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  1. Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (2013). Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke and Matthew H. Slater (Eds) Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axt002.
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  2. Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (2010). Are Psychiatric Kinds Real? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):11-27.
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  3. Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (2010). Introduction. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge.
     
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  4. Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (2010). On the Abuse of the Necessary a Posteriori. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. 159--79.
     
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  5. Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.) (2010). The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge.
    Essentialism--roughly, the view that natural kinds have discrete essences, generating truths that are necessary but knowable only a posteriori --is an increasingly popular view in the metaphysics of science. At the same time, philosophers of language have been subjecting Kripke’s views about the existence and scope of the necessary a posteriori to rigorous analysis and criticism. Essentialists typically appeal to Kripkean semantics to motivate their radical extension of the realm of the necessary a posteriori ; but they rarely attempt to (...)
     
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  6. Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (2010). Descriptivist Reference From Metaphysical Essence. Dialectica 64 (3):419-433.
    Scott Soames (2002) has recently developed and defended strategies for (i) accounting for the meaning of Millian terms, and (ii) extending Kripke's insights from proper names to natural kind terms. In this paper I argue that if we accept these strategies, and their implausible assumptions and consequences, then we can present a novel defence of descriptivism for at least some natural kind terms – those for substances – on that basis. The conclusion, then, will be that there is just no (...)
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