Search results for 'Ought-to-be' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. William A. Edmundson (forthcoming). Ought We to Do What We Ought to Be Made to Do? In Georgios Pavlakos Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (ed.), Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.score: 360.0
    The late Jerry Cohen struggled to reconcile his egalitarian political principles with his personal style of life. His efforts were inconclusive, but instructive. This comment locates the core of Cohen’s discomfort in an abstract principle that connects what we morally ought to be compelled to do and what we have a duty to do anyway. The connection the principle states is more general and much tighter than Cohen and others, e.g. Thomas Nagel, have seen. Our principles of justice always put (...)
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  2. Dietmar von der Pfordten (2008). Radbruch as an Affirmative Holist.On the Question of What Ought to Be Preserved of His Philosophy. Ratio Juris 21 (3):387-403.score: 360.0
    Abstract. Gustav Radbruch is one of the most important German-speaking philosophers of law of the twentieth century. This paper raises the question of how to classify Radbruch's theories in the international context of legal philosophy and philosophy in general. Radbruch's work was mainly influenced by the southwest German school of Neo-Kantianism, represented by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask. Their theories of culture and value show an affirmative-holistic understanding of philosophy as a source of wisdom and meaningfulness. Kant, on the other hand, (...)
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  3. Andrew Botterell (2007). Why We Ought to Be (Reasonable) Subjectivists About Justification. Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (1):36-58.score: 360.0
    My aim in this paper is to argue that justification should not be conceived of in purely objective terms. In arguing for that conclusion I focus in particular on Paul Robinson’s presentation of that position, since it is the most sophisticated defense of the objective account of justification in the literature. My main point will be that the distinction drawn by robinson between objective and subjective accounts of justification is problematic, and that careful attention to the role played by reasonableness (...)
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  4. Gerhard Minnameier (2004). Peirce-Suit of Truth – Why Inference to the Best Explanation and Abduction Ought Not to Be Confused. Erkenntnis 60 (1):75-105.score: 351.0
    It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...)
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  5. Alex Silk (2014). Why 'Ought' Detaches: Or, Why You Ought to Get with My Friends (If You Want to Be My Lover). Philosophers' Imprint 14 (7).score: 348.0
    This paper argues that a standard analysis of modals from formal semantics suggests a solution to the detaching problem — the problem of whether un-embedded 'ought'-claims can "detach" (be derived) from hypothetical imperatives and their antecedent conditions. On a broadly Kratzerian analysis, modals have a skeletal conventional meaning and receive a particular reading (e.g., deontic, epistemic, teleological) only relative to certain forms of contextual supplementation. I argue that 'ought'-claims can detach — subject to an important qualification — but only as (...)
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  6. Donald Ipperciel (2008). What Ought the Nation to Be? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:269-277.score: 348.0
    Renan’s paradigmatic question ‘What is the nation?’ has been inflected in many ways: When is the nation? Where is the nation? Why is the nation? etc. However, few have explicitly considered the normative question: ‘What ought the nation to be?’, which raises the distinctively moral and philosophical-political question of the normativity of the nation in general, and in turn, that of the normative criteria that underpin the nation’s normativity. Since the choice of these criteria is clearly arbitrary and culturally-determined, any (...)
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  7. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). What Philosophy Ought to Be. In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 11: Ten Years After Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Ria University Press. 125-162.score: 312.0
    The proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness of what our most fundamental, important, urgent problems are, what our best attempts are at solving them and, if possible, what needs to be done to improve these attempts. Unfortunately, academic philosophy fails disastrously even to conceive of the task in these terms. It makes no attempt to ensure that universities tackle global problems - global intellectually, and global in the sense of concerning the future of the earth and humanity. (...)
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  8. Krist Vaesen (2006). How Norms in Technology Ought to Be Interpreted. Techne 10 (1):117-133.score: 312.0
    This paper defends the claim that there are — at least — two kinds of normativity in technological practice. The first concerns what engineers ought to do and the second concerns normative statements about artifacts. The claim is controversial, since the standard approach to normativity, namely normative realism, actually denies artifacts any kind of normativity; according to the normative realist, normativity applies exclusively to human agents. In other words, normative realists hold that only “human agent normativity” is a genuine form (...)
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  9. Ralph Wedgwood (2006). How We Know What Ought to Be. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.score: 306.0
    This paper outlines a new approach to the epistemology of normative beliefs, based on a version of the claim that “the intentional is normative”. This approach incorporates an account of where our “normative intuitions” come from, and of why it is essential to these intuitions that they have a certain weak connection to the truth. This account allows that these intuitions may be fallible, but it also seeks to explain why it is rational for us to rely on these intuitions (...)
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  10. Michael Dummett (forthcoming). Ought Research to Be Unrestricted? Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:281-298.score: 303.0
    Freedom of scientific enquiry must be distinguished from freedom to communicate scientific results. The former demands freedom for scientists to communicate among one another, without which progress is hampered, but not, in itself, freedom to communicate conclusions to the public. The latter freedom may be taken as resting on a general principle of free speech, or, more specifically, on the right of all members of society to knowledge gained by that society, especially by means of public expenditure: it is not (...)
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  11. Peter Achinstein (2000). Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):192.score: 279.0
    There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation.
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  12. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005). You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation). Philosophical Issues 15 (1):193-208.score: 279.0
    The distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations has a long history in moral philosophy and is important to many central issues in moral theory and in everyday morality. Unfortunately, this distinction is often overlooked and rarely defined precisely or univocally. This paper tries to clarify the distinction in light of recent empirical research on guilt and shame. I begin with the general notion of an obligation before distinguishing its sub-classes.
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  13. Matthew Chrisman (2010). The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth. In James O.’Shea Eric Rubenstein (ed.), elf, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co..score: 270.0
    Davidson, Rorty, and Rosenberg each reject, for similar reasons, the idea that truth is the aim of belief and the goal of inquiry. Rosenberg provides the most explicit and compelling argument for this provocative view. Here, with a focus on this argument, I suggest that this view is a mistake, but not for the reasons some might think. In my view, we can view truth as a constitutive aim of belief even if not a regulative goal of inquiry, if we (...)
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  14. Sally Haslanger (1999). What Knowledge is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):459-480.score: 270.0
  15. Paul Horwich (1995). Meaning, Use and Truth: On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning is Precluded by the Requirement That Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which It Ought to Be Applied. Mind 104 (414):355-368.score: 270.0
  16. Gualtiero Piccinini (forthcoming). Scientific Methods Ought to Be Public, and Descriptive Experience Sampling is One of Them. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1).score: 270.0
    Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel’s groundbreaking book, Describing Inner Experience: Proponent Meets Skeptic, examines a research method called Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). DES, which was developed by Hurlburt and collaborators, works roughly as follows. An investigator gives a subject a random beeper. During the day, as the subject hears a beep, she writes a description of her conscious experience just before the beep. The next day, the investigator interviews the subject, asks for more details, corrects any apparent mistakes made by the subject, (...)
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  17. Michael J. Almeida (2000). Why We Ought to Be a Little Less Beneficent. Analysis 60 (265):97–106.score: 270.0
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  18. N. Fotion (1976). `All Humans Ought to Be Eliminated'. Ethics 87 (1):87-95.score: 270.0
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  19. Lou Goble (1973). Opacity and the Ought-to-Be. Noûs 7 (4):407-412.score: 270.0
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  20. Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (2005). You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation). Philosophical Issues 15 (1):193–208.score: 270.0
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  21. P. D'Altan, J.-J. Ch Meyer & R. J. Wieringa (1996). An Integrated Framework for Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do Constraints. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (2):77-111.score: 270.0
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  22. Jean G. Harrell (1997). There Ought to Be a Law. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1):61-72.score: 270.0
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  23. William B. Hund (1967). The Distinction Between Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do. New Scholasticism 41 (3):345-355.score: 270.0
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  24. J. Fang (1967). What is, and Ought to Be, Philosophy of Mathematics? Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):71-75.score: 270.0
  25. L. S. Woolf (1916). "Magna Latrocinia."-The State as It Ought to Be, as It Is. International Journal of Ethics 27 (1):36-49.score: 270.0
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  26. D. Krishna (1986). Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be. Diogenes 34 (136):58-69.score: 270.0
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  27. Lou Goble (1974). Corrigenda: Opacity and the Ought-to-Be. Noûs 8 (2):200.score: 270.0
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  28. George J. Annas (1983). Defining Death: There Ought to Be a Law. Hastings Center Report 13 (1):20-21.score: 270.0
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  29. Lawrence C. Becker (1983). White, Morton: What Is and What Ought to Be Done. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):954-956.score: 270.0
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  30. Carl Jorgensen (1956). On the Possibility of Deducing What Ought to Be From What Is. Ethics 66 (4):271 - 278.score: 270.0
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  31. A. L. Hodder (1894). The Morality That Ought to Be. Philosophical Review 3 (4):412-428.score: 270.0
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  32. J. Fang (1966). What is, and Ought to Be, History of Mathematics? Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):39-44.score: 270.0
  33. Alan McMichael (1980). What Ought to Be. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):69 - 74.score: 270.0
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  34. Leigh Turner (2003). Doffing the Mask: Why Manuscript Reviewers Ought to Be Identifiable. [REVIEW] Journal of Academic Ethics 1 (1):41-48.score: 270.0
  35. Lawrence C. Becker (1983). What Is and What Ought to Be Done. Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):954-956.score: 270.0
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  36. William H. Bruening (1985). What Is and What Ought to Be Done. International Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):107-109.score: 270.0
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  37. Piero D'Altan, John-Jules Ch Meyer & Roelf Johannes Wieringa (1996). An Integrated Framework for Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do Constraints. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (2):77-111.score: 270.0
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  38. James A. Gould (1982). Political Free Speech Ought to Be an Absolute. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1):65-70.score: 270.0
  39. Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis & William E. May (1988). ''Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life'': Toward a Clearer Understanding. The Thomist 52 (3):365-426.score: 270.0
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  40. Carl Jørgensen (1956). On the Possibility of Deducing What Ought to Be From What Is. Ethics 66 (4):271-278.score: 270.0
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  41. Daya Krishna (1986). Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be. Diogenes 34 (136):58-69.score: 270.0
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  42. Chukwugozie Maduka (2008). Funeral Orations as Indicators of What a Good Life Ought to Be. Human Affairs 18 (2).score: 270.0
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  43. Deborah Mayo & Peter Achinstein (2000). Experiment and Conceptual Change-Evidence, Data Generation, and Scientific Practice: Toward a Reliabilist Philosophy of Experiment-Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be). Philosophy of Science 67 (3).score: 270.0
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  44. Stephen Nathanson (1982). What Is and What Ought to Be Done. International Philosophical Quarterly 22 (3):211-212.score: 270.0
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  45. P. Oneill (1994). The Same Thing Therefore Ought to Be and Ought Not to Be, Anselm on Conflicting Oughts. Heythrop Journal-a Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology 35 (3):312-314.score: 270.0
     
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  46. Anthony Palmer (1987). Some AI People Have Recently Become Fond of Describing Their Discipline As' Experimental Epistemology'. This Unfortunate Term Should Make a Philosopher's Blood Boil, but If AI Called Itself Thought-Experimental Epistemology (or Even Better: G «Fa/J/; Efl-Experimental Epistemology) Philosophers Ought to Be Reassured.(Dennett, 1978, P. 117). [REVIEW] In Alan Costall (ed.), Cognitive Psychology in Question. St Martin's Press. 55.score: 270.0
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  47. Jeff Russell (forthcoming). This Paper's Thesis Ought to Be Unnecessary; It is the Sort of Claim That Only Requires Defense Because of the Assaults on Intuition Raised by Impudent Philosophers. The Point Under Attack, to Whose Defense I Rally, is the Reality of Time. In This Paper I Examine the Argument for the Unreality of Time Raised by JME McTaggart, First in its Classic Form, and Then as John Earman Recasts It in the Context of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR). McTaggart Characterizes Time in Two Ways, One in Terms of the Predicates" Past"," Present" and" Future", and Another in Terms of the Relations" Before"," After", and" Simultaneous". The First Characterization Puts Events in Time in an A-Series; the Second Orders Them as a B-Series. Then McTaggart's Argument Runs as Follows. [REVIEW] Philosophy.score: 270.0
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  48. Bedward J. Rykiel (2001). What is, What Might Be, and What Ought to Be. Bioscience 51 (6):423.score: 270.0
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  49. Artur Łuszczyński (2011). What Ought to Be a Person's Relationship to Society?: Polish Struggles with the Selected Problems of Philosophy of Law and Philosophy of Politics. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego.score: 270.0
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  50. Morton Gabriel White (1981). What is and What Ought to Be Done: An Essay on Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 270.0
     
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