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  1. Nikolaj Nottelmann (forthcoming). Against Overconfidence in Radical A Priori Fallibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  2. Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.) (forthcoming). New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution, and Content.
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  3. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2013). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification: A Reassessment. Synthese 190 (12):2219-2241.
    This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance. The new account takes it departure from William Alston’s influential work. Section 1 argues that a fair account of DCEJ is only achieved by modifying Alston’s account and brings out the crucial difference between DCEJ and the less radical position (...)
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  4. Nikolaj Nottelmann & Rik Peels (2013). Some Metaphysical Implications of a Credible Ethics of Belief. In , New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution, and Content. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Any plausible ethics of belief must respect that normal agents are doxastically blameworthy for their beliefs in a range of non-exotic cases. In this paper, we argue, first, that together with independently motivated principles this constraint leads us to reject occurrentism as a general theory of belief. Second, we must acknowledge not only dormant beliefs, but tacit beliefs as well. Third, a plausible ethics of belief leads us to acknowledge that a difference in propositional content cannot in all contexts count (...)
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  5. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2012). A Critique of Laurence BonJour's Central Arguments for a Priori Fallibilism. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 45:89-105.
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  6. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2012). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Belief-Desire Explanation. Philosophy Compass 7 (1):71-73.
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  7. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2011). Belief-Desire Explanation. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):912-921.
    Theses claiming a constitutive or necessary role for belief-desire pairs in the rationalizing, motivation or explanation of action, are generally known as Humean. The main purpose of this short paper is clearly to present the basic versions of Humeanism and lay bare their commitments and interrelations in preparation for a short general introduction to the debate over belief-desire explanation of action. After this, some influential arguments for and against a Humean account of action explanation are briefly discussed.
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  8. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2008). Introduction. Synthese 161 (3):325-337.
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  9. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2008). The Present and Future State of Epistemic Deontologism. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  10. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2007). All in One, or Almost So: The Contemporary State of a Universal Debate. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):141-146.
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  11. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2006). The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559 - 582.
    An influential version of doxastic voluntarism claims that doxastic events such as belief-formations at least sometimes qualify as actions. William Alston has made a simple response to this claim by arguing on empirical grounds that in normal human agents intentions to form specific beliefs are simply powerless. However, despite Alston’s observation, various authors have insisted that belief-formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even to actions in general. I examine three analogy arguments of (...)
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