This paper analyzes, first, the reception of Schelling’s philosophy in the environment of Kant in Königsberg, and second in Kantian writings published by his students Jäsche and Rink. – The only two passages Kant mentions Schelling are to be found in the latest leaves of the Opuspostumum. Here Schelling’s philosophy is characterized as transcendental idealism. In current research it became rather common to interpret these passages as a positive account of Schelling’s philosophy, moreover, that Kant recognized Schelling’s transcendental (...) idealism as an improvement of his own philosophy. However, in the latest leaves of the Opuspostumum the term transcendental idealism is – remarkably – strongly linked with Spinozism. In this paper I argue, thirdly, that Kant in the Opuspostumum employs transcendental idealism in a negative way in order to distinguish his own transcendental philosophy clearly from the wrong philosophical account transcendental idealism brings forward. (shrink)
Friedrich Paneth’s conception of “chemical element” has functioned as the official definition adopted by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry since 1923. Paneth maintains a distinction between empirical and “transcendental” concepts of element; furthermore, chemical science requires fluctuation between the two. The origin of the empirical-transcendental split is found in Immanuel Kant’s classic Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). The present paper examines Paneth’s foundational concept of element in light of Kant’s attempt, late in life, to revoke key distinctions (...) made in his Critique, including that of regulative and constitutive functions of reason. In a section of his Opuspostumum devoted to the “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics,” Kant bends his philosophical system to address the newly emerging sciences of matter of his time. Specifically, he tried, without success, to develop the transcendental ground for microscale motions of bodies encountered in physical, electrical and chemical processes. Paneth’s discussion of chemical element does not take the Opuspostumum into account, which is why it begins with a rejection of Kant’s rejection (in his earlier writings) of chemistry’s status as science. I make the case that Paneth’s definition of element effectively maintains something very like Kant’s critical separation of regulative and constitutive principles, while a advancing the concept of chemical science. (shrink)
The three presumptions that Hegel’s idealism further develops or radicalises Kant’s transcendental idealism, that their respective versions of idealism are linked by Kant’s account of self-positing (Selbstsetzungslehre) in the late opuspostumum and that the basic model of Hegel’s early idealism holds also for his mature system are wide-spread and largely unexamined. This paper examines several problems confronting these presumptions, including Hegel’s refutation of the basic premises of Kant’s transcendental idealism and Transzendentalphilosophie in the late opus (...) class='Hi'>postumum (§2), Hegel’s critical rejection of intellectual intuition because it cannot escape Pyrrhonian scepticism (§3), and his critical rejection of the deductivist ideal of scientia, which undergirds Kant’s transcendental idealism and his late Transzendentalphilosophie (§4), the highly un-Kantian principles of Hegel’s mature idealism (§5) and finally Hegel’s thorough and incisive critique in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit of common philosophical views, concepts and presuppositions, including those which undergird the three presumptions noted above (§6). To understand properly Hegel’s philosophy of nature and hence also his philosophical system requires abandoning those three presumptions. (shrink)
This volume is the first ever English translation of Kant's last major work, the so-called OpusPostumum, a work Kant himself described as his 'chef d'oeuvre' and as the keystone of his entire philosophical system. It occupied him for more than the last decade of his life. Begun with the intention of providing a 'transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics,' Kant's reflections take him far beyond the problem he initially set out to solve. In (...) fact, he reassesses a whole series of fundamental topics of transcendental philosophy: the thing in itself, the nature of space and time, the concept of the self and its agency, the idea of God, and the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Though never completed, the text reaches a logical albeit not fully developed, conclusion. (shrink)
Insbesondere die Naturphilosophie hat Kant zeitlebens beschäftigt. Ihre Begründung kulminiert in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) in den berühmten Fragen, wie Erfahrung überhaupt und wie synthetische Urteile a priori möglich sind. Seine Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786) liefern eine metaphysische Begründung der newtonschen Physik. Dieses Begründungsprogramm hat die damalige Debatte nachhaltig beeinflusst. Das vielleicht größte systematische Problem in diesem Werk ist der von Kant sehr eng gefasste Begriff von Naturwissenschaft, der etwa die Chemie oder Biologie ausschließt.
Insbesondere was die (...) Biologie betrifft, entwickelt Kant jedoch in der Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) eine Strategie, teleologische Naturbestimmtheit ins kritische Erkenntnisprogramm einzubauen. Etwa zeitgleich mit dieser Schrift entdeckt er eine Lücke in seinem System: Von den apriorischen Bestimmungen der Metaphysik der Natur kann nicht unmittelbar zu den Bestimmungen der Physik übergegangen werden. Diese Lücke sollte eine neue Schrift schließen, wie das umfangreiche Material des sogenannten Opuspostumum bezeugt. Nun war Kant nicht der einzige, der gravierende Probleme in der kritischen Philosophie gesehen hat. Schellings und insbesondere Hegels kritische Umformung der kantischen Naturphilosophie ist deshalb nicht nur von historischem Interesse, sondern auch wichtig für das zeitgenössische Verständnis der kantischen Naturphilosophie. Die Beiträge in diesem Band diskutieren Kants zentrale Überlegungen zur Naturphilosophie jeweils im Kontext ihrer historischen Bedingungen und ihrer Weiterentwicklung. So soll die Bedeutung der kantischen Naturphilosophie für die Entwicklungen im 19. Jahrhundert erhellt werden. (shrink)
In this essay, I call attention to Kant’s and Whewell’s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant’s aim in the Opuspostumum (ca. 1796-1803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science (on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) see section 1) and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or ‘Mittelbegriffe’ (henceforth this problem is referred to as ‘the bridging-problem’). I argue that the late-Kant attempted (...) to show that the concept of ‘moving force’, an intermediary concept derived from a priori principles, could be given empirical content so that concrete scientific knowledge is arrived at. Thus, the late-Kant wished not only to show that proper scientific laws are necessary a priori (as he had shown in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) but also that intermediary concepts could be derived from a priori principles which, when interpreted empirically, resulted in the specific forces as established by physics (see section 2). Of course, William Whewell never knew about Kant’s Opuspostumum and his attempt to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of science and physics. However, it is striking that Whewell had similar concerns about the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as Kant himself. According to Whewell, the Kantian project was incomplete because it did not show how ‘modifications’ (in the sense of concretizations) of a priori principles could result in empirical laws (section 3). Next, it will be argued, by taking into account several of Whewell’s philosophical notebooks which have scarcely been studied systematically, that Whewell’s doctrine of Fundamental Ideas grew out of his dissatisfaction with the Kantian project with respect to the bridging problem and that his own philosophical position should be seen as an attempt to bypass the bridging-problem. (shrink)
El presente artículo estudia la visión zubiriana de la voluntad en el pensamiento publicado póstumamente de Zubiri, donde aparece un concepto original de libertad como capacidad de autodeterminación de la voluntad.
The period from Kant to Hegel is one of the most intense and rigorous in modern philosophy. The central problem at the heart of it was the development of a new standard of theoretical reflection and of the principle of rationality itself. The essays in this volume consider both the development of Kant's system of transcendental idealism in the three Critiques, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and the OpusPostumum, as well as the reception and transformation of (...) that idealism in the work of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The contributors include many of today's preeminent philosophers of German idealism. (shrink)
Contrary to Eckart Förster, I argue that the Opuspostumum represents more of an evolution than a revolution in Kant's thought. Among other points, I argue that Kant's Selbstsetzungslehre, or theory of self-positing, according to which we cannot have knowledge of the spatio-temporal world except through recognition of the changes we initiate in it by our own bodies, does not constitute a radicalization of Kant's transcendental idealism, but is a development of the realist line of argument introduced by (...) the "Refutation of Idealism" of 1787-90; and I argue that Kant's concept of the highest good, which according to Förster was only revised to connect virtue to collective rather than individual happiness in 1790-93 and was then in any case withdrawn in the Opuspostumum, was uninterruptedly focused on collective happiness from the first edition of the first Critique, and that there is no reason to believe that ever Kant retracted it. (shrink)
Abstract Hanna proposes a version of non-conceptualism he closely associates with Kant. This paper takes issue with his proposal on two fronts. First, there are reasons to dispute whether any version of non-conceptualism can be rightly attributed to Kant. In addition to pointing out passages that conflict with Hanna?s interpretation, I also suggest ways in which the Kant of the opuspostumum could integrate key insights of non-conceptualism into a basically conceptualist framework. In Part Two of the paper, (...) I turn to a more systematically oriented critique of Hanna?s nonconceptualism. Drawing on work by Gareth Evans, John McDowell, Sonia Sedivy, and Alva Noë, I argue that conceptualism is in a position to integrate the points which are taken by Hanna to speak most strongly in favor of non-conceptualism. In particular, I argue for the deep compatibility of conceptualism and direct realism. At the same time, I point to what I see as weaknesses in Hanna?s defence of non-conceptualism. (shrink)
This paper poses a dilemma for applying the category of substance given Kant's different conceptions of substance in the Critique of Pure Reason. Briefly stated, if the category of substance applies to an omnipresent and sempiternal substance, then although this would ensure that all experiences of empirical objects take place in a common spatiotemporal framework, one could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. If the category of substance applies to ordinary empirical objects, however, then although one could (...) individuate these substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a common spatiotemporal framework for these experiences. I will argue that this dilemma can be overcome by examining the development of Kant's conception of substance in his final work, the Opuspostumum. (shrink)
The purpose of the Cambridge Edition is to offer translations of the best modern German edition of Kant's work in a uniform format suitable for Kant scholars. When complete (fourteen volumes are currently envisaged) the edition will include all of Kant's published writings and a generous selection from the unpublished writings such as the Opuspostumum, handschriftliche Nachlass, lectures, and correspondence. This volume contains the first translation into English of notes from Kant's lectures on metaphysics. These lectures, dating (...) from the 1760s to the 1790s, touch on all the major topics and phases of Kant's philosophy. Most of these notes have appeared only recently in the German Academy Edition; this translation offers many corrections of that edition. As is standard with the volumes in the Cambridge Edition there is an extensive editorial apparatus, including extensive linguistic and explanatory notes, a detailed subject index, and glossaries of key terms. (shrink)
In this thesis I provide an interpretation of Kant's theories of knowledge, nature, and being in order to argue that Kant's ontology is a productive ontology: it is a theory of being that includes a notion of production. I aim to show that Kant's epistemology and philosophy of nature are based on a theory of being as productivity. The thesis contributes to knowledge in that it considers in detail Kant's ontology and theory of being, topics which have generally been ignored (...) or misunderstood. In arguing for Kant's productive ontology, I argue against Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, which states that Kant understands being as "produced permanent presence" or as divinely created materiality. Based on Kant's definition of being as positing, I argue, by contrast to Heidegger, that Kant understands being as the original productive relation between subject and object. This can also be expressed as the relation between formality and materiality, or between epistemic conditions and existence, that is productive of objects of experience. Being is not producedness but a relation of productivity, through which both subject and object are themselves productive. The subject is productive in its spontaneity, and nature, determined as dynamical interaction, is interpreted as productive. The subject, I will argue, does not understand nature as produced, but approaches it with a comportment towards its production as object of experience. Because of its own subjective productivity - spontaneity or "life" - the subject has a "productive comportment" towards nature. Ontology, I claim, concerns the realm of the productive relation of being, the realm of the relation between epistemic conditions and existence, and therefore the realm of possible experience. This marks Kant as divergent not only from what Heidegger calls "the ontology of the extant", but also from the concept-based ontology of the German rationalists. The general aims of the thesis are, first, to argue that being for Kant is the original relation between subject and object, and that ontology concerns this relation; second, to argue that ontology and being are understood in terms of production and productivity; and third, to argue that Heidegger is wrong to ascribe to Kant an understanding of being as "produced pennanent presence". I approach these aims by examining a number of Kant's texts in detail, focusing particularly on Kant's theses about existence and being in The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God and the Critique of Pure Reason; on Kant's philosophy of nature and dynamical matter in the Transcendental Analytic and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science; on Kant's doctrine of experience and objectivity in the Transcendental Deductions; on ontological reflection and the productive comportment of "life" in the Critique of Judgment; and on Kant's final theory of matter, life and production in the OpusPostumum. (shrink)
According to Kant, justifying the application of mathematics to objects in natural science requires metaphysically constructing the concept of matter. Kant develops these constructions in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN). Kant’s specific aim is to develop a dynamic theory of matter to replace corpuscular theory. In his Preface Kant claims completely to exhaust the metaphysical doctrine of body, but in the General Remark to MAdN ch. 2, “Dynamics,” Kant admits that once matter is reconceived as basic forces, it (...) is no longer possible to construct the concept of matter. I argue that Kant’s admission is only the tip of the problem, and that none of Kant’s commentators has fully grasped the problems infecting the MAdN that underlie Kant’s admission. I show that Kant’s proof that matter consists of forces is fallacious. I then re-analyze the circularity in Kant’s definition of density, criticizing both Adickes’ formulations and his later dissolution of it. I also show that a third circularity infects the relations between Kant’s treatment of “Dynamics” and “Mechanics” (MAdN ch. 3). These three fundamental problems demonstrate the untenability of Kant’s metaphysical method, and they require the radical revision of the relation between mathematics and metaphysics Kant undertakes in his opuspostumum. I show that some of Kant’s most surprising and critical later claims about the Critical philosophy are correct, and that they require the sorts of remedies Kant contemplates in the opuspostumum. (I defend the essentially correct analyses offered by Burkhard Tuschling and Eckart Forster against criticisms by Michael Friedman.). (shrink)
t. 1. La déduction transcendentale avant la Critique de la raison pure.--t. 2. La déduction transcendentale de 1781 jusqu'à la deuxième édition de la Critique de la raison pure (1887).--t. 3. La déduction transcendentale de 1787 jusqu'à l'Opuspostumum.
Flader, John With very great hope, the Church directs its attention and maternal care to Opus Dei, which - by divine inspiration - the Servant of God Josemaria Escriva de Balaguer founded in Madrid on October 2, 1928, so that it may always be an apt and effective instrument of the salvific mission which the Church carries out for the life of the world.
Ockham é considerado por muitos como o fundador do direito positivo, por tomar ius como uma potestas individual. Ele aprofunda sua teoria no Opus nonaginta dierum, onde rebate frase por frase uma bula do papa João XXII. Nele define o que vem a ser domínio, propriedade, direito de uso, licença de uso, uso de fato, puro uso, direito do foro, direito do céu (ius poli). Com isso, ele está dando fundamentos jurídicos e teológicos ao modo de viver sem propriedade (...) dos frades menores franciscanos. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Pobreza. Franciscanismo. Domínio. Poder. Direito positivo. Direito. ABSTRACT Ockham is considered by many as the founder of positive right, for taking ius as an individual potestas. He advances his theory in the Opus nonaginta dierum, wherein he confronts sentence after sentence of a pope’s John XXII bula. There he defines what comes to be dominium, property, right of use, license of use, factual use, pure use, law of the forum, law of heaven (ius poli). With such a terminology, he is giving the juridical and theological foundations to the propriety-free way of live of the minor Franciscan friars. KEY WORDS – Poverty. Franciscanism. Dominium. Power. Positiv right. Right. (shrink)
El artículo habla del uso que de las citas de Ambrosio de Milán hicieron Agustín y Juliano de Eclana, tal y como queda reflejado en "Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum". Se señalan algunas cuestiones implicadas en este asunto, por ejemplo, la acusación de maniqueísmo hecha a Agustín y la diversa comprensión de la Tradición y de las Sagradas Escrituras, que tienen ambos autores.
This column is a milestone. In 1983, while I was on a one year sabbatical at the Hahn Meitner Institute for Nuclear Physics in what was then West Berlin, I received a letter from Stan Schmidt informing me that Jerry Pournelle had decided that he no longer wished to be an Alternate View columnist for Analog and asking if I was interested in taking over as the AV columnist and “alternating” with G. Harry Stine.