18 found
Sort by:
  1. Nigel Pleasants (2010). Moral Argument Is Not Enough. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):159-180.
    Slavery seems to us to be a paradigm of a morally wrong institutionalized practice. And yet for most of its millennia-long historical existence it was typically accepted as a natural, necessary, and inevitable feature of the social world. This widespread normative consensus was only challenged toward the end of the eighteenth century. Then, within a hundred years of the emergence of radical moral criticism of slavery, the existing practices had been dismantled and the institution itself “abolished.” How do we explain (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Nigel Pleasants (2009). Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty. Philosophia 37 (4):669-679.
    In On Certainty, Wittgenstein’s reflections bring into view the phenomenon of basic certainty. He explores this phenomenon mostly in relation to our certainty with regard to empirical states of affairs. Drawing on these seminal observations and reflections, I extend the inquiry into what I call “basic moral certainty”, arguing that the latter plays the same kind of foundational role in our moral practices and judgements as basic empirical certainty does in our epistemic practices and judgements. I illustrate the nature and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nigel Pleasants (2008). Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):96–115.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Nigel Pleasants (2008). Wittgenstein, Ethics and Basic Moral Certainty. Inquiry 51 (3):241 – 267.
    Alice Crary claims that “the standard view of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics” is dominated by “inviolability interpretations”, which often underlie conservative readings of Wittgenstein. Crary says that such interpretations are “especially marked in connection with On Certainty”, where Wittgenstein is represented as holding that “our linguistic practices are immune to rational criticism, or inviolable”. Crary's own conception of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics, which I call the “intrinsically-ethical reading”, derives from the influential New Wittgenstein school (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Nigel Pleasants (2006). Nonsense on Stilts? Wittgenstein, Ethics, and the Lives of Animals. Inquiry 49 (4):314 – 336.
    Wittgenstein is often invoked in philosophical disputes over the ethical justifiability of our treatment of animals. Many protagonists believe that Wittgenstein's philosophy points to a quantum difference between human and animal nature that arises out of humans' linguistic capacity. For this reason - its alleged anthropocentrism - animal liberationists tend to dismiss Wittgenstein's philosophy, whereas, for the same reason, anti-liberationists tend to embrace it. I endorse liberationist moral claims, but think that many on both sides of the dispute fail to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nigel Pleasants (2004). The Concept of Learning From the Study of the Holocaust. History of the Human Sciences 17 (2-3):187-210.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Nigel Pleasants (2003). A Philosophy for the Social Sciences: Realism, Pragmatism, or Neither? [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 8 (1):69-87.
    Philosophers of science seek to discover theessential features of science. Having donethis, these features are then proffered as a`benchmark' against which any putative sciencecan be assessed for its scientificity. Socialscientists, in particular, are much concernedwith achieving the status of genuine science.When considering the status of the socialsciences, philosophers of science also seek todiscern the essential, and differentiating,characteristics of the object of study, namely,social phenomena as such. This paper provides acritical examination of two apparentlydiametrically opposed approaches to philosophyof science, namely, realism (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Nigel Pleasants (2003). Social Criticism for 'Critical Critics'? History of the Human Sciences 16 (4):95-100.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. G. N. Kitching & Nigel Pleasants (eds.) (2002). Marx and Wittgenstein: Knowledge, Morality and Politics. Routledge.
    At first sight, Karl Marx and Ludwig Wittgenstein may well seem to be as different from each other as it is possible for the ideas of two major intellectuals to be. Despite this standard conception, however, a small number of scholars have long suggested that there are deeper philosophical commonalities between Marx and Wittgenstein. They have argued that, once grasped, these commonalities can radically change and enrich understanding both of Marxism and of Wittgensteinian philosophy. This book develops and extends this (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Nigel Pleasants (2002). Rich Egalitarianism, Ordinary Politics, and the Demands of Justice. Inquiry 45 (1):97 – 117.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Nigel Pleasants (2002). Towards a Critical Use of Marx and Wittgenstein. In G. N. Kitching & Nigel Pleasants (eds.), Marx and Wittgenstein: Knowledge, Morality and Politics. Routledge. 35--160.
  12. Nigel Pleasants (2000). Winch and Wittgenstein on Understanding Ourselves Critically: Descriptive Not Metaphysical. Inquiry 43 (3):289 – 317.
    This paper presents an 'internal' criticism of Winch's seminal 'Understanding a Primitive Society'. It distinguishes between two contrasting approaches to critical social understanding: (1) the metaphysical approach, central to the whole tradition of critical philosophy and critical social theory from Kant, through Marx to the Frankfurt School and contemporary theorists such as Habermas and Searle; (2) the descriptive approach, advocated by Winch, and which derives from Wittgenstein's critique of philosophical theory. It is argued, against a long tradition of 'critical theory' (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Nigel Pleasants (2000). Winch, Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory. History of the Human Sciences 13 (1):78-91.
    The received understanding of Winch’s critique of social science is that he propounded a radically relativist, anti-explanatory and a-critical conception of the legitimate task of ‘social studies’. This conception is presumed to be predicated upon an extension of Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy. I argue, against this view, that Winch reads Wittgenstein through a Kantian framework, and that in fact he advanced a rigorously essentialist and universalist picture of ‘social phenomena’. It is Winch’s underlying Kantian metaphysics that has made his ideas (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Nigel Pleasants (1999). Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory: A Critique of Giddens, Habermas, and Bhaskar. Routledge.
    This book uses the philosophy of Wittgenstein as a perspective from which to challenge the idea of a critical social theory, represented pre-eminently by Giddens, Habermas and Bhaskar.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Nigel Pleasants (1997). Free to Act Otherwise? A Wittgensteinian Deconstruction of the Concept of Agency in Contemporary Social and Political Theory. History of the Human Sciences 10 (4):1-28.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Nigel Pleasants (1997). The Epistemological Argument Against Socialism: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Hayek and Giddens. Inquiry 40 (1):23 – 45.
    Hayek's and Mises's argument for the impossibility of socialist planning is once again popular. Their case against socialism is predicated on an account of the nature of knowledge and social interaction. Hayek refined Mises's original argument by developing a philosophical anthropology which depicts individuals as tacitly knowledgeable rule-followers embedded in a 'spontaneous order' of systems of rules. Giddens, whose social theory is informed by his reading of Wittgenstein, has recently added his sociological support to Hayek's 'epistemological argument' against socialism. With (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Nigel Pleasants (1996). Nothing is Concealed: De-Centring Tacit Knowledge and Rules From Social Theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):233–255.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Nigel Pleasants (1996). Review Essays : A Wittgensteinian Social Theory?: Introducing Reflexivity to Marxism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (3):397-416.