PhilPapers is currently in read-only mode while we are performing some maintenance. You can use the site normally except that you cannot sign in. This shouldn't last long.
My own philosophical interests led me to investigate the letter which Smith submitted to The Times, along with eighteen other signatures from renowned philosophers, each objecting to the honorary degree which Cambridge was about to award Jacques Derrida. While Smith's letter has been esteemed for sober defense of philosophy, it has also been viewed as rather notorious by Derrida and postmodern sympathizers. After having contacted Smith at the State University of New York at Buffalo, we agreed to meet and discuss (...) the matter in more detail. What follows are my inquiries, and his account, of his letter to The Times letters page, 9 May, 1992. (shrink)
When Adam Smith published his celebrated writings on economics and moral philosophy he famously referred to the operation of an invisible hand. Adam Smith's Political Philosophy makes visible the invisible hand by examining its significance in Smith's political philosophy and relating it to similar concepts used by other philosophers, revealing a distinctive approach to social theory that stresses the significance of the unintended consequences of human action. This book introduces greater conceptual clarity to the discussion of the invisible hand and (...) the related concept of unintended order in the work of Smith and in political theory more generally. By examining the application of spontaneous order ideas in the work of Smith, Hume, Hayek and Popper, Adam Smith's Political Philosophy traces similarities in approach and from these builds a conceptual, composite model of an invisible hand argument. While setting out a clear model of the idea of spontaneous order the book also builds the case for using the idea of spontaneous order as an explanatory social theory, with chapters on its application in the fields of science, moral philosophy, law and government. (shrink)
John E. Smith has contributed to contemporary philosophy in primarily four distinct capacities; first, as a philosopher of religion and God; second, as an indefatigable defender of philosophical reflection in its classical sense ( a sense inclusive of, but not limited to, metaphysics); third, as a participant in the reconstruction of experience and reason so boldly inaugurated by Hegel then redically transformed by the classical American pragmatists, and significantly augmented by such thinkers as Josiah Royce, william Earnest Hocking, and Alfred (...) North Whitehead; fourth, as an interpreter of philosophical texts and traditions (Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche no less than Charles Peirce, WIlliam James and John Dewey; German idealism as well as American; the Augustinian tradition no less than the pragmatic). Reason, Experience, and God provides an important and comprehensive look at the work of John E. Smith by collected essays which each address aspects of his life-long work. A response by John E. Smith himself draws a line of continuity between the pieces. (shrink)
This book offers a defense of the tensed theory of time, a critique of the New Theory of Reference, and an argument that simultaneity is absolute. Although Smith rejects ordinary language philosophy, he shows how it is possible to argue from the nature of language to the nature of reality. Specifically, he argues that semantic properties of tensed sentences are best explained by the hypothesis that they ascribe to events temporal properties of futurity, presentness, or pastness and do not merely (...) ascribe relations of earlier than or simultaneity. He criticizes the New Theory of Reference, which holds that "now" refers directly to a time and does not ascribe the property of presentness. Smith does not adopt the old or Fregean theory of reference but develops a third alternative, based on his detailed theory of de re and de dicto propositions and a theory of cognitive significance. He concludes the book with a lengthy critique of Einstein's theory of time. Smith offers a positive argument for absolute simultaneity based on his theory that all propositions exist in time. He shows how Einstein's relativist temporal concepts are reducible to a conjunction of absolutist temporal concepts and relativist nontemporal concepts of the observable behavior of light rays, rigid bodies, and the like. (shrink)
The work of Jacques Derrida can be seen to reinvent most theories. In this book Robert Smith offers both a reading of the philosophy of Derrida and an investigation of current theories of autobiography. Smith argues that for Derrida autobiography is not so much subjective self-revelation as relation to the other, not so much a general condition of thought as a general condition of writing - what Derrida calls the 'autobiography of the writing' - which mocks any self-centred finitude of (...) living and dying. In this context, and using literary-critical, philosophical, and psychoanalytical sources, Smith thinks through Derrida's texts in a new, but distinctly Derridean, way, and finds new perspectives to analyse the work of classical writers including Hegel, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Freud, and de Man. (shrink)
Consider a game of blind chess between two chess masters that is recorded in some standard chess notation. The recording is a representation of the game. But what is the game itself? We argue that it a special sort of quasi-abstract pattern, something that is:(i) like abstract entities such as numbers or forms, in that it is both nonphysical and nonpsychological; but at the same time, (ii) through its association with specific players and a specific occasion, tied to time and (...) history. We discover other abstract patterns of this sort especially in the domains of law and commerce. This essay draws on the work in social ontology, we of Hernando de Soto and of John Searle to develop an ontology of the social world based on an analysis of the peculiar interdependence between quasi-abstract patterns and their representations in documents of different sorts. (shrink)
RÉSUMÉ : Afin de circonscrire lescepticisme qui lui paraît miner l'entreprise métaphysique des Lumières, il est apparu nécessaire au Kant de la période critique de répondre à trois formes de scepticisme : au scepticisme baylien, qui s'interroge sur la capacité de la raison à parvenir à définir une vérité en rapport avec les idées de cette même raison; au scepticisme humien, ce qui le conduit à distinguer la question soulevée par Hume de son scepticisme pour parvenir à dégager la possibilité (...) de jugements synthétiques a priori; et au scepticisme cartésien, qui met en jeu le lien entre concepts empiriques et choses du monde extérieur. L,'analyse du traitement qu'il en propose montre que le scepticisme joue un rôle fondamental au sein de l'entreprise critique si bien qu'il peut être considéré comme un allié possible afin de rabattre les prétentions du dogmatisme idéaliste.ABSTRACT: In his critical period, Kant thought that scepticism was a threat to the metaphysical enterprise of Enlightenment. He consequently tried to tackle three of its species: Baylean scepticism, which doubts that reason could establish any truth concerning its ideas; Humean scepticism, which must be distinguished from Hume's formulation of the problem if we want to show that synthetic a priori judgements are possible; and Cartesian scepticism, which puts in doubt the reference of empirical concepts to things in the external world. Kant's treatment reveals the fundamental role played by scepticism in his critical enterprise not only as a tripIe challenge to the critical project, but also as an ally against idealist dogmatism. (shrink)
Toward a Postmodernist View of Conflict of Interest Content Type Journal Article Category Case Studies Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11673-012-9359-x Authors Elise Smith, Doctorat en sciences humaines appliquées, option bioéthique, Programmes de bioéthique, Département de médecine sociale et préventive, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succ. Centre-ville, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 3J7 Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529.
A partir da ideia de que filosofar é duvidar, o artigo examina a relação do ceticismo de Montaigne com o ceticismo antigo. De um lado, mostram-se os elementos do ceticismo antigo de que Montaigne se apropria, como a divisão da filosofia em três seitas e o método cético da oposição. De outro lado, identificam-se as inovações introduzidas por Montaigne nesses mesmos elementos céticos. Finalmente, procura-se mostrar que Montaigne, com o projeto de pintar-se a si mesmo, desenvolveria uma maneira própria de (...) duvidar. Starting from the view that to philosophise is to doubt, this paper compares Montaigne's scepticism to ancient scepticism. On the one hand, it is shown that elements from ancient scepticism are used by Montaigne, such as the division of philosophy in three sects and the sceptical principle of opposition. On the other, the paper focuses on the novelties introduced by Montaigne into these sceptical elements. Finally, it is investigated to what extent Montaigne's project of a self-portrait allows him to develop a new kind of doubt. (shrink)
Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, both (...) the feeling and the yawning are effects of an underlying neural state. (shrink)
This collection of essays on the social history of disciplinary practices in education in North America, Northern Europe, and Colonial Bengal coverage upon an understanding that schools regulate the behavior of beliefs of students, teachers, and parents by enforcing certain disciplinary social norms.
Frans de Waal’s view that empathy is at the basis of morality directly seems to build on Darwin, who considered sympathy as the crucial instinct. Yet when we look closer, their understanding of the central social instinct differs considerably. De Waal sees our deeply ingrained tendency to sympathize (or rather: empathize) with others as the good side of our morally dualistic nature. For Darwin, sympathizing was not the whole story of the workings of sympathy ; the (selfish) need to receive (...) sympathy played just as central a role in the complex roads from sympathy to morality. Darwin’s understanding of sympathy stems from Adam Smith, who argued that the presence of morally impure motives should not be a reason for cynicism about morality. I suggest that De Waal’s approach could benefit from a more thorough alignment with the analysis of the workings of sympathy in the work of Darwin and Adam Smith. (shrink)
O presente artigo intenta perquirir o pensamento do abade e místico medieval Joaquim de Fiore (1132-1202), no que tange a concepção escatológica. O abade cisterciense e filósofo místico, defensor do milenarismo e do advento da idade do Espírito Santo deu origem a diversos movimentos filosóficos, com destaque para os joaquimitas. Seu pensamento foi combatido por Tomás de Aquino e condenado pelo Concílio de Laterão de 1215. Partindo de uma releitura dos escritos de Joaquim de Fiore (Liber Concordiae Novi ac Veteris (...) Testamenti, Expositio in Apocalipsim e Psalterium Decem Chordarum) buscar-se-á ponderar o contributo de seu pensamento, a teologia como história trinitário-escatológica. O abade calabrês sente-se autorizado a superar o absolutismo crístico, favorecendo uma concepção mais trinitária da história com acentos escatológicos e apocalípticos. Por fim, o artigo busca contribuir positivamente no retorno aos escritos joaquinistas que muito podem contribuir para a teologia como história humano-Trintária. (shrink)
In his book The Moral Problem and in a recent issue of this journal, Michael Smith claims to refute any theory which construes the relationship between moral judgements and motivation as contingent and rationally optional. Smith’s argument fails. In showing how it fails, I shall make three claims. First, a concern for what is right, where this is read de dicto, does not amount to moral fetishism. Second, it is not always morally preferable to care about what is right, where (...) this is read de re. Third, the externalist can account for why a good and strong-willed person is reliably motivated in accordance with her moral judgements without appealing to a basic moral motive to do what is right, where this is read de dicto. (shrink)
In The Moral Problem Michael Smith presents what he claims is a decisive argument against moral externalism. Smith's claims that (i) moral externalists are committed to explain the connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation in terms of de dicto desires, and (ii) de dicto desires to perform moral acts amounts to moral fetishism. The argument is spelled out and the difference between desires de dicto and desires de re explained. The tenability of the fetishist argument (as it has been (...) named) is then questioned by focusing on the second clause; contrary to what Smith seems to think, it seems a plausible description of a good moral person that she is often motivated by both kinds of desires and, moreover, there are ways of being motivated to perform moral acts solely by de dicto desires that would not amount to moral fetishism. Lastly, two cases are suggested where being motivated by de dicto desires to perform moral acts would be reasonable as well as morally preferable. Internalists then, should also provide room for de dicto desires in moral motivation.The upshot is that the fetishist argument is unconvincing, though no attempt is made to defend moral externalism in general. (shrink)
Adam Smith’s account of sympathy or ‘fellow feeling’ has recently become exceedingly popular. It has been used as an antecedent of the concept of simulation: understanding, or attributing mental states to, other people by means of simulating them. It has also been singled out as the first correct account of empathy. Finally, to make things even more complicated, some of Smith’s examples for sympathy or ‘fellow feeling’ have been used as the earliest expression of emotional contagion. The aim of the (...) paper is to suggest a new interpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy and point out that on this interpretation some of the contemporary uses of this concept, as a precursor of simulation and empathy, are misleading. My main claim is that Smith's concept of sympathy, unlike simulation and empathy, does not imply any correspondence between the mental states of the sympathizer and of the person she is sympathizing with. (shrink)
O texto pretende discutir a maneira como Foucault trabalha o problema da constituição do sujeito do cuidado de si – tema que tomou conta de seus últimos livros, cursos, entrevistas e conferências. A problematização deste sujeito e das “técnicas de si” que o constitui surgem na obra do autor a partir do momento em que Foucault reorienta as suas pesquisas sobre as relações de poder ao final dos anos 70, dando início às investigações sobre as formas de governar (governo dos (...) outros). Procura-se mostrar que o deslocamento operado pelo autor passa necessariamente por uma problematização das condições de possibilidade a partir das quais as relações de poder, em sua modalidade de “ações sobre ações”, tornam-se possíveis. A liberdade como condição de possibilidade das relações de poder surge na obra de Foucault ao mesmo tempo em que a investigação sobre as “técnicas de si” descortinam a formação de sujeitos éticos. (shrink)
En 1931, Rudolf Carnap publicó un artículo titulado "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" donde calificaba algunas expresiones de la conferencia de Martin Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?", como 'sinsentidos'. Distinguía así entre expresiones (enunciados) 'con' y 'sin' sentido. Denunció que las que violaran el criterio empirista de significado serían del segundo tipo: 'pseudo-expresiones'. Sin embargo, Carnap reconocía desconocer la fuente exacta de los sinsentidos al comentar que expresaban algo, pero 'como lo hace un artista'. En 1936, Heidegger (...) reaccionaba explorando el 'como lo hace un artista' de Carnap en una conferencia en Zürich, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", donde distinguía, basado en la 'diferencia ontológica' de Sein und Zeit (1927), entre expresiones (lenguaje) 'de comunicación' y 'del ser'. En 1955, Heidegger fundaría esa distinción en términos de áreas de investigación, 'filosofía' y 'poesía', en la conferencia de Normandia, "Was ist das-die Philosophie?". En ella, Heidegger, no obstante, concluía, al igual que Carnap, no saber cómo distinguirlas, dado que el lenguaje acoge a ambas. Esta disputa por la prioridad entre tipos de expresión continúa en nuestros días (Stove 1991; Smith 1992; Lacoue-Labarthe 2002; Gadenne 2008; y Nef 2009). En este escrito, quisiera contribuir a la controversia ensayando una reconciliación entre lo que llamaré 'la concepción formal del mundo', representada por el realismo lógico, el empirismo lógico y las fenomenologías realista y trascendental, y 'la concepción informal del mundo', representada por la filosofía del lenguaje ordinario, la hermenéutica, la deconstrucción, el contextualismo y la poesía. La conclusión será una eliminación de las prioridades mediante una defensa biológica de la libertad de expresión. Em 1931, Rudolf Carnap publicou um artigo intitulado "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" onde qualificava algumas expressões da conferência de Martin Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?", como 'sem sentido'. Distinguia assim entre expressões (enunciados) 'com' e 'sem' sentido. Denunciou que aquelas expressões que violassem o critério empirista de significado seriam do segundo tipo: 'pseudo-expressões'. Todavia, Carnap reconhecia desconhecer a fonte exata dos sem-sentidos ao comentar que expressavam algo, mas 'como o faz um artista'. Em 1936, Heidegger reagia explorando o 'como o faz um artista' de Carnap em uma conferência em Zürich, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", onde distinguia, baseado na 'diferença ontológica' de Sein und Zeit (1927), entre expressões (linguagem) 'de comunicação' e 'de ser'. Em 1955, Heidegger estabeleceria essa distinção em termos de áreas de investigação, 'filosofia' e 'poesia', na conferência de Normandia, "Was ist das-die Philosophie?". Nela, Heidegger concluia, contudo, do mesmo modo que Carnap, não saber como distingui-las, dado que a linguagem acolhe a ambas. Esta disputa pela prioridade entre tipos de expressão continua en nossos dias (Stove 1991; Smith 1992; Lacoue-Labarthe 2002; Gadenne 2008; y Nef 2009). Neste artigo, gostaria de contribuir à controvérsia procurando uma reconciliação entre o que chamarei 'a concepção formal do mundo', representada pelo realismo lógico, o empirismo lógico e as fenomenologias realista e trascendental, e 'a concepção informal do mundo', representada pela filosofia da linguagem ordinária, a hermenéutica, a desconstrução, o contextualismo e a poesia. A conclusão será uma eliminação das prioridades mediante uma defesa biológica da liberdade de expressão. (shrink)
Análisis de dos testimonios medievales del rito celta de la ‘triple muerte’ en Hispania, donde hasta ahora no se había señalado. La leyenda gallega de Santa Marina de Aguas Santas, en Orense, asocia este rito a una sauna iniciática galaico-lusitana, lo que parece indicar un origen prerromano, mientras que el relato del fijo del rey Alcarás en el Libro de Buen Amor constituye otro ejemplo de literatura celta hispana en el siglo XIV, probablemente llegado a través del círculo artúrico de (...) Merlín, originado en Gales y Bretaña, pero con algún posible influjo persa, que acabó integrado en el imaginario celta hispano. (shrink)
When working with a first-order theory, it is often convenient to use definitions. That is, if ϕ(x) is a first-order formula with the free variables shown, one can introduce a new relation symbol R to abbreviate ϕ, with defining axiom ∀x (R(x) ↔ ϕ(x)). Of course, this definition can later be eliminated from a proof, simply by replacing every instance of R by ϕ. But suppose the proof involves nested definitions, with a sequence of relation symbols R0, . . . (...) , Rk abbreviating formulae ϕ0, . . . , ϕk, where each ϕi may have multiple occurrences of R0, . . . , Ri−1. In that case, the naive elimination procedure described above can yield an exponential increase in the length of the proof. In Section 2, I show that if the underlying theory proves that there are at least two elements in the universe, a more careful translation allows one to eliminate the new definitions with at most a polynomial increase in length. In fact, I will describe an explicit algorithm that can be implemented in polynomial time. The proof is not difficult, but it relies on the assumption that equality is included in the logic. A similar trick has been used by Solovay in simulating iterated definitions efficiently, as discussed in Section 3.2 of [Pudl´ak 1998]. Consequently, the result proved here may be folklore, but to my knowledge it has not appeared in the literature, and it is needed in Section 3. It is also sometimes convenient, in a first-order setting, to introduce Skolem func-. (shrink)
En este trabajo analizaré algunos aspectos filosóficamente relevantes en la disolución del p roblema de la identificación de los números naturales de Benacerraf por parte del estructuralismo de Shapiro. El propósito fundamental consiste en ofrecer tres críticas a la posición de Shapiro –a su concepción sobre el lenguaje, a la caracterización de las estructuras como ante rem y a su concepción dramática de la ontología de la matemática. Algunas de estas críticas se dirigen también al planteo del problema en Benacerraf.
Asumiendo junto con Heidegger que la filosofía es ontología por su objeto y fenomenología por su método, la intención es presentar algunas directrices para la hermenéutica de la poesía mística; específicamente para el Cántico Espiritual. Para ello se realiza una descripción esencial de la poesía, destinada a esclarecer por qué ésta es lo hablado puro, seguida por la caracterización de la poesía mística. Posteriormente se muestra que la inefabilidad de la poesía mística es un rasgo que le pertenece por ser (...) ésta palabra originaria que funda un modo de ser en el mundo, cuyo sentido es la unión entre el hombre y Dios. Por último, atendiendo a las advertencias que San Juan de la Cruz (SJC) hace sobre la interpretación de los textos místicos, se piensa sobre el temple de la conversión como disposición emocional instalado en la cual el hombre comienza la búsqueda del Amado. (shrink)
C’est à partir de deux exemples concrets, celui des employés de banque et des chauffeurs de taxi collectif à Beyrouth que nous nous proposons d’interroger l’« absence » de la question du temps de travail dans les revendications sociales au Liban. Une absence qui serait l’indice de la prégnance d’un autre rapport au temps : on serait en présence de régimes de temporalités hétérogènes les uns aux autres, à la mesure de la fragmentation de la société entre des mondes sociaux (...) où le travail est soumis à des contraintes radicalement opposées. (shrink)
Trata-se de uma investigação sobre a teoria dos primeiros princípios da razão prática na obra de Tomás de Aquino. No centro dessa teoria está o termo “sindérese”, cujo conteúdo foi elaborado nas discussões da filosofia e da teologia medievais, a partir de sua menção na Glosa de Jerônimo a Ezequiel. Tal termo designa um conceito que apresenta um caráter inovador dentro da teoria da ação moral em comparação com a ética aristotélica. Afinal, Tomás de Aquino o entende como o hábito (...) dos primeiros princípios da moral, equivalente ao hábito dos primeiros princípios teóricos de Aristóteles. Dessa forma, o interesse é compreender como o conceito de sindérese é recebido e desenvolvido na filosofia moral de Tomás de Aquino através da análise das três questões tradicionais: de sua natureza, de sua infalibilidade e de sua extinção. (shrink)
Neste artigo defendo que a Teoria da Informação Fortemente Semântica de Floridi (2004) – TIFS – está correta ao assumir a Tese da Veracidade, que por sua vez orienta a definição de informação semântica como “p é informação se e somente se p é constituído por dados bem-formados, com significado e verdadeiros”. Argumento que a teoria não é arbitrária, pois dá conta do desembaraço de conundrums filosóficos importantes, principalmente por evitar o paradoxo de Bar-Hillel e Carnap (1953), que é gerado (...) a partir da teoria clássica da informação semântica. Primeiro é discutido um dos principais resultados da teoria clássica, o de produzir “sentenças muito informativas para serem verdadeiras”. Depois são resumidas as motivações para a elaboração de uma “lógica de estar informado” e é mostrado como o sistema KTB-IL é montado e modelado mantendo-se entre os seus axiomas o da veracidade – K ou A4. Finalmente, a TIFS é examinada e defendida ao mostrar que ela restringe aleticamente a extensão do conceito clássico de informação para evitar problemas com tautologias e contradições. A TIFS oferece uma solução original ao capturar nossas intuições modais a respeito da informatividade como noção básica. (shrink)
À partir d’une étude qualitative comparée en France et au Québec, nous montrons dans cet article que la phase d’intégration des nouvelles recrues aides-soignantes dans les organisations gériatriques françaises et québécoises est une phase complexe d’expérimentation du métier, où elles intègrent des normes collectives de rythmes de travail. Le collectif de travail, par la voix d’une « ancienne », juge de la capacité des nouvelles recrues à respecter ces rythmes et transmet des stratégies de régulation créées localement et indispensables pour (...) répondre aux prescriptions contradictoires. La situation actuelle d’intensification du travail vécue dans les organisations gériatriques françaises et québécoises conduit néanmoins à une fragilisation dangereuse des collectifs, voire à une individualisation du rapport aux enjeux organisationnels. Une telle individualisation peut conduire les nouvelles recrues à subir une souffrance éthique consécutive au fait d’accomplir des actes moralement condamnables pour parvenir à respecter les normes temporelles. (shrink)
Cet article traite de la norme de disponibilité induite par une temporalité marchande et des résistances des employés à une flexibilité maximale. Il s’appuie sur une enquête dans des réseaux de boutiques en France et en Belgique. Nous étudions les principes d’organisation marchande au travers des pratiques managériales d’adaptation au flux marchand et de mise en subordination des salariés par les durées d’emploi. Les enseignes de mode (prêt-à-porter) façonnent un temps marchand dont la rentabilité provient de la concordance entre temps (...) de travail et temps de consommation. L’organisation productive de ces enseignes conduit à placer les managers responsables de ces boutiques dans une fonction de maximisation de la rentabilité des points de vente et à exiger du personnel une disponibilité temporelle flexible. Il en résulte de fortes pressions sur une temporalité personnelle de moins en moins autonome (désarticulations temporelles) mais aussi une opposition à une dépendance permanente au temps imprévisible de la boutique. Cette variabilité du temps de travail entraîne des conduites d’indisponibilité et de défense d’une autonomie temporelle contre le temps marchand. Les résistances ont lieu lors de changements arbitraires des jours de travail ou des horaires ; elles peuvent conduire au refus d’heures supplémentaires ou de passer à temps complet certains mois de l’année. (shrink)
Le conflit social autour de la réforme du régime d'assurance chômage des intermittents du spectacle a été marqué par son intensité et par sa durée. La thèse défendue ici est que la maîtrise du temps constitue l’un des enjeux majeurs de ce conflit. L'affrontement sur le terrain économique de la régulation de l'emploi et de l'industrie culturelle s'est doublé de l'affrontement sur le temps. La question du temps ne se limite pas à la régulation du temps de travail, elle concerne (...) la maîtrise du temps et les « formes de vie » auxquelles les individus aspirent. Les deux plans de l'emploi et du temps ne sont pas exclusifs l’un de l’autre, ils coexistent, mais le conflit autour de la maîtrise du temps est relativement imperceptible. L'objectif de cet article est de lui donner de la visibilité et d'en questionner le sens. (shrink)
Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 O trabalho pretende refletir sobre a concepçáo de justiça política de John Rawls, especificamente no que diz respeito à sua formulaçáo de princípios de economia política que se contraporiam de maneira direta ao liberalismo político e econômico clássicos (John Locke e Adam Smith, respectivamente), mas que também se contraporiam, e essa será a tese perseguida aqui, à posiçáo neoliberal de Hayek.
G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yields (...) counter-examples to deductive closure claims for both epistemic rationality and knowledge that are immune to contextualist pro-closure maneuvers. (shrink)
In this paper I will show some contributions from Averroes around some issues related to psychology and medicine. My intention is to establish some relations between the commentaries on De anima and the medical treatises. The itinerary is the following: a) I will show that, like Aristotle, Averroes conceives the soul as a set of biological capacities; b) De anima is a biological treatise, so there we can find some considerations that must be understood from a medical point of view, (...) specially, from the Arabic contributions on Anatomy. It is necessary, then, to point out the importance of the nerves and the brain to understand the narrow relation between the De anima and the Book of Medicine. We will find that Averroes does not understand the soul as a 'spiritual principle' but like something generated that makes possible several biological functions, from the vegetative and the sensitive to the intellectual ones. So, Averroes denies the Neoplatonic conception of the soul as something separated from the body. Averroes explains that the soul is the concretion of the biological process denominated "life". KEY WORDS – Averroes. Aristotle. De anima. Neoplatonism. Biology. Life. (shrink)
Los estudios especializados sobre la obra de Hans Blumenberg [1920-1996] han prestado poca atención a su historia de la ciencia, en particular a su historia de la astronomía. A partir de 1955 Blumenberg empezó a ocuparse de la astronomía copernicana, y publicó diversos artículos relacionados con esta temática a finales de la década de los 50 y comienzos de los 60, luego recopilados en su Die kopernikanische Wende [1965]. Blumenberg preparó también estudios preliminares al Sidereus Nuncius de Galileo Galilei y (...) al De coniecturis, de Cusa. Todo este trabajo fue culminado en su monumental Die genesis der kopernikanischen Welt [1975], así como en el libro póstumo Die Vollzähligkeit der Sterne [1997]. El propósito de este artículo es tomar en consideración este ámbito específico de la obra de Blumenberg. Nos centraremos en la presencia de algunos motivos heideggerianos en la historia blumenberguiana de la astronomía. Defenderemos que en ella cabe identificar una metafísica de la existencia en sentido heideggeriano, en tanto paradigmas existenciales astronómicos. (shrink)
Este artigo discute a questão da responsabilidade moral em Aristóteles e, especialmente, em Harry Frankfurt e Alexandre de Afrodísia, buscando identificar se a mesma é compatível com o determinismo.
This paper is a discussion of the ‘moralization’ of resentment in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. By moralization, I do not refer to the complex process by which resentment is transformed by the machinations of sympathy, but a prior change in how the ‘raw material’ of the emotion itself is presented. In just over fifty pages, not only Smith’s attitude toward the passion of resentment, but also his very conception of the term, appears to shift dramatically. What is an (...) unpleasant, unsocial and relatively amoral passion of anger in general metamorphoses into a morally and psychologically rich account of a cognitively sharpened, normatively laden attitude, an attitude that contains both the judgment that the injury done to me was unjust and wrongful, and the demand that the offender acknowledge its wrongfulness. Two very different readings of ‘Smithean resentment’ are thus available from the text. Indeed, the notion of two distinct forms of resentment – an instinctive, amoral version and a rich, rationally appraising attitude – would bring Smith into line with an earlier account of resentment, found in Bishop Joseph Butler’s Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel, first published in 1726. Ultimately, I argue, the differences in their theories are to Smith’s credit. It is precisely because the ‘thin’ or generic retaliatory passion described in Part I can be reconciled with the rich, normative attitude in Part II, that Smith is able to accomplish his meta-ethical goal of grounding moral judgments in naturally occurring emotions. (shrink)
L’idée selon laquelle le temps, son organisation, sa discipline est un facteur discriminant permettant de séparer nettement la période industrielle de celle qui la précède a longtemps prévalu chez les historiens. Cet article s’inscrit en faux contre cette thèse : les conflits autour du temps de travail doivent être inscrits dans la longue durée des rapports sociaux de production. Nous dressons ici une esquisse large des conflits où le temps est un élément de la mobilisation des travailleurs, du XIVe au (...) premier XIXe siècle. Alors qu’au Moyen-Âge, certains conflits portent clairement sur la remise en cause de la définition du temps de travail, à partir du XVIIe siècle, le thème semble s’estomper. Mais apparaissent alors des conflits qui portent sur le contenu du travail effectué dans un temps donné. La première industrialisation ne change pas véritablement la nature des revendications. Elles proviennent encore majoritairement d’ouvriers engagés dans des activités traditionnelles. Les ouvriers d’usine, quant à eux, ne sortent globalement pas de leur mutisme avant les décennies 1860/1870. (shrink)
Aristotle’s major work on psychology was De anima. Nevertheless, Parva naturalia, also known as De sensu et sensato, played a prominent role among Arabs and Western thinkers. In the present essay, we aim to show how the Arabic translation of this last work was used by Avicenna, Ibn Bâjjia and, under his influence, by Averroes. In Averroes’s Epitome De Sensu one can notice, for example, that the theoretical principles are Aristotelian, but they are contaminated by the term “spiritual”, which is (...) not used by the Greek philosopher. In the Latin West, Averroes’s reading will have influence on Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. KEY WORDS – Parva naturalia. De anima. Arabic and Western philosophy of mind. Averroes. Spiritual perception. (shrink)
Today philosophical discussion on indicative conditionals is dominated by the so called Lewis Triviality Results, according to which, tehere is no binary connective '-->' (let alone truth-functional) such that the probability of p --> q equals the probability of q conditionally on p, so that P(p --> q)= P(q|p). This tenet, that suggests that conditonals lack truth-values, has been challenged in 1991 by Goodman et al. who show that using a suitable three-valued logic the above equation may be restored. In (...) this paper it is first analysed a long neglected paper by Bruno de Finetti, written in 1935, where the essentials of Goodman's theory was clearly outlined. It is also stressed that de Finetti anticipated Kleene's as well as Bochvar and Blamey ideas. In the second part of the paper it is argued that the de Finetti-Goodman's original theory is defective and leads to absurd results. However, a new semantics, called semantics of hypervaluations, is here defined, that avoids the defects of the original theory. This appears to be a powerful challenge to Lewis Triviality results and to the thesis by which conditionals lack truth-values as well. (shrink)
Agustín Serrano de Haro edita y presenta en el volumen colectivo Cuerpo vivido una selección de textos memorables en torno a lo que en 1925 fue denominado programáticamente por Ortega y Gasset una “topografía de nuestra intimidad”. La reflexión fenomenológica acerca del intracuerpo fue un tema que ha preocupado y preocupa de manera notoria a los filósofos cuyos trabajos reúne este colectivo: Ortega y Gasset, José Gaos, Joaquín Xirau, Leopoldo-Eulogio Palacios y Agustín Serrano de Haro. Pese a ello, tal vez (...) no sea tan conocido de todos nosotros el hecho de que las investigaciones filosóficas acerca del cuerpo humano (siempre sentido por uno mismo y reconocido por otros de modo intransferible) resultaron ser contribuciones pioneras y anticipaciones preclaras del tema actual del cuerpo y la corporalidad. (shrink)
The platonic ideas attribution into God’s mind creates a problem, namely: how to speak about “divine attributes” without put multiplicity into the divine simple substance? From this problem, this paper aims to show how Luis de Léon is between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.
Dans sa Théorie des sentiments moraux (1759), Adam Smith classe les passions en trois catégories : passions sociales, asociales, égoïstes. Cette classification résulte directement de leur capacité à susciter ou non la sympathie. Les passions sociales apparaissent ainsi comme les plus propres à susciter un écho sympathique. La question à laquelle tente de répondre l'article est de savoir pourquoi ces mêmes passions sociales sont qualifiées par A. Smith de « naturellement musicales ». L'utilisation du concept de sympathie dans le domaine (...) musical est fréquente aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles, mais l'hypothèse avancée ici est que le lien est plus profond chez A. Smith. La sympathie met en effet en évidence une qualité d'ordre à la fois esthétique et morale inhérente à certaines passions, leur « convenance » (propriety) par opposition aux passions « discordantes ». Ces passions, produisant une superposition d'échos sympathiques comparables aux harmoniques d'un ton fondamental, sont les plus susceptibles d'être imitées par la musique, si l'on tient compte de la théorie esthétique originale formulée par A. Smith, pour qui la beauté des arts imitatifs ne tient pas à l'illusion mais au contraire à l'écart entre l'imitation et son objet. (shrink)
En este trabajo se estudia la sugerente posición de algunos pensadores que constituyen una excepción en la historia de la filosofía respecto de la interpretación del intelecto agente, el gran hallazgo aristotélico: Francisco Canals, Leonardo Polo y sus discípulos, pues lo emplazan a nivel de “ac tus essendi hominis ”.
Marsílio de Pádua foi um pensador da Idade Média que escreveu duas obras de filosofia política que influenciaram a modernidade. Este estudo analisa o capítulo 17 da primeira parte do Defensor Pacis, onde se trata da unidade do governo ou do principado. Se houver muitos em número ou espécie, tal como acontece nas grandes cidades e, em particular, em um reino, aí deve haver então um supremo governante, a quem os demais estejam subordinados e por quem sejam dirigidos. Trata-se de (...) uma unidade de ordem, não de uma unidade absoluta, ou seja, de muitos homens considerados ou de um conjunto de pessoas, que se afirma constituir algo único quantitativa- mente. (shrink)
This article intends to argue that Francisco de Vitoria’s conception of the Spanish Conquest of America is based upon notions that stem from various sources of the 14th and 15th Century. One of his most important source is the Opus septipertitum de contractibus, written by the German theologian Conradus Summenhart, whom Vitoria quotes frequently. By comparing both thinkers it can be shown that Vitoria’s basic terminology concerning rights and dominion is in greatly indebted to Summenhart’s account.
Uno de los fenómenos característicos de la sociedad española, a partir del año simbólico de 1492, es la progresiva adopción de los estatutos de pureza de sangre por parte de diversas administraciones. La Compañía de Jesús, sin embargo, se negó durante casi todo el siglo XVI a aplicar estos estatutos, alegando para ello la voluntad expresada en tal sentido por el mismo Ignacio de Loyola. Sin embargo, en 1593 la Quinta Congregación General decide implantar el examen de pureza para el (...) ingreso en los Colegios de la Compañía. Este artículo describe la tenaz oposición que contra esta decisión realizó el jesuita español Pedro de Ribadeneyra, de origen judío, en una serie de cartas dirigidas al entonces General, Claudio Aquaviva. Asimismo, contextualiza la polémica jesuita en torno a los estatutos de pureza de sangre dentro del giro que la Compañía realiza tras el ascenso al generalato de Everardo Mercuriano y, después, con Aquaviva, y cuya principal característica es el alejamiento de los conversos de los puestos de poder. (shrink)
Ce texte propose une analyse des mécanismes argumentatifs mis en œuvre dans les lettres que Hernán Cortés, conquistador du Mexique, a adressées à Charles V (Cartas de Relación) pour légitimer sa conquête du territoire qui deviendra la Nouvelle Espagne et, par ce biais, le Nouveau Monde. Il s’agit en particulier de montrer l’emploi du concept rhétorique d’inventio dans le passage d’une appropriation conceptuelle du « Nouveau Monde » (par l’élaboration de ce concept) à sa domination territoriale (la fondation de Veracruz (...) et la création de la Nouvelle Espagne). (shrink)
Au XVIe siècle, le Saint Empire romain de nation allemande constitue un ensemble politique complexe, caractérisé par un système à plusieurs niveaux de représentation politique et par l’existence de multiples États placés sous l’autorité impériale. L’étude des cartes et des descriptions géographiques de l’espace germanique produites à cette période met au jour la compréhension qu’avaient les contemporains des formes de souveraineté existant dans l’Empire et ses territoires. Elle montre notamment que le pouvoir impérial, à la différence des pouvoirs territoriaux, n’était (...) pas conçu au premier chef comme une forme d’autorité s’exerçant sur un espace, mais comme une entité juridique et institutionnelle chargée d’assurer le fonctionnement politique et l’unité de l’Empire. (shrink)
Ce texte propose une analyse des mécanismes argumentatifs mis en œuvre dans les lettres que Hernán Cortés, conquistador du Mexique, a adressées à Charles V (Cartas de Relación) pour légitimer sa conquête du territoire qui deviendra la Nouvelle Espagne et, par ce biais, le Nouveau Monde. Il s’agit en particulier de montrer l’emploi du concept rhétorique d’inventio dans le passage d’une appropriation conceptuelle du « Nouveau Monde » (par l’élaboration de ce concept) à sa domination territoriale (la fondation de Veracruz (...) et la création de la Nouvelle Espagne). (shrink)
We investigate the validity of the field explanation of the wave function by analyzing the mass and charge density distributions of a quantum system. It is argued that a charged quantum system has effective mass and charge density distributing in space, proportional to the square of the absolute value of its wave function. This is also a consequence of protective measurement. If the wave function is a physical field, then the mass and charge density will be distributed in space simultaneously (...) for a charged quantum system, and thus there will exist a remarkable electrostatic self-interaction of its wave function, though the gravitational self-interaction is too weak to be detected presently. This not only violates the superposition principle of quantum mechanics but also contradicts experimental observations. Thus we conclude that the wave function cannot be a description of a physical field. In the second part of this paper, we further analyze the implications of these results for the main realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics, especially for de Broglie-Bohm theory. It has been argued that de Broglie-Bohm theory gives the same predictions as quantum mechanics by means of quantum equilibrium hypothesis. However, this equivalence is based on the premise that the wave function, regarded as a Ψ-field, has no mass and charge density distributions, which turns out to be wrong according to the above results. For a charged quantum system, both Ψ-field and Bohmian particle have charge density distribution. This then results in the existence of an electrostatic self-interaction of the field and an electromagnetic interaction between the field and Bohmian particle, which contradicts both the predictions of quantum mechanics and experimental observations. Therefore, de Broglie-Bohm theory as a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is probably wrong. Lastly, we suggest that the wave function is a description of some sort of ergodic motion (e.g. random discontinuous motion) of particles, and we also briefly analyze the implications of this suggestion for other realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics including many-worlds interpretation and dynamical collapse theories. (shrink)
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.
In this paper I consider Saul Kripke’s famous Humphrey objection to David Lewis’s views on de re modality and argue that responses to this objection currently on the market fail to mitigate its force in any significant way.
This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de (...) re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by special ‘ de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)
De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont (...) uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented. (shrink)
In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief among (...) which is its characterization of transitions from first potentiality to first actuality, e.g., learning, not as `ordinary', but rather as acquisitions of natural dispositions or faculties. (shrink)
John Campbell proposed a so-called simple view of colours according to which colours are categorical properties of the surfaces of objects just as they normally appear to be. I raised an invertion problem for Campbell's view according to which the senses of colour terms fail to match their references, thus rendering those terms meaningless—or so I claimed. Gabriele de Anna defended Campbell's view against my example by contesting two points in particular. Firstly, de Anna claimed that there is no special (...) problem here for the simple view of colours, a similar invertion story could apply to primary qualities terms for shapes. Secondly, de Anna purported to give an account of the senses and references of colour terms in my invertion story which renders the senses and references of those terms mutually consistent. In this paper I contested both of de Anna's claims. Regarding the first, I argue that his imagined invertion of apparent shapes is not epistemically stable, in contrast to the invertion of apparent shapes is not epistemically stable, in contrast to the invertion of apparent colours. Hence the victims of apparently inverted shapes would be able to discover the mismatch of senses and refences of their shape terms, in contrast to the victims of apparent invertions of colours. Regarding the second, I argue that de Anna's account of the victim's colour terms itself uses and not merely mentions so-called colours terms. Hence de Anna' account of them is itself meaningless due to a mismatch of sense and reference. So I conclude that my objection to Campbell's simple view of colours stands. (shrink)
In his recent article, ‘Lottery puzzles and Jesus’ return’, Donald Smith says that Christians should accept a very robust scepticism about the future because a Christian ought to think that the probability of Jesus’ return happening at any future moment is inscrutable to her. But I think that Smith’s argument lacks the power rationally to persuade Christians who are antecedently uncommitted as to whether or not we can or do have any substantive knowledge about the future. Moreover, I think that (...) Christians who are so antecedently uncommitted have available objections they can reasonably press against Smith’s arguments. In the article, I attempt to bring out these objections. (shrink)
ABSTRACT: In this paper I show that, contrary to the prevalent view, in his De Interpretatione chapter 8, Aristotle is concerned with a kind of ambiguity, i.e. with homonymy; more precisely, with homonymy of linguistic expressions as it may occur in dialectical argument. The paper has two parts. In the first part, I argue that in the Sophistici Elenchi 175b39-176a5 Aristotle indubitably deals with homonymy in dialectical argument; that De Interpretatione 8 is a parallel to Sophistici Elenchi 175b39-176a5; that De (...) Interpretatione 8 is concerned with dialectical argument; that, hence, De Interpretatione 8, too, deals with homonymy in dialectical argument. In the second part I discuss objections that have been put forward against the view that De Interpretatione 8 is about homonymy and demonstrate that they do not succeed. (shrink)
It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered.
The second chapter of book three of the De anima marks the end of Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception. The chapter is a long one and apparently rambling in subject matter. It begins with a passage that is usually taken as a discussion of some sort of self-awareness, particularly awareness that one is perceiving, although such an interpretation raises some difficulties. This paper reconsiders the problems raised by supposing that the question discussed in the first paragraph is ‘how do we perceive (...) that we perceive?’, and suggests an alternative interpretation which would solve many of the difficulties and have the additional merit of restoring unity to the sequence of notes which go to make up the whole chapter. (shrink)
ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...) explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)
In their review essay (published in this issue), Looren de Jong and Schouten take my 2003 book to task for (among other things) neglecting to keep up with the latest developments in my favorite scientific case study (memory consolidation). They claim that these developments have been guided by psychological theorizing and have replaced neurobiology's traditional 'static' view of consolidation with a 'dynamic' alternative. This shows that my 'essential but entirely heuristic' treatment of higher-level cognitive theorizing is a mistaken view of (...) actual scientific practice. In response I contend that, on the contrary, a closer look at the memory reconsolidation following reactivation experiments and data suggests (1) a less revolutionary judgment about the proposed alternative, and (2) a now-complete reliance on ruthlessly reductive experimental methods from cellular and molecular neuroscience. These conclusions save the heuristic status I propose for higher-level investigations of behavior and brain. I close with a brief comment on their further charge that I 'sell out' philosophy of science to factual developments in science itself. (shrink)
Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: (1) a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; (2) a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; (3) a version (...) formed by the assimilation of (2) to (1), labelled the ‘standard’ version’ by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and (4) Brickhouse and Smith’s own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith’s handling of the ‘appetites and passions’, which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation (4). Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith’s defence of ‘Socratic studies’ in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of ‘the philosophy of Socrates’. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of ‘Socratic studies’, is how different Brickhouse and Smith’s Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-‘Socratic’ dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith’s interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its ‘Platonic’ counterpart—as that is currently understood—than it is on the interpretation(s) they oppose. (shrink)
