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Olaf L. Mueller [3]Olaf Mueller [2]
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Profile: Olaf L Müller (Humboldt-University, Berlin)
  1. Olaf Mueller (1998). Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? Erkenntnis 48 (1):85-104.
    Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In Word and Object, he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...)
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  2.  11
    Olaf L. Mueller (2016). Prismatic Equivalence – A New Case of Underdetermination: Goethe Vs. Newton on the Prism Experiments. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):323-347.
    Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than often acknowledged. You can accept the most important elements of these objections without disagreeing with Newton about light and colours. As I will argue, Goethe exposed a crucial weakness of Newton's methodological self-assessment. Newton believed that with the help of his prism experiments, he could prove that sunlight was composed of variously coloured rays of light. Goethe showed that this step from observation to theory is more problematic than (...)
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    Olaf L. Mueller (2003). Can They Say What They Want? A Transcendental Argument Against Utilitarianism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):241-259.
    Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...)
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    Olaf L. Mueller (2003). Can They Say What They Want? Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):241-259.
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    Olaf Mueller (1998). Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us From Defining Analyticity? On Fallacy in Quine. Erkenntnis 48 (1):81 - 99.
    Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...)
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