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Profile: Ori Herstein (King's College London)
  1. Ori J. Herstein (2013). A Legal Right to Do Legal Wrong. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1):gqt022.
    The literature, as are the intuitions of many, is sceptical as to the coherence of ‘legal rights to do legal wrong’. A right to do wrong is a right against interference with wrongdoing. A legal right to do legal wrong is, therefore, a right against legal enforcement of legal duty. It is, in other words, a right that shields the right holder’s legal wrongdoing. The sceptics notwithstanding, the category of ‘legal right to do legal wrong’ coheres with the concepts of (...)
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  2. Ori J. Herstein (2013). Why 'Nonexistent People' Do Not Have Zero Wellbeing but No Wellbeing at All. Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):136-145.
    Some believe that the harm or benefit of existence is assessed by comparing a person's actual state of wellbeing with the level of wellbeing they would have had had they never existed. This approach relies on ascribing a state or level of wellbeing to ‘nonexistent people’, which seems a peculiar practice: how can we attribute wellbeing to a ‘nonexistent person'? To explain away this oddity, some have argued that because no properties of wellbeing can be attributed to ‘nonexistent people’ such (...)
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  3. Ori J. Herstein (2012). Defending the Right To Do Wrong. Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.
    Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition (...)
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  4. Ori J. Herstein (2008). Historic Justice and the Non-Identity Problem: The Limitations of the Subsequent-Wrong Solution and Towards a New Solution. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 27 (5):505 - 531.
    The "non-identity argument" has been applied to reject the validity of claims for historic justice, often generating highly unintuitive conclusions. George Sher has suggested a solution to this problem, explaining the harm to descendants of historically wronged peoples as deriving not from the historic wrongs but from the failure to provide rectification to the previous generation for harm they suffered. That generation was likewise owed rectification for harm they suffered from failure to provide rectification to the generation preceding them. In (...)
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