Search results for 'Non-realism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  16
    Jussi Suikkanen (forthcoming). Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity. Acta Analytica:1-20.
    In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that normative judgments are beliefs; that some normative beliefs are true; that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim (...)
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  2.  29
    Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Rodopi.
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by (...)
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  3.  78
    Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Schopenhauer has been consistently ignored by contemporary metaethics, and almost no commentators on his work address the question of whether his metaethics is realist or anti-realist. I argue, however, that Schopenhauer’s views provide a powerful and novel challenge to the widely-held metaethical view that cognitivism about moral judgments is a necessary condition for moral realism. I begin by discussing how the phrase “moral realism” has been intended to characterize the family of anti-skeptical views that goes back at least to Plato. (...)
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  4.  70
    Nicolas Gisin (2012). Non-Realism: Deep Thought or a Soft Option? Foundations of Physics 42 (1):80-85.
    The claim that the observation of a violation of a Bell inequality leads to an alleged alternative between nonlocality and non-realism is annoying because of the vagueness of the second term.
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  5.  43
    Michael Esfeld (forthcoming). How to Account for Quantum Non-Locality: Ontic Structural Realism and the Primitive Ontology of Quantum Physics. Synthese:1-16.
    The paper has two aims: (1) it sets out to show that it is well motivated to seek for an account of quantum non-locality in the framework of ontic structural realism (OSR), which integrates the notions of holism and non-separability that have been employed since the 1980s to achieve such an account. However, recent research shows that OSR on its own cannot provide such an account. Against this background, the paper argues that by applying OSR to the primitive ontology theories (...)
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  6. Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (2002). Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics an Outline of Indian Non-Realism. Routledge.
    Based on original translations of passages from the works of three major thinkers of the classical Indian school of Advaita, but addressing issues found in Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and contemporary analytic philosophers, this book argues for a philosophical position it calls 'non-realism'. This is the view that an independent, external world must be assumed if the features of cognition are to be explained, but that it cannot be proved that there is such a world, independently of an (...)
     
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  7.  14
    Ruth Walker (2006). Rescuing Religious Non-Realism From Cupitt. Heythrop Journal 47 (3):426–440.
    Don Cupitt's version of religious non‐realism based as it is on linguistic constructivism, radical relativism and the view that culture forms human nature has been attacked with devastating effect by realists in the last few years. I argue that there is another strand in Cupitt's thinking, his biological naturalism, that supports a different version of religious non‐realism and that he failed to see this possibility because of his global non‐realism and commitment to the strong programme in the sociology of scientific (...)
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  8.  23
    María Ponte Azcárate (2007). A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.
    My aim in this article is to analyze and to discuss what I think are the two most important approaches to a theory of truth from a non-realist standpoint: the proposal of Crispin Wright and the proposal enounced by Putnam in Reason, Truth and History. Wright argues for a minimalist theory of truth according to which truth has to be a metaphysically neutral notion and admits several possible models. One of these possible models is Putnam's notion of "rational acceptability under (...)
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  9.  40
    Jared Warren (forthcoming). Epistemology Versus Non-Causal Realism. Synthese:1-20.
    This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are sometimes missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument—non-causal realism—and argue that any non-causal realist theory, no matter the subject matter, cannot be given a reasonable epistemology and so should be rejected. Finally I discuss (...)
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  10.  93
    James Harold (2007). The Ethics of Non-Realist Fiction: Morality's Catch-22. Philosophia 35 (2):145-159.
    The topic of this essay is how non-realistic novels challenge our philosophical understanding of the moral significance of literature. I consider just one case: Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. I argue that standard philosophical views, based as they are on realistic models of literature, fail to capture the moral significance of this work. I show that Catch-22 succeeds morally because of the ways it resists using standard realistic techniques, and suggest that philosophical discussion of ethics and literature must be pluralistic if it (...)
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  11.  75
    Ralph Wedgwood (1999). The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.
    Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties necessitate which (...)
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  12.  37
    Karim Zahidi (2014). Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.
    Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that (...)
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  13.  53
    Décio Krause & Jonas R. B. Arenhart (2014). Separability and Non-Individuality: Is It Possible to Conciliate (At Least A Form Of) Einstein's Realism with Quantum Mechanics? Foundations of Physics 44 (12):1269-1288.
    In this paper we argue that physical theories, including quantum mechanics, refer to some kind of ‘objects’, even if only implicitly. We raise questions about the logico-mathematical apparatuses commonly employed in such theories, bringing to light some metaphysical presuppositions underlying such apparatuses. We point out to some incongruities in the discourse holding that quantum objects would be entities of some ‘new kind’ while still adhering to the logico-mathematical framework we use to deal with classical objects. The use of such apparatus (...)
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  14.  26
    Barbara Hannan (1990). `Non-Scientific Realism' About Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31.
    Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.
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  15.  12
    Karin Johannesson (2007). God Pro Nobis: On Non-Metaphysical Realism and the Philosophy of Religion. Peeters.
    Drawing on the work of Putnam, Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson, the author elaborates a non-metaphysical realist perspective that she recommends as a ...
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  16.  15
    Jonathan Surovell (2016). The Bradleyan Regress, Non-Relational Realism, and the Quinean Semantic Strategy. Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):63-79.
    Non-Relational Realism is a popular solution to the Bradleyan regress of facts or truths. It denies that there is a relational universal of exemplification; for an object a to exemplify a universal F-ness, on this view, is not for a relation to subsist between a and F-ness. An influential objection to Non-Relational Realism is that it is unacceptably obscure. The author argues that Non-Relational Realism can be understood as a selective application of satisfaction semantics to predicates like ‘exemplify’, and that (...)
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  17.  24
    Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (2003). Appelros, Erica (2002) God in the Act of Reference: Debating Religious Realism and Non-Realism. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., $69.95, 212 Pp. Barnes, Michael (2002) Theology and the Dialogue of Religions. New York: Cambridge University Press, $25.00, 274 Pp. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53:61-63.
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  18. Erik Wielenberg (2009). In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism. Faith and Philosophy 29 (1):23-41.
    Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.
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  19.  10
    Chris Meyers (2005). A Non-Realist Theory of Objective Moral Truth. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):69-75.
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  20.  2
    Claus Festersen (2007). Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward: Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, Edited by Pieranna Garavaso . Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2006. SATS 8 (2).
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  21.  3
    Claus Festersen (2007). Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward: Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, Edited by Pieranna Garavaso (Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 90). Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2006 (393 Pp.). [REVIEW] SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):147-155.
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  22.  2
    Bernard M. Garrett & Roger L. Cutting (2015). Ways of Knowing: Realism, Non-Realism, Nominalism and a Typology Revisited with a Counter Perspective for Nursing Science. Nursing Inquiry 22 (2):95-105.
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  23.  4
    Paul McCallion (2008). A Non-Realist Non-Starter. Metascience 17 (3):445-448.
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  24.  4
    Josep-Vicent Ferre Domínguez, Francisco Bueno-Félix C. Fernández, Antonio Claver Ferrer, Jacinto García & Gregorio Martínez (2003). Bermejo, Ignacio Jericó. Domingo Báñez, Teología de la Infidelidad En Paganos y Herejes (1584). Madrid: Editorial Revista Agustiniana, 2000. Chrétien, Jean-Luis. The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For. Trans. J. Bloechl. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. Cupitt, Don. Is Nothing Sacred: The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion. New. [REVIEW] Augustinian Studies 34 (1).
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  25.  8
    Sukharanjan Saha (2004). Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism (Review). Philosophy East and West 54 (2):264-268.
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  26. Manuel Bremer (2010). Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 27 (3):188-191.
     
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  27.  4
    Ronald B. Nicolson (1995). Real Evil Needs a Real God? Non-Realist Theology in a Third World. Heythrop Journal 36 (2):140–152.
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  28. M. Bremer (2007). Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Philosophy in Review 27 (3):188.
     
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  29.  16
    Don Cupitt (2002). Is Nothing Sacred?: The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion: Selected Essays. Fordham University Press.
    This book contains essays written over twenty years that appear in book form for the first time.
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  30. Andrew Moore (2010). God in Postliberal Perspective: Between Realism and Non-Realism. New Blackfriars 91 (1034):486-487.
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  31. Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (1991). An Outline of Indian Non-Realism Some Central Arguments of Advaita Metaphysics.
     
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  32. Sanford Shieh (2006). What is Non-Realism About Arithmetic? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 (1):317-341.
     
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  33. Jean Paul Van Bendegem (2006). Non-Realism, Nominalism and Strict Finitism the Sheer Complexity of It All. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:343-365.
     
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  34. Robert Samuel Wachbroit (1979). Truth and Understanding: The Dispute Between Realist and Non-Realist Conceptions. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
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  35.  7
    Maria J. Frapolli, Non-Representational Mathematical Realism.
    This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable. I will argue for the following (...)
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  36. Timothy D. Lyons (2009). Non-Competitor Conditions in the Scientific Realism Debate. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):65-84.
    A general insight of 20th-century philosophy of science is that the acceptance of a scientific theory is grounded, not merely on a theory's relation to data, but on its status as having no, or being superior to its, competitors. I explore the ways in which scientific realists might be thought to utilise this insight, have in fact utilised it, and can legitimately utilise it. In more detail, I point out that, barring a natural but mistaken characterisation of scientific realism, traditional (...)
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  37. Olga Ramirez (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three Fold Model. Prolegomena (Croatia) 10 (1):101-11202.
    Abstracts The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the (...)
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  38.  7
    María José Frápolli (2015). Non-Representational Mathematical Realism. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):331-348.
    This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphysical inflationism derived from some versions of mathematical realism do not force them to embrace non-standard, epistemic approaches to truth and existence. It is also an attempt to convince mathematical realists that they do not need to implement their perfectly sound and judicious intuitions with the anti-intuitive developments that render full-blown mathematical realism into a view which even Gödel considered objectionable.I will argue for the following two (...)
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  39.  19
    Alberto Voltolini (2006). How to Get a Non-Intensionalist, Propositional, Moderately Realist Truthconditional Account of Internal Metafictional Sentences. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):179-199.
    In what follows, I will first try to show that both anti-realist and realist intensionalist truthconditional accounts of internal metafictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form "in the story S, p") are unsatisfactory. Moreover, I will claim that this does not mean that propositional truthconditional accounts of those sentences are to be dispensed with; simply, one has to provide a non-intensionalist propositional truthconditional account of those sentences. Finally, I will show that this account is fully compatible with a realist interpretation (...)
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  40. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  41.  7
    Timothy D. Lyons (forthcoming). Epistemic Selectivity, Historical Threats, and the Non-Epistemic Tenets of Scientific Realism. Synthese:1-17.
    The scientific realism debate has now reached an entirely new level of sophistication. Faced with increasingly focused challenges, epistemic scientific realists have appropriately revised their basic meta-hypothesis that successful scientific theories are approximately true: they have emphasized criteria that render realism far more selective and, so, plausible. As a framework for discussion, I use what I take to be the most influential current variant of selective epistemic realism, deployment realism. Toward the identification of new case studies that challenge this form (...)
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  42.  16
    John Drummond (1990). Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object. Springer.
    The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from Frege-is finally closing.
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  43. Michela Massimi (2004). Non‐Defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):36-60.
    Experimental realism aims at striking a middle ground between scientific realism and anti-realism, between the success of experimental physics it would explain and the realism about scientific theories it would supplant. This middle ground reinstates the engineering idea that belief in scientific entities is justified on purely experimental grounds, without any commitment to scientific theories and laws. This paper argues that there is no defensible middle ground to be staked out when it comes to justifying physicists' belief in colored quarks, (...)
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  44. Anjan Chakravartty, Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of Non-Eliminative, Ontic Structural Realism.
    The number of positions identified with structural realism in philosophical debates about scientific knowledge has grown significantly in the past decade, particularly with respect to the metaphysical or ‘ontic’ approach (OSR). In recent years, several advocates of OSR have proposed a novel understanding of it in order to side-step a serious challenge faced by its original formulation, eliminative OSR. I examine the conceptual basis of the new, noneliminative view, and conclude that it too faces a serious challenge, resulting in a (...)
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  45.  11
    Paul Horwich (2006). A World Without Isms: Life After Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press 188.
  46.  2
    I. Danka (2015). Reconciling Constructivism with Realism: How Far Non-Dualism Should Be Followed. Constructivist Foundations 11 (1):165-167.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Towards a PL-Metaphysics of Perception: In Search of the Metaphysical Roots of Constructivism” by Konrad Werner. Upshot: In his target article, Werner proposes a metaphysical foundation for a radical constructivist epistemology that is nonetheless claimed to reconcile constructivism with some sort of realism. While acknowledging his success in demonstrating that constructivism without an external/internal dualism is suitable for his purposes, I shall argue that rejecting a distinction between epistemological and ontological issues makes it questionable (...)
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  47.  20
    Héctor Cuadra Montiel (2007). Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach: Comments on a Non-Typical KWNS–SWPR Experience. Journal of Critical Realism 6 (1):84-110.
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  48. John H. Finch & Robert McMaster (2003). A Pragmatic Alliance Between Critical Realism and Simple Non-Parametric Statistical Techniques. In Paul Downward (ed.), Applied Economics and the Critical Realist Critique. Routledge 129--150.
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  49.  7
    Manuel Pérez Otero (2002). Reasoning About Non-Actual Possibilities. Problems with the Douven-Putnam Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism (Razonar Sobre Posibilidades Contrafácticas. Los Problemas Del Argumento Teórico-Modelista de Douven-Putnam Contra El Realismo Metafísico). Critica 34 (102):29 - 45.
    Igor Douven has offered an original reconstruction and defence of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Douven's construal has notable exegetical virtues, since it makes sense of some assumptions in Putnam's argument which his opponents have considered question-begging or puzzling. In this article I provide an indirect defence of metaphysical realism, by showing why this new version of the anti-realist argument should also be rejected. The main problems in the Douven-Putnam argument come from ascribing to the realist a distorted view (...)
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  50. Héctor Cuadra Montiel (2010). Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach: Comments on a Non-Typical KWNS–SWPR Experience. Journal of Critical Realism 6 (1).
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