5 found
  1. Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2013). Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.
    Logical pluralism has been in vogue since JC Beall and Greg Restall 2006 articulated and defended a new pluralist thesis. Recent criticisms such as Priest 2006a and Field 2009 have suggested that there is a relationship between their type of logical pluralism and the meaning-variance thesis for logic. This is the claim, often associated with Quine 1970, that a change of logic entails a change of meaning. Here we explore the connection between logical pluralism and meaning-variance, both in general and (...)
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    Ole Thomassen Hjortland (forthcoming). Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
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  3. Julien Murzi & Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2009). Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen. Analysis 69 (3):480-488.
    It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen (2008) argues that this view - call it logical inferentialism - is undermined by some "very little known" considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that "in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard (...)
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    Ole Thomassen Hjortland (2014). Speech Acts, Categoricity, and the Meanings of Logical Connectives. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (4):445-467.
    In bilateral systems for classical logic, assertion and denial occur as primitive signs on formulas. Such systems lend themselves to an inferentialist story about how truth-conditional content of connectives can be determined by inference rules. In particular, for classical logic there is a bilateral proof system which has a property that Carnap in 1943 called categoricity. We show that categorical systems can be given for any finite many-valued logic using $n$-sided sequent calculus. These systems are understood as a further development (...)
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    Olivier Roy & Ole Thomassen Hjortland (forthcoming). Dynamic Consequence for Soft Information. Journal of Logic and Computation.