Search results for 'Non-realism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (2006). Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. rodopi.score: 180.0
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by (...)
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  2. Nicolas Gisin (2012). Non-Realism: Deep Thought or a Soft Option? Foundations of Physics 42 (1):80-85.score: 132.0
    The claim that the observation of a violation of a Bell inequality leads to an alleged alternative between nonlocality and non-realism is annoying because of the vagueness of the second term.
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  3. María Ponte Azcárate (2007). A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.score: 120.0
    My aim in this article is to analyze and to discuss what I think are the two most important approaches to a theory of truth from a non-realist standpoint: the proposal of Crispin Wright and the proposal enounced by Putnam in Reason, Truth and History. Wright argues for a minimalist theory of truth according to which truth has to be a metaphysically neutral notion and admits several possible models. One of these possible models is Putnam's notion of "rational acceptability under (...)
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  4. Hugh S. Chandler, Putnam on Realism.score: 108.0
    In 1974 Putnam was a ‘realist’ in regard to the physical world. By 1981 he had become a 'non-realist' in this regard. (I don’t know where he stands today.) In this paper I argue that his realism was more plausible than his non-realism. The physical world is what it is independently of any rational being’s interpretation of it.
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  5. Ralph Wedgwood (1999). The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.score: 108.0
    Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties necessitate which (...)
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  6. Karim Zahidi (forthcoming). Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 108.0
    Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that (...)
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  7. Décio Krause & Jonas R. B. Arenhart (forthcoming). Separability and Non-Individuality: Is It Possible to Conciliate (At Least A Form Of) Einstein's Realism with Quantum Mechanics? Foundations of Physics:1-20.score: 108.0
    In this paper we argue that physical theories, including quantum mechanics, refer to some kind of ‘objects’, even if only implicitly. We raise questions about the logico-mathematical apparatuses commonly employed in such theories, bringing to light some metaphysical presuppositions underlying such apparatuses. We point out to some incongruities in the discourse holding that quantum objects would be entities of some ‘new kind’ while still adhering to the logico-mathematical framework we use to deal with classical objects. The use of such apparatus (...)
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  8. Karin Johannesson (2007). God Pro Nobis: On Non-Metaphysical Realism and the Philosophy of Religion. Peeters.score: 108.0
    Drawing on the work of Putnam, Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson, the author elaborates a non-metaphysical realist perspective that she recommends as a ...
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  9. Barbara Hannan (1990). `Non-Scientific Realism' About Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31.score: 108.0
    Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.
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  10. James Harold (2007). The Ethics of Non-Realist Fiction: Morality's Catch-22. Philosophia 35 (2):145-159.score: 104.0
    The topic of this essay is how non-realistic novels challenge our philosophical understanding of the moral significance of literature. I consider just one case: Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. I argue that standard philosophical views, based as they are on realistic models of literature, fail to capture the moral significance of this work. I show that Catch-22 succeeds morally because of the ways it resists using standard realistic techniques, and suggest that philosophical discussion of ethics and literature must be pluralistic if it (...)
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  11. Timothy D. Lyons (2009). Non-Competitor Conditions in the Scientific Realism Debate. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):65-84.score: 96.0
    A general insight of 20th-century philosophy of science is that the acceptance of a scientific theory is grounded, not merely on a theory's relation to data, but on its status as having no, or being superior to its, competitors. I explore the ways in which scientific realists might be thought to utilise this insight, have in fact utilised it, and can legitimately utilise it. In more detail, I point out that, barring a natural but mistaken characterisation of scientific realism, traditional (...)
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  12. Olga Ramirez (2011). Between Non-Cognitivism and Realism in Ethics: A Three Fold Model. Prolegomena (Croatia) 10 (1):101-11202.score: 96.0
    Abstracts The aim of the paper is to propose an alternative model to realist and non-cognitive explanations of the rule-guided use of thick ethical concepts and to examine the implications that may be drawn from this and similar cases for our general understanding of rule-following and the relation between criteria of application, truth and correctness. It addresses McDowell’s non-cognitivism critique and challenges his defence of the entanglement thesis for thick ethical concepts. Contrary to non-cognitivists, however, I propose to view the (...)
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  13. Alberto Voltolini (2006). How to Get a Non-Intensionalist, Propositional, Moderately Realist Truthconditional Account of Internal Metafictional Sentences. Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):179-199.score: 96.0
    In what follows, I will first try to show that both anti-realist and realist intensionalist truthconditional accounts of internal metafictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form "in the story S, p") are unsatisfactory. Moreover, I will claim that this does not mean that propositional truthconditional accounts of those sentences are to be dispensed with; simply, one has to provide a non-intensionalist propositional truthconditional account of those sentences. Finally, I will show that this account is fully compatible with a realist interpretation (...)
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  14. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.score: 90.0
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  15. Don Cupitt (2002). Is Nothing Sacred?: The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion: Selected Essays. Fordham University Press.score: 90.0
    This book contains essays written over twenty years that appear in book form for the first time.
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  16. Sukharanjan Saha (2004). Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism (Review). Philosophy East and West 54 (2):264-268.score: 90.0
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  17. Ronald B. Nicolson (1995). Real Evil Needs a Real God? Non-Realist Theology in a Third World. Heythrop Journal 36 (2):140–152.score: 90.0
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  18. Ruth Walker (2006). Rescuing Religious Non-Realism From Cupitt. Heythrop Journal 47 (3):426–440.score: 90.0
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  19. Josep-Vicent Ferre Domínguez, Francisco Bueno-Félix C. Fernández, Antonio Claver Ferrer, Jacinto García & Gregorio Martínez (2003). Bermejo, Ignacio Jericó. Domingo Báñez, Teología de la Infidelidad En Paganos y Herejes (1584). Madrid: Editorial Revista Agustiniana, 2000. Chrétien, Jean-Luis. The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For. Trans. J. Bloechl. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. Cupitt, Don. Is Nothing Sacred: The Non-Realist Philosophy of Religion. New. [REVIEW] Augustinian Studies 34 (1).score: 90.0
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  20. Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal (2010). Filosofia Analítica da Religião como Pensamento Pós-"Pós-Metafísico" (Analytic Philosophy of Religion as a Post-'Post-Metaphysical' Thought) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2010v8n16p80. [REVIEW] Horizonte 8 (16):80-98.score: 90.0
    Entendendo “pensamento pós-metafísico” no sentido da crítica moderna e positivista à metafísica como forma de conhecimento, o artigo apresenta a filosofia analítica da religião como uma resposta à tese de que a linguagem religiosa não tem sentido porque não se refere a nenhum dado empiricamente verificável ou falseável. Em primeiro lugar, é apresentada a resposta não-realista ao desafio pós-metafísico, especialmente a de D. Z. Phillips, baseada nas ideias de Wittgenstein. Nessa proposta, o sentido da linguagem religiosa não está na referência (...)
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  21. Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (2003). Appelros, Erica (2002) God in the Act of Reference: Debating Religious Realism and Non-Realism. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., $69.95, 212 Pp. Barnes, Michael (2002) Theology and the Dialogue of Religions. New York: Cambridge University Press, $25.00, 274 Pp. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53:61-63.score: 90.0
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  22. Manuel Bremer (2010). Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 27 (3):188-191.score: 90.0
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  23. Paul McCallion (2008). A Non-Realist Non-Starter. Metascience 17 (3):445-448.score: 90.0
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  24. Chris Meyers (2005). A Non-Realist Theory of Objective Moral Truth. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):69-75.score: 90.0
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  25. M. Bremer (2007). Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Philosophy in Review 27 (3):188.score: 90.0
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  26. Claus Festersen (2007). Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward: Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic, Edited by Pieranna Garavaso (Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 90). Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2006 (393 Pp.). [REVIEW] SATS 8 (2):147-155.score: 90.0
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  27. Sanford Shieh (2006). What is Non-Realism About Arithmetic? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 (1):317-341.score: 90.0
     
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  28. Erik Wielenberg (2009). In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism. Faith and Philosophy 29 (1):23-41.score: 84.0
    Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.
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  29. Federico Laudisa (2008). Non-Local Realistic Theories and the Scope of the Bell Theorem. Foundations of Physics 38 (12):1110-1132.score: 84.0
    According to a widespread view, the Bell theorem establishes the untenability of so-called ‘local realism’. On the basis of this view, recent proposals by Leggett, Zeilinger and others have been developed according to which it can be proved that even some non-local realistic theories have to be ruled out. As a consequence, within this view the Bell theorem allows one to establish that no reasonable form of realism, be it local or non-local, can be made compatible with the (experimentally tested) (...)
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  30. Michela Massimi (2004). Non‐Defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):36-60.score: 78.0
    Experimental realism aims at striking a middle ground between scientific realism and anti-realism, between the success of experimental physics it would explain and the realism about scientific theories it would supplant. This middle ground reinstates the engineering idea that belief in scientific entities is justified on purely experimental grounds, without any commitment to scientific theories and laws. This paper argues that there is no defensible middle ground to be staked out when it comes to justifying physicists' belief in colored quarks, (...)
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  31. Anjan Chakravartty, Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of Non-Eliminative, Ontic Structural Realism.score: 78.0
    The number of positions identified with structural realism in philosophical debates about scientific knowledge has grown significantly in the past decade, particularly with respect to the metaphysical or ‘ontic’ approach (OSR). In recent years, several advocates of OSR have proposed a novel understanding of it in order to side-step a serious challenge faced by its original formulation, eliminative OSR. I examine the conceptual basis of the new, noneliminative view, and conclude that it too faces a serious challenge, resulting in a (...)
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  32. Héctor Cuadra Montiel (2007). Critical Realism and the Strategic-Relational Approach: Comments on a Non-Typical KWNS–SWPR Experience. Journal of Critical Realism 6 (1):84-110.score: 78.0
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  33. Manuel Pérez Otero (2002). Reasoning About Non-Actual Possibilities. Problems with the Douven-Putnam Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism (Razonar Sobre Posibilidades Contrafácticas. Los Problemas Del Argumento Teórico-Modelista de Douven-Putnam Contra El Realismo Metafísico). Crítica 34 (102):29 - 45.score: 78.0
    Igor Douven has offered an original reconstruction and defence of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Douven's construal has notable exegetical virtues, since it makes sense of some assumptions in Putnam's argument which his opponents have considered question-begging or puzzling. In this article I provide an indirect defence of metaphysical realism, by showing why this new version of the anti-realist argument should also be rejected. The main problems in the Douven-Putnam argument come from ascribing to the realist a distorted view (...)
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  34. Paul Horwich (2006). A World Without Isms: Life After Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. 188.score: 78.0
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  35. John H. Finch & Robert McMaster (2003). A Pragmatic Alliance Between Critical Realism and Simple Non-Parametric Statistical Techniques. In Paul Downward (ed.), Applied Economics and the Critical Realist Critique. Routledge. 129--150.score: 78.0
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  36. Mark Sainsbury (2002). Realism Vs Nominalism About theDispositional-Non-Dispositional Distinction. In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism. Ashgate. 160.score: 78.0
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  37. Michael Ridge (2007). Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.score: 72.0
    In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how (...)
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  38. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah (forthcoming). Metaethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Moral Constructivism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.score: 72.0
    The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and between (...)
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  39. Matthias Egg (2013). The Foundational Significance of Leggett's Non-Local Hidden-Variable Theories. Foundations of Physics 43 (7):872-880.score: 72.0
    Laudisa (Found. Phys. 38:1110–1132, 2008) claims that experimental research on the class of non-local hidden-variable theories introduced by Leggett is misguided, because these theories are irrelevant for the foundations of quantum mechanics. I show that Laudisa’s arguments fail to establish the pessimistic conclusion he draws from them. In particular, it is not the case that Leggett-inspired research is based on a mistaken understanding of Bell’s theorem, nor that previous no-hidden-variable theorems already exclude Leggett’s models. Finally, I argue that the framework (...)
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  40. Heather Dyke (2012). Propositions: Truth Vs. Existence. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Ratiois Defensor.score: 72.0
    I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a series of theses (...)
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  41. Richard B. Miller (1993). Genuine Modal Realism: Still the Only Non-Circular Game in Town. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):159 – 160.score: 72.0
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  42. Matthew McGrath (1998). Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):113-127.score: 72.0
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  43. Eberhard Herrmann (2008). On the Distinction Between the Concept of God and Conceptions of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (2):63 - 73.score: 72.0
    The starting-point is the distinction between concept and conception. Our conceptions of gold, for instance, are the different understandings we get when we hear the word ‘gold’ whereas the concept of gold consists in the scientific determination of what gold is. It depends on the context whether it is more reasonable to claim a concept or to look for fitting conceptions. By arguing against metaphysical realism and for non-metaphysical realism, I will elaborate on some philosophical reasons for dealing with conceptions (...)
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  44. William J. Wainwright (2010). In Defense of Non-Natural Theistic Realism. Faith and Philosophy 27 (4):457-463.score: 72.0
    Eric Wielenberg and I agree that basic moral truths are necessarily true. But Wielenberg thinks that, because these truths are necessary, they require no explanation, and I do not: some basic moral truths are not self-explanatory. I argue that Wielenberg’s reasons for thinking that my justification of that claim is inadequate are ultimately unconvincing.
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  45. Ulysses T. Araña (2009). Yes to Realism! No to Non-Naturalism! Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):98.score: 72.0
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  46. Gang Chen (2009). Hierarchy, Form, and Reality. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (3):437-453.score: 72.0
    Scientific progress in the 20th century has shown that the structure of the world is hierarchical. A philosophical analysis of the hierarchy will bear obvious significance for metaphysics and philosophy in general. Jonathan Schaffer’s paper, “Is There a Fundamental Level?”, provides a systematic review of the works in the field, the difficulties for various versions of fundamentalism, and the prospect for the third option, i.e., to treat each level as ontologically equal. The purpose of this paper is to provide an (...)
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  47. William Fitzpatrick (2008). Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:159-205.score: 72.0
  48. Robert Sokolowski (1992). Husserl and Analytic Philosophy and Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):725-730.score: 72.0
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  49. Robert Sokolowski (1992). Review: Review Essay: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy and Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):725 - 730.score: 72.0
  50. Richard Cobb-Stevens (1992). Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Review of Metaphysics 45 (4):850-852.score: 72.0
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