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  1. Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Rogeberg (2013). Addiction: Choice or Compulsion? Frontiers in Addictive Disorders and Behavioral Dyscontrol 4 (77):11.
    Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a moral model which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behaviour under the control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular consumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain structures (...)
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  2. Ole Rogeberg & Hans Olav Melberg (2011). Acceptance of Unsupported Claims About Reality: A Blind Spot in Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 18 (01):29-52.
    Do economists accept absurd and unsupported claims about reality, and if so, why? We define four types of claims commonly made in economics that require different types of evidence, and show examples of each from the rational addiction literature. Claims about real world causal mechanisms and welfare effects seem poorly supported. A survey mailed to all researchers with peer-reviewed work on rational addiction theory provides some evidence that criteria for evaluating claims of pure theory and statistical prediction are better (...)
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  3. Ole Rogeberg (2004). Taking Absurd Theories Seriously: Economics and the Case of Rational Addiction Theories. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):263-285.
    Rational addiction theories illustrate how absurd choice theories in economics get taken seriously as possibly true explanations and tools for welfare analysis despite being poorly interpreted, empirically unfalsifiable, and based on wildly inaccurate assumptions selectively justified by ad-hoc stories. The lack of transparency introduced by poorly anchored mathematical models, the psychological persuasiveness of stories, and the way the profession neglects relevant issues are suggested as explanations for how what we perhaps should see as displays of technical skill and ingenuity are (...)
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  4. Charles R. Twardy, Kevin B. Korb, Ole Rogeberg, Cristina Bicchieri, John Duffy, Gil Tolle, P. D. Magnus, Craig Callender, Joseph F. Hanna & Paul Skokowski (2004). 1. A Criterion of Probabilistic Causation A Criterion of Probabilistic Causation (Pp. 241-262). Philosophy of Science 71 (3).
     
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