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  1. Reem Maassarani, Pierre Gosselin, Patricia Montembeault & Mathieu Gagnon (2014). French-Speaking Children’s Freely Produced Labels for Facial Expressions. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  2. Yves Gingras & Pierre-Marc Gosselin (2008). The Emergence and Evolution of the Expression “Conflict of Interests” in Science : A Historical Overview, 1880–2006. Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (3):337-343.
    The tendency is strong to take the notion of “conflict of interests” for granted as if it had an invariant meaning and an ethical content independent of the historical context. It is doubtful however, from an historical and sociological point of view, that many of the cases now considered as instances of “conflicts of interests” would also have been conceived and perceived as such in, say, the 1930s. The idea of a “conflict of interests” presupposes that there are indeed interests (...)
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  3. Phil Gosselin (2000). Can the Potentiality Argument Survive the Contraception Reduction? Journal of Philosophical Research 25:437-458.
    Many philosophers believe that the main reason it is wrong to kill people is that killing them deprives them of all the experiences and activities that would otherwise have constituted their futures. Some of these philosophers have also argued that killing potential people is wrong for the same reason, and have used this as support for a conservative position on abortion. Critics have countered by arguing that if zygotes are potential people so too are gamete pairs, and that the potentialist (...)
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  4. Phil Gosselin (1993). Francis Snare, The Nature of Moral Thinking Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 13 (3):120-121.
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  5. Phillip D. Gosselin (1987). The Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):91-104.
    In 1969 harry frankfurt attacked the principle of alternate possibilities, I.E., The principle that one is morally responsible for what one has done only if one could have done otherwise. The first two parts of this paper offer a supplement to and clarification of that principle; the third part defends the supplemented version of it against three frankfurt arguments; and the fourth comments on a recent discussion of it by michael zimmerman.
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  6. Gilles Kirouac, François Y. Doré & Pierre Gosselin (1983). Analyse des confusions dans l'identification d'expressions faciales émotionnelles: comparaison de deux modalités de jugement. Semiotica 45 (1-2).
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  7. Phillip Gosselin (1982). Moral Responsibility and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Philosophy Research Archives 8:499-512.
    This paper evaluates three recent attacks on what Harry Frankfurt has called the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), i.e., the principle that if a person could not have done otherwise he is not morally responsible for what he has done. One critic of PAP argues that, if a person was drawn irresistibly to a drug yet was “altogether delighted with his condition”, he might well be morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise. A second critic describes circumstances (...)
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  8. P. Gosselin (1980). Freedom and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to Hunter's Reply. Dialogue 19 (04):572-574.
    In the preceding article John Hunter attempts to show that my criticisms of his position on freedom and responsibility are defective. Hunter believes that (what he calls) my first criticism is directed against his explanation of why so many people have come to believe in the freedom principle (i.e. the principle that freedom is necessary for moral responsibility). But at no point in my paper do I even consider the merit of that explanation. What Hunter calls my first criticism is (...)
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  9. Phillip D. Gosselin (1979). Is There a Freedom Requirement for Moral Responsibility? Dialogue 18 (03):289-306.
    The Principle that freedom is necessary for moral responsibility (hereafter referred to as “the freedom principle”) has received a variety of explications, but few philosophers have doubted that in some plausible sense it is true. However, two philosophers have recently challenged it using very different but equally ingenious arguments. J.F.M. Hunter has provided the more obviously direct attack in arguing that considerations of freedom as such are in no way relevant to assessments of moral responsibility. Harry Frankfurt has directed his (...)
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  10. Phillip D. Gosselin (1977). C. A. Campbell's Effort of Will Argument. Religious Studies 13 (4):429 - 438.
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