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Profile: Pär Sundström (Umeå University)
  1. Pär Sundström (2013). Are Colours Visually Complex? In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag.
  2. Pär Sundström (2011). On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought. Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.
    Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept *Q* (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.
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  3. Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
    It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...)
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  4. Pär Sundström (2008). A Somewhat Eliminativist Proposal About Phenomenal Consciousness. In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  5. Pär Sundström (2008). Humes utelämnade nyans av blått. Filosofisk Tidskrift.
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  6. Pär Sundström (2008). Is the Mystery an Illusion? Papineau on the Problem of Consciousness. Synthese 163 (2):133 - 143.
    A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that (...)
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  7. Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
    Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...)
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  8. Pär Sundström (2006). Review of David Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Theoria 72 (1):80-86.
  9. Pär Sundström (2005). Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and the Mind. Sorites 16 (December):6-22.
  10. Pär Sundström (2004). Lessons for Mary. In Marek and Reicher (ed.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  11. Sten Lindstrom & Pär Sundström (eds.) (2002). Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind.
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  12. Pär Sundström (2002). An Argument Against Spectrum Inversion. In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. 65--94.
  13. Pär Sundström (2002). Nagel's Case Against Physicalism. SATS 3 (2):91-108.
  14. Pär Sundström (1999). Psychological Phenomena and First-Person Perspectives: Critical Discussions of Some Arguments in Philosophy of Mind. Acta University Umensis.
     
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  15. Pär Sundström, Consciousness and Intentionality of Action. The 20th World Congress of Philosophy.