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Profile: Peter Carruthers (University of Maryland, College Park)
  1. Peter Carruthers, Author’s Response.
    The present paper elucidates, elaborates, and defends the main thesis advanced in the target article: namely, that natural-language sentences play a constitutive role in some human thought processes, and that they are responsible for some of the distinctive flexibility of human thinking, serving to integrate the outputs of a variety of conceptual modules. Section R1 clarifies and elaborates this main thesis, responding to a number of objections and misunderstandings. R2 considers three contrasting accounts of the mechanism of inter-modular integration. R3 (...)
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  2. Peter Carruthers, The Fragmentation of Reasoning.
    This article evaluates the scientific credentials of a distinction that is frequently endorsed by scientists who study human reasoning, between so-called “System 1” and “System 2”. The paper argues that one aspect of what is generally intended by this distinction is real. In particular, there is a real distinction between intuitive and reflective cognitive processes. But this distinction fails to line up with many of the other properties attributed to System 1 and System 2. Accordingly, the paper argues that the (...)
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  3. Peter Carruthers, Cartesian Epistemology.
    This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, (...)
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  4. Peter Carruthers, Précis of the Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and The.
    This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers (2006). Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume).
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  5. Peter Carruthers, The Distinctively-Human Mind: The Many Pillars of Cumulative Culture.
    This chapter argues that there are multiple adaptations underlying the distinctiveness of the human mind. Careful analysis of the capacities that are involved in the creation, acquisition, and transmission of culture and cultural products suggests that it is very unlikely that these could all be underlain by just one, or a few, novel cognitive systems. On the contrary, there are at least a handful of such systems, each of which is largely independent of the others.
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  6. P. Carruthers (forthcoming). Review of Recreative Minds. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
     
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  7. P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (forthcoming). Theories of Theories Of. Mind.
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  8. Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Mindreading in Adults: Evaluating Two-Systems Views. Synthese:1-16.
    A number of convergent recent findings with adults have been interpreted as evidence of the existence of two distinct systems for mindreading that draw on separate conceptual resources: one that is fast, automatic, and inflexible; and one that is slower, controlled, and flexible. The present article argues that these findings admit of a more parsimonious explanation. This is that there is a single set of concepts made available by a mindreading system that operates automatically where it can, but which frequently (...)
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  9. Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Two Systems for Mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues . This has issued in a number of new findings . The present paper shows (...)
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  10. Peter Carruthers & Elizabeth Picciuto (forthcoming). The Origins of Creativity. In E. Paul & S. Kaufman (eds.), The Philosophy of Creativity. Oxford University Press
    The goal of this chapter is to provide an integrated evolutionary and developmental account of the emergence of distinctively-human creative capacities. Our main thesis is that childhood pretend play is a uniquely human adaptation that functions in part to enhance adult forms of creativity. We review evidence that is consistent with such an account, and contrast our proposal favorably with a number of alternatives.
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  11. Vincent Picciuto & Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Inner-Sense. In Biggs S., Matthen M. & Stokes D. (eds.), Perception and its Modalites. Oxford University Press
    This chapter considers whether any of the inner sense mechanisms that have been postulated to detect and represent some of our own mental states should qualify as sensory modalities. We first review and reject the four standard views of the senses, and then propose a set of properties that would be possessed by a prototypical sensory system. Thereafter we consider how closely the existing models of inner sense match the prototype. Some resemble a prototypical sense to a high degree, some (...)
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  12. Peter Carruthers (2014). Unconsciously Competing Goals Can Collaborate or Compromise as Well as Win or Lose. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):139-140.
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  13. Ryan Ogilvie & Peter Carruthers (2014). Better Tests of Consciousness Are Needed, but Skepticism About Unconscious Processes is Unwarranted. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):36-37.
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  14. Peter Carruthers (2013). Animal Minds Are Real, (Distinctively) Human Minds Are Not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):233-248.
    Everyone allows that human and animal minds are distinctively (indeed, massively) different in their manifest effects. Humans have been able to colonize nearly every corner of the planet, from the artic, to deserts, to rainforests (and they did so in the absence of modern technological aids); they live together in large cooperative groups of unrelated individuals; they communicate with one another using the open-ended expressive resources of natural language; they are capable of cultural learning that accumulates over generations to result (...)
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  15. Peter Carruthers (2013). Mindreading in Infancy. Mind and Language 28 (2):141-172.
    Various dichotomies have been proposed to characterize the nature and development of human mindreading capacities, especially in light of recent evidence of mindreading in infants aged 7 to 18 months. This article will examine these suggestions, arguing that none is currently supported by the evidence. Rather, the data support a modular account of the domain-specific component of basic mindreading capacities. This core component is present in infants from a very young age and does not alter fundamentally thereafter. What alters with (...)
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  16. Peter Carruthers (2013). On Central Cognition. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-20.
    This article examines what is known about the cognitive science of working memory, and brings the findings to bear in evaluating philosophical accounts of central cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning. It is argued that central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts. Contrary to a broad spectrum of philosophical opinion, the central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active.Introduction: philosophers’ commitmentsMost (...)
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  17. Peter Carruthers, Logan Fletcher & J. Brendan Ritchie (2012). The Evolution of Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 40 (2):13-37.
    Humans have the capacity for awareness of many aspects of their own mental lives—their own experiences, feelings, judgments, desires, and decisions. We can often know what it is that we see, hear, feel, judge, want, or decide. This article examines the evolutionary origins of this form of self-knowledge. Two alternatives are contrasted and compared with the available evidence. One is first-person based: self-knowledge is an adaptation designed initially for metacognitive monitoring and control. The other is third-person based: self-knowledge depends on (...)
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  18. Peter Carruthers & J. Brendan Ritchie (2012). The Emergence of Metacognition: Affect and Uncertainty in Animals. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press 76.
    This chapter situates the dispute over the metacognitive capacities of non-human animals in the context of wider debates about the phylogeny of metarepresentational abilities. This chapter clarifies the nature of the dispute, before contrasting two different accounts of the evolution of metarepresentation. One is first-person-based, claiming that it emerged initially for purposes of metacognitive monitoring and control. The other is social in nature, claiming that metarepresentation evolved initially to monitor the mental states of others. These accounts make differing predictions about (...)
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  19. Matt King & Peter Carruthers (2012). Moral Responsibility and Consciousness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):200-228.
    Our aim in this paper is to raise a question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. Our question has rarely been raised previously. Among those who believe in the reality of human freedom, compatibilists have traditionally devoted their energies to providing an account that can avoid any commitment to the falsity of determinism while successfully accommodating a range of intuitive examples. Libertarians, in contrast, have aimed to (...)
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  20. Peter Carruthers (2011). Action-Awareness and the Active Mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2):133-156.
    In a pair of recent papers and his new book, Christopher Peacocke (2007, 2008a, 2008b) takes up and defends the claim that our awareness of our own actions is immediate and not perceptually based, and extends it into the domain of mental action.1 He aims to provide an account of action-awareness that will generalize to explain how we have immediate awareness of our own judgments, decisions, imaginings, and so forth. These claims form an important component in a much larger philosophical (...)
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  21. Peter Carruthers (2011). Creative Action in Mind. Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):437 - 461.
    The goal of this article is to display the attractiveness of a novel account of the place of creativity in the human mind. This is designed to supplement (and perhaps replace) the widespread assumption that creativity is thought-based, involving novel combinations of concepts to form creative thoughts, with the creativity of action being parasitic upon prior creative thinking. According to the proposed account, an additional (or perhaps alternative) locus of creativity lies in the assembly and activation of action-schemata, with creative (...)
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  22. Peter Carruthers (2011). I Do Not Exist. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (5):189-190.
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  23. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.
     
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  24. Peter Carruthers & Vincent Picciuto (2011). Should Damage to the Machinery for Social Perception Damage Perception. Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (2):116-17.
    We argue that Graziano and Kastner are mistaken to claim that neglect favors their self-directed social perception account of consciousness. For the latter should not predict that neglect would result from damage to mechanisms of social perception. Neglect is better explained in terms of damage to attentional mechanisms.
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  25. Peter Carruthers & Bénédicte Veillet (2011). The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press 35.
    The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that if (...)
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  26. Mark Engelbert & Peter Carruthers (2011). Descriptive Experience Sampling: What is It Good For? Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):130-149.
    We defend the reliability of Hurlburt's Descriptive Experi-ence Sampling method against some of Schwitzgebel's attacks. But we agree with Schwitzgebel that the method could be used much more widely than it has been, helping to answer questions about the nature and structure of consciousness in addition to cataloguing the latter's contents. We sketch a number of potential lines of further enquiry.
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  27. Peter Carruthers (2010). Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter (...)
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  28. Peter Carruthers (2010). Reductive Explanation and The. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-173.
  29. J. Brendan Ritchie & Peter Carruthers (2010). Massive Modularity is Consistent with Most Forms of Neural Reuse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):289-290.
    Anderson claims that the hypothesis of massive neural reuse is inconsistent with massive mental modularity. But much depends upon how each thesis is understood. We suggest that the thesis of massive modularity presented in Carruthers (2006) is consistent with the forms of neural reuse that are actually supported by the data cited, while being inconsistent with a stronger version of reuse that Anderson seems to support.
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  30. Peter Carruthers (2009). Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.
    SHORT ABSTRACT: A number of accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of these accounts endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. The different types of theory are developed and evaluated, and multiple lines of evidence are reviewed, including evolutionary and comparative data, evidence of confabulation when self-attributing attitudes, phenomenological evidence (...)
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  31. Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.
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  32. Peter Carruthers (2009). Invertebrate Concepts Confront the Generality Constraint (and Win). In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press 89--107.
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  33. Peter Carruthers (2009). 254 List of Publications by Stephen Stich. In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell 14--17.
     
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  34. Peter Carruthers (2009). Mindreading Underlies Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):164-182.
    This response defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
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  35. Peter Carruthers (2009). Review: Simulation and the First-Person. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475.
    This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman's view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
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  36. Peter Carruthers (2009). Simulation and the First-Person. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475.
    This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman’s view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
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  37. Peter Carruthers & Andrew Chamberlain (eds.) (2009). Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge University Press.
    How did our minds evolve? Can evolutionary considerations illuminate the question of the basic architecture of the human mind? These are two of the main questions addressed in Evolution and the Human Mind by a distinguished interdisciplinary team of philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists and archaeologists. The essays focus especially on issues to do with modularity of mind, the evolution and significance of natural language, and the evolution of our capacity for meta-cognition , together with its implications for consciousness. The editors have (...)
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  38. P. Carruthers, S. Stich & S. Laurence (eds.) (2008). The Innate Mind, Vol. III, Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press.
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  39. Peter Carruthers (2008). An Architecture for Dual Reasoning. In J. Evans & K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press
    In J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, 2008. (In draft.).
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  40. Peter Carruthers (2008). Cartesian Epistemology: Is the Theory of the Self-Transparent Mind Innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):28-53.
    This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, (...)
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  41. Peter Carruthers, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  42. Peter Carruthers (2008). Las Heurísticas Simples Se Encuentran Con la Modularidad Masiva. Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):113-138.
    Este artículo investiga la coherencia entre la propuesta de una organización modular masiva de la mente y el enfoque de las heurísticas simples. Se discute una serie de potenciales conflictos entre los dos programas, pero finalmente son desestimados. De todos modos, el programa de las heurísticas simples sí termina socavando uno de los muchos argumentos propuestos para apoyar la modularidad masiva, al menos en el modo en que esta última es comprendida por los filósofos. Así que un resultado de la (...)
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  43. Peter Carruthers (2008). Language in Cognition. In E. Margolis, R. Samuels & S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press
    In E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press, 2008.
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  44. Peter Carruthers (2008). Meta-Cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look. Mind and Language 23 (1):58–89.
    This paper examines the recent literature on meta-cognitive processes in non-human animals, arguing that in each case the data admit of a simpler, purely first-order, explanation. The topics discussed include the alleged monitoring of states of certainty and uncertainty, knowledge-seeking behavior in conditions of uncertainty, and the capacity to know whether or not the information needed to solve some problem is stored in memory. The first-order explanations advanced all assume that beliefs and desires come in various different strengths, or degrees.
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  45. Peter Carruthers (2008). On Fodor-Fixation, Flexibility, and Human Uniqueness: A Reply to Cowie, Machery, and Wilson. Mind and Language 23 (3):293–303.
    This paper argues that two of my critics (Cowie and Wilson) have become fixated on Fodor’s notion of modularity, both to their own detriment and to the detriment of their understanding of Carruthers, 2006. The paper then focuses on the supposed inadequacies of the latter’s explanations of both content flexibility and human uniqueness, alleged by Machery and Cowie respectively.
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  46. Peter Carruthers (2008). Précis of the Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Mind and Language 23 (3):257–262.
    This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers, 2006. Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume).
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  47. Peter Carruthers (2008). Universal Human Thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):46-47.
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  48. Peter Carruthers & Scott M. James (2008). Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):237-244.
    A commentary on Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality.
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  49. Michael Tetzlaff & Peter Carruthers (2008). Languages of Thought Need to Be Distinguished From Learning Mechanisms, and Nothing yet Rules Out Multiple Distinctively Human Learning Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):148-149.
    We distinguish the question whether only human minds are equipped with a language of thought (LoT) from the question whether human minds employ a single uniquely human learning mechanism. Thus separated, our answer to both questions is negative. Even very simple minds employ a LoT. And the comparative data reviewed by Penn et al. actually suggest that there are many distinctively human learning mechanisms.
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