1. Nicola Dimitri & Jan van Eijck, Time Discounting and Time Consistency.
    Time discounting is the phenomenon that a desired result in the future is perceived as less valuable than the same result now. Economic theories can take this psychological fact into account in several ways. In the economic literature the most widely used type of additive time discounting is exponential discounting. In exponential discounting, the fall of valuation depends by a constant factor on the length of the delay period. It is well known, however, that exponential time discounting often does not (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Nicola Dimitri (2009). Dynamic Consistency in Extensive Form Decision Problems. Theory and Decision 66 (4):345-354.
    In a stimulating paper, Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) argued how a decision maker could undertake dynamically inconsistent choices when, in an extensive form decision problem, she has a particular type of imperfect recall named absentmindedness. Such memory limitation obtains whenever information sets include decision histories along the same decision path. Starting from work focusing on the absentminded driver example, and independently developed by Segal (2000) and Dimitri (1999), the main theorem of this article provides a general result of dynamically consistent (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nicola Dimitri (2003). Coordination in an Email Game Without ``Almost Common Knowledge''. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):1-11.
    The paper presents a variation of the EMAIL Game, originally proposed byRubinstein (American Economic Review, 1989), in which coordination ofthe more rewarding-risky joint course of actions is shown to obtain, evenwhen the relevant game is, at most, ``mutual knowledge.'' In the exampleproposed, a mediator is introduced in such a way that two individualsare symmetrically informed, rather than asymmetrically as in Rubinstein,about the game chosen by nature. As long as the message failure probabilityis sufficiently low, with the upper bound being a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation