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Peter Forrest [115]P. Forrest [20]Peter V. Forrest [1]Pj Forrest [1]
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Profile: Peter V. Forrest (Oxford University)
Profile: Pj Forrest (William Carey University (Coast))
Profile: Patrick Forrest (Washington State University)
  1.  24
    Peter Forrest (forthcoming). Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Analysis:anw024.
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  2. Peter Forrest (2004). The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
    In "How Do We Know It Is Now Now?" David Braddon-Mitchell (Analysis 2004) develops an objection to the thesis that the past is real but the future is not. He notes my response to this, namely that the past, although real, is lifeless and (a fortiori?) lacking in sentience. He argues, however, that this response, which I call 'the past is dead hypothesis', is not tenable if combined with 'special relativity'. My purpose in this reply is to argue that, on (...)
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  3.  9
    P. Forrest, The Personal Pantheist Conception of God.
    This chapter is a case for the pantheist conception considered as a species of theism, rather than a rival to it. The starting point, the premise of the argument, is properly anthropomorphic metaphysics, which I propose as a rival to scientific naturalism; I begin, then, by stating my version of pantheism, by expounding PAM, and by sketching my argument.
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  4.  9
    Peter V. Forrest (forthcoming). Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought? Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    According to a number of popular intentionalist theories in philosophy of mind, phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically intentional: phenomenal properties are identical to intentional properties of a certain type, or at least, the phenomenal character of an experience necessarily fixes a type of intentional content. These views are attractive, but it is questionable whether the reasons for accepting them generalize from sensory-perceptual experience to other kinds of experience: for example, agentive, moral, aesthetic, or cognitive experience. Meanwhile, a number of philosophers (...)
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  5.  7
    Peter Forrest (forthcoming). Einstein's Genie: Spacetime Out of the Bottle, by Graham Nerlich. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  6. Peter Forrest (1986). Ways Worlds Could Be. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):15 – 24.
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  7.  24
    Dean E. Allmon, Henry C. K. Chen, Thomas K. Pritchett & Pj Forrest (1997). A Multicultural Examination of Business Ethics Perceptions. Journal of Business Ethics 16 (2):183-188.
    This study provides an evaluation of ethical business perception of busIness students from three countries: Australia, Taiwan and the United States. Although statistically significant differences do exist there is significant agreement with the way students perceive ethical/unethical practices in business. The findings of this paper indicate a universality of business ethical perceptions.
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  8.  47
    Peter Forrest (2007). Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Overview -- Theism, simplicity, and properly anthropocentric metaphysics -- Materialism and dualism -- The power, knowledge, and motives of the primordial God -- The existence of the primordial God -- God changes -- Understanding evil -- The Trinity -- The Incarnation -- Concluding remarks.
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  9.  47
    Peter Forrest (2006). General Facts, Physical Necessity and the Metaphysics of Time. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:137-154.
    In this chapter I assume that we accept, perhaps reluctantly, general facts, that is states of affairs corresponding to universal generalizations. I then argue that, without any addition, this ontology provides us with physical necessities, and moreover with various grades of physical necessity, including the strongest grade, which I call absolute physical necessity. In addition there are consequences for our understanding of time. For this account, which I call the Mortmain Theory, provides a defence of No Futurism against an otherwise (...)
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  10. P. Forrest (2012). The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined. Philosophical Review 121 (4):622-625.
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  11.  49
    Peter Forrest (2002). Nonclassical Mereology and Its Application to Sets. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):79-94.
    Part One of this paper is a case against classical mereology and for Heyting mereology. This case proceeds by first undermining the appeal of classical mereology and then showing how it fails to cohere with our intuitions about a measure of quantity. Part Two shows how Heyting mereology provides an account of sets and classes without resort to any nonmereological primitive.
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  12. Peter Forrest & D. M. Armstrong (1984). An Argument Against David Lewis' Theory of Possible Worlds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):164 – 168.
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  13. John Bigelow, Raymond D. Bradley, Andrew Brennan, Tony Coady, Peter Forrest, James Franklin, Karen Green, Russell Grigg, Matthew Sharpe, Jeanette Kennett, Neil Levy, Catriona Mackenzie, Gary Malinas, Chris Mortensen, Robert Nola & Paul Patton (2011). The Antipodean Philosopher: Public Lectures on Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Lexington Books.
     
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  14. Peter Forrest (1995). Is Space-Time Discrete or Continuous? — An Empirical Question. Synthese 103 (3):327--354.
    In this paper I present the Discrete Space-Time Thesis, in a way which enables me to defend it against various well-known objections, and which extends to the discrete versions of Special and General Relativity with only minor difficulties. The point of this presentation is not to convince readers that space-time really is discrete but rather to convince them that we do not yet know whether or not it is. Having argued that it is an open question whether or not space-time (...)
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  15. Peter Forrest (2006). Uniform Grounding of Truth and the Growing Block Theory: A Reply to Heathwood. Analysis 66 (290):161–163.
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  16.  89
    Peter Forrest (1996). Physical Necessity and the Passage of Time. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers 49--62.
  17.  50
    Peter Forrest (2005). Universals as Sense-Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622-631.
    This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being treeshaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material (...)
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  18.  35
    Peter Forrest (2004). Grit or Gunk. The Monist 87 (3):351-370.
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  19.  48
    Peter Forrest (1986). Neither Magic nor Mereology: A Reply to Lewis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):89 – 91.
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  20.  49
    Peter Forrest, The Identity of Indiscernibles. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  21.  71
    Peter Forrest (2006). The Operator Theory of Instantiation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):213 – 228.
    Armstrong holds the Supervenience Theory of instantiation, namely that the instantiation of universals by particulars supervenes upon what particulars and what universals there are, where supervenience is stipulated to be explanatory or dependent supervenience. I begin by rejecting the Supervenience Theory of instantiation. Having done so it is then tempting to take instantiation as primitive. This has, however, an awkward consequence, undermining one of the main advantages universals have over tropes. So I examine another account hinted at by Armstrong. This (...)
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  22.  14
    Peter Forrest (forthcoming). The Mereology of Structural Universals. Logic and Logical Philosophy.
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  23. Peter Forrest (1987). The Fixed and the Zerked. Mind 96 (382):245-246.
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  24. Peter Forrest (1984). Is Motion Change of Location? Analysis 44 (4):177 - 178.
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  25. Peter Forrest (2010). Why Richard Swinburne Won't 'Rot in Hell': A Defense of Tough-Minded Theodicy. [REVIEW] Sophia 49 (1):37-47.
    In his recent paper in Sophia , ‘Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?’ Nick Trakakis endorses the position that theodicy, whether intellectually successful or not, is a morally obnoxious enterprise. My aim in this paper is to defend theodicy from this accusation. I concede that God the Creator is a moral monster by human standards and neither to be likened to a loving parent nor imitated. Nonetheless, God is morally perfect. What is abhorrent (...)
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  26.  18
    Peter Forrest (2012). Replying to the Anti-God Challenge: A God Without Moral Character Acts Well. Religious Studies 48 (1):35 - 43.
    Several authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the (...)
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  27.  41
    Peter Forrest & D. M. Armstrong (1987). The Nature of Number. Philosophical Papers 16 (3):165-186.
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  28.  7
    Peter Forrest (2009). Vectors on Curved Space. Dialectica 63 (4):491-501.
    In this paper I provide an ontology for the co‐variant vectors, contra‐variant vectors and tensors that are familiar from General Relativity. This ontology is developed in response to a problem that Timothy Maudlin uses to argue against universals in the interpretation of physics. The problem is that if vector quantities are universals then there should be a way of identifying the same vector quantity at two different places, but there is no absolute identification of vector quantities, merely a path‐relative one.My (...)
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  29.  54
    Peter Forrest (2007). Mereological Summation and the Question of Unique Fusion. Analysis 67 (295):237–242.
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  30.  11
    Peter Forrest (2015). James Franklin: An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and Structure. Studia Neoaristotelica 12 (1):105-109.
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  31.  18
    Peter Forrest (1981). The Problem of Evil: Two Neglected Defences. [REVIEW] Sophia 20 (1):49-54.
    Theism can be defended against the Philosophical Problem of Evil, provided one rejects the Principle of Perfectionism, without relying on the Greater Good Defence or, unless one is a libertarian, the Free-Will Defence.A corollary of the All Good Possible Worlds Defence and the No Best Possible World Defence, is that God’s goodness need not determine God’s choice to create. The reasons, if any, which God has are relevant to the Theological Problem of Evil but not to the Philosophical Problem of (...)
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  32.  63
    Peter Forrest (2000). The Incarnation: A Philosophical Case for Kenosis. Religious Studies 36 (2):127-140.
    As a preliminary, I shall clarify the kenotic position by arguing that a position which is often called kenotic is actually a quasi-kenotic version of the classical account, according to which Jesus had normal divine powers but chose not to exercise them. After this preliminary, I discuss three problems with the strict kenotic account. The first is that kenosis conflicts with the standard list of attributes considered essential to God. The second problem is posed by the Exaltation, namely the resumption (...)
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  33.  21
    Peter Forrest (1988). Quantum Metaphysics. B. Blackwell.
    The book comprises an enquiry into what quantum theory shows us about the world. Its aim is to sort out which metaphysical speculations are tenable and which are not. After an initial discussion of realism, the author provides a non-technical exposition of quantum theory and a criticism of the proposal that quantum theory should make us revise our beliefs about logic. He then discusses the various problems and puzzles which make quantum theory both interesting and perplexing. The text defends three (...)
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  34. Peter Forrest (1986). The Dynamics of Belief: A Normative Logic. Blackwell.
     
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  35.  31
    Peter Forrest (2006). Collective Guilt; Individual Shame. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):145–153.
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  36.  42
    Peter Forrest (1988). Supervenience: The Grand-Property Hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):1-12.
    THE ARTICLE IS AN ATTACK ON THE MYSTERY OR REDUCTION DILEMMA FOR SUPERVENIENCE. THIS IS THE DILEMMA THAT EITHER SUPERVENIENCE IS MYSTERIOUS OR THE SUPERVENIENT IS REDUCIBLE TO THE SUBVENIENT. A NONMYSTERIOUS, NONREDUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF SUPERVENIENCE IS PROPOSED, BASED ON THE METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION THAT SUPERVENIENT TERMS AND PHRASES APPLY TO OBJECTS WHOSE INTRINSIC NATURES THEMSELVES HAVE AN APPROPRIATE PROPERTY. SINCE THIS IS A PROPERTY OF A NATURE IT IS A PROPERTY OF A PROPERTY, THAT IS, A GRAND-PROPERTY. SUPERVENIENCE FOLLOWS FROM (...)
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  37.  31
    Peter Forrest (1994). Why Most of Us Should Be Scientific Realists. The Monist 77 (1):47-70.
  38.  2
    Willem B. Drees & P. Forrest (2000). God Without the Supernatural. Zygon 35:207-209.
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  39. Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt, D. M. Armstrong, Jonathan Bennett, John Bigelow, Daniel Bonevac, Phillip Bricker, Peter Forrest, Terence Horgan, Harold W. Noonan, Paul Teller & Michael Tye (2001). Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism.
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  40.  95
    Peter Forrest (2010). Mereotopology without mereology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):229 - 254.
    Mereotopology is that branch of the theory of regions concerned with topological properties such as connectedness. It is usually developed by considering the parthood relation that characterizes the, perhaps non-classical, mereology of Space (or Spacetime, or a substance filling Space or Spacetime) and then considering an extra primitive relation. My preferred choice of mereotopological primitive is interior parthood . This choice will have the advantage that filters may be defined with respect to it, constructing “points”, as Peter Roeper has done (...)
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  41.  31
    Peter Forrest (1997). Common Sense and a “Wigner-Dirac” Approach to Quantum Mechanics. The Monist 80 (1):131-159.
  42.  69
    Peter Forrest (2012). Truths About Non-Existent Things. Metascience 21 (2):305-307.
    Truths about non-existent things Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9583-8 Authors Peter Forrest, Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  43. Peter Forrest (1996). How Innocent is Mereology? Analysis 56 (3):127–131.
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  44.  43
    Peter Forrest (2013). Exemplification and Parthood. Axiomathes 23 (2):323-341.
    Consider the things that exist—the entities—and let us suppose they are mereologically structured, that is, some are parts of others. The project of ontology within the bounds of bare mereology use this structure to say which of these entities belong to various ontological kinds, such as properties and particulars. My purpose in this paper is to defend the most radical section of the project, the mereological theory of the exemplification of universals. Along the way I help myself to several hypotheses: (...)
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  45.  19
    Peter Forrest (1990). New Problems with Repeatable Properties and with Change. Noûs 24 (4):543-556.
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  46.  72
    Peter Forrest (2002). Sets As Mereological Tropes. Metaphysica 3 (1).
    Either from concrete examples such as tomatoes on a plate, an egg carton full of eggs and so on, or simply because of the braces notation, we come to have some intuitions about the sorts of things sets might be. (See Maddy 1990.) First we tend to think of a set of particulars as itself a particular thing.. Second, even after the distinction between settheory and mereology has been carefully explained we tend to think of the members of a set (...)
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  47.  56
    Peter Forrest (1982). Occam's Razor and Possible Worlds. The Monist 65 (4):456--464.
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  48.  18
    Peter Forrest (2001). Counting the Cost of Modal Realism. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman and Littlefield 93--103.
    Conceivability is, I say, prima facie evidence for possibility. Hence, we may count the cost of theories about possibility by listing the ways in which, according to the theory in question, something conceivable is said nonetheless to be impossible. More succinctly we may state a principle, Hume's razor to put alongside Ockham's. Hume's razor says that necessities are not to be multiplied more than necessary. In this paper I count the cost of David Lewis's modal realism, showing that many of (...)
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  49.  57
    Peter Forrest (1985). Backwards Causation in Defense of Free Will. Mind 94 (April):210-17.
  50.  9
    Peter Forrest (1996). Space Curvature and Repeatable Properties: Mormann's Perspectival Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):319 – 323.
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