Search results for 'Non reductive machine consciousness' (try it on Scholar)

999 found
Sort by:
  1. Nicholas Boltuc & Peter Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. AAAI Press, Merlo Park, CA.score: 510.0
    We should eventually understand how exactly first person phenomenal consciousness is generated. When we do, we should be able to enginner one for robots. This is the engineering thesis in machine consciousness.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Liam Dempsey & Itay Shani (2009). Dynamical Agents: Consciousness, Causation, and Two Specters of Epiphenomenalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):225-243.score: 283.5
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Piotr Boltuc (2012). The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (2):187-207.score: 276.0
    I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. James B. Miller (2012). Haunted by the Ghost in the Machine. Commentary on “The Spirituality of Human Consciousness: A Catholic Evaluation of Some Current Neuro-Scientific Interpretations”. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):503-507.score: 252.0
    Metaphysical and epistemological dualism informs much contemporary discussion of the relationships of science and religion, in particular in relation to the neurosciences and the religious understanding of the human person. This dualism is a foundational artifact of modern culture; however, contemporary scientific research and historical theological scholarship encourage a more holistic view wherein human personhood is most fittingly understood as an emergent phenomenon of, but not simply reducible to, evolutionary and developmental neurobiology.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. J. C. Nyíri (forthcoming). Wittgenstein and the Problem of Machine Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 33:375-394.score: 207.0
    For any given society, its particular technology of communication has far-reaching consequences, not merely as regards social organization, but on the epistemic level as well. Plato's name-theory of meaning represents the transition from the age of primary orality to that of literacy; Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning stands for the transition from the age of literacy to that of a second orality (audiovisual communication, electronic information processing). On the basis of a use-theory of meaning the problem of machine consciousness, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Susan A. J. Stuart (2011). Enkinaesthesia: The Fundamental Challenge for Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):145-162.score: 189.0
    In this short paper I will introduce an idea which, I will argue, presents a fundamental additional challenge to the machine consciousness community. The idea takes the questions surrounding phenomenology, qualia and phenomenality one step further into the realm of intersubjectivity but with a twist, and the twist is this: that an agent’s intersubjective experience is deeply felt and necessarily co-affective; it is enkinaesthetic, and only through enkinaesthetic awareness can we establish the affective enfolding which enables first the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. E. Diaz-Leon (2011). Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.score: 184.5
    In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Susan Schneider (2012). Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.score: 175.5
    I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Roberto Cordeschi (2010). Which Kind of Machine Consciousness? International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):31-33.score: 168.0
    Aaron Sloman remarks that a lot of present disputes on consciousness are usually based, on the one hand, on re-inventing “ideas that have been previously discussed at lenght by others”, on the other hand, on debating “unresolvable” issues, such as that about which animals have phenomenal consciousness. For what it’s worth I would make a couple of examples, which are related to certain topics that Sloman deals with in his paper, and that might be useful for introducing some (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.score: 166.5
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jessica M. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.score: 162.0
    Some claim that Non-reductive Physicalism (NRP) is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism (contra Non-reduction ), or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety (contra Physicalism ). I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jessica M. Wilson (2011). Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy. The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.score: 162.0
    I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers' (first introduced in Wilson 1999). In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2012). MachineConsciousness and “Artificial” Thought: An Operational Architectonics Model Guided Approach. Brain Research 1428:80-92.score: 162.0
    Instead of using low-level neurophysiology mimicking and exploratory programming methods commonly used in the machine consciousness field, the hierarchical Operational Architectonics (OA) framework of brain and mind functioning proposes an alternative conceptual-theoretical framework as a new direction in the area of model-driven machine (robot) consciousness engineering. The unified brain-mind theoretical OA model explicitly captures (though in an informal way) the basic essence of brain functional architecture, which indeed constitutes a theory of consciousness. The OA describes (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael Baumgartner (2013). Rendering Interventionism and Non‐Reductive Physicalism Compatible. Dialectica 67 (1):1-27.score: 162.0
    In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an ‘interventionist turn’. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of non-reducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventionist exclusion argument showing that interventionism is in fact incompatible with non-reductive physicalism. In response, a number of revised versions of interventionism have been suggested that are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Daniel Lim (2014). Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.score: 162.0
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience argument (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Alex Hankey (2014). Complexity Biology-Based Information Structures Can Explain Subjectivity, Objective Reduction of Wave Packets, and Non-Computability. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 10 (1):237-250.score: 145.5
    Background: how mind functions is subject to continuing scientific discussion. A simplistic approach says that, since no convincing way has been found to model subjective experience, mind cannot exist. A second holds that, since mind cannot be described by classical physics, it must be described by quantum physics. Another perspective concerns mind's hypothesized ability to interact with the world of quanta: it should be responsible for reduction of quantum wave packets; physics producing ‘Objective Reduction' is postulated to form the basis (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Piotr Boltuc (2009). The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):155-176.score: 144.0
    The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess' (like in Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness). Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Daniel D. Hutto (1998). An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (3):328-43.score: 139.5
    This paper distinguishes three conceptual problems that attend philosophical accounts of consciousness. The first concerns the problem of properly characterizing the nature of consciousness itself, the second is the problem of making intelligible the relation between consciousness and the ‘physical’, and the third is the problem of creating the intellectual space for a shift in philosophical framework that would enable us to deal adequately with the first two problems. It is claimed that physicalism, in both its (...) and non-reductive forms, fails to deal adequately with either the first or second problem. The diagnosis of this failure is connected to the fact that consciousness cannot be treated in its own terms while being simultaneously fitted into an object-based conceptual schema. In light of this, it is proposed that a Bradleian version of absolute idealism may provide a metaphysical and epistemological framework which would enable us to recognize the conceptual diversity required to treat conscious phenomena on their own terms without forcing us to abandon naturalism. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Catherine Legg (2004). Review of Holland (Ed.) "Machine Consciousness&Quot;. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Reviews Online 2004 (Sep).score: 135.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Roger Vergauwen (2010). Will Science and Consciousness Ever Meat? Complexity, Symmetry and Qualia. Symmetry 2 (3):1250-1269.score: 130.5
    Within recent discussions in the Philosophy of Mind, the nature of conscious phenomenal states or qualia (also called ‘raw feels’ or the feel of ‘what it is like to be’) has been an important focus of interest. Proponents of Mind-Body Type-Identity theories have claimed that mental states can be reduced to neurophysiological states of the brain. Others have denied that such a reduction is possible; for them, there remains an explanatory gap. In this paper, functionalist, physicalist, epiphenomenalist, and biological models (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Max Velmans (2007). Where Experiences Are: Dualist, Physicalist, Enactive and Reflexive Accounts of Phenomenal Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):547-563.score: 130.5
    Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Pentti O. A. Haikonen (2007). Essential Issues of Conscious Machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):72-84.score: 130.5
    The development of conscious machines faces a number of difficult issues such as the apparent immateriality of mind, qualia and self-awareness. Also consciousness-related cognitive processes such as perception, imagination, motivation and inner speech are a technical challenge. It is foreseen that the development of machine consciousness would call for a system approach; the developer of conscious machines should consider complete systems that integrate the cognitive processes seamlessly and process information in a transparent way with representational and non-representational (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Eric LaRock (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):201-229.score: 130.5
    I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Sven Walter (2006). Causal Exclusion as an Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):67-83.score: 130.5
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Mark Rowlands (2001). The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.score: 126.0
    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative and radical account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Consciousness-Dependence and the Explanatory Gap. Inquiry 45 (4):521-540.score: 126.0
    Contrary to certain rumours, the mind-body problem is alive and well. So argues Joseph Levine in Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness . The main argument is simple enough. Considerations of causal efficacy require us to accept that subjective experiential, or 'phenomenal', properties are realized in basic non-mental, probably physical properties. But no amount of knowledge of those physical properties will allow us conclusively to deduce facts about the existence and nature of phenomenal properties. This failure of deducibility constitutes (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Bernard Haisch (2014). Is the Universe a Vast, Consciousness-Created Virtual Reality Simulation? Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 10 (1):48-60.score: 126.0
    Two luminaries of 20th century astrophysics were Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington. Both took seriously the view that there is more to reality than the physical universe and more to consciousness than simply brain activity. In his Science and the Unseen World (1929) Eddington speculated about a spiritual world and that "conscious is not wholly, nor even primarily a device for receiving sense impressions." Jeans also speculated on the existence of a universal mind and a non-mechanical reality, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Avinash De Sousa (2013). Towards an Integrative Theory of Consciousness: Part 2 (An Anthology of Various Other Models). Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):151.score: 126.0
    The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. A. Sousa (2013). Towards an Integrative Theory of Consciousness: Part 2 (An Anthology of Various Other Models). Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):151.score: 126.0
    The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Michael O'Rourke (2011). The Afterlives of Queer Theory. Continent 1 (2):102-116.score: 123.0
    continent. 1.2 (2011): 102-116. All experience open to the future is prepared or prepares itself to welcome the monstrous arrivant, to welcome it, that is, to accord hospitality to that which is absolutely foreign or strange [….] All of history has shown that each time an event has been produced, for example in philosophy or in poetry, it took the form of the unacceptable, or even of the intolerable, or the incomprehensible, that is, of a certain monstrosity. Jacques Derrida “Passages—from (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.score: 121.5
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Prof Max Velmans (2011). Can Evolutionary Theory Explain the Existence of Consciousness? A Review of Humphrey, N. (2010) Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. London: Quercus, ISBN 9781849162371. Journal of Consciousness Studies.score: 121.5
    This review summarises why it is difficult for Darwinian evolutionary theory to explain the existence and function of consciousness. It then evaluates whether Humphrey's book Soul Dust overcomes these problems. According to Humphrey, consciousness is an illusion constructed by the brain to enhance reproductive fitness by motivating creatures that have it to stay alive. Although the review entirely accepts that consciousness gives a first-person meaning to existence, it concludes that Humphrey does not give a convincing account of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Eugene G. D'Aquili & Andrew B. Newberg (1996). Consciousness and the Machine. Zygon 31 (2):235-52.score: 120.0
  34. Sushil Ghanshyam Kachewar & Siddappa Gurubalappa Gandage (2012). The Foetal 'Mind'as a Reflection of its Inner Self: Evidence From Colour Doppler Ultrasound of Foetal MCA. Mens Sana Monographs 10 (1):98.score: 118.0
    The unborn healthy foetus is looked upon as a blessing by one and all. A plethora of thoughts arise in the brains of expectant parents. But what goes on in the brain of the yet unborn still remains a mystery. 'Foetal mind' is a reflection of functions of its organs of sense, an instrument of knowledge that may even be reduced to machine to demonstrate the effect of sense organs and brain contact. Testimony to this fact are the various (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Aaron Sloman & Ronald L. Chrisley (2003). Virtual Machines and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):133-172.score: 114.0
    Replication or even modelling of consciousness in machines requires some clarifications and refinements of our concept of consciousness. Design of, construction of, and interaction with artificial systems can itself assist in this conceptual development. We start with the tentative hypothesis that although the word “consciousness” has no well-defined meaning, it is used to refer to aspects of human and animal informationprocessing. We then argue that we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Susan A. J. Stuart (2007). Machine Consciousness: Cognitive and Kinaesthetic Imagination. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):141-153.score: 114.0
    Machine consciousness exists already in organic systems and it is only a matter of time -- and some agreement -- before it will be realised in reverse-engineered organic systems and forward- engineered inorganic systems. The agreement must be over the preconditions that must first be met if the enterprise is to be successful, and it is these preconditions, for instance, being a socially-embedded, structurally-coupled and dynamic, goal-directed entity that organises its perceptual input and enacts its world through the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Owen Holland (2007). A Strongly Embodied Approach to Machine Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):97-110.score: 114.0
    Over sixty years ago, Kenneth Craik noted that, if an organism (or an artificial agent) carried 'a small-scale model of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head', it could use the model to behave intelligently. This paper argues that the possible actions might best be represented by interactions between a model of reality and a model of the agent, and that, in such an arrangement, the internal model of the agent might be a transparent model of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Ralph Wedgwood (1999). The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.score: 112.0
    Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties necessitate (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Carl Gillett (2010). Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Principia 6 (1):89-120.score: 112.0
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positons are committed to an untenabie combination of both 'upward' and 'dounward' determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis in 'Completeness of Physics' (CoP). I show (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Melanie Boly, Anil K. Seth, Melanie Wilke, Paul Ingmundson, Bernard Baars, Steven Laureys, David Edelman & Naotsugu Tsuchiya (2013). Consciousness in Humans and Non-Human Animals: Recent Advances and Future Directions. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 111.0
    This joint article reflects the authors’ personal views regarding noteworthy advances in the neuroscience of consciousness in the last ten years, and suggests what we feel may be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference at the Samoset Resort in Rockport, Maine, USA, in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio, Texas. Here, we summarize recent advances in our understanding of subjectivity in humans and other animals, including empirical, applied, technical and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Markus E. Schlosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos.score: 110.0
    Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. But (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Julie Yoo (2008). New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism. In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitget (eds.), Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences.score: 110.0
    Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses: first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true. Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other. In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kim’s criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Robert Northcott (2009). On Lewis, Schaffer and the Non-Reductive Evaluation of Counterfactuals. Theoria 75 (4):336-343.score: 110.0
    Jonathan Schaffer (2004 ) proposes an ingenious amendment to David Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals. This amendment explicitly invokes the notion of causal independence, thus giving up Lewis's ambitions for a reductive counterfactual account of causation. But in return, it rescues Lewis's semantics from extant counterexamples. I present a new counterexample that defeats even Schaffer's amendment. Further, I argue that a better approach would be to follow the causal modelling literature and evaluate counterfactuals via an explicit postulated causal structure. This (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Carl Gillett (2002). Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist Metaphysics for 'Downward' Determination. Principia 6 (1):89-120.score: 109.0
    Iaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challen,ge to both emergentism cmd ncm-reductIve physicalism lyy providing arguments that these positums are cornmitted to an untenabie combmation of both `upwarcit and 'clouniwardi determmation. In secuon 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realiza:0n relatzon underlies such sicepucal arguments However, tn secuon 2, I suggest that such conclusicrns involve a confusion between the implications of physicahsm and those of a related thesis the Vompleteness of Physics' (Co?) I show (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Jaegwon Kim (1989). The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.score: 108.0
    Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Dennis Schulting (2012). Non-Apperceptive Consciousness. In Riccardo Pozzo, Piero Giordanetti & Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious. de Gruyter.score: 108.0
    * Note that in this article an inverted comma is used for NER', where it should be an accent, to differentiate it from standard NER. Same with P1', P2' etc. Apparently, the editors of de Gruyter can't understand an author's instruction and just invent their own conventions. -/- In this article, I am interested in answering two, relatively simple, but important questions: (a) Does Kant allow first-order consciousness without second-order consciousness, that is, does he allow for empirical (...) that is not transcendentally apperceived, and so not accompanied by the 'I think', either in principle or de facto? (b) If Kant allows for unaccompanied first-order consciousness, what is the status of this consciousness? Is it in any way possible to be conscious of this consciousness? Or is this first-order consciousness in some way a consciousness of which we are and remain ex hypothesi unconscious? A related question which is independent of Kant's arguments regarding the conditions for self-consciousness, is whether Kant allows for unconsciousness strictius dicta, viz., the total lack of consciousness at all. I believe that transcendental apperception itself provides sufficient ground for establishing Kant's position on unaccompanied or non-apperceptive consciousness. An argument for the thesis that Kant either allows or doesn't allow for non-apperceptive consciousness can be gleaned from the positive argument for transcendental apperception as an analytic principle. We need only look at the logical ramifications of this principle to find such an argument. (shrink)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Andrew Melnyk (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.score: 108.0
    Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.score: 108.0
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 999