Search results for 'Non-reductive physicalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Non-Reductive Physicalism (2010). 2 On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness. In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge 6--25.
     
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  2. Jessica M. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
    Some claim that Non- reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between (...)
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  3.  73
    Michael Baumgartner (2013). Rendering Interventionism and Non‐Reductive Physicalism Compatible. Dialectica 67 (1):1-27.
    In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an ‘interventionist turn’. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of non-reducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventionist exclusion argument showing that interventionism is in fact incompatible with non-reductive physicalism. In response, a number of revised versions of interventionism have been suggested (...)
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  4.  21
    Daniel Lim (2014). Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience (...)
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  5. Andrew Melnyk (2008). Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive? Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.
    Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.
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  6. Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
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  7.  35
    Carl Gillett (2010). Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Principia 6 (1):89-120.
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positons are committed to an untenabie combination of both 'upward' and 'dounward' determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis in 'Completeness of Physics' (CoP). (...)
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  8.  19
    Carl Gillett (2002). Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist Metaphysics for 'Downward' Determination. Principia 6 (1):89-120.
    Iaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challen,ge to both emergentism cmd ncm-reductIve physicalism lyy providing arguments that these positums are cornmitted to an untenabie combmation of both `upwarcit and 'clouniwardi determmation. In secuon 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realiza:0n relatzon underlies such sicepucal arguments However, tn secuon 2, I suggest that such conclusicrns involve a confusion between the implications of physicahsm and those of a related thesis the Vompleteness of Physics' (Co?) I show (...)
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  9.  33
    Andrew Melnyk (2014). Pereboom's Robust Non-Reductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 79 (5):1191-1207.
    Derk Pereboom has recently elaborated a formulation of non-reductive physicalism in which supervenience does not play the central role and realization plays no role at all; he calls his formulation “robust non-reductive physicalism”. This paper argues that for several reasons robust non-reductive physicalism is inadequate as a formulation of physicalism: it can only rule out fundamental laws of physical-to-mental emergence by stipulating that there are no such laws; it fails to entail the supervenience (...)
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  10. Susan Schneider (2013). Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem 1. Noûs 47 (1):135-153.
    Most answers to the mind-body problem are claims about the nature of mental properties and substances. But advocates of non-reductive physicalism have generally neglected the topic of the nature of substance, quickly nodding to the view that all substances are physical, while focusing their intellectual energy on understanding how mental properties relate to physical ones. Let us call the view that all substances are physical or are exhaustively composed of physical substances substance physicalism (SP). Herein, I argue (...)
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  11. Markus E. Schlosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos
    Given some reasonable assumptions concerning the nature of mental causation, non-reductive physicalism faces the following dilemma. If mental events cause physical events, they merely overdetermine their effects (given the causal closure of the physical). If mental events cause only other mental events, they do not make the kind of difference we want them to. This dilemma can be avoided if we drop the dichotomy between physical and mental events. Mental events make a real difference if they cause actions. (...)
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  12.  77
    Andrew Russo (2011). The Supervenience Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
    This short paper is a "quick and dirty" introduction for non-philosophers (with some background in propositional logic) to Jaegwon Kim's famous supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism (also known as the exclusion problem). It motivates the problem of mental causation, introduces Kim's formulation of the issue centered around mind-body supervenience, presents the argument in deductive form, and makes explicit why Kim concludes that vindicating mental causation demands a reduction of mind.
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  13. Julie Yoo (2008). New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism. In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitget (eds.), Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences.
    Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses: first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true. Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other. In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kim’s criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible.
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  14.  41
    Jeff Yoshimi (2012). Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.
    It is often claimed (1) that levels of nature are related by supervenience, and (2) that processes occurring at particular levels of nature should be studied using dynamical systems theory. However, there has been little consideration of how these claims are related. To address the issue, I show how supervenience relations give rise to ‘supervenience functions’, and use these functions to show how dynamical systems at different levels are related to one another. I then use this analysis to describe a (...)
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  15. Jessica M. Wilson (2011). Non-Reductive Realization and the Powers-Based Subset Strategy. The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.
    I argue that an adequate account of non-reductive realization must guarantee satisfaction of a certain condition on the token causal powers associated with (instances of) realized and realizing entities---namely, what I call the 'Subset Condition on Causal Powers' (first introduced in Wilson 1999). In terms of states, the condition requires that the token powers had by a realized state on a given occasion be a proper subset of the token powers had by the state that realizes it on that (...)
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  16.  49
    Ralph Wedgwood (2000). The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Noûs 34 (3):400-421.
    Nonreductive physicalism faces a serious objection: physicalism entails the existence of an enormous number of modal facts--specifically, facts about exactly which physical properties necessitate each mental property; and, it seems, if mental properties are irreducible, these modal facts cannot all be satisfactorily explained. The only answer to this objection is to claim that the explanations of these modal facts are themselves contingent. This claim requires rejecting "S5" as the appropriate logic for metaphysical modality. Finally, it is argued that (...)
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  17. A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press
  18. Sven Walter (2006). Causal Exclusion as an Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):67-83.
  19.  58
    Susan Schneider (2012). Non-Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):719-728.
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  20. J. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
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  21. Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchill (2010). Is Non-Reductive Physicalism Viable Within a Causal Powers Metaphysic? In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press
     
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  22.  4
    Robert Van Gulick (2011). Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind. Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):1-2.
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  23. Paul Mainwood, How is Non-Reductive Physicalism Possible.
     
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  24.  3
    Antti Heikinheimo (2011). Rule-Following, Intentionality and Non-Reductive Physicalism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):36-59.
  25. Carl Gillett (2009). On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism. In T. O'connor & A. Corradini (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge
  26.  2
    Markus E. Sciilosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos Verlag 12--73.
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  27. Robert Van Gulick (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind. Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):103-124.
     
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  28. Antti Heikinheimo (2011). Rule-Following, Intentionality and Non-Reductive Physicalism. SATS 12 (1).
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  29. Jessica M. Wilson (1999). How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):33-52.
    Note: this is the first published presentation and defense of the 'proper subset strategy' for making sense of non-reductive physicalism or the associated notion of realization; this is sometimes, inaccurately, called "Shoemaker's subset strategy"; if people could either call it the 'subset strategy' or better yet, add my name to the mix I would appreciate it. Horgan claims that physicalism requires "superdupervenience" -- supervenience plus robust ontological explanation of the supervenient in terms of the base (...)
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  30.  23
    Robert C. Bishop (2012). Excluding the Causal Exclusion Argument Against Non-Redirective Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):57-74.
    A much discussed argument in the philosophy of mind against non-reductive physicalism leads to the conclusion that all genuine causes involved in mental phenomena must be reductive physical causes. The latter ostensibly exclude any other causes from having genuine effects in human thought and behaviour. Jaegwon Kim has been the chief exponent of this line of argument, calling it variously the causal exclusion argument or the supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. I will analyse this argument and (...)
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  31.  21
    Jeff Engelhardt (2015). Property Reductive Emergent Dualism. Philosophia 43 (1):63-75.
    This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: (...)
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  32.  59
    Erhan Demircioglu (2011). Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
    Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional (...)
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  33. Jaegwon Kim (1989). The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
    Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive.
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  34.  57
    Thomas Kroedel & Moritz Schulz (forthcoming). Grounding Mental Causation. Synthese:1-15.
    This paper argues that the exclusion problem for mental causation can be solved by a variant of non-reductive physicalism that takes the mental not merely to supervene on, but to be grounded in, the physical. A grounding relation between events can be used to establish a principle that links the causal relations of grounded events to those of grounding events. Given this principle, mental events and their physical grounds either do not count as overdetermining physical effects, or they (...)
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  35. Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.
    For over 20 years, Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument has stood as the major hurdle for non-reductive physicalism. If successful, Kim’s argument would show that the high-level properties posited by non-reductive physicalists must either be identical with lower-level physical properties, or else must be causally inert. The most prominent objection to the Causal Exclusion Argument—the so-called Overdetermination Objection—points out that there are some notions of causation that are left untouched by the argument. If causation is simply counterfactual (...)
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  36.  62
    Sven Walter (2010). Taking Realization Seriously: No Cure for Epiphobia. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 151 (2):207 - 226.
    The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called non-reductive physicalism because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and, despite their irreducibility, their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of realization has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind until a couple of years ago authors like Carl (...)
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  37.  50
    Thomas Kroedel (2015). A Simple Argument for Downward Causation. Synthese 192 (3):841-858.
    Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been (...)
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  38.  39
    Nicholas Schroeder (2015). A Physicalistic Account of Emergentism. Axiomathes 25 (4):479-494.
    Jaegwon Kim’s argument against non-reductive physicalism is well known. Many philosophers take Kim’s argument to also apply to emergentism. But this does not necessarily follow. In this paper, I will first briefly show why Kim’s argument against non-reductive physicalism need not apply to emergentism. Next, I will present a physicalistic account of emergentism offered by Jason Megill in his paper “A Defense of Emergence.” This will be followed by an examination of some of the limitations of (...)
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  39.  63
    Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism (...)
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  40.  22
    James Blachowicz (2013). The Constraint Interpretation of Physical Emergence. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):21-40.
    I develop a variant of the constraint interpretation of the emergence of purely physical (non-biological) entities, focusing on the principle of the non-derivability of actual physical states from possible physical states (physical laws) alone. While this is a necessary condition for any account of emergence, it is not sufficient, for it becomes trivial if not extended to types of constraint that specifically constitute physical entities, namely, those that individuate and differentiate them. Because physical organizations with these features are in fact (...)
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  41.  51
    Joseph A. Baltimore (2010). Defending the Piggyback Principle Against Shapiro and Sober's Empirical Approach. Synthese 175 (2):151-168.
    Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with (...)
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  42.  24
    Dwayne Moore & Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism (...)
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  43.  29
    John Donaldson (2014). The Super-Overdetermination Problem. Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how (...)
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  44. Andrew Melnyk (2006). Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):127-55.
    Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having (...)
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  45.  14
    Brian Jonathan Garrett (1997). Causal Relevance and the Mental: Towards a Non-Reductive Metaphysics. Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
    My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states , then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim that our explanatory practice should (...)
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  46.  31
    Andrew Botterell (2005). Review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 114:125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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  47. Susan Schneider (2012). Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.
    I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.
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  48.  23
    José L. Falguera & Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez (forthcoming). Incommensurability, Comparability, and Non-Reductive Ontological Relations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-22.
    We begin by highlighting some points related to Kuhn’s later thoughts on the incommensurability thesis and then show to what extent the standard version of the thesis given by the structuralist metatheory allows us to capture Kuhn’s ideas. Our main aim is to establish what constitutes the basis of comparability between incommensurable theories, even in cases of incommensurability with respect to theoretical and non-theoretical terms. We propose that comparability between incommensurable theories requires some connection between their respective ontologies that can (...)
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  49. Fernando Birman (2009). Quantum Mechanics and the Plight of Physicalism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):207-225.
    The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physical ism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental , such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some “final theory of (...)
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  50.  4
    Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino & Jean Pierre Noël Llored (2016). Reality Without Reification: Philosophy of Chemistry’s Contribution to Philosophy of Mind. In Grant Fisher Eric Scerri (ed.), Essays in the Philosophy of Chemistry. Oxford University Press 83-110.
    In this essay, we argue that there exist obvious parallels between questions that inform philosophy of chemistry and the so-called hard problem of consciousness in philosophy of mind. These include questions regarding the emergence of higher-level phenomena from lower-level physical states, the reduction of higher-level phenomena to lower-level physical states, and 'downward causation'. We, therefore, propose that the 'hard problem' of consciousness should be approached in a manner similar to that used to address parallel problems in philosophy of chemistry. Thus, (...)
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