198 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Paul M. Churchland [94]Patricia S. Churchland [50]Patricia Smith Churchland [25]Paul Churchland [17]
Patricia Churchland [9]P. M. Churchland [8]P. S. Churchland [6]P. Churchland [3]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also:
Profile: Patricia Smith Churchland (University of California, San Diego)
  1.  14
    Willard Van Orman Quine, Patricia Smith Churchland & Dagfinn Føllesdal (2013). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
    Willard Van Orman Quine begins this influential work by declaring, "Language is asocial art.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   148 citations  
  2.  88
    Patricia S. Churchland (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   421 citations  
  3. Paul M. Churchland (1984). Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press.
    The Mind-Body Problem Questions: What is the mind? What is its connection to the body? Most basic division of answers: Dualist and Materialist (or Physicalist) responses.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   421 citations  
  4. Paul M. Churchland (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.
    A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   312 citations  
  5. Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
  6. Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
    This article describes a theory of the computations underlying the selection of coordinated motion patterns, especially in reaching tasks. The central idea is that when a spatial target is selected as an object to be reached, stored postures are evaluated for the contributions they can make to the task. Weights are assigned to the stored postures, and a single target posture is found by taking a weighted sum of the stored postures. Movement is achieved by reducing the distance between the (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   407 citations  
  7. Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
  8. Patricia S. Churchland, V. S. Ramachandran & Terrence J. Sejnowski (1993). A Critique of Pure Vision. In Christof Koch & Joel L. David (eds.), Large-scale neuronal theories of the brain. MIT Press 23.
    Anydomainofscientificresearchhasitssustainingorthodoxy. Thatis, research on a problem, whether in astronomy, physics, or biology, is con- ducted against a backdrop of broadly shared assumptions. It is these as- sumptionsthatguideinquiryandprovidethecanonofwhatisreasonable-- of what "makes sense." And it is these shared assumptions that constitute a framework for the interpretation of research results. Research on the problem of how we see is likewise sustained by broadly shared assump- tions, where the current orthodoxy embraces the very general idea that the business of the visual system is to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  9. Patricia S. Churchland, Terrence J. Sejnowksi & Brian P. McLaughlin (1996). The Computational Brain. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):137.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   118 citations  
  10. Patricia S. Churchland (1988). Reduction and the Neurobiological Basis of Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press
  11. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1994). Intertheoretic Reduction: A Neuroscientist's Field Guide. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
  12.  46
    Paul M. Churchland (1995). The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain. MIT Press.
    For the uninitiated, there are two major tendencies in the modeling of human cognition. The older, tradtional school believes, in essence, that full human cognition can be modeled by dividing the world up into distinct entities -- called __symbol s__-- such as “dog”, “cat”, “run”, “bite”, “happy”, “tumbleweed”, and so on, and then manipulating this vast set of symbols by a very complex and very subtle set of rules. The opposing school claims that this system, while it might be good (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   66 citations  
  13. Paul M. Churchland (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   116 citations  
  14. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33-50.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  15. Paul M. Churchland (1988). Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21.
  16. Patricia S. Churchland (2012). Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality. Princeton University Press.
    What is morality? Where does it come from? And why do most of us heed its call most of the time? In Braintrust, neurophilosophy pioneer Patricia Churchland argues that morality originates in the biology of the brain. She describes the "neurobiological platform of bonding" that, modified by evolutionary pressures and cultural values, has led to human styles of moral behavior. The result is a provocative genealogy of morals that asks us to reevaluate the priority given to religion, absolute rules, and (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  17.  20
    Paul M. Churchland (2012). Plato's Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures a Landscape of Abstract Universals. The MIT Press.
    In _ Plato's Camera_, eminent philosopher Paul Churchland offers a novel account of how the brain constructs a representation -- or "takes a picture" -- of the universe's timeless categorical and dynamical structure. This construction process, which begins at birth, yields the enduring background conceptual framework with which we will interpret our sensory experience for the rest of our lives. But, as even Plato knew, to make singular perceptual judgments requires that we possess an antecedent framework of abstract categories to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  18. Patricia S. Churchland (2002). Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  19. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1981). Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-32.
  20. Patricia S. Churchland (1983). Consciousness: The Transmutation of a Concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):80-95.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   90 citations  
  21. Patricia Churchland, The Big Questions: Do We Have Free Will?
    As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1990). Could a Machine Think? Scientific American 262 (1):32-37.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  23. Paul M. Churchland (1986). Some Reductive Strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology. Mind 95 (July):279-309.
  24. Paul M. Churchland (2007). Neurophilosophy at Work. Cambridge University Press.
    In this collection of essays, Paul Churchland explores the unfolding impact of the several empirical sciences of the mind, especially cognitive neurobiology and computational neuroscience on a variety of traditional issues central to the discipline of philosophy. Representing Churchland's most recent research, they continue his research program, launched over thirty years ago, and which has evolved into the field of neurophilosophy.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  25. Patricia S. Churchland (1980). Language, Thought, and Information Processing. Noûs 14 (May):147-70.
  26.  87
    Patricia S. Churchland (1981). The Timing of Sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):492-7.
  27. Patricia S. Churchland (1987). Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84 (October):546-53.
  28. Paul M. Churchland (1996). The Rediscovery of Light. Journal of Philosophy 93 (5):211-28.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  29.  40
    Christopher L. Suhler & Patricia S. Churchland (2009). Control: Conscious and Otherwise. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (8):341-347.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  30. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  31.  62
    Patricia S. Churchland (1980). A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research. Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   62 citations  
  32. Patricia S. Churchland (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8.
    Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have propsed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem’. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine’ arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  33.  45
    Patricia S. Churchland (1981). On the Alleged Backward Referral of Experience and its Relevance to the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):165-81.
    A remarkable hypothesis has recently been advanced by Libet and promoted by Eccles which claims that there is standardly a backwards referral of conscious experiences in time, and that this constitutes empirical evidence for the failure of identity of brain states and mental states. Libet's neurophysiological data are critically examined and are found insufficient to support the hypothesis. Additionally, it is argued that even if there is a temporal displacement phenomenon to be explained, a neurophysiological explanation is most likely.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   61 citations  
  34.  5
    Paul M. Churchland (1991). [Book Review] Matter and Consciousness, a Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (374):27-40.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   45 citations  
  35.  39
    Paul M. Churchland (1989). Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson. In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press 163--178.
  36.  58
    Paul Churchland (2007). On the Reality (and Diversity) of Objective Colors: How Color‐Qualia Space is a Map of Reflectance‐Profile Space. Philosophy of Science 74 (2):119-149.
    How, if at all, does the internal structure of human phenomenological color space map onto the internal structure of objective reflectance‐profile space, in such a fashion as to provide a useful and accurate representation of that objective feature space? A prominent argument (due to Hardin, among others) proposes to eliminate colors as real, objective properties of objects, on grounds that nothing in the external world (and especially not surface‐reflectance‐profiles) answers to the well‐known and quite determinate internal structure of human phenomenological (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  37. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). Recent Work on Consciousness: Philosophical, Theoretical, and Empirical. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. Amsterdam: J Benjamins 49--123.
  38.  50
    Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1998). On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This collection was prepared in the belief that the most useful and revealing of anyone's writings are often those shorter essays penned in conflict with...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  39. William D. Casebeer & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):169-194.
    We critically review themushrooming literature addressing the neuralmechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reachingthe following broad conclusions: (1) researchmainly focuses on three inter-relatedcategories: the moral emotions, moral socialcognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2)Research varies in terms of whether it deploysecologically valid or experimentallysimplified conceptions of moral cognition. Themore ecologically valid the experimentalregime, the broader the brain areas involved.(3) Much of the research depends on simplifyingassumptions about the domain of moral reasoningthat are motivated by the need to makeexperimental progress. This is a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  40. Paul M. Churchland (1999). Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):763-767.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Patricia Smith Churchland, The Impact of Neuroscience on Philosophy.
    Philosophy, in its traditional guise, addresses questions where experimental science has not yet nailed down plausible explanatory theories. Thus, the ancient Greeks pondered the nature of life, the sun, and tides, but also how we learn and make decisions. The history of science can be seen as a gradual process whereby speculative philosophy cedes intellectual space to increasingly wellgrounded experimental disciplines—first astronomy, but followed by physics, chemistry, geology, biology, archaeology, and more recently, ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Science now encompasses plausible (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Paul M. Churchland (2006). Into the Brain: Where Philosophy Should Go From Here. [REVIEW] Topoi 25 (1-2):29-32.
    The maturation of the cognitive neurosciences will throw light on many central philosophical issues. Among them: semantic theory, perception, learning, social and moral knowledge, and practical reasoning and decision making. As contemporary medicine cannot do without the achievements of modern biology, philosophy would be pitiful if it disregarded the achievements of brain research.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  68
    Paul M. Churchland (1970). The Logical Character of Action-Explanations. Philosophical Review 79 (2):214-236.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  44. Paul M. Churchland (2006). Eliminative Materialism [Selection From Matter and Consciousness]. In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman and Littlefield 115.
    The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities were thought to be poor, but because it seemed unlikely that the arrival of an adequate materialist theory would bring with it the nice one-to-one match-ups, between the concepts of folk psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction requires. The reason for that doubt was the great variety of quite different physical systems that could instantiate the required functional (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (eds.) (1985). Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. University of Chicago Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  46.  22
    Patricia S. Churchland (2015). The Neurobiological Platform for Moral Values. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:97-110.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Rick Grush & P. Churchland (1995). Gaps in Penrose's Toiling. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Ferdinand Schoningh 10-29.
    Using the Gödel Incompleteness Result for leverage, Roger Penrose has argued that the mechanism for consciousness involves quantum gravitational phenomena, acting through microtubules in neurons. We show that this hypothesis is implausible. First, the Gödel Result does not imply that human thought is in fact non algorithmic. Second, whether or not non algorithmic quantum gravitational phenomena actually exist, and if they did how that could conceivably implicate microtubules, and if microtubules were involved, how that could conceivably implicate consciousness, is entirely (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  38
    Patricia Smith Churchland (2002). Brain Wise. The MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  49.  57
    Paul M. Churchland (1993). State-Space Semantics and Meaning Holism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):667 - 672.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. Rick Grush & Patricia S. Churchland (1998). Computation and the Brain. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), Mit Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Mitecs). MIT Press
    Two very different insights motivate characterizing the brain as a computer. One depends on mathematical theory that defines computability in a highly abstract sense. Here the foundational idea is that of a Turing machine. Not an actual machine, the Turing machine is really a conceptual way of making the point that any well-defined function could be executed, step by step, according to simple 'if-you-are-in-state-P-and-have-input-Q-then-do-R' rules, given enough time (maybe infinite time) [see COMPUTATION]. Insofar as the brain is a device whose (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 198