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Profile: Noa Latham (University of Calgary)
  1. Noa Latham (2011). Are Fundamental Laws Necessary or Contingent? In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. MIT Press. 97.
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  2. Noa Latham (2006). Three Compatible Theories of Desire. Dialogue 45 (1):131-138.
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  3. Noa Latham (2004). Determinism, Randomness, and Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
    What values, if any, would be undermined by determinism?[i] Traditionally this question has been tackled by asking whether determinism is compatible with free will or whether it is compatible with moral responsibility. Compatibilists say that determinism would not threaten free will or moral responsibility, and hence that people’s values should not be influenced by whether or not they believe in determinism. Incompatibilists say that determinism would undermine free will or moral responsibility, and hence that a belief in determinism should have (...)
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  4. Noa Latham (2003). Are There Any Nonmotivating Reasons for Action? In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 273.
    When performing an action of a certain kind, an agent typically has se- veral reasons for doing so. I shall borrow Davidson’s term and call these rationalising reasons (Davidson 1963, 3). These are reasons that allow us to understand what the agent regarded as favourable features of such an action. (There will also be reasons against acting, expressing unfavour- able features of such an action, from the agent’s point of view.) I shall say that R is a rationalising reason of (...)
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  5. Noa Latham (2003). What is Token Physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
    The distinction between token and type physicalism is a familiar feature of discussion of psychophysical relations. Token physicalism, or ontological physicalism, is the view that every token, or particular, in the spatiotemporal world is a physical particular. It is contrasted with type physicalism, or property physicalism -- the view that every first-order type, or property, instantiated in the spatiotemporal world is a physical property. Token physicalism is commonly viewed as a clear thesis, strictly weaker than property physicalism, strictly stronger than (...)
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  6. Noa Latham (2002). Spatiotemporal and Spatial Particulars. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-35.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a classification of particulars in terms of their relations to spatiotemporal and spatial regions. It begins with an examination of spatiotemporal particulars, and then explores the extent to which a parallel account can be offered of continuants, or spatial particulars that can endure and change over time, assuming such particulars exist. For every spatial particular there are spatiotemporal particulars that can be described as its life and parts thereof. But not every time-slice (...)
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  7. Noa Latham (2001). Substance Physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  8. Noa Latham (1999). Cdd: 12j. 5 the Relevance of Libertarian Freedom. Manuscrito 22:173.
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  9. Noa Latham (1999). Davidson and Kim on Psychophysical Laws. Synthese 118 (2):121-44.
    Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But (...)
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  10. Noa Latham (1998). Chalmers on the Addition of Consciousness to the Physical World. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):71-97.
  11. Noa Latham (1994). Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Action Solely From the Motive of Duty. Journal of Philosophy 91 (11):599-618.
    My concern in part I of this paper is with how to make sense of the position that one can have reasons both of duty and inclination for an action one performs but be motivated solely by duty, and more generally that one can have several reasons for an action one performs but be motivated only by some of them. I examine a number of ways of attempting to do this, most of them independent of the Kantian context, and argue (...)
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  12. Noa Latham (1987). Singular Causal Statements and Strict Deterministic Laws. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68:29-43.
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