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Profile: Nicole A Vincent (Delft University of Technology, Georgia State University)
  1. Nicole A. Vincent (forthcoming). A Compatibilist Theory of Legal Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-22.
    Philosophical compatibilism reconciles moral responsibility with determinism, and some neurolaw scholars think that it can also reconcile legal views about responsibility with scientific findings about the neurophysiological basis of human action. Although I too am a compatibilist, this paper argues that philosophical compatibilism cannot be transplanted “as-is” from philosophy into law. Rather, before compatibilism can be re-deployed, it must first be modified to take account of differences between legal and moral responsibility, and between a scientific and a deterministic world view, (...)
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  2. Nicole A. Vincent (ed.) (forthcoming). Legal Responsibility and Neuroscience. OUP.
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  3. Nicole A. Vincent (2014). Neurolaw and Direct Brain Interventions. Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):43-50.
    This issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy contains three papers on a topic of increasing importance within the field of “neurolaw”—namely, the implications for criminal law of direct brain intervention based mind altering techniques (DBI’s). To locate these papers’ topic within a broader context, I begin with an overview of some prominent topics in the field of neurolaw, where possible providing some references to relevant literature. The specific questions asked by the three authors, as well as their answers and central (...)
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  4. Nicole A. Vincent (2014). Restoring Responsibility: Promoting Justice, Therapy and Reform Through Direct Brain Interventions. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):21-42.
    Direct brain intervention based mental capacity restoration techniques—for instance, psycho-active drugs—are sometimes used in criminal cases to promote the aims of justice. For instance, they might be used to restore a person’s competence to stand trial in order to assess the degree of their responsibility for what they did, or to restore their competence for punishment so that we can hold them responsible for it. Some also suggest that such interventions might be used for therapy or reform in criminal legal (...)
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  5. Filippo Santoni de Sio & Nicole A. Vincent (2013). Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will by David Hodgson. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-12.
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  6. Nicole A. Vincent (2013). Blame, Desert and Compatibilist Capacity: A Diachronic Account of Moderateness in Regards to Reasons-Responsiveness. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-17.
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  7. Nicole A. Vincent (2011). Legal Responsibility Adjudication and the Normative Authority of the Mind Sciences. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.
    In the field of ?neurolaw?, reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own moderate suggestions about (...)
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  8. Nicole A. Vincent (2011). Neuroethics & Law Blog. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.
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  9. Nicole A. Vincent, Pim Haselager & Gert-Jan Lokhorst (2011). “The Neuroscience of Responsibility”—Workshop Report. Neuroethics 4 (2):175-178.
    This is a report on the 3-day workshop “The Neuroscience of Responsibility” that was held in the Philosophy Department at Delft University of Technology in The Netherlands during February 11th–13th, 2010. The workshop had 25 participants from The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Canada and Australia, with expertise in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry and law. Its aim was to identify current trends in neurolaw research related specifically to the topic of responsibility, and to foster international collaborative research on this topic. (...)
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  10. Nicole A. Vincent (2010). On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):77-98.
    Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks – at least one for each responsibility concept – (...)
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  11. Nicole A. Vincent (2009). Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments. Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49.
    Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility.
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  12. Nicole A. Vincent (2009). Responsibility: Distinguishing Virtue From Capacity. Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):111-26.
    Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a “capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008:462). However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patently irresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such (...)
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  13. Nicole A. Vincent (2009). What Do You Mean I Should Take Responsibility for My Own Ill Health? Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 1 (1):39-51.
    Luck egalitarians think that considerations of responsibility can excuse departures from strict equality. However critics argue that allowing responsibility to play this role has objectionably harsh consequences. Luck egalitarians usually respond either by explaining why that harshness is not excessive, or by identifying allegedly legitimate exclusions from the default responsibility-tracking rule to tone down that harshness. And in response, critics respectively deny that this harshness is not excessive, or they argue that those exclusions would be ineffective or lacking in justification. (...)
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  14. Nicole A. Vincent (2008). Book Review of "Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice" by Tsachi Keren-Paz. [REVIEW] Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33:199-204.
    In "Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice" (Ashgate, 2007), Tsachi Keren-Paz presents impressingly detailed analysis that bolsters the case in favour of incremental tort law reform. However, although this book's greatest strength is the depth of analysis offered, at the same time supporters of radical law reform proposals may interpret the complexity of the solution that is offered (and its respective cost) as conclusive proof that tort law can only take adequate account of egalitarian aims at an unacceptably high cost.
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  15. Nicole A. Vincent (2008). Responsibility, Dysfunction and Capacity. Neuroethics 1 (3):199-204.
    The way in which we characterize the structural and functional differences between psychopath and normal brains – either as biological disorders or as mere biological differences – can influence our judgments about psychopaths’ responsibility for criminal misconduct. However, Marga Reimer (Neuroethics 1(2):14, 2008) points out that whether our characterization of these differences should be allowed to affect our judgments in this manner “is a difficult and important question that really needs to be addressed before policies regarding responsibility... can be implemented (...)
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  16. Nicole A. Vincent (2007). Responsibility, Compensation and Accident Law Reform. Dissertation, University of Adelaide
    This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort (...)
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  17. Neelke Doorn, Nicole A. Vincent & Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist (2006). International Conference on Moral Responsibility: Neuroscience. Economics and Philosophy 22:409-427.
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  18. Nicole A. Vincent (2006). Equality, Responsibility and Talent Slavery. Imprints 9 (2):118-39.
    Egalitarians must address two questions: i. What should there be an equality of, which concerns the currency of the ‘equalisandum’; and ii. How should this thing be allocated to achieve the so-called equal distribution? A plausible initial composite answer to these two questions is that resources should be allocated in accordance with choice, because this way the resulting distribution of the said equalisandum will ‘track responsibility’ — responsibility will be tracked in the sense that only we will be responsible for (...)
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  19. Nicole A. Vincent (2005). Compensation for Mere Exposure to Risk. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 29:89-101.
    It could be argued that tort law is failing, and arguably an example of this failure is the recent public liability and insurance (‘PL&I’) crisis. A number of solutions have been proposed, but ultimately the chosen solution should address whatever we take to be the cause of this failure. On one account, the PL&I crisis is a result of an unwarranted expansion of the scope of tort law. Proponents of this position sometimes argue that the duty of care owed by (...)
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  20. Nicole A. Vincent (2001). What is at Stake in Taking Responsibility? Lessons From Third-Party Property Insurance. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 20 (1):75-94.
    Third-party property insurance (TPPI) protects insured drivers who accidentally damage an expensive car from the threat of financial ruin. Perhaps more importantly though, TPPI also protects the victims whose losses might otherwise go uncompensated. Ought responsible drivers therefore take out TPPI? This paper begins by enumerating some reasons for why a rational person might believe that they have a moral obligation to take out TPPI. It will be argued that if what is at stake in taking responsibility is the ability (...)
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