Search results for 'Omniscience' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jens Christian Bjerring (2013). Impossible Worlds and Logical Omniscience: An Impossibility Result. Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal agents (...)
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  2. Robert Bass (2007). Omniscience and the Identification Problem. Florida Philosophical Review 7 (1):78-91.score: 24.0
    I once came across a Mark Twain story in which a character said something to the effect that the one thing God didn’t know was that he was not all-knowing. As an argument against omniscience, Twain’s one-liner doesn’t amount to much. Thinking about it, however, led to the kind of puzzles I explore here. Some puzzles about omniscience are connected to other issues, such as whether all claims about the future presently have truth-values. Those in turn are connected (...)
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  3. Laureano Luna (2012). Grim's Arguments Against Omniscience and Indefinite Extensibility. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):89-101.score: 24.0
    Patrick Grim has put forward a set theoretical argument purporting to prove that omniscience is an inconsistent concept and a model theoretical argument for the claim that we cannot even consistently define omniscience. The former relies on the fact that the class of all truths seems to be an inconsistent multiplicity (or a proper class, a class that is not a set); the latter is based on the difficulty of quantifying over classes that are not sets. We first (...)
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  4. Tomis Kapitan (1991). Agency and Omniscience. Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.score: 24.0
    It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy (...)
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  5. Mark Jago (2007). Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.score: 24.0
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which (...)
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  6. Yujin Nagasawa (2007). A Further Reply to Beyer on Omniscience. Sophia 46 (1):65-67.score: 24.0
    I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His other attributes.
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  7. T. Ryan Byerly (forthcoming). Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing. Sophia:1-8.score: 24.0
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience (...)
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  8. Wesley D. Cray (2011). Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):147-153.score: 22.0
    At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. (To say that some properties are co-instantiable is just to say that it is possible that some object instantiate all of them simultaneously. Being entirely red and being a ball are co-instantiable; being entirely red and being entirely blue are not). But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to (...)
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  9. Noreen E. Johnson (2007). Divine Omnipotence and Divine Omniscience: A Reply to Michael Martin. Sophia 46 (1):69-73.score: 22.0
    In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Michael Martin argues that to posit a God that is both omnipotent and omniscient is philosophically incoherent. I challenge this argument by proposing that a God who is necessarily omniscient is more powerful than a God who is contingently omniscient. I then argue that being omnipotent entails being omniscient by showing that for an all-powerful being to be all-powerful in any meaningful way, it must possess complete knowledge about all states of affairs and thus must (...)
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  10. Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.score: 21.0
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  11. Martin Lembke (2012). Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 17 (2):211-223.score: 21.0
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  12. F. Richmann (2002). Omniscience Principles and Functions of Bounded Variation. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 48 (1):111-116.score: 21.0
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  13. Elisa Freschi (2013). Review of Kei Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing. A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika Ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra). [REVIEW] International Journal of Asian Studies 10 (1):90--94.score: 21.0
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  14. Sara L. McClintock (2010). Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason: Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha and Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā. Wisdom Publications.score: 21.0
  15. Ramjee Singh (1979). The Concept of Omniscience in Ancient Hindu Thought. Oriental Publishers & Distributors.score: 21.0
     
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  16. Ramjee Singh (1974). The Jaina Concept of Omniscience. L.D. Institute of Indology.score: 21.0
     
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  17. Dennis Whitcomb (forthcoming). Grounding and Omniscience. In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Vol. 4. OUP.score: 18.0
    I’m going to argue that omniscience is impossible and therefore that there is no God. The argument turns on the notion of grounding. After illustrating and clarifying that notion, I’ll start the argument in earnest. The first step will be to lay out five claims, one of which is the claim that there is an omniscient being, and the other four of which are claims about grounding. I’ll prove that these five claims are jointly inconsistent. Then I’ll argue for (...)
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  18. Hugh Rice (2006). Divine Omniscience, Timelessness, and the Power to Do Otherwise. Religious Studies 42 (2):123-139.score: 18.0
    There is a familiar argument based on the principle that the past is fixed that, if God foreknows what I will do, I do not have the power to act otherwise. So, there is a problem about reconciling divine omniscience with the power to do otherwise. However the problem posed by the argument does not provide a good reason for adopting the view that God is outside time. In particular, arguments for the fixity of the past, if successful, either (...)
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  19. Thomas Metcalf (2004). Omniscience and Maximal Power. Religious Studies 40 (3):289-306.score: 18.0
    This essay examines a conflict between God's omnipotence and His omniscience. I discuss our intuitions regarding omnipotence and omniscience and describe a method by which we can decide whether a being is omnipotent. I consider the most promising versions of omnipotence and argue that they produce a genuine conflict with omniscience. Finally, I suggest that we can take the example of omniscience and generalize it to several of God's essential properties and thereby reveal incompatibilities that result (...)
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  20. Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Knowledge de Se. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):73-82.score: 18.0
    Patrick Grim argues that God cannot beomniscient because no one other than me canacquire knowledge de se of myself. Inparticular, according to Grim, God cannot knowwhat I know in knowing that I am making amess. I argue, however, that given twoplausible principles regarding divineattributes there is no reason to accept Grim'sconclusion that God cannot be omniscient. Inthis paper I focus on the relationship betweendivine omniscience and necessaryimpossibilities, in contrast to the generaltrend of research since Aquinas, which hasconcentrated on the (...)
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  21. Rohit Parikh (2008). Sentences, Belief and Logical Omniscience, or What Does Deduction Tell Us? Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):459-476.score: 18.0
    We propose a model for belief which is free of presuppositions. Current models for belief suffer from two difficulties. One is the well known problem of logical omniscience which tends to follow from most models. But a more important one is the fact that most models do not even attempt to answer the question what it means for someone to believe something, and just what it is that is believed. We provide a flexible model which allows us to give (...)
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  22. Christopher Hughes (1998). Negative Existentials, Omniscience, and Cosmic Luck. Religious Studies 34 (4):375-401.score: 18.0
    Suppose there are possible worlds in which God exists but Anselm does not. Then (I argue) there are possible worlds in which Anselm does not exist, but God cannot even entertain the thought that he does not. In such worlds Anselm does not exist, but God does not know that. This, I argue, is incompatible with (a straightforward construal of) the doctrine of God's essential omniscience. Considerations involving negative existentials also call into question a certain picture of creation, on (...)
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  23. Mary Midgley (1999). Determinism, Omniscience, and the Multiplicity of Explanations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):900-901.score: 18.0
    Complete determinism is, as Karl Popper said, “a daydream of omniscience.” Determinism is usually conceived as linked with a particular science whose explanations are deemed fundamental. As Rose rightly points out, biological enquiry includes many different kinds of question. Genetic determinism, making genes central to biology, is therefore biased and misguided. The crucial unit must be the whole organism. Correspondence:c1 IA Collingwood Terrace, Newcastle on Tyne NE2 2JP, United Kingdom mbm@coll1a.demon.co.uk.
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  24. Douglas P. Lackey (1984). Divine Omniscience and Human Privacy. Philosophy Research Archives 10:383-391.score: 18.0
    This paper argues that there is a conflict between divine omniscience and the human right to privacy. The right to privacy derives from the right to moral autonomy, which human persons possess even against a divine being. It follows that if God exists and persists in knowing all things, his knowledge is a non-justifiable violation of a human right. On the other hand, if God exists and restricts his knowing in deference to human privacy, it follows that he cannot (...)
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  25. Marcel Sarot (1991). Omniscience and Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (2):89 - 102.score: 18.0
    My conclusions are the following:We can distinguish between two sorts of kowledge: intellectual knowledge (knowledge of true propositions) and experiential knowledge (knowledge of how certain experiences feel).If we want the doctrine of divine omniscience to be theologically relevant, we will have to assert that divine omniscience involves experiential as well as intellectual omniscience.In order to be omniscient, God does not need to share all the feelings of His creatures with them. However, in order to be experientially omniscient, (...)
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  26. William Lane Craig (2000). Omniscience, Tensed Facts and Divine Eternity. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):227--228.score: 18.0
    A difficulty for a view of divine eternity as timelessness is that if time is tensed, then God, in virtue of His omniscience, must know tensed facts. But tensed facts, such as It is now t, can only be known by a temporally located being.Defenders of divine atemporality may attempt to escape the force of this argument by contending either that a timeless being can know tensed facts or else that ignorance of tensed facts is compatible with divine (...). Kvanvig, Wierenga, and Leftow adopt both of these strategies in their various defenses of divine timelessness. Their respective solutions are analyzed in detail and shown to be untenable.Thus, if the theist holds to a tensed view of time, he should construe divine eternity in terms of omnitemporality. (shrink)
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  27. Jason A. Beyer (2004). A Physicalist Rejoinder to Some Problems with Omniscience; or, How God Could Know What We Know. Sophia 43 (2):5-13.score: 18.0
    A certain objection to belief in God is based on the intrinsic incoherence of the concept of Divine Being or God. In particular, it questions the major traditional characteristic, notably omniscience, and its relation to omnipotence, moral unassailability, and absence of embodiment on the part of the Divine Being. In this paper, an attempt is made to counter this objection by an appeal, not to natural theology, but rather to physicalism in its application to human beings, and by extension (...)
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  28. Maurice Lagueux, Omniscience and Rationality in Microeconomics.score: 18.0
    It would be very difficult to discuss the question concerning the hypothesis of omniscience in microeconomics without relating this hypothesis to the more fundamental hypothesis of rationality (usually referred to as rationality principle or postulate) which is at the base of the very idea of an economic theory and even social sciences. Indeed omniscience is a quality which was typically attributed to homo oeconomicus whose essential characteristic is to be perfectly "rational". This association between omniscience and rationality (...)
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  29. Jill Graper Hernandez (2005). Divine Omniscience and Human Evil: Interpreting Leibniz Without Middle Knowledge. Philosophy and Theology 17 (1/2):107-120.score: 18.0
    The ‘middle knowledge’ doctrine salvages free will and divine omniscience by contending that God knows what agents will freely choose under any possible circumstances. I argue, however, that the Leibnizian problem of divine knowledge of human evil is best resolved by applying a Theodicy II distinction between determined, foreseen, and resolved action. This move eliminates deference to middle knowledge. Contingent action is indeed free, but not all action is contingent, and so not all action is free. For Leibniz, then, (...)
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  30. S. McCall (2013). Freewill and Omniscience: A Reply to Garrett. Analysis 73 (3):488-488.score: 18.0
    Brian Garrett (Analysis (2012), 293–5) comments on McCall's paper (Analysis (2011), 501–6). McCall had claimed that since the truth of true empirical propositions supervenes on, and depends upon, empirical fact, what God knows and does not know also depends upon being, i.e. upon facts. Consequently God's foreknowing what I freely decide to do depends upon what I freely do. Garrett objects that the dependence of truth on being seems to play no essential role in McCall's argument. McCall replies that his (...)
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  31. Patrick Grim (1988). Truth, Omniscience, and the Knower. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):9 - 41.score: 18.0
    Let us sum up.The paradox of the Knower poses a direct and formal challenge to the coherence of common notions of knowledge and truth. We've considered a number of ways one might try to meet that challenge: propositional views of truth and knowledge, redundancy or operator views, and appeal to hierarchy of various sorts. Mere appeal to propositions or operators, however, seems to be inadequate to the task of the Knower, at least if unsupplemented by an auxiliary recourse to hierarchy. (...)
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  32. Daniel Diederich Farmer (2010). Defining Omniscience. Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):306-320.score: 18.0
    In contemporary philosophy of religion, the doctrine of omniscience is typically rendered propositionally, as the claim that God knows all true propositions (and believes none that are false). But feminist work makes clear what even the analytic tradition sometimes confesses, namely, that propositional knowledge is quite limited in scope. The adequacy of propositional conceptions of omniscience is therefore in question. This paper draws on the work of feminist epistemologists to articulate alternative renderings of omniscience which remedy the (...)
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  33. Stamatios Gerogiorgakis (2011). Omniscience in Łukasiewicz's, Kleene's and Blau's Three-Valued Logics. Polish Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):59-78.score: 18.0
    In this paper several assumptions concerning omniscience and future contingents on the one side, and omniscience and self-reference on the other, areexamined with respect to a classical and a three-valued semantic setting (the latter pertains especially to Łukasiewicz’s, Kleene’s and Blau’s three-valued logics).Interesting features of both settings are highlighted and their basic assumptions concerning omniscience are explored. To generate a context in which the notion of omniscience does not deviate from some basic intuitions, two special futurity (...)
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  34. Tomis Kapitan (1994). The Incompatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to David P. Hunt. Religious Studies 30 (1):55 - 66.score: 18.0
    In "Omniprescient Agency" (Religious Studies 28, 1992) David P. Hunt challenges an argument against the possibility of an omniscient agent. The argument—my own in "Agency and Omniscience" (Religious Studies 27, 1991)—assumes that an agent is a being capable of intentional action, where, minimally, an action is intentional only if it is caused, in part, by the agent's intending. The latter, I claimed, is governed by a psychological principle of "least effort," viz., that no one intends without antecedently feeling that (...)
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  35. John Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):33-48.score: 18.0
    Adhering to the traditional concept of omniscience lands Gale in the incoherence Grim's Cantorian arguments reveal in talk of all propositions. By constructing variants and extensions of Grim's arguments, I explain why various ways out of the incoherence are unacceptable, why theists would do better to adopt a certain revisionary concept of omniscience, and why the Cantorian troubles are so deep as to be troubles as well for Gale's Weak Principle of Sufficient Reason. I conclude with some brief (...)
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  36. Laura L. Garcia (1993). Timelessness, Omniscience, and Tenses. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:65-82.score: 18.0
    Two major objections to divine atemporality center on supposed tensions between the claim that God is omniscient and the claim that he is timeless. Since most defenders of divine timelessness are even more firmly committed to omniscience, driving a wedge between the two is intended to convert such persons to a temporal view of God. However, I believe that both arguments fail to demonstrate an incompatibility between omniscience and timelessness, and that the objections themselves rest in large part (...)
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  37. Antonio Moreno, Ulises Cortés & Ton Sales (2002). Subjective Situations and Logical Omniscience. Studia Logica 72 (1):7-29.score: 18.0
    The beliefs of the agents in a multi-agent system have been formally modelled in the last decades using doxastic logics. The possible worlds model and its associated Kripke semantics provide an intuitive semantics for these logics, but they commit us to model agents that are logically omniscient. We propose a way of avoiding this problem, using a new kind of entities called subjective situations. We define a new doxastic logic based on these entities and we show how the belief operators (...)
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  38. Bruce R. Reichenbach (1984). Omniscience and Deliberation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (3):225 - 236.score: 18.0
    To sum up, we have argued that if deliberation is incompatible with (fore)knowing what one is going to do at the time of the deliberation, then God cannot deliberate. However, this thesis cannot be used to show either that God cannot act intentionally or that human persons cannot deliberate. Further, we have suggested that though omniscience is incompatible with deliberation, it is not incompatible with either some speculation or knowing something on the grounds of inference. Funding for writing this (...)
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  39. Steven J. Brams (1982). Omniscience and Omnipotence: How They May Help - or Hurt - in a Game. Inquiry 25 (2):217 – 231.score: 18.0
    The concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are defined in 2 ? 2 ordinal games, and implications for the optimal play of these games, when one player is omniscient or omnipotent and the other player is aware of his omniscience or omnipotence, are derived. Intuitively, omniscience allows a player to predict the strategy choice of an opponent in advance of play, and omnipotence allows a player, after initial strategy choices are made, to continue to move after the other (...)
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  40. Rik Peels (2013). Is Omniscience Impossible? Religious Studies 49 (4):481-490.score: 18.0
    In a recent paper, Dennis Whitcomb argues that omniscience is impossible. But if there cannot be any omniscient beings, then God, at least as traditionally conceived, does not exist. The objection is, roughly, that the thesis that there is an omniscient being, in conjunction with some principles about grounding, such as its transitivity and irreflexivity, entails a contradiction. Since each of these principles is highly plausible, divine omniscience has to go. In this article, I argue that Whitcomb's argument, (...)
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  41. John F. Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo 6 (1):33-48.score: 18.0
    Adhering to the traditional concept of omniscience lands Gale in the incoherence Grim’s Cantorian arguments reveal in talk of “all propositions.” By constructing variants and extensions of Grim’s arguments, I explain why various ways out of the incoherence are unacceptable, why theists would do better to adopt a certain revisionary concept of omniscience, and why the Cantorian troubles are so deep as to be troubles as well for Gale’s Weak PSR. I conclude with some brief reflections on method, (...)
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  42. Bruce Reichenbach (1987). Hasker on Omniscience. Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):86-92.score: 18.0
    I contend that William Hasker’s argument to show omniscience incompatible with human freedom trades on an ambiguity between altering and bringing about the past, and that it is the latter only which is invoked by one who thinks they are compatible. I then use his notion of precluding circumstances to suggest that what gives the appearance of our inability to freely bring about the future (and hence that omniscience is incompatible with freedom) is that, from God’s perspective of (...)
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  43. Vasco Brattka & Guido Gherardi (2011). Weihrauch Degrees, Omniscience Principles and Weak Computability. Journal of Symbolic Logic 76 (1):143 - 176.score: 18.0
    In this paper we study a reducibility that has been introduced by Klaus Weihrauch or, more precisely, a natural extension for multi-valued functions on represented spaces. We call the corresponding equivalence classes Weihrauch degrees and we show that the corresponding partial order induces a lower semi-lattice. It turns out that parallelization is a closure operator for this semi-lattice and that the parallelized Weihrauch degrees even form a lattice into which the Medvedev lattice and the Turing degrees can be embedded. The (...)
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  44. Jonathan Kvanvig (1989). The Analogy Argument for a Limited Acccount of Omniscience. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):129-138.score: 18.0
    IN COMPARISON with other doctrines Cthe doctrine of omnipotence, for example Cthe proper formulation of the doctrine of omniscience has not seemed especially problematic. Once we accept the contemporary wisdom that knowledge is knowledge of truths, the formulation of the traditional doctrine seems straightforward: to be omniscient is just to know all truths. What has seemed problematic, rather, is whether the doctrine is itself true. In particular, many have wondered whether anyone can know the parts of the future not (...)
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  45. Brian MacPherson (2000). Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:125-140.score: 18.0
    David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of (...)
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  46. Alexander R. Pruss (2011). From Restricted to Full Omniscience. Religious Studies 47 (2):257-264.score: 18.0
    Some, notably Peter van Inwagen, in order to avoid problems with free will and omniscience, replace the condition that an omniscient being knows all true propositions with a version of the apparently weaker condition that an omniscient being knows all knowable true propositions. I shall show that the apparently weaker condition, when conjoined with uncontroversial claims and the logical closure of an omniscient being's knowledge, still yields the claim that an omniscient being knows all true propositions.
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  47. Carl Rubino (1993). Managing the Future: Science, the Humanities, and the Myth of Omniscience. World Futures 38 (1):157-164.score: 18.0
    (1993). Managing the future: Science, the Humanities, and the myth of omniscience. World Futures: Vol. 38, Theoretical Achievements and Practical Applications of General Evolutionary Theory, pp. 157-164.
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  48. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989). Unknowable Truths and the Doctrine of Omniscience. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 57:485-507.score: 18.0
    THE DOCTRINE OF omniscience has been understood in two ways. Roughly, it has been taken either as the claim that God knows all that is true (Geach, Kvanvig 1986) or as the claim that God knows all that can be known (Swinbume; Mavrodes). The first construal I shall call the traditional construal, and the second I shall call a limited construal. Though the traditional construal would seem to be the natural one to hold, considerations of the analogy between the (...)
     
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  49. Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Experience: A Reply to Alter. Ars Disputandi 3.score: 16.0
    According to one antitheist argument, the necessarily omniscient, necessarily omnipotent, and necessarily omnibenevolent Anselmian God does not exist, because if God is necessarily omnipotent it is impossible for Him to comprehend fully certain concepts, such as fear, frustration and despair, that an omniscient being needs to possess. Torin Alter examines this argument and provides three elaborate objections to it. I argue that theists would not accept any of them because they con ict with traditional Judaeo-Christian doctrines concerning divine attributes.
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  50. Alfred J. Stenner (1989). A Paradox of Omniscience and Some Attempts at a Solution. Faith and Philosophy 6 (3):303-319.score: 16.0
    A paradox is constructed employing four languages L1-L4, such that L1 is a metalanguage for L3, L3 for L2, and L2 for L1; L4 functions as the semantic meta-metalanguage for each of L1-L3. The paradox purports to show that no omniscient being can exist, given that there is a set of true sentences (each true within its respective language) from L1, L2, and L3 that no omniscient being can believe.The remainder of the paper consists in an examination of some attempts (...)
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