Search results for 'Ordinary Language' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Avner Baz (2012). When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
    The basic conflict: an initial characterization -- The main arguments against ordinary language philosophy -- Must philosophers rely on intuitions? -- Contextualism and the burden of knowledge -- Contextualism, anti-contextualism, and knowing as being in a position to give assurance -- Conclusion: skepticism and the dialectic of (semantically pure) "knowledge" -- Epilogue: ordinary language philosophy, Kant, and the roots of antinomial thinking.
     
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  2. Eugen Fischer (2014). Verbal Fallacies and Philosophical Intuitions: The Continuing Relevance of Ordinary Language Analysis. In Brian Garvey (ed.), Austin on Language. Palgrave Macmillan 124-140.
    The paper builds on a methodological idea from experimental philosophy and on findings from psycholinguistics, to develop and defend ordinary language analysis (OLA) as practiced in J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia. That attack on sense-datum theories of perception focuses on the argument from illusion. Through a case-study on this paradoxical argument, the present paper argues for a form of OLA which is psychologically informed, seeks to expose epistemic, rather than semantic, defects in paradoxical arguments, and is immune to (...)
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  3.  99
    Oswald Hanfling (2000). Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. Routledge.
    Philosophy and Ordinary Language is a defense of the view that philosophy is largely about questions of language, which to a large extent means ordinary language. Oswald Hanfling, a leading expert in the development of analytic philosophy, covers a wide range of topics, including scepticism and the definition of "knowledge," free will, empiricism, "folk psychology," ordinary versus artificial logic, and philosophy versus science. He also draws on philosophers such as Austin, Wittgenstein, and Quine to (...)
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  4. Nat Hansen (2014). Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 9 (8):556-569.
    There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing but going by various aliases – in particular (some versions of) ‘contextualism’ and (some versions of) ‘experimental philosophy’. And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the (...)
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  5.  90
    Sally Parker-Ryan, Ordinary Language Philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    For Ordinary Language philosophy, at issue is the use of the expressions of language, not expressions in and of themselves. So, at issue is not, for example, ordinary versus (say) technical words; nor is it a distinction based on the language used in various areas of discourse, for example academic, technical, scientific, or lay, slang or street discourses – ordinary uses of language occur in all discourses. It is sometimes the case that an (...)
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  6. Eugen Fischer (2005). Austin on Sense-Data: Ordinary Language Analysis as 'Therapy'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):67-99.
    The construction and analysis of arguments supposedly are a philosopher's main business, the demonstration of truth or refutation of falsehood his principal aim. In Sense and Sensibilia, J.L. Austin does something entirely different: He discusses the sense-datum doctrine of perception, with the aim not of refuting it but of 'dissolving' the 'philosophical worry' it induces in its champions. To this end, he 'exposes' their 'concealed motives', without addressing their stated reasons. The paper explains where and why this at first sight (...)
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  7. Sally Parker Ryan (2010). Reconsidering Ordinary Language Philosophy: Malcolm’s (Moore’s) Ordinary Language Argument. Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):123-149.
    The ‘Ordinary Language’ philosophy of the early 20th century is widely thought to have failed. It is identified with the broader so-called ‘linguistic turn’, a common criticism of which is captured by Devitt and Sterelny (1999), who quip: “When the naturalistic philosopher points his finger at reality, the linguistic philosopher discusses the finger.” (p 280) The implication is that according to ‘linguistic’ philosophy, we are not to study reality or truth or morality etc, but the meaning of the (...)
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  8.  18
    Don S. Levi (2014). A Champion for Ordinary Language Philosophy - "When Words Are Called For" by Avner Baz. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (2):187-190.
    Review of Avner Baz: When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012.
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  9.  18
    Alex Stewart Davies (2012). How to Use (Ordinary) Language Offensively. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 1 (1):55-80.
    One can attack a philosophical claim by identifying a misuse of the language used to state it. I distinguish between two varieties of this strategy: one belonging to Norman Malcolm and the other to Ludwig Wittgenstein. The former is flawed and easily dismissible as misled linguistic conservatism. It muddies the name of ordinary language philosophy. I argue that the latter avoids this flaw. To make perspicuous the kind of criticism of philosophical claims that the second variety makes (...)
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  10. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63 (3):190–194.
    There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g.
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  11.  90
    Stephen Puryear (2013). Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):120-140.
    Frege supposedly thought that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism. In the process, I call (...)
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  12.  90
    C. Chihara & Jerry A. Fodor (1965). Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):281-95.
    This paper explores some lines of argument in wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings in order to indicate the relations between wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, On the one hand, And his philosophy of language, His epistemology, And his doctrines about the nature of philosophical analysis on the other. The authors maintain that the later writings of wittgenstein express a coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a philosophical psychology of a type the authors call "logical behaviorism." they (...)
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  13. Hilary Putnam (1957). Psychological Concepts, Explication, and Ordinary Language. Journal of Philosophy 54 (February):94-99.
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  14.  36
    Nat Hansen (2014). Review of When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):179-181.
  15.  13
    Keith Graham (1977). J. L. Austin: A Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Harvester Press.
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  16.  4
    Charles E. Caton (1963). Philosophy and Ordinary Language. Urbana, University of Illinois Press.
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  17. V. C. Chappell (ed.) (1964). Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method. Dover Publications.
     
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  18.  7
    Fausto Caruana (2010). «Learning to See». The Role of the Mirror Neurons System, Between Neuroscience of Perception and Ordinary Language Analysis. Rivista di Filosofia 101 (3):333-354.
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  19.  1
    Alan R. White & G. L. Vander Veer (1980). Philosophical Scepticism and Ordinary-Language Analysis. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):155.
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  20. Stanley Rosen (1999). Metaphysics in Ordinary Language. St. Augustine's Press.
     
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  21. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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  22. Wesley Buckwalter (2010). Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.
    Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts. Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding ordinary knowledge practices. Proposed is an experiment designed to test the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist defenses rely. In the cases tested, the folk pattern of knowledge attribution runs contrary to what contextualism predicts. While preliminary, these data inspire (...)
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  23.  21
    Nat Hansen & Emmanuel Chemla, Linguistic Experiments and Ordinary Language Philosophy.
    J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of (...)
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  24. Francis Y. Lin (1999). Chomsky on the 'Ordinary Language' View of Language. Synthese 120 (2):151-191.
    There is a common-sense view of language, which is held by Wittgenstein, Strawson Dummett, Searle, Putnam, Lewis, Wiggins, and others. According to this view a language consists of conventions, it is rule-governed, rules are conventionalised, a language is learnt, there are general learning mechanisms in the brain, and so on. I shall call this view the ‘ ordinary language ’ view of language. Chomsky’s attitude towards this view of language has been rather negative, (...)
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  25.  26
    James D. McCawley (1999). Unconfirmed Sightings of an 'Ordinary Language' Theory of Language. Synthese 120 (2):213-228.
    It is unfortunate that Francis Y. Lin, in ‘Chomsky on the “ordinary language” view of language’ pays little attention to his own remark, ‘Chomsky’s criticisms make us realize that we should not be content with general and vague formulations of convention, ability, and so on. We must make such notions precise and provide details’ Lin speaks so imprecisely and provides so few details of notions on which he relies heavily, such as ‘general learning mechanism’ and ‘sentence frame’, (...)
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  26.  52
    Nat Hansen & Emmanuel Chemla (2015). Linguistic Experiments and Ordinary Language Philosophy. Ratio 28 (4):422-445.
    J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of (...)
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  27. Norman Malcolm (1964). Moore and Ordinary Language. In V. C. Chappell (ed.), Ordinary Language: Essays in Philosophical Method. Dover Publications
     
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  28.  59
    Martin Gustafsson (2005). Perfect Pitch and Austinian Examples: Cavell, McDowell, Wittgenstein, and the Philosophical Significance of Ordinary Language. Inquiry 48 (4):356 – 389.
    In Cavell (1994), the ability to follow and produce Austinian examples of ordinary language use is compared with the faculty of perfect pitch. Exploring this comparison, I clarify a number of central and interrelated aspects of Cavell's philosophy: (1) his way of understanding Wittgenstein's vision of language, and in particular his claim that this vision is "terrifying," (2) the import of Wittgenstein's vision for Cavell's conception of the method of ordinary language philosophy, (3) Cavell's dissatisfaction (...)
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  29.  3
    Nat Hansen, Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy.
    There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular "contextualism" and "experimental philosophy". And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title of (...) language philosophy and arguing that it has been unfairly maligned and was never decisively refuted. In this overview, I will outline the main projects and arguments employed by contemporary ordinary language philosophers, and make the case that updated versions of the arguments made by ordinary language philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century are attracting renewed attention. (shrink)
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  30.  3
    Sandra Laugier (2013). Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
    Drawing on J. L. Austin and the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, she argues for the solution provided by ordinary language philosophy—a philosophy that trusts and utilizes the everyday use of language and the clarity of meaning it ...
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  31.  38
    Peter J. Lewis (2003). Quantum Mechanics and Ordinary Language: The Fuzzy Link. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1437-1446.
    It is widely acknowledged that the link between quantum language and ordinary language must be "fuzzier" than the traditional eigenstate-eigenvalue link. In the context of spontaneous-collapse theories, Albert and Loewer argue that the form of this fuzzy link is a matter of convention, and can be freely chosen to minimize anomalies for those theories. I defend the position that the form of the link is empirical, and could be such as to render collapse theories idle. This means (...)
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  32.  7
    Jonathan Trigg (2010). The Philosophy of Ordinary Language is a Naturalistic Philosophy. Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):6.
    It is argued that the only response to the mereological objections of the ordinary language philosopher available to the scientistic philosopher of mind requires the adoption of the view that ordinary psychological talk is theoretical and falsified by the findings of brain science. The availability of this sort of response produces a kind of stalemate between these opposed views and viewpoints: the claim that attribution of psychological predicates to parts of organisms is nonsense is met with the (...)
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  33.  1
    Cecilea Mun (2016). Natural Kinds, Social Constructions, and Ordinary Language: Clarifying the Crisis in the Science of Emotion. Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):247-269.
    I argue for the importance of clarifying the distinction between metaphysical, semantic, and meta-semantic concerns regarding what Emotion is. This allows us to see that those involved in the Scientific Emotion Project and the Folk Emotion Project are in fact involved in the same project – the Science of Emotion. It also helps us understand why questions regarding the natural kind status of Emotion, as well as answers to questions regarding the value of ordinary language emotion terms or (...)
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  34.  16
    Barry Stocker (2000). Wittgenstein's Paradox of Ordinary Language. Essays in Philosophy 1 (2):1-14.
    The later Wittgenstein claimed to resolve philosophical problems through returning words to their 'ordinary' use. The paradox arises that Wittgenstein's own philosophy must be written in a philosophical language and, therefore, in an extra-ordinary language. The paradox is discussed with particular reference to rules. Rules constitute language, but the account of the 'rule' itself leads to paradox and contradiction. A rule is followed and following a rule requires an interpretation. The interpretation of the rule requires (...)
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  35.  4
    Andreas Vrahimis (2015). The Intentionality of Speech Acts: A Confrontation Between Ordinary Language Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Deconstruction? The Intentionality of Speech Acts: A Confrontation Between Ordinary Language Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Deconstruction? 23 (4):584-594.
  36.  25
    Herman Tennessen (1965). Ordinary Language in Memoriam. Inquiry 8 (1-4):225 – 248.
    Taking as a point of departure a recently published collection of representative contributions from various philosophers who claim to ?proceed from ordinary language?, this article examines ordinary language philosophy in the light of some of the claims made by these philosophers. The claims are criticized mainly for failing to account for the variability of the use of terms in respect both of depth of intention and special contexts. These factors are such as to render the claims (...)
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  37.  37
    Karl R. Popper (1954). Self-Reference and Meaning in Ordinary Language. Mind 63 (250):162-169.
    This article is a modern socratic dialogue between socrates and theaetetus presented in the "ordinary language." the discussion centers on self-Referring statements and their meaning. (staff).
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  38.  13
    Thomas A. Fay (1979). Heidegger and Wittgenstein on the Question of Ordinary Language. Philosophy Today 23 (2):154-159.
    If one were to try to imagine two philosophers of language who would be more opposed to each other than wittgenstein and heidegger, It would seem to be, At least at first glance, A quite difficult thing to do. After all the wittgenstein of the "investigations" stresses the "use" of words, Whereas heidegger emphasizes the exact opposite, That is, The role of the poetic in language, Which is to say the non-Use aspect of language. For wittgenstein (...) language is a kind of court of last resort beyond which no appeal is possible, While for heidegger the ordinary language of our daily "usage" is all too frequently not authentic discourse which reveals ("rede"), But rather a trite sort of idle chatter which conceals ("gerede"). And so one might go on and on pointing out differences between these two great thinkers in their approaches to language, With the result that the very enterprise of attempting to bring them into some sort of dialogue which might prove mutually fruitful might seem, From the very outset, A questionable undertaking at best. (edited). (shrink)
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  39.  4
    Paul K. Miller & Tom Grimwood (2015). Mountains, Cones, and Dilemmas of Context The Case of “Ordinary Language” in Philosophy and Social Scientific Method. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (3):331-355.
    The order of influence from thesis to hypothesis, and from philosophy to the social sciences, has historically governed the way in which the abstraction and significance of language as an empirical object is determined. In this article, an argument is made for the development of a more reflexive intellectual relationship between ordinary language philosophy and the social sciences that it helped inspire. It is demonstrated that, and how, the social scientific traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis press (...)
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  40.  25
    Dick Garner (1977). Skepticism, Ordinary Language and Zen Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 27 (2):165-181.
    The goal of tranquility through non-Assertion, Advocated by sextus empiricus, Is examined and his method criticized. His understanding of non-Assertion is compared with that of seng-Chao (383-414) and chi-Tsang (549-623). Zen buddhism shares the quest for tranquility, But offers more than sextus did to help us attain it, And avoids the excessively metaphysical thought of these two chinese buddhists. Wittgenstein, Whose goal was that philosophical problems completely disappear, And austin, Who rejected many standard western dichotomies, Offer a method superior to (...)
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  41.  10
    Kieran Cashell (2012). New Criteria for Pain: Ordinary Language, Other Minds, and the Grammar of Sensation. Abstracta 6 (2):178-215.
    What does ordinary language philosophy contribute to the solution of the problems it diagnoses as violations of linguistic use? One of its biggest challenges has been to account for the epistemic asymmetry of mental states experienced by the subject of those states and the application of psychological properties to others. The epistemology of other minds appears far from resolved with reference to how sensation words are used in everyday language. In this paper, I revisit the Wittgensteinian arguments (...)
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  42.  24
    Charles Chihara (1973). Operationalism and Ordinary Language Revisited. Philosophical Studies 24 (3):137 - 157.
    In "human beings", "studies in the philosophy of wittgenstein" (ed. By p winch), J cook presents a radical solution to the problem of other minds and then suggests that this treatment of the problem is to be found in the writings of wittgenstein. According to cook's interpretation, Wittgenstein's analysis of the problem does not involve in any essential way any special doctrines about criteria, Nor does it commit him to any form of behaviorism. In the course of arguing these theses, (...)
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  43.  8
    Waldemar Rohloff (2012). From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):131-149.
    In this paper I discuss Kant's and Bolzano's differing perspectives on ordinary natural language. I argue that Kant does not see ordinary language as providing semantically organized content and that, as a result, Kant does not believe that ordinary language is sufficiently well-developed to support philosophical analysis and definition. By contrast, for Bolzano, the content given in ordinary language are richly structured entities he calls 'propositions in themselves'. This contrast in views is (...)
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  44.  15
    Frank A. Tillman (1965). Explication and Ordinary Language Analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (3):375-383.
    The business of philosophical analysis is clarification, But explicators and ordinary-Language philosophers disagree about how to achieve it. Their mutual criticisms or attempts at arbitration are made at such a level of generality as to leave the basis for dispute or settlement obscure. By focusing on supposedly competing analyses of truth--Tarski's semantical and strawson's performative conceptions of truth--The paper makes clarification itself the subject of clarification in an attempt to determine the basis of dispute.
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  45.  11
    Daniel N. Robinson (2000). Review of Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. [REVIEW] Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):76-79.
    Reviews the book, Philosophy and ordinary language: The bent and genius of our tongue by Oswald Hanfling . This book is in the Routledge Series in 20th Century Philosophy and it is a distinguished contribution to that series. It is in its own way an exemplary exercise in philosophical acumen and clarity. In thirteen chapters the reader is paced carefully through what are often the tares and snares of contemporary analytical philosophy, but for the express purpose of defending (...)
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  46.  12
    Richard H. Schlagel (1966). Science, Truth, and Ordinary Language. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (1):27-44.
    One purpose of this article is to correct the current false assumption that ordinary language is a self-Contained, Self-Sufficient, Absolute framework. Most of the article is devoted to showing how developments in the physical sciences from copernicanism to relativity theory have affected revisions in our conceptual framework, Imposing new representations of the world on our thought. It is suggested that these developments imply a relational conception of the universe described as "contextualistic realism". The challenge facing philosophers today is (...)
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  47.  7
    Rollo Handy (1960). Doubts About Ordinary Language in Ethics. Inquiry 3 (1-4):270 – 277.
    Many writers assume one of the major functions (if not the major function) of ethical theory is to analyze the “ordinary language”; of moral discourse. This paper argues that different social groups develop quite different concepts of values; that there are many “ordinary languages.”; What analysts often in practice arc concerned with is middle-class ethical usage. In addition, it is argued that widely accepted moral usages may be incorrect because they are based on faulty empirical generalizations, pre-scientific (...)
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  48. Daniela Ginsburg (ed.) (2013). Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy. University of Chicago Press.
    Sandra Laugier has long been a key liaison between American and European philosophical thought, responsible for bringing American philosophers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Stanley Cavell to French readers—but until now her books have never been published in English. _Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy_ rights that wrong with a topic perfect for English-language readers: the idea of analytic philosophy. Focused on clarity and logical argument, analytic philosophy has dominated the discipline in the (...)
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  49. Oswald Hanfling (2000). Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. Routledge.
    What is philosophy about and what are its methods? _Philosophy and Ordinary Language_ is a defence of the view that philosophy is largely about questions of language, which to a large extent means _ordinary_ language. Some people argue that if philosophy is about ordinary language, then it is necessarily less deep and difficult than it is usually taken to be but Oswald Hanfling shows us that this isn't true. Hanfling, a leading expert in the development (...)
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  50. Oswald Hanfling (2013). Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. Routledge.
    What is philosophy about and what are its methods? _Philosophy and Ordinary Language_ is a defence of the view that philosophy is largely about questions of language, which to a large extent means _ordinary_ language. Some people argue that if philosophy is about ordinary language, then it is necessarily less deep and difficult than it is usually taken to be but Oswald Hanfling shows us that this isn't true. Hanfling, a leading expert in the development (...)
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