Meinong introduces the concept of implexive being and nonbeing to explain the metaphysics of universals, and as a contribution to the theory of reference and perception. Meinong accounts for Aristotle's doctrine of the inherence of secondary substances in primary substances in object theory terms as the implection of incomplete universals in complete existent or subsistent objects. The derivative notion of implexive so-being is developed by Meinong to advance an intuitive modal semantics that admits degrees of possibility. A set theoretical (...) interpretation of Meinong's mereological concept of the implection of incomplete beingless objects in existent or subsistent complete objects is proposed. The implications of Meinong's concept of implection are exploited to answer extensionalist objections about "Meinong's jungle", defending the ontic economy of an extraontological neo-Meinongian semantic domain that supports individual reference and true predication of constitutive properties to beingless objects. (shrink)
Jewish Messianism and the History of Philosophy contests the ancient opposition between Athens and Jerusalem by retrieval of the concept of meontology - the doctrine of nonbeing - in one strand of the Jewish philosophical and theological tradition. This book offers new readings of important figures in contemporary Continental philosophy, critiquing arguments about the role of lived religion in the thought of Jacques Derrida, the role of Greek philosophy in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, and the ethical import of (...) the thought of Franz Rosenzweig. Kavka argues that the Greek concept of nonbeing (understood as both lack and possibility) clarifies the meaning of Jewish life. This concept allows these thinkers to articulate Jewish life as centered on messianic anticipation, the hungering after a stasis that philosophy has traditionally associated with the concept of being. (shrink)
On Thomas Reid's 18thC theory of psychology and ontology, our conception of primary qualities was original and our conception of secondary qualities was acquired. The conception of both was a response to sensations. In the Inquiry Reid insisted that our original conceptions were automatic and irresistible, while in the Essays he insisted that our conception of general attributes arises from a two step process of abstraction and generalization. These doctrines are rendered consistent by a distinction between particular attributes, which exist (...) and are conceived by abstraction, and general attributes, which do not exist and are conceived by generalization guided by their utility in knowledge and communication. (shrink)
In De veritate I.2, Thomas Aquinas claims that “to every true act of understanding there must correspond some being and likewise to every being there corresponds a true act of understanding.” For Aquinas, the ratio of truth consists in a conformity between intellect and being. This account of truth, however, doesnot appear to allow for a certain class of truths, namely those that are about nonbeings. Many think that it is true that ‘no chimeras exist,’ that ‘blindness can becaused by (...) exposure to bright lights,’ and that ‘evil should be avoided.’ Yet, in each of these cases of truth, there does not appear to be a being to which the intellectconforms. In this paper, I will explore the ways in which Aquinas’s notion of truth as “conformity to being” is able to accommodate truths about nonbeings. (shrink)
The following is my interpretation of the philosophy of Parmenides of Elea , the Greek father of metaphysics. His only work, On Nature , is written in rather obscure verse, and so his thesis can be viewed from a variety of perspectives, of which mine is only one (although a fairly standard one). Parmenides' most important principle, hereafter called "Parmenides' Principle", was that anything rationally conceivable must exist. Nonbeing is not a thing and can neither be thought of nor (...) spoken about in any meaningful or coherent way. Parmenides forbade talking as if there are possible things that nonetheless do not exist. He illustrated this principle by showing us three possible methods of inquiry, of which only one is valid. The following chart summarizes them. (shrink)
Parmenides expelled nonbeing from the realm of knowledge and forbade us to think or talk about it. But still there has been a long tradition of nay-sayings throughout the history of Western and Eastern philosophy. Are those philosophers talking about the same nonbeing or nothing? If not, how do their concepts of nothing differ from each other? Could there be different types of nothing? Surveying the traditional classifications of nothing or nonbeing in the East and West have (...) led me to develop a typology of nothing that consists of three main types: 1) privative nothing, commonly known as absence; 2) negative nothing, the altogether not or absolute nothing; and finally 3) original nothing, the nothing that is equivalent to being. I will test my threefold typology of nothing by comparing the similarities and differences between the conceptions of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. With this study, I hope that I will clarify some confusion in the understanding of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism, and shed light on the central philosophical issue of “what there is not”. (shrink)
God -- On the cognitivity of mystical experiences -- The problem of evil -- God eternal and Paul helm -- A new cosmological argument, co-authored with Alexander Pruss -- A response to oppy and to Davey and Clifton -- Co-authored with Alexander Pruss -- The ecumenicalism of William James -- Time -- Is it now now? -- McTaggart's analysis of time -- The egocentric particular and token-reflexive analyses of tense -- The impossibility of backward causation -- An identity theory of (...) the A- and B-series -- Co-authored with Michelle Beer -- Disanalogies between space and time -- Nonbeing -- Negative statements -- On what there isn't -- Nonbeing and the receptacle -- Could logical space be empty? (shrink)
"The Sophist seems to be concerned with two things: being and nonbeing, on the one hand, and true and false speech, on the other. If speech is either true or false speech, it seems not even plausible for being to be either being or nonbeing, since we would then be compelled to say that nonbeing is as much being as false speech is speech. If nonbeing, however, is being, then nonbeing cannot be nonbeing, for (...) otherwise the falseness of false speech would not consist in its saying 'nonbeing.' And, in turn, if nonbeing is nonbeing, the falseness of' false speech again cannot consist in its saying 'nonbeing,' for it would then not be saying anything. If we then say that nonbeing is appearing, and appearing is not unqualified nonbeing, being is being and appearing, and we want to distinguish between the strict identity which belongs to being and the likeness of' nonbeing to the strict identity of being. We say, then, 'Here is Socrates himself' and 'Here is a likeness of Socrates.' Everything in the likeness of Socrates that is a likeness of' Socrates himself will generate a true speech of Socrates identical to another speech true of Socrates himself. Everything, how ever, in the likeness of Socrates that is not a likeness of Socrates himself yields a false speech of Socrates. Among the false speeches of Socrates would be, for example, the paint on Socrates' portrait but not the color of the paint that is true of Socrates himself. The paint, then, without the color (per impossibile), is not true of Socrates, but it certainly is not a likeness of Socrates either. The paint must be together with its color in order for it to be both a likeness of Socrates and nonbeing, but it seems to be utterly mysterious how by being together it can be that and by being apart it ceases to be anything of the sort. If every thing then is just what it is and nothing else, it is impossible for there to be any speech, either true or false, for speech is impossible unless something can be put together with something else.. (shrink)
This essay argues two main points by analyzing Sengzhaoâs contentions regarding several basic Buddhist concepts such as emptiness, being, and nonbeing. First, Sengzhao synthesizes Daoist methods of argumentation into his description of the middle path and other Buddhist concepts. Second, he revives Daoist concepts, giving them Buddhist meaning and expressing them in Buddhist terms. In the process, he consciously differentiates Madhyamika Buddhism from earlier Buddhism as understood from a Daoist perspective, such as the teachings of the School of Original (...) Non-Being and the School of No-Mind. However, because his understanding of the middle path is not sufficiently deep, he wavers between Buddhist and Daoist understandings of terms such as prajÃ±Ä and nirvÄá¹a, rest and movement, and name and reality. Despite these inconsistencies, his discourse, as the first attempt to differentiate Madhyamika from Daoism, is still a milestone in the development of Chinese Buddhism and has exerted a far-reaching influence on later generations. (shrink)
St. Thomas Aquinas has been considered a kairos in intellectual history for seeing God’s essence as being. Martin Heidegger criticized philosophers forrepresenting being as a be-ing and identifying it with God, and Jean-Luc Marion speaks of “God without being.” In her Potency and Act Edith Stein introduced thecategory of being without essence, but such being is not God but “the opposite.” For St. Augustine sin was an approach to nonbeing, and Stein saw it leading to a“displacement into nonbeing,” (...) to an “annihilation” where only a “null being” is retained. This eschatological reflection is an intriguing aspect of her “fusion” ofscholasticism and phenomenology. (shrink)
Quine may be taken to use the phrase ‘Plato's Beard’ to denote a solution to the following problem: How is it possible to speak of that which does not exist, of non-being or as Read has it, to denote a solution to the problem: ‘How can a sentence with empty names have meaning?’. Quine writes: Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Plato's beard; historically it has proved (...) tough, frequently dulling the edge of Occam's razor. To expand. If nonbeing in no sense is, then we cannot ever assert that it is not; yet if it in some sense is, then how can it remain nonbeing? Let us fill out with an example (coined from Quine). If Pegasus in no sense exists, then how can we ever assert that Pegasus does not exist?—yet we may clearly want to assert that Pegasus does not exist and affirm the proposition that it is false that Pegasus exists. If, on the other hand, Pegasus in some sense exists, how may we affirm that he does not? We shall be contradicting ourselves or be guilty of equivocation. (shrink)
Oriental thought requires the introduction of a novel metaphysical concept of nonbeing, along with being, to exhibit the dynamics of becoming. The initial contact of being and nonbeing is the basis of aesthetic nature and the fountainhead of Oriental aesthetics.
Nots is a virtuoso exploration of negation and negativity in theology, philosophy, art, architecture, postmodern culture, and medicine. In nine essays that range from nihility in Buddhism to the embodiment of negativity in disease, Mark C. Taylor looks at the surprising ways in which contrasting concepts of negativity intersect. In the first section of this book, Taylor discusses the question of the "not" in the religious thought of Anselm, Hegel, Derrida, and Nishitani. In the second part, he analyzes artistic (...) efforts "to figure not" in the work of artists Arakawa and Madeline Gins, architect Daniel Libeskind, pop artist David Sallee, and pop icon Madonna. The final section consists of a deeply personal and scientifically informed chapter that discusses the workings of negativity in immunology and illness. Taylor's essays work toward a sense of the not as unnameable as it is irrepressible--an "unthinkable third" that falls between being and nonbeing. Bringing together concerns that span Taylor's early investigations of Hegel and Kierkegaard and recent studies of art and architecture, Nots is an important contribution by one of the most original and distinctive voices now writing on the American scene. Religion and Postmodernism series. (shrink)
This essay considers the ‘limit’ in Derrida's work from the early consideration of linearisation in ‘Ousia and Grammē’ to the conception of limit as aporia in Aporias. Developing Derrida's tripartite definition of the limit via a reading of Being and Time as closure, border and demarcation, the essay then considers the earlier presentation of limit in Heidegger as temporal primordiality. Developing the metaphysics of line as presentation of presence in terms of Aristotle's aporetics of time as line, the circle is (...) then considered as representing the closed field of presence and its definition via the negation of being's other. This leads to Derrida's early, foundational definition of the law of metaphysics as submission-subtraction, and his proposal of the trace as an alternate way of thinking spatially about being, nonbeing and difference. The second half of the essay then proposes a series of alternative ways of thinking geometrically to those of the traditional metaphysics of point-line-circle topography. Thus topology is proposed as an alternate means of thinking field enclosure, similarity and difference. The figures of the double torus and mathematical limit are proposed as a potential alternative geometry for Western thought. Finally the essay concludes on the apotropaic logic of the problem which echoes that of the trace and is developed in contradistinction to the aporia. Proposing the edge as an interim state between the metaphysics of the line and the deconstructive impossibilities of the aporia, it suggests that the limits of metaphysics are to be found not merely in the apotropaic law of submission-subtraction, but also across alternate geometries which facilitate the bringing together of the two central elements of the totality of Derrida's thinking the limit: différance and singularity. (shrink)
Henri J. Renard, S. J.: a sketch, by J. P. Jelinek.--The good as undefinable, by M. Childress.--Gottlieb Söhngen's sacramental doctrine on the mass, by J. F. Clarkson.--Christ's eucharistic action and history, by B. J. Cooke.--Objective reality of human ideas: Descartes and Suarez, by T. J. Cronin.--A medieval commentator on some Aristotelian educational themes, by J. W. Donohue.--God as sole cause of existence, by M. Holloway.--Knowledge, commitment, and the real, by R. O. Johann.--John Locke and sense realism, by H. R. Klocker.--The (...) being of nonbeing in Plato's Sophist, by Q. Lauer.--Ethics and verification, by R. McInerny.--Analogy and the fourth way, by J. J. O'Brien.--Love and being, by W. L. Rossner.--Complexity in human knowledge: its basis in form/matter composition, by E. L. Rousseau.--Toward a more dynamic understanding of substance and relation, by J. M. Somerville.--The origin of participant and of participated perfections in Proclus' Elements of theology, by L. Sweeney. (shrink)
Aristotle twice affirms that being is better than nonbeing. Throughout the corpus—in both practical and theoretical works—he explicates this claim in terms of three main concepts, each of which serves to link being with goodness. These include completeness and self-sufficiency, which are well-known from Aristotle’s ethics and politics. Even more fundamental, however, are the closely related concepts of order and determinacy, which the present essay explores. Beginning with the causal role of the good in Aristotle’s accounts of nature and (...) human life, it proceeds to his identification of order as characterizing both the being and the goodness of natural things. After pausing to consider the relation between goodness and beauty, it then moves from order to determinacy as a general characteristic of being by examining his concepts of limit and the unlimited. It concludes by discussing determinacy and the good in Aristotle’s ethics and metaphysics. (shrink)
Existence -- Categories and distinctions : on classification and taxonomy in metaphysical perspective -- Complexity -- Truth and reality : factual truth as grounded in reality -- Process : on substance and process in metaphysics -- Pragmatic idealism and metaphysical realism -- Scientific realism : the limits of science as revelator of the real -- Nonexistence and nonbeing : on possibilities and merely possible individuals -- Knowledge and its limits : on quantifying knowledge : and essay in epistemetrics -- (...) Explicability and sufficient reason : on the price of an ultimate theory -- Optimalism and the rationality of the real : on the prospect of axiological explanation. (shrink)
