Online research in philosophy

This paper deals with the policy of affirmative action as an additional means for achieving equality of opportunity in society. It assumes that in modem society-at least in principle-the superior positions are distributed according to merit, and on the basis of fair competition. I argue that formal equality of opportunity injects apparently neutral requirements, such as experience, into the selection procedure for top positions, that, in fact, act particularly against women, since they allow the past employment situation to affect the (...) new selection. I use a statistical argument to show that without preferential treatment towards women, they will not overcome structural obstacles that prevent them from getting top positions. I also use the same argument to show that affirmative action at present contributes to equality of opportunity in the future. (shrink)

This paper presents the view of the Israeli “Refusal Movement” known as “Yesh-Gvul.” This movement began when Israel started a war in Lebanon in 1982. Some Israeli reservists refused at the time to join in that war on the basis of the concept of jus ad bellum. In 1987, when the first Palestinian “Intifada” (uprising) began, the Yesh Gvul movement expanded the forms of disobedience it supported, and acknowledged the legitimacy of the refusal to do military service in the “occupied (...) territories” and detention camps in which Palestinians were incarcerated. In 2000, when the second “Intifada” began, Yesh Gvul decided on an additional expansion of the forms of disobedience it supported in expanding the right of disobedience to those who totally refused to serve in the Israeli army. In this paper I want to present a more detailed defense of the justification of these three phases of disobedience that Yesh Gvul supports. (shrink)

This paper seeks to ascertain the reasons for the regrettable gap between the extent to which human rights are acknowledged in many countries, and the extent to which residents of those countries in fact are able to enjoy these rights. However, when we seek to assess to what extent residents of those countries in fact enjoy these rights, the findings are somewhat depressing. In this paper I suggest an explanation for this phenomenon and argue that its cause is built into (...) the very structure of Human Rights as these have hitherto been understood. I maintain that because the addressees of such rights are the states’ governments, there is no external body that functions as the guarantor of such rights that has the authority and power to force the governments when they renege on their correlative duties as the addressees of Human Rights. (shrink)