Search results for 'Other Minds' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  7
    Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds & Joëlle Proust (1999). Attributing Mental Concepts to Nonlinguistic Animals Poses Wellknown Problems to Ethologists and Philosophers. It is All Too Easy to Interpret a Piece of Animal Social Behavior (Ie a Behavior Performed Inside a Group on the Basis of Information Being Displayed by Behaviors From Other Members of the Group) as Involving Representations of Other Individual's Beliefs And. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):203-232.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.
    The everyday capacity to understand the mind, or 'mindreading', plays an enormous role in our ordinary lives. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich provide a detailed and integrated account of the intricate web of mental components underlying this fascinating and multifarious skill. The imagination, they argue, is essential to understanding others, and there are special cognitive mechanisms for understanding oneself. The account that emerges has broad implications for longstanding philosophical debates over the status of folk psychology. Mindreading is another trailblazing volume (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   149 citations  
  3.  99
    Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  4.  64
    Johannes Roessler (2005). Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5.  74
    Elijah Chudnoff (2016). Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard (2012). Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds. ProtoSociology (47):239-262.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  7.  96
    Stevan Harnad (1991). Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has (...)
    Direct download (16 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   52 citations  
  8. Daniel D. Hutto (2002). The World is Not Enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate
    This chapter argues that the conceptual problem of other minds cannot be properly addressed as long as we subscribe to an individualistic model of how we stand in relation to our own experiences and the behaviour of others. For it is commitment to this picture that sponsors the strong first/third person divide that lies at the heart of the two false accounts of experiential concept learning sketched above. This is the true source of the problem. To deal successfully (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Ted Everett (2014/2015). Other Minds and the Origins of Consciousness. Anthropology and Philosophy 11.
    Why are we conscious? What does consciousness enable us to do that cannot be done by zombies in the dark? This paper argues that introspective consciousness probably co-evolved as a "spandrel" along with our more useful ability to represent the mental states of other people. The first part of the paper defines and motivates a conception of consciousness as a kind of "double vision" – the perception of how things seem to us as well as what they are – (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Anita Avramides (2001). Other Minds. Routledge.
    How do I know whether there are any minds beside my own? This problem of other minds in philosophy raises questions which are at the heart of all philosophical investigations--how it is that we know, what is in the mind, and whether we can be certain about any of our beliefs. In this book, Anita Avramides begins with a historical overview of the problem from the Ancient Skeptics to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Wittgenstein. The second (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  11. Anil Gomes (2011). Is There a Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Arindam Chakrabarti (2011). Troubles with a Second Self: The Problem of Other Minds in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):23-35.
    In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Anil Gomes (2011). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry 54 (3):277-292.
    John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Søren Overgaard (2006). The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):53-73.
    This paper discusses Wittgenstein's take on the problem of other minds. In opposition to certain widespread views that I collect under the heading of the “No Problem Interpretation,” I argue that Wittgenstein does address some problem of other minds. However, Wittgenstein's problem is not the traditional epistemological problem of other minds; rather, it is more reminiscent of the issue of intersubjectivity as it emerges in the writings of phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  15. Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”. In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Anil Gomes (2009). Other Minds and Perceived Identity. Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.
    Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  32
    Hanna Pickard (2003). Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 87-103.
    The problem of other minds is a collection of problems centering upon the extent to which our belief in other minds or other's minds can be justified. Swedish psychologist, Gunnar Borg has developed a principle called "the range principle" which helps fill out our "knowledge" of other minds. Borg developed this principle partly in response to the skeptical challenge of Harvard psychophysicist S S Stevens. Stevens claimed that the intersubjective comparison of experience (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  18. Matheson Russell & Jack Reynolds (2011). Transcendental Arguments About Other Minds and Intersubjectivity. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):300-11.
    This article describes some of the main arguments for the existence of other minds, and intersubjectivity more generally, that depend upon a transcendental justification. This means that our focus will be largely on ‘continental’ philosophy, not only because of the abiding interest in this tradition in thematising intersubjectivity, but also because transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous in continental philosophy. Neither point holds for analytic philosophy. As such, this essay will introduce some of the important contributions of Edmund (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Bill Brewer (2002). Emotion and Other Minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate
    What is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? As very preliminary clarification, I mean by ‘emotional experience’ such things as the subjective feeling of being afraid of something, or of being angry at someone. On the side of behavioural expression, I focus on such things as cowering in fear, or shaking a fist or thumping the table in anger. Very crudely, this is behaviour intermediate between the bodily changes which just happen in emotional arousal, such as sweating (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  24
    Anik Waldow (2009). David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds. Continuum.
    Other minds and their place in the Hume-literature -- A modern approach -- Scepticism versus naturalism -- The vulgar and the philosopher -- Relative ideas -- Concepts of the real -- Intuition and common sense -- Epistemic responsibility -- Degeneration of reason -- Just philosophy -- Conceiving minds -- Abstraction -- Argument from analogy -- Sympathy -- Limitations -- Generality -- Hume's concept of mind -- The world and the other -- Habit and intersubjective responsiveness -- (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. Jack Reynolds (2010). Problems of Other Minds: Solutions and Dissolutions in Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):326-335.
    While there is a great diversity of treatments of other minds and inter-subjectivity within both analytic and continental philosophy, this article specifies some of the core structural differences between these treatments. Although there is no canonical account of the problem of other minds that can be baldly stated and that is exhaustive of both traditions, the problem(s) of other minds can be loosely defined in family resemblances terms. It seems to have: (1) an epistemological (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  88
    Joel Smith (2011). Strawson on Other Minds. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. OUP
    I critically discuss Strawson's transcendental argument against other minds scepticism, and look at the prospects for a naturalised version of it.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  59
    Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger (2013). Social Perception and “Spectator Theories” of Other Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
    We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second person approach from the social perception view.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  58
    Bettina Bergo (2009). Review of Søren Overgaard, Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
    Søren Overgaard's Wittgenstein and Other Minds (WM) makes two interesting contributions to the Wittgenstein literature. First, it approaches contemporary debates about the problem of "other minds" (WM 2) as a conceptual and ontological problem -- viz., how we conceive of mind in the first place[1] (before turning to determinations concerning the minds of others). It also extends that question to ethics, since the way in which we pose the question of other minds, or (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  16
    Maria Antonietta Perna (2008). An Answer to the Problem of Other Minds. Phaenex 3 (1):1-31.
    The present paper sets out to counter the claim put forward by British philosopher of mind, Robert Kirk, according to which Sartre's notion of consciousness as for-itself, while offering some valuable insights regarding human existence, nonetheless fails to engage with the problem of how to establish the existence of such conscious beings on philosophical grounds. To the extent that it succeeds in meeting the challenge raised by Kirk's comment, the reading of Being and Nothingness offered here could be considered as (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  11
    Bryan Benham (2009). Analogies and Other Minds. Informal Logic 29 (2):198-214.
    The argument by analogy for other minds is customarily rejected as a weak inference because the argument is based on a single instance. The current paper argues that this objection fundamentally misunderstands the inferential structure of analogies and so misrepresents the role analogy plays in the justifycation of belief in other minds. Arguments by be uniquely suited to draw inferences from single instances. This defense does not remove all difficulties faced by the argument by analogy for (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  15
    Douglas C. Long (1975). Other Minds. Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):179-181.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be said (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  5
    Joe Ullian (1957). Karalis and Other Minds. Review of Metaphysics 10 (March):525-528.
    In his paper "knowledge of other minds" ("review of metaphysics", Volume ix, June, 1956, Pages 565-568), Nicholas karalis attempts to demonstrate that numerically identical acts of thought can occur in different minds. The cogency of his arguments is questioned. It is contended that some of them rest on a confusion between what is known and what is true.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  5
    G. Thomas Goodnight (2013). The Virtues of Reason and the Problem of Other Minds: Reflections on Argumentation in a New Century. Informal Logic 33 (4):510-530.
    From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in skeptical discussions concerning knowledge of the existence, state, and standing of other minds. The analogical move from self to other unfolds as controversy. This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation predicament and examines analogy as an opening to the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition is identified as a productive process coming to terms with an other through testing sustainable risk. The paper explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Mark R. Addis (1999). Wittgenstein: Making Sense of Other Minds. Ashgate.
    The difficulties about other minds are deep and of central philosophical importance. This text explores attempts to apply Wittgenstein's concept of criteria in explaining how we can know other minds and their properties. It is shown that the use of criteria for this purpose is misguided.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. G. Thomas Goodnight (2013). The Virtues of Reason and the Problem of Other Minds: Reflections on Argumentation in a New Century. Informal Logic 33 (4):510-530.
    From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in skeptical discussions concerning knowledge of the existence, state, and standing of other minds. The analogical move from self to other unfolds as controversy. This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation predicament and examines analogy as an opening to the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition is identified as a productive process coming to terms with an other through testing sustainable risk. The paper explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Douglas C. Long (1975). Other Minds (Film). [REVIEW] Teaching Philosophy 1 (2):179-181.
    D. C. Long's review of a color film of a lively discussion of the problem of other minds featuring A. J. Ayer and G. N. A. Vesey. Ayer invokes the traditional argument from analogy to explain our knowledge of other minds. Vesey attempts to rebut Ayer's argument along Wittgensteinian lines, appealing to the essential role that the natural expression of psychological states plays in our learning of psychological words referring to those states. Filmed in Ayer's lodgings. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  14
    Harrison B. Hall (1976). Criteria, Perception and Other Minds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):257-274.
    The paper uses thompson clark's theory of the relation of perceptual parts and wholes to illuminate certain aspects of our knowledge of other minds. The thesis is that the traditional problem can be usefully broken down into two parts--One of which calls for a better understanding of the logic of perceptual concepts; the other, For a closer look at what happens when we try to take the epistemological skeptic seriously.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  67
    Chad Engelland (2016). Perceiving Other Animate Minds in Augustine. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):25-48.
    This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine’s treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition: the separation of invisible spirit and visible body. The immediate self-awareness of mind includes awareness of life, that is, of animating a body. Each of us animates our own body; seeing other animated (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Anil Gomes (2015). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  36. Søren Overgaard (2007). Wittgenstein and Other Minds: Rethinking Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl. Routledge.
    A compelling new approach to the problem that has haunted twentieth century philosophy in both its analytical and continental shapes. No other book addresses as thoroughly the parallels between Wittgenstein and leading Continental philosophers such as Levinas, Husserl, and Heidegger.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  37.  61
    Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  90
    Sam C. Coval (1959). Exceptives and Other Minds. Analysis 19 (June):138-142.
    The article addresses the sceptics who claim there is only one mind. the author contends that the statement 'there is only one mind' is not solipsistic and does not account for a plurality of minds. (staff).
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  30
    Stuart S. Glennan (1995). Computationalism and the Problem of Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):375-88.
    In this paper I discuss Searle's claim that the computational properties of a system could never cause a system to be conscious. In the first section of the paper I argue that Searle is correct that, even if a system both behaves in a way that is characteristic of conscious agents (like ourselves) and has a computational structure similar to those agents, one cannot be certain that that system is conscious. On the other hand, I suggest that Searle's intuition (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Joel Krueger (2014). Emotions and Other Minds. In Julia Weber & Rüdiger Campe (eds.), Rethinking Emotion: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern, and Contemporary Thought. De Gruyter 324-350.
  41.  3
    Godfrey Norman Agmondisham Vesey (1973). Other Minds? Bletchley,Open University Press.
    There is a passage in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations in which he compares an answer that may be given to a philosophical question about someone else's pain with an answer that may be given to a question about the meaning of ‘It is 5 o'clock on the sun’. Wittgenstein does not compare other answers that may be given to the two questions. And he does not compare the questions themselves in respect of what lies behind them – making them ones (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Norman Malcolm (1958). Knowledge of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 55 (September):35-52.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  43. Elliott Sober (2000). Evolution and the Problem of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):365-387.
  44. Michael E. Levin (1984). Why We Believe in Other Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):343-59.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45. W. W. Mellor (1956). Three Problems About Other Minds. Mind 65 (April):200-217.
  46. Paul T. Sagal & Gunnar Borg (1993). The Range Principle and the Problem of Other Minds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):477-91.
  47. Andrew Bowman (1953). Knowledge of Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 50 (September):328-32.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Sydney Shoemaker (1965). Ziff's Other Minds. Journal of Philosophy 62 (October):587-89.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49. Asa Maria Wikforss (2004). Direct Knowledge and Other Minds. Theoria 70 (2-3):271-293.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. Robert Pargetter (1984). The Scientific Inference to Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (June):158-63.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000