8 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Nivedita Gangopadhyay (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
  1. Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2014). Introduction: Embodiment and Empathy, Current Debates in Social Cognition. Topoi 33 (1):117-127.
    This special issue targets two topics in social cognition that appear to increasingly structure the nature of interdisciplinary discourse but are themselves not very well understood. These are the notions of empathy and embodiment. Both have a history rooted in phenomenological philosophy and both have found extensive application in contemporary interdisciplinary theories of social cognition, at times to establish claims that are arguably contrary to the ones made by the phenomenologists credited with giving us these notions. But this special issue (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara (2014). Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Vivian Bohl & Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2013). Theory of Mind and the Unobservability of Other Minds. Philosophical Explorations (2):1-20.
    The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt & Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2013). Sensorimotor Intentionality. Developmental Review 33 (4):399-425.
    Efficient prospective motor control, evident in human activity from birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and pre-conceptual nature that we identify here as sensorimotor intentionality. We identify a structural continuity between the emergence of this earliest form of prospective movement and the structure of mental states as intentional or content-directed in more advanced forms. We base our proposal on motor control studies, from foetal observations through infancy. These studies reveal movements are guided by anticipations of future effects, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Riccardo Fusaroli, Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Kristian Tylén (2013). The Dialogically Extended Mind: Language as Skilful Intersubjective Engagement. Cognitive Systems Research.
    A growing conceptual and empirical literature is advancing the idea that language extends our cognitive skills. One of the most influential positions holds that language – qua material symbols – facilitates individual thought processes by virtue of its material properties (Clark, 2006a). Extending upon this model, we argue that language enhances our cognitive capabilities in a much more radical way: the skilful engagement of public material symbols facilitates evolutionarily unprecedented modes of collective perception, action and reasoning (interpersonal synergies) creating dialogically (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2011). The Extended Mind: Born to Be Wild? A Lesson From Action-Understanding. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
    The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.) (2010). Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    Machine generated contents note: -- 1. Introduction -- Consciousness and Sensorimotor Dynamics: Methodological Issues -- 2. Computational consciousness, D. Ballard -- 3. Explaining what people say about sensory qualia, J. Kevin O'Regan -- 4. Perception, action, and experience: unraveling the golden braid, A. Clark -- The Two-Visual Systems Hypothesis -- 5. Cortical visual systems for perception and action, A.D. Milner and M.A. Goodale -- 6. Hermann Lotze's Theory of 'Local Sign': evidence from pointing responses in an illusory figure, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Julian Kiverstein (2009). Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action. Topoi 28 (1):63-73.
    This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation