20 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Nishi Shah [19]Nishiten Shah [1]
  1. Nishi Shah, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 4 (October 2004).
    George, feeling stressed and anxious about the criminal investigation into his firm’s accounting practices, decides that it would do him good to get away and take a long, relaxing vacation in Bermuda. According to popular informed-desire accounts of a person’s good, if George would desire to take a vacation to Bermuda upon being made fully aware of what his experience of the vacation would be like and of all the consequences therein, then this course of action would benefit him. This (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Nishiten Shah, Research Overview.
    Tom has mounting evidence that he has incurable cancer, but he also believes that he would be happier, regardless of the truth, were he to believe that he is healthy. W.K.Clifford, who famously claimed, “It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence,” would, depending upon the sufficiency of Tom’s evidence, direct him to believe that he has incurable cancer, no matter the results for his happiness. The legendary pragmatist William James, on the other hand, (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah (forthcoming). Metaethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Moral Constructivism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.
    The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and between (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Nishi Shah & Katia Vavova (2014). Review: Hilary Kornblith, On Reflection. [REVIEW] Ethics 124 (3):632-636,.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Nishi Shah (2013). Why We Reason the Way We Do. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nishi Shah & Matthew Silverstein (2013). Reasoning in Stages. Ethics 124 (1):101-113.
    Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Matthew Evans & Nishi Shah (2012). Mental Agency and Metaethics. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:80-109.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Nishi Shah (2011). Can Reasons for Belief Be Debunked? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Nishi Shah (2010). The Limits of Normative Detachment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):347-371.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Nishi Shah (2009). The Normativity of Belief and Self-Fulfilling Normative Beliefs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):189-212.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Nishi Shah (2008). How Action Governs Intention. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (5):1-19.
    Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah (2006). Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1. Clarendon Press. 265-94.
    Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. Our (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of "the Will to Believe&Quot;. Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.
    We argue that an expressivist interpretation of "The Will to Believe" provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely-read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are "only expressions of our passional life". Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently-defended expressivism. James (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
    When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Nishi Shah & Jeffrey Kasser (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of “The Will to Believe”. Social Epistemology 20 (1):1-17.
    Taylor and Francis Ltd TSEP_A_151217.sgm..
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497 - 534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true---or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
    Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Nishi Shah (2002). Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism. The Monist 85 (3):436-445.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation