Search results for 'Ought-to-be' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. William A. Edmundson (forthcoming). Ought We to Do What We Ought to Be Made to Do? In Georgios Pavlakos Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (ed.), Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press
    The late Jerry Cohen struggled to reconcile his egalitarian political principles with his personal style of life. His efforts were inconclusive, but instructive. This comment locates the core of Cohen’s discomfort in an abstract principle that connects what we morally ought to be compelled to do and what we have a duty to do anyway. The connection the principle states is more general and much tighter than Cohen and others, e.g. Thomas Nagel, have seen. Our principles of justice always put (...)
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  2.  33
    Andrew Botterell (2007). Why We Ought to Be (Reasonable) Subjectivists About Justification. Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (1):36-58.
    My aim in this paper is to argue that justification should not be conceived of in purely objective terms. In arguing for that conclusion I focus in particular on Paul Robinson’s presentation of that position, since it is the most sophisticated defense of the objective account of justification in the literature. My main point will be that the distinction drawn by robinson between objective and subjective accounts of justification is problematic, and that careful attention to the role played by reasonableness (...)
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  3.  19
    Dietmar von der Pfordten (2008). Radbruch as an Affirmative Holist.On the Question of What Ought to Be Preserved of His Philosophy. Ratio Juris 21 (3):387-403.
    . Gustav Radbruch is one of the most important German-speaking philosophers of law of the twentieth century. This paper raises the question of how to classify Radbruch's theories in the international context of legal philosophy and philosophy in general. Radbruch's work was mainly influenced by the southwest German school of Neo-Kantianism, represented by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask. Their theories of culture and value show an affirmative-holistic understanding of philosophy as a source of wisdom and meaningfulness. Kant, on the other hand, (...)
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  4.  8
    Nicholas Maxwell (2014). Global Philosophy: What Philosophy Ought to Be. Imprint Academic.
    These essays are about education, learning, rational inquiry, philosophy, science studies, problem solving, academic inquiry, global problems, wisdom and, above all, the urgent need for an academic revolution. Despite this range and diversity of topics, there is a common underlying theme. Education ought to be devoted, much more than it is, to the exploration real-life, open problems; it ought not to be restricted to learning up solutions to already solved problems - especially if nothing is said about the problems that (...)
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  5. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). Global Philosophy: What Philosophy Ought to Be. Imprint Academic.
    These essays are about education, learning, rational inquiry, philosophy, science studies, problem solving, academic inquiry, global problems, wisdom and, above all, the urgent need for an academic revolution. Despite this range and diversity of topics, there is a common underlying theme. Education ought to be devoted, much more than it is, to the exploration real-life, open problems; it ought not to be restricted to learning up solutions to already solved problems - especially if nothing is said about the problems that (...)
     
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  6.  36
    Alex Silk (2014). Why 'Ought' Detaches: Or, Why You Ought to Get with My Friends (If You Want to Be My Lover). Philosophers' Imprint 14 (7).
    This paper argues that a standard analysis of modals from formal semantics suggests a solution to the detaching problem — the problem of whether un-embedded 'ought'-claims can "detach" (be derived) from hypothetical imperatives and their antecedent conditions. On a broadly Kratzerian analysis, modals have a skeletal conventional meaning and receive a particular reading (e.g., deontic, epistemic, teleological) only relative to certain forms of contextual supplementation. I argue that 'ought'-claims can detach — subject to an important qualification — but only as (...)
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  7.  91
    Gerhard Minnameier (2004). Peirce-Suit of Truth – Why Inference to the Best Explanation and Abduction Ought Not to Be Confused. Erkenntnis 60 (1):75-105.
    It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...)
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  8.  3
    Donald Ipperciel (2008). What Ought the Nation to Be? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:269-277.
    Renan’s paradigmatic question ‘What is the nation?’ has been inflected in many ways: When is the nation? Where is the nation? Why is the nation? etc. However, few have explicitly considered the normative question: ‘What ought the nation to be?’, which raises the distinctively moral and philosophical-political question of the normativity of the nation in general, and in turn, that of the normative criteria that underpin the nation’s normativity. Since the choice of these criteria is clearly arbitrary and culturally-determined, any (...)
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  9. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). What Philosophy Ought to Be. In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 11: Ten Years After Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Ria University Press 125-162.
    The proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness of what our most fundamental, important, urgent problems are, what our best attempts are at solving them and, if possible, what needs to be done to improve these attempts. Unfortunately, academic philosophy fails disastrously even to conceive of the task in these terms. It makes no attempt to ensure that universities tackle global problems - global intellectually, and global in the sense of concerning the future of the earth and humanity. (...)
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  10. Krist Vaesen (2006). How Norms in Technology Ought to Be Interpreted. Techne 10 (1):117-133.
    This paper defends the claim that there are — at least — two kinds of normativity in technological practice. The first concerns what engineers ought to do and the second concerns normative statements about artifacts. The claim is controversial, since the standard approach to normativity, namely normative realism, actually denies artifacts any kind of normativity; according to the normative realist, normativity applies exclusively to human agents. In other words, normative realists hold that only “human agent normativity” is a genuine form (...)
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  11.  3
    Raphael Van Riel (2016). Enhancing Beyond What Ought to Be the Case - A Conceptual Clarification. Bioethics 30 (6):384-388.
    In order to do justice to the intuition that medical treatments as such do not form proper instances of bio-enhancement, as the notion is employed in the ethical debate, we should construe bio-enhancements as interventions, which do not aim at states that, other things being equal, ought to obtain. In the light of this clarification, we come to see that cases of moral enhancement are not covered by the notion of bio-enhancement, properly construed.
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  12.  2
    N. Maxwell (2014). What Philosophy Ought to Be. In C. Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 11: Ten Years After Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Ria University Press 125-162.
    The proper task of philosophy is to keep alive awareness of what our most fundamental, important, urgent problems are, what our best attempts are at solving them and, if possible, what needs to be done to improve these attempts. Unfortunately, academic philosophy fails disastrously even to conceive of the task in these terms. It makes no attempt to ensure that universities tackle global problems - global intellectually, and global in the sense of concerning the future of the earth and humanity. (...)
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  13.  4
    Raphael Van Riel (2015). Enhancing Beyond What Ought to Be the Case ‐ A Conceptual Clarification. Bioethics 30 (5):n/a-n/a.
    In order to do justice to the intuition that medical treatments as such do not form proper instances of bio-enhancement, as the notion is employed in the ethical debate, we should construe bio-enhancements as interventions, which do not aim at states that, other things being equal, ought to obtain. In the light of this clarification, we come to see that cases of moral enhancement are not covered by the notion of bio-enhancement, properly construed.
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  14.  95
    Ralph Wedgwood (2006). How We Know What Ought to Be. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.
    This paper outlines a new approach to the epistemology of normative beliefs, based on a version of the claim that “the intentional is normative”. This approach incorporates an account of where our “normative intuitions” come from, and of why it is essential to these intuitions that they have a certain weak connection to the truth. This account allows that these intuitions may be fallible, but it also seeks to explain why it is rational for us to rely on these intuitions (...)
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  15.  24
    Tobias Keiling (2014). What Phenomenology Ought to Be. Research in Phenomenology (2):281-300.
    Steven Crowell’s rich book is an eminent advance in the interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger, in thinking about the nature of phenomenology as a way of philosophical inquiry, and in accessing the contribution phenomenology can make to philosophy in general. Just as its predecessor Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning (2001) has not stood uncontested—the review by Taylor Carman, for instance, is very critical—Crowell’s new book on normativity is also likely to spur debate. But such debate should be most (...)
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  16.  23
    Ioannis Votsis, How Not to Be a Realist or Why We Ought to Make It Safe for Closet Structural Realists to Come Out.
    When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...)
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  17.  24
    Michael Dummett (1981). Ought Research to Be Unrestricted? Grazer Philosophische Studien 12:281-298.
    Freedom of scientific enquiry must be distinguished from freedom to communicate scientific results. The former demands freedom for scientists to communicate among one another, without which progress is hampered, but not, in itself, freedom to communicate conclusions to the public. The latter freedom may be taken as resting on a general principle of free speech, or, more specifically, on the right of all members of society to knowledge gained by that society, especially by means of public expenditure: it is not (...)
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  18. David Aldridge (2014). How Ought War To Be Remembered in Schools? Impact 2014 (21):1-45.
    Each year a national day of commemoration of the war dead is celebrated on 11th November in the United Kingdom. Despite public controversy about the nature and purpose of remembrance, there has been no significant discussion of the role schools should play in this event. In this centenary year of the outbreak of the First World War, with the government planning to send groups from every secondary school in Britain to tour the battlefields of the western front over the next (...)
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  19. Peter Achinstein (2000). Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):192.
    There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation.
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  20.  56
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005). You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation). Philosophical Issues 15 (1):193-208.
    The distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations has a long history in moral philosophy and is important to many central issues in moral theory and in everyday morality. Unfortunately, this distinction is often overlooked and rarely defined precisely or univocally. This paper tries to clarify the distinction in light of recent empirical research on guilt and shame. I begin with the general notion of an obligation before distinguishing its sub-classes.
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  21. Daya Krishna (1986). Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be. Diogenes 34 (136):58-69.
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  22. Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (2009). Book Review: The Law and the Right: A Reappraisal of the Reality That Ought to Be, by Enrico Pattaro. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 22 (2):451-456.
    Rodriguez-Blanco examines Enrico Pattaro's effort to explain the normativeness or binding force of the law. Pattaro defends the controversial claim that norms are motives of behaviour and provides a rich explanation of how these motives, i.e., beliefs in the human brain, move human agency. In her review, Rodriguez-Blanco challenges Pattaro's empirical conception of human agency.
     
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  23. Sally Haslanger (1999). What Knowledge is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):459-480.
  24. Paul Horwich (1995). Meaning, Use and Truth: On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning is Precluded by the Requirement That Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which It Ought to Be Applied. Mind 104 (414):355-368.
  25. L. S. Woolf (1916). "Magna Latrocinia."-The State as It Ought to Be, as It Is. International Journal of Ethics 27 (1):36-49.
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  26.  15
    Leigh Turner (2003). Doffing the Mask: Why Manuscript Reviewers Ought to Be Identifiable. [REVIEW] Journal of Academic Ethics 1 (1):41-48.
  27.  16
    Piero D'Altan, John-Jules Ch Meyer & Roelf Johannes Wieringa (1996). An Integrated Framework for Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do Constraints. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (2):77-111.
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  28. Gualtiero Piccinini (forthcoming). Scientific Methods Ought to Be Public, and Descriptive Experience Sampling is One of Them. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1).
    Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel’s groundbreaking book, Describing Inner Experience: Proponent Meets Skeptic, examines a research method called Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). DES, which was developed by Hurlburt and collaborators, works roughly as follows. An investigator gives a subject a random beeper. During the day, as the subject hears a beep, she writes a description of her conscious experience just before the beep. The next day, the investigator interviews the subject, asks for more details, corrects any apparent mistakes made by the subject, (...)
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  29.  13
    Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (2005). You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect Moral Obligation). Philosophical Issues 15 (1):193–208.
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  30.  80
    Michael J. Almeida (2000). Why We Ought to Be a Little Less Beneficent. Analysis 60 (265):97–106.
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  31.  2
    Morton Gabriel White (1981). What is and What Ought to Be Done: An Essay on Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  32. Deborah Mayo & Peter Achinstein (2000). Experiment and Conceptual Change-Evidence, Data Generation, and Scientific Practice: Toward a Reliabilist Philosophy of Experiment-Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be). Philosophy of Science 67 (3).
     
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  33.  6
    Sally Haslanger (1999). What Knowledge Is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology. Noûs 33 (s13):459-480.
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  34.  48
    J. Fang (1966). What is, and Ought to Be, History of Mathematics? Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):39-44.
  35. Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis & William E. May (1988). ''Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life'': Toward a Clearer Understanding. The Thomist 52 (3):365-426.
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  36.  5
    M. J. Almeida (2000). Why We Ought to Be a Little Less Beneficent. Analysis 60 (1):97-106.
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  37.  32
    J. Fang (1967). What is, and Ought to Be, Philosophy of Mathematics? Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):71-75.
  38.  8
    Carl Jørgensen (1956). On the Possibility of Deducing What Ought to Be From What Is. Ethics 66 (4):271-278.
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  39.  8
    James A. Gould (1982). Political Free Speech Ought to Be an Absolute. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1):65-70.
  40.  8
    Daniel M. Hausman (1983). What Is and What Ought to Be Done by Morton White. Journal of Philosophy 80 (5):312-315.
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  41.  13
    Lawrence C. Becker (1983). White, Morton: What Is and What Ought to Be Done. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):954-956.
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  42.  7
    William H. Bruening (1985). What Is and What Ought to Be Done. International Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):107-109.
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  43.  10
    Lawrence C. Becker (1983). What Is and What Ought to Be Done. Review of Metaphysics 36 (4):954-956.
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  44.  29
    Lou Goble (1973). Opacity and the Ought-to-Be. Noûs 7 (4):407-412.
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  45.  1
    George J. Annas (1983). Defining Death: There Ought to Be a Law. Hastings Center Report 13 (1):20-21.
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  46.  14
    P. D'Altan, J.-J. Ch Meyer & R. J. Wieringa (1996). An Integrated Framework for Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do Constraints. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (2):77-111.
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  47. Morton White (1983). What Is and What Ought To Be Done. Mind 92 (368):631-633.
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  48.  2
    Krist Vaesen (2006). How Norms in Technology Ought to Be Interpreted. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 10 (1):95-108.
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  49.  2
    L. S. Woolf (1916). "Magna Latrocinia."-The State as It Ought to Be, as It Is. Ethics 27 (1):36.
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  50.  16
    Alan McMichael (1980). What Ought to Be. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):69 - 74.
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