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Profile: Ole Koksvik (Bergen University)
  1. Ole Koksvik, Précis of Intuition.
    This thesis seeks to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that there is a class of mental states deserving of the label ‘intuition’, and which is a good candidate for a psychological kind, a kind which cuts the mind at its natural joints. These mental states are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character.
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  2. Ole Koksvik, Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.
    In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to some (...)
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  3. Ole Koksvik, Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability.
    A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, and that (...)
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  4. Ole Koksvik (2013). Intuition and Conscious Reasoning. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):709-715.
    This paper argues that, contrary to common opinion, intuition can result from conscious reasoning. It also discusses why this matters.
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  5. Ole Koksvik (2012). Précis of Intuition. Dissertation, ANU
    This thesis seeks to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that there is a class of mental states deserving of the label ‘intuition’, and which is a good candidate for a psychological kind, a kind which cuts the mind at its natural joints. These mental states are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character.
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  6. Ole Koksvik (2011). Intuition. Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis I seek to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that intuitions are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character. -/- In Chapter 1 I identify our target and provide some important reliminaries. Intuitions are mental states, but which ones? Giving examples helps: a person has an intuition when it seems to her that torturing the innocent is wrong, or that if something is (...)
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  7. Ole Koksvik (2010). Metaphysics of Consciousness. In Graham Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
  8. Ole Koksvik (2007). Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism. Dialectica 61 (4):573–582.
    I argue against Montero’s claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) has nothing to do with Physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument from CoE against interactionist dualism, and offer instead an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict between interactionist dualism and CoE.
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