Search results for 'Non reductive machine consciousness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nicholas Boltuc & Peter Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. AAAI Press, Merlo Park, CA.score: 534.0
    We should eventually understand how exactly first person phenomenal consciousness is generated. When we do, we should be able to enginner one for robots. This is the engineering thesis in machine consciousness.
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  2. Piotr Boltuc (2012). The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (2):187-207.score: 384.0
    I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition (...)
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  3. James B. Miller (2012). Haunted by the Ghost in the Machine. Commentary on “The Spirituality of Human Consciousness: A Catholic Evaluation of Some Current Neuro-Scientific Interpretations”. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):503-507.score: 348.0
    Metaphysical and epistemological dualism informs much contemporary discussion of the relationships of science and religion, in particular in relation to the neurosciences and the religious understanding of the human person. This dualism is a foundational artifact of modern culture; however, contemporary scientific research and historical theological scholarship encourage a more holistic view wherein human personhood is most fittingly understood as an emergent phenomenon of, but not simply reducible to, evolutionary and developmental neurobiology.
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  4. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (2009). Dynamical Agents: Consciousness, Causation, and Two Specters of Epiphenomenalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):225-243.score: 301.5
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology (...)
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  5. J. C. Nyíri (1989). Wittgenstein and the Problem of Machine Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 33:375-394.score: 288.0
    For any given society, its particular technology of communication has far-reaching consequences, not merely as regards social organization, but on the epistemic level as well. Plato's name-theory of meaning represents the transition from the age of primary orality to that of literacy; Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning stands for the transition from the age of literacy to that of a second orality (audiovisual communication, electronic information processing). On the basis of a use-theory of meaning the problem of machine consciousness, (...)
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  6. Susan A. J. Stuart (2011). Enkinaesthesia: The Fundamental Challenge for Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):145-162.score: 243.0
    In this short paper I will introduce an idea which, I will argue, presents a fundamental additional challenge to the machine consciousness community. The idea takes the questions surrounding phenomenology, qualia and phenomenality one step further into the realm of intersubjectivity but with a twist, and the twist is this: that an agent’s intersubjective experience is deeply felt and necessarily co-affective; it is enkinaesthetic, and only through enkinaesthetic awareness can we establish the affective enfolding which enables first the (...)
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  7. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2006). Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness. Ontos.score: 238.5
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  8. Roberto Cordeschi (2010). Which Kind of Machine Consciousness? International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):31-33.score: 222.0
    Aaron Sloman remarks that a lot of present disputes on consciousness are usually based, on the one hand, on re-inventing “ideas that have been previously discussed at lenght by others”, on the other hand, on debating “unresolvable” issues, such as that about which animals have phenomenal consciousness. For what it’s worth I would make a couple of examples, which are related to certain topics that Sloman deals with in his paper, and that might be useful for introducing some (...)
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  9. Jessica M. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.score: 216.0
    Some claim that Non-reductive Physicalism (NRP) is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism (contra Non-reduction ), or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety (contra Physicalism ). I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations (...)
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  10. Jessica M. Wilson (2011). Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy. The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.score: 216.0
    I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers' (first introduced in Wilson 1999). In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that (...)
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  11. Michael Baumgartner (2013). Rendering Interventionism and Non‐Reductive Physicalism Compatible. Dialectica 67 (1):1-27.score: 216.0
    In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an ‘interventionist turn’. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of non-reducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventionist exclusion argument showing that interventionism is in fact incompatible with non-reductive physicalism. In response, a number of revised versions of interventionism have been suggested that are (...)
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  12. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2012). MachineConsciousness and “Artificial” Thought: An Operational Architectonics Model Guided Approach. Brain Research 1428:80-92.score: 216.0
    Instead of using low-level neurophysiology mimicking and exploratory programming methods commonly used in the machine consciousness field, the hierarchical Operational Architectonics (OA) framework of brain and mind functioning proposes an alternative conceptual-theoretical framework as a new direction in the area of model-driven machine (robot) consciousness engineering. The unified brain-mind theoretical OA model explicitly captures (though in an informal way) the basic essence of brain functional architecture, which indeed constitutes a theory of consciousness. The OA describes (...)
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  13. Daniel Lim (2014). Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.score: 216.0
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience argument (...)
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  14. Sven Walter (2006). Causal Exclusion as an Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):67-83.score: 211.5
     
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  15. E. Diaz-Leon (2011). Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.score: 202.5
    In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a <span class='Hi'>priori</span> entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the (...)
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  16. Piotr Boltuc (2009). The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):155-176.score: 198.0
    The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess' (like in Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness). Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.
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  17. Catherine Legg (2004). Review of Holland (Ed.) "Machine Consciousness&Quot;. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Reviews Online 2004 (Sep).score: 189.0
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  18. Alex Hankey (2014). Complexity Biology-Based Information Structures Can Explain Subjectivity, Objective Reduction of Wave Packets, and Non-Computability. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 10 (1):237-250.score: 181.5
    Background: how mind functions is subject to continuing scientific discussion. A simplistic approach says that, since no convincing way has been found to model subjective experience, mind cannot exist. A second holds that, since mind cannot be described by classical physics, it must be described by quantum physics. Another perspective concerns mind's hypothesized ability to interact with the world of quanta: it should be responsible for reduction of quantum wave packets; physics producing ‘Objective Reduction' is postulated to form the basis (...)
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  19. Susan Schneider (2012). Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.score: 175.5
    I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.
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  20. Susan A. J. Stuart (2007). Machine Consciousness: Cognitive and Kinaesthetic Imagination. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):141-153.score: 168.0
    Machine consciousness exists already in organic systems and it is only a matter of time -- and some agreement -- before it will be realised in reverse-engineered organic systems and forward- engineered inorganic systems. The agreement must be over the preconditions that must first be met if the enterprise is to be successful, and it is these preconditions, for instance, being a socially-embedded, structurally-coupled and dynamic, goal-directed entity that organises its perceptual input and enacts its world through the (...)
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  21. Owen Holland (2007). A Strongly Embodied Approach to Machine Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):97-110.score: 168.0
    Over sixty years ago, Kenneth Craik noted that, if an organism (or an artificial agent) carried 'a small-scale model of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head', it could use the model to behave intelligently. This paper argues that the possible actions might best be represented by interactions between a model of reality and a model of the agent, and that, in such an arrangement, the internal model of the agent might be a transparent model of (...)
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  22. Eugene G. D'Aquili & Andrew B. Newberg (1996). Consciousness and the Machine. Zygon 31 (2):235-52.score: 168.0
  23. Ralph Wedgwood (1999). The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.score: 166.0
    Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties necessitate (...)
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  24. Carl Gillett (2010). Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Principia 6 (1):89-120.score: 166.0
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positons are committed to an untenabie combination of both 'upward' and 'dounward' determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis in 'Completeness of Physics' (CoP). I show (...)
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  25. Markus E. Schlosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos.score: 164.0
    Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. But (...)
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  26. Julie Yoo (2008). New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism. In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitget (eds.), Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences.score: 164.0
    Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses: first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true. Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other. In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kim’s criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible.
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  27. Robert Northcott (2009). On Lewis, Schaffer and the Non-Reductive Evaluation of Counterfactuals. Theoria 75 (4):336-343.score: 164.0
    Jonathan Schaffer (2004 ) proposes an ingenious amendment to David Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals. This amendment explicitly invokes the notion of causal independence, thus giving up Lewis's ambitions for a reductive counterfactual account of causation. But in return, it rescues Lewis's semantics from extant counterexamples. I present a new counterexample that defeats even Schaffer's amendment. Further, I argue that a better approach would be to follow the causal modelling literature and evaluate counterfactuals via an explicit postulated causal structure. This (...)
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  28. Carl Gillett (2002). Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist Metaphysics for 'Downward' Determination. Principia 6 (1):89-120.score: 163.0
    Iaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challen,ge to both emergentism cmd ncm-reductIve physicalism lyy providing arguments that these positums are cornmitted to an untenabie combmation of both `upwarcit and 'clouniwardi determmation. In secuon 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realiza:0n relatzon underlies such sicepucal arguments However, tn secuon 2, I suggest that such conclusicrns involve a confusion between the implications of physicahsm and those of a related thesis the Vompleteness of Physics' (Co?) I show (...)
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  29. Jaegwon Kim (1989). The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.score: 162.0
    Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive.
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  30. Andrew Melnyk (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.score: 162.0
    Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.
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  31. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.score: 162.0
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
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  32. Aaron Sloman (2010). Machine Consciousness: Response to Commentaries. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):75-116.score: 162.0
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  33. Louis deRosset (2009). Possible Worlds II: Non-Reductive Theories of Possible Worlds. Philosophy Compass 4 (6):1009-1021.score: 162.0
    It is difficult to wander far in contemporary metaphysics without bumping into talk of possible worlds. And, reference to possible worlds is not confined to metaphysics. It can be found in contemporary epistemology and ethics, and has even made its way into linguistics and decision theory. What are those possible worlds, the entities to which theorists in these disciplines all appeal? Some have hoped that a theory of possible worlds can be used to reduce modality to non-modal terms. This paper (...)
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  34. Susan Schneider (2013). Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem 1. Noûs 47 (1):135-153.score: 162.0
    Most answers to the mind-body problem are claims about the nature of mental properties and substances. But advocates of non-reductive physicalism have generally neglected the topic of the nature of substance, quickly nodding to the view that all substances are physical, while focusing their intellectual energy on understanding how mental properties relate to physical ones. Let us call the view that all substances are physical or are exhaustively composed of physical substances substance physicalism (SP). Herein, I argue that non- (...) physicalism (NRP) cannot uphold substance physicalism and is thereby false. For NRP faces a mind problem: its commitment to property irreducibility prevents that which bears the mental properties—the mind, or on some views, the self or person—from being a physical thing. (shrink)
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  35. Theo Van Willigenburg (2005). Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):45-62.score: 162.0
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of (...)
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  36. Jeff Yoshimi (2012). Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.score: 162.0
    It is often claimed (1) that levels of nature are related by supervenience, and (2) that processes occurring at particular levels of nature should be studied using dynamical systems theory. However, there has been little consideration of how these claims are related. To address the issue, I show how supervenience relations give rise to ‘supervenience functions’, and use these functions to show how dynamical systems at different levels are related to one another. I then use this analysis to describe a (...)
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  37. Andrew Russo (2011). The Supervenience Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 162.0
    This short paper is a "quick and dirty" introduction for non-philosophers (with some background in propositional logic) to Jaegwon Kim's famous supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism (also known as the exclusion problem). It motivates the problem of mental causation, introduces Kim's formulation of the issue centered around mind-body supervenience, presents the argument in deductive form, and makes explicit why Kim concludes that vindicating mental causation demands a reduction of mind.
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  38. Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (2009). Machine Consciousness: A Manifesto for Robotics. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):33-51.score: 162.0
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  39. Igor Aleksander (2009). The Potential Impact of Machine Consciousness in Science and Engineering. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):1-9.score: 162.0
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  40. Janusz A. Starzyk & Dilip K. Prasad (2011). A Computational Model of Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):255-281.score: 162.0
  41. Stan Franklin, Sidney D'Mello, Bernard J. Baars & Uma Ramamurthy (2009). Evolutionary Pressures for Perceptual Stability and Self as Guides to Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):99-110.score: 162.0
  42. Carlos Hernández, Ignacio López & Ricardo Sanz (2009). The Operative Mind: A Functional, Computational and Modeling Approach to Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):83-98.score: 162.0
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  43. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2009). Brain and Mind Operational Architectonics and Man-Made “MachineConsciousness. Cognitive Processing 10 (2):105-111.score: 162.0
    To build a true conscious robot requires that a robot’s “brain” be capable of supporting the phenomenal consciousness as human’s brain enjoys. Operational Architectonics framework through exploration of the temporal structure of information flow and inter-area interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations [by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) on the millisecond scale] reveals and describes the EEG architecture which is analogous to the architecture of the phenomenal world. This suggests that the task (...)
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  44. Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma & Araceli Sanchis (2010). The Cognitive Development of Machine Consciousness Implementations. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (02):213-225.score: 162.0
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  45. David J. Calverley (2007). Imagining a Non-Biological Machine as a Legal Person. AI and Society 22 (4):523-537.score: 162.0
    As non-biological machines come to be designed in ways which exhibit characteristics comparable to human mental states, the manner in which the law treats these entities will become increasingly important both to designers and to society at large. The direct question will become whether, given certain attributes, a non-biological machine could ever be viewed as a legal person. In order to begin to understand the ramifications of this question, this paper starts by exploring the distinction between the related concepts (...)
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  46. Klaus Raizer, André L. O. Paraense & Ricardo R. Gudwin (2012). A Cognitive Architecture with Incremental Levels of Machine Consciousness Inspired by Cognitive Neuroscience. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (02):335-352.score: 162.0
  47. Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma & Araceli Sanchis (2009). Strategies for Measuring Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (02):193-201.score: 162.0
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  48. Aaron Sloman (2010). An Alternative to Working on Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):1-18.score: 162.0
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