4. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Kant's Argument That Existence is Not a Determination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper, I examine Kant’s famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant’s primary target is not ontological arguments as such (...)
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  5. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Proceedings of the XIth International Kant Congress. De Gruyter.
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  6. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Who's Afraid of Double Affection? Philosophers' Imprint.
    There is substantial textual evidence that Kant held the doctrine of double affection: subjects are causally affected both by things in themselves and by appearances. However, Kant commentators have been loath to attribute this view to him, for the doctrine of double affection is widely thought to face insuperable problems. I begin by explaining what I take to be the most serious problem faced by the doctrine of double affection: appearances cannot cause the very experience in virtue of which they (...)
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  7. Nicholas Stang (2013). Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan. Kantian Review 18 (1):99-106.
    In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance (the doctrine that we have no knowledge of things in themselves) but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge (...)
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  8. Nicholas Stang (2013). The Non‐Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves. Noûs 47 (4):106-136.
    According to the ‘One Object’ reading of Kant's transcendental idealism, the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is not a distinction between two objects, but between two ways of considering one and the same object. On the ‘Metaphysical’ version of the One Object reading, it is a distinction between two kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object. Consequently, the Metaphysical One Object view holds that a given appearance, an empirical object, is numerically identical to (...)
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  9. Nicholas Stang (2012). Artworks Are Not Valuable for Their Own Sake. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (3):271-280.
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  10. Nicholas Stang (2012). A Kantian Response to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):33-61.
    One of Bolzano’s objections to Kant’s way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction is that it only applies to judgments within a narrow range of syntactic forms, namely, universal affirmative judgments. According to Bolzano, Kant cannot account for judgments of other syntactic forms that, intuitively, are analytic. A recent paper by Ian Proops also attributes to Kant the view that analytic judgments beyond a limited range of syntactic forms are impossible. I argue that, correctly understood, Kant’s conception of analyticity allows for (...)
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  11. Nicholas Stang (2012). Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1117-1139.
    In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as (...)
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  12. Nicholas F. Stang (2011). Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori? Noûs 45 (3):443-471.
    It is commonly accepted by Kant scholars that Kant held that all necessary truths are a priori, and all a priori knowledge is knowledge of necessary truths. Against the prevailing interpretation, I argue that Kant was agnostic as to whether necessity and a priority are co-extensive. I focus on three kinds of modality Kant implicitly distinguishes: formal possibility and necessity, empirical possibility and necessity, and noumenal possibility and necessity. Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience; empirical possibility is (...)
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  13. Nicholas F. Stang (2011). Review: Kant's Thinker. [REVIEW] Notes Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  14. Nicholas F. Stang (2010). Kant's Possibility Proof. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):275-299.
  15. Nicholas Stang (2000). Alexander Nehemas. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 8 (1):24-38.
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