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  1. E. Vayena, R. Brownsword, S. J. Edwards, B. Greshake, J. P. Kahn, N. Ladher, J. Montgomery, D. O'Connor, O. O'Neill, M. P. Richards, A. Rid, M. Sheehan, P. Wicks & J. Tasioulas (forthcoming). Research Led by Participants: A New Social Contract for a New Kind of Research. Journal of Medical Ethics.
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  2. Onora O'Neill, Civic and Cosmopolitan Justice.
    This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 2000, given by Onora O'Neill, a British philosopher.
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  3. Onora O'neill (2013). Who Can Endeavour Peace? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1):41-73.
    (1986). Who Can Endeavour Peace? Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 41-73.
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  4. Onora O'Neill (2012). Global Poverty and the Limits of Academic Expertise. Ethics and International Affairs 26 (2):183-189.
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  5. Onora O'Neill (2012). Kant and the Social Contract Tradition. In Elisabeth Ellis (ed.), Kant's Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications. Pennsylvania State University Press.
  6. Onora O'Neill (2012). The Jurisprudence Annual Lecture 2012 Making Laws Better or Making Better Laws? Jurisprudence 3 (1):1-12.
    Accounts of good legislative process require a prior understanding of the features that make laws good. Yet many contemporary discussions of ways to improve legislative process say little about the quality of laws. Although it is widely taken as read that laws should not be unjust, too little is said about the importance of their being comprehensible and ascertainable, or about the requirements they set being feasible for those who are to comply. It is unclear whether certain widely discussed ways (...)
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  7. O. O'Neill (2010). Rights, Obligations, Priorities. Studies in Christian Ethics 23 (2):163-171.
    In Justice: Rights and Wrongs Nicholas Wolterstorff argues for the priority of rights over obligations, and suggests that assigning priority to obligations will take too little account of the wrongs suffered by many types of victim. In this comment on the book I suggest various reasons for assigning priority to obligations, emphasise the importance of offering an account of imperfect as well as perfect obligations, and question the reading of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork on which some of Wolterstorff’s arguments against the (...)
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  8. Onora O'Neill (2010). Amartya Sen: The Idea of Justice. Journal of Philosophy 107 (7).
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  9. Onora O'neill (2010). The Idea of Justice. Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):384-388.
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  10. Onora O'neill (2009). Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3):219-230.
  11. Onora O'Neill (2009). A Simplified Account of Kant's Ethics. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Ethics: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  12. Onora O'Neill (2009). Ethics for Communication? European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):167-180.
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  13. Onora O'Neill (2009). Humanity and Hyper-Regulation : From Nuremberg to Helsinki. In N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen & Jeff McMahan (eds.), Ethics and Humanity: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Katrin Flikschuh, Jens Timmermann & Onora O'Neill (2007). Brill Online Books and Journals. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2).
     
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  15. Onora O'Neill (2007). Experts, Practitioners, and Practical Judgement. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2):154-166.
    Kant challenges the well-worn view that practitioners do not need to rely on theory. He acknowledges that experts with a deep knowledge of theory may fail as practitioners both in technical matters, and in matters of morality and justice. However, since action-guiding theories are intended to shape rather than to fit the world, practitioners have no point of reference other than the theories or principles that they seek to enact. If theories of duty appear to offer too little guidance for (...)
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  16. Onora O'Neill (2007). Normativity and Practical Judgement. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):393-405.
    Norms are apt for reasoning because they have propositional structure and content; they are practical because they aim to guide action, rather than to describe aspects of the world. These two features hold equally of norms construed sociologically as the norms of specific social groups, and of norms conceived abstractly as principles of action. On either view, norms are indeterminate while acts are particular and determinate. Consequently norms cannot fully specify which particular act is to be done. Are they then (...)
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  17. Onora O'Neill (2007). 7 Trust and Autonomy. In Julian Baggini & Jeremy Stangroom (eds.), What More Philosophers Think. Continuum. 66.
     
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  18. Onora O'neill (2004). Consequences for Non-Consequentialists. Utilitas 16 (1):1-11.
    Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical reasoning have difficulties in accounting for the value of consequences. Taken neat, consequentialism is too fierce in its emphasis on success and disregard of luck, while non-consequentialism seemingly over-values inner states and undervalues actual results. In Uneasy Virtue Julia Driver proposes a form of objective consequentialism which claims that characters are good if they typically (but not invariably) produce good results. This position addresses the problems moral luck raises for consequentialism, but requires some form of (...)
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  19. Onora O'neill (2004). Kant: Racjonalność jako rozum praktyczny. Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 52 (4):125-145.
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  20. Onora O'Neill (2004). Modern Moral Philosophy and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54:301-316.
    Anscombe's indictment of modern moral philosophy is full-blooded. She began with three strong claims: The first is that is not profitable to do moral philosophy… until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation and duty… and of the moral sense of ‘ought’, ought to be jettisoned… because they are derivatives… from an earlier conception of ethics… and are only harmful without it. The third thesis is that (...)
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  21. O. O'Neill (2003). Some Limits of Informed Consent. Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (1):4-7.
    Many accounts of informed consent in medical ethics claim that it is valuable because it supports individual autonomy. Unfortunately there are many distinct conceptions of individual autonomy, and their ethical importance varies. A better reason for taking informed consent seriously is that it provides assurance that patients and others are neither deceived nor coerced. Present debates about the relative importance of generic and specific consent do not address this issue squarely. Consent is a propositional attitude, so intransitive: complete, wholly specific (...)
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  22. Onora O'Neill (2003). Autonomy: The Emperor's New Clothes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):1–21.
    Conceptions of individual autonomy and of rational autonomy have played large parts in twentieth century moral philosophy, yet it is hard to see how either could be basic to morality. Kant's conception of autonomy is radically different. He predicated autonomy neither of individual selves nor of processes of choosing, but of principles of action. Principles of action are Kantianly autonomous only if they are law-like in form and could be universal in scope; they are heteronomous if, although law-like in form, (...)
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  23. Onora O'neill (2003). 9 Constructivism in Rawls and Kant1. In Samuel Richard Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge University Press. 347.
  24. Onora O'Neill (2003). Constructivism VS. Contractualism. Ratio 16 (4):319–331.
  25. Onora O'Neill (2003). The Inaugural Address: Autonomy: The Emperor's New Clothes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77:1 - 21.
    Conceptions of individual autonomy and of rational autonomy have played large parts in twentieth century moral philosophy, yet it is hard to see how either could be basic to morality. Kant's conception of autonomy is radically different. He predicated autonomy neither of individual selves nor of processes of choosing, but of principles of action. Principles of action are Kantianly autonomous only if they are law-like in form and could be universal in scope; they are heteronomous if, although law-like in form, (...)
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  26. Onora O'neill & Katrin Flikschuh (2003). Bounds of Justice. Political Theory 31 (2):315-318.
     
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  27. Onora O'Neill (2002). Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Why has autonomy been a leading idea in philosophical writing on bioethics, and why has trust been marginal? In this important book, Onora O'Neill suggests that the conceptions of individual autonomy so widely relied on in bioethics are philosophically and ethically inadequate, and that they undermine rather than support relations of trust. She shows how Kant's non-individualistic view of autonomy provides a stronger basis for an approach to medicine, science and biotechnology, and does not marginalize untrustworthiness, while also explaining why (...)
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  28. Onora O'Neill (2002). Public Health or Clinical Ethics: Thinking Beyond Borders. Ethics and International Affairs 16 (2):35–45.
    A normatively adequate public health ethics needs to be anchored in political philosophy rather than in ethics. Its central ethical concerns are likely to include trust and justice, rather than autonomy and informed consent.
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  29. Quentin Skinner, Partha Dasgupta, Raymond Geuss, Melissa Lane, Peter Laslett, Onora O'Neill, W. G. Runciman & Andrew Kuper (2002). Political Philosophy: The View From Cambridge. Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (1):1–19.
    This article reports on a conversation convened by Quentin Skinner at the invitation of the Editors of The Journal of Political Philosophy and held in Cambridge on 13 February 2001.
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  30. O. O'Neill (2001). Informed Consent and Genetic Information. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 32 (4):689-704.
    In the last 25 years writing in bioethics, particularly in medical ethics, has generally claimed that action is ethically acceptable only if it receives informed consent from those affected. However, informed consent provides only limited justification, and may provide even less as new information technologies are used to store and handle personal data, including personal genetic data. The central philosophical weakness of relying on informed consent procedures for ethical justification is that consent is a propositional attitude, so referentially opaque: consent (...)
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  31. Onora O'Neill (2001). Agents of Justice. Metaphilosophy 32 (1-2):180-195.
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  32. Onora O'neill (2001). Practical Principles & Practical Judgment. Hastings Center Report 31 (4):15-23.
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  33. O. O'neill (1999). Vom Positivismus zum Pluralismus. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 47 (5):843-850.
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  34. Onora O'Neill, Reason and the Resolution of Disputes.
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  35. Onora O'neill (1999). Towards Justice and Virtue. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1103-1105.
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  36. Onora O'Neill (1998). Consistency in Action. In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. Oup Oxford.
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  37. Onora O'Neill (1998). Instituting Principles: Between Duty and Action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):79-96.
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  38. Onora O'Neill (1998). Kant. Kant's Virtues. In Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Clarendon Press.
     
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  39. Onora O'Neill (1998). Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature: Onora O'Neill. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):211–228.
    [Allen W. Wood] Kant's moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity's natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant's argumentative strategy for (...)
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  40. Allen W. Wood & Onora O'Neill (1998). Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):189–210.
    [Allen W. Wood] Kant's moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity's natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant's argumentative strategy for (...)
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  41. O. O'Neill (1997). Herlinde Pauer-Studer on Tugend Und Gerechtigkeit: Eine Konstruktive Darstellung des Praktischen Denkens by Onora O'Neill (Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning). European Journal of Philosophy 5:331-333.
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  42. Onora O'neill (1997). Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism. Environmental Values 6 (2):127 - 142.
    Ethical reasoning of all types is anthropocentric, in that it is addressed to agents, but anthropocentric starting points vary in the preference they accord the human species. Realist claims about environmental values, utilitarian reasoning and rights-based reasoning all have difficulties in according ethical concern to certain all aspects of natural world. Obligation-based reasoning can provide quite strong if incomplete reasons to protect the natural world, including individual non-human animals. Although it cannot establish all the conclusions to which anti-speciesists aspire, it (...)
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  43. Onora O'Neill (1997). Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism. Philosophical Review 106 (3):411-428.
  44. Onora O'Neill & Environmental Values (1997). Anthropocentrism and Speciesism'. Environmental Values 6:127-42.
     
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  45. O. O'Neill (1996). Medical and Scientific Uses of Human Tissue. Journal of Medical Ethics 22 (1):5-7.
    Inevitably a policy-oriented report on issues as complex and as rapidly changing as the medical and scientific uses of human tissue can achieve neither philosophical purity nor regulatory completeness. The council's strategy has been to begin with robust ethical principles, for which sound philosophical arguments can be given, which will (it is hoped) command widespread support. The council went on to argue for guidelines of sufficient, but not vapid, generality which could be of practical use to the various medical intermediaries, (...)
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  46. Onora O'Neill (1996). Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    Towards Justice and Virtue challenges the rivalry between those who advocate only abstract, universal principles of justice and those who commend only the particularities of virtuous lives. Onora O'Neill traces this impasse to defects in underlying conceptions of reasoning about action. She proposes and vindicates a modest account of ethical reasoning and a reasoned way of answering the question 'who counts?', then uses these to construct linked accounts of principles by which we can move towards just institutions and virtuous lives.
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  47. Onora O'neill (1994). Practical Reason and Possible Community: A Reply to Jean-Marc Ferry. Ratio Juris 7 (3):308-313.
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  48. Alexander Broadie, Desmond M. Clarke, Tom Sorell, Steven Nadler, Stephen Gaukroger, Sylvana Tomaselli, François Tricaud, Reinhardt Brandt, G. H. R. Parkinson, Leon Pompa, Onora O'Neill, Ralph C. S. Walker, Andrew Belsey, Michael Walsh & Andy Hamilton (1993). Book Review. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1 (1):127-175.
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  49. Onora O'Neill (1993). Duties and Virtues. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 35:107-120.
    Duty and virtue are no longer the common coin of daily conversation. Both terms strike many of us as old-fashioned and heavy handed. Yet we incessantly talk about what ought and ought not to be done, and about the sorts of persons we admire or despise. As soon as we talk in these ways we discuss topics traditionally dealt with under the headings of duty and of virtue. If we no longer use these terms, it may be because we associate (...)
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  50. Onora O'neill (1993). Kommunikative Rationalität und praktische Vernunft. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41 (2):329-332.
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