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Paul Horwich [85]P. Horwich [3]
  1. Paul Horwich (2013). 1. Alternative Formulations. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. 17.
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  2. Paul Horwich (2013). 3 Naturalism and the Linguistic Turn. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. 13--37.
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  3. Paul Horwich (2013). Reply to Timothy Williamson's Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21 (S3):e18-e26.
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  4. Paul Horwich (2012). Regularities, Rules, Meanings, Truth-Conditions, and Epistemic Norms. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
     
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  5. Paul Horwich (2012). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. Oup Oxford.
    Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.
     
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  6. Paul Horwich (2011). Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):524-533.
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  7. Paul Horwich (2010). Rorty's Wittgenstein. In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
  8. Paul Horwich (2010). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? -- Varieties of deflationism -- A defense of minimalism -- The value of truth -- A minimalist critique of Tarski -- Kripke's paradox of meaning -- Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms -- Semantics : what's truth got to do with it? -- The motive power of evaluative concepts -- Ungrounded reason -- The nature of paradox -- A world without 'isms' -- The quest for reality -- Being and truth -- Provenance of chapters.
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  9. Paul Horwich (2010). Wittgenstein's Definition of 'Meaning' as 'Use'. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  10. Paul Horwich (2009). Kripke's Paradox of Meaning. Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):23-32.
    This paper argues that deflationism about truth enables us to resolve the notorious problem of intentionality—the problem (forcibly articulated by Kripke) of explaining how intrinsically dead signs, whether material or mental, are able to reach into the world and pick out specific collections of things.
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  11. Paul Horwich (2009). The Metaphysics of Now. In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Arguing About Metaphysics. Routledge. 151.
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  12. Paul Horwich (2008). A Minimalist Critique of Tarski on Truth. In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oup Oxford.
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  13. Paul Horwich (2008). A New Framework for Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):233-240.
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  14. Paul Horwich (2008). Being and Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):258-273.
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  15. Paul Horwich (2008). Explaining intentionality. Manuscrito 31 (1).
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  16. Paul Horwich (2008). Ungrounded Reason. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):453-471.
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  17. Paul Horwich (2008). Varieties of Deflationism. Philosophical Topics 36 (2):29-43.
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  18. Paul Horwich (2008). What's Truth Got to Do with It? Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (3):309-322.
    This paper offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good theory must (1) explain relations of entailment, (ii) show how the meanings of complex expressions derive from the meanings of their parts, and (iii) characterize facts of meaning in truth-theoretic terms. It then proceeds to criticize the orthodox conception of semantics that is articulated in these three desiderata. This critique is followed by a sketch of an alternative (...)
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  19. J. L. Austin, Anthony Brueckner, Noam Chomsky, Donald Davidson, Keith Donnellan, Michael Dummett, Gareth Evans, Gottlob Frege, H. P. Grice, Paul Horwich, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, John McDowell, Michael McKinsey, Ruth Millikan, Stephen Neale, Hilary Putnam, W. V. Quine, Bertrand Russell, Nathan Salmon, Stephen Schiffer, John Searle, P. F. Strawson, Alfred Tarski & Ludwig Wittgenstein (2007). Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  20. Paul Horwich (2007). The Quest for REALITY. Dialectica 61 (1):5–16.
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  21. Paul Horwich (2006). A World Without Isms: Life After Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. 188.
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  22. Paul Horwich (2006). The Value of Truth. Noûs 40 (2):347–360.
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  23. Paul Horwich (2005). Reflections on Meaning. Oxford University Press,Clarendon Press ;.
    Paul Horwich's main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world--that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is a groundbreaking development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a term is nothing more than its use. While the chapters here have appeared as individual essays, (...)
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  24. Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed (...)
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  25. Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
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  26. Paul Horwich (2004). A Use Theory of Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):351–372.
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  27. Paul Horwich (2004). From a Deflationary Point of View. Oxford University Press.
    "Deflationism" has emerged as one of the most significant developments in contemporary philosophy. It is best known as a story about truth -- roughly, that the traditional search for its underlying nature is misconceived, since there can be no such thing. However, the scope of deflationism extends well beyond that particular topic. For, in the first place, such a view of truth substantially affects what we should say about neighboring concepts such as "reality," "meaning," and "rationality." And in the second (...)
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  28. Paul Horwich (2004). Selection From Asymmetries in Time. In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oup Oxford.
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  29. Paul Horwich (2004). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophical Development. In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance. Routledge.
     
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  30. Paul Horwich (2003). Meaning and its Place in the Language Faculty. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 162--178.
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  31. Paul Horwich (2003). The Philosophy of Jerrold Katz. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):225–232.
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  32. Paul Horwich (2001). A Defense of Minimalism. Synthese 126 (1-2):149 - 165.
    My aim in this paper is to clarify and defend a certain ‘minimalist’ thesis about truth: roughly, that the meaning of the truth predicate is fixed by the schema, ’The proposition that p is true if and only if p’.1 The several criticisms of this idea to which I wish to respond are to be found in the recent work of Davidson, Field, Gupta, Richard, and Soames, and in a classic paper of Dummett’s.
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  33. Paul Horwich (2001). Deflating Compositionality. Ratio 14 (4):369–385.
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  34. Paul Horwich (2000). Norms of Truth and Meaning. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:19-34.
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  35. Paul Horwich (2000). On the Existence of Meanings. In. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand. 151--162.
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  36. Paul Horwich (2000). The Sharpness of Vague Terms. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):83--92.
  37. Paul Horwich (2000). Stephen Schiffer's Theory of Vagueness. Noûs 34 (s1):271 - 281.
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  38. Paul Horwich (1999). The Minimalist Conception of Truth. In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oup Oxford.
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  39. Paul Horwich (1998). Concept Constitution. Philosophical Issues 9:15-19.
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  40. Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, the author of the classic Truth presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all contenders. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use. Meaning and its companion volume Truth (now published in a revised edition) together demystify two central issues in philosophy and offer a controversial but compelling view of the (...)
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  41. Paul Horwich (1998). Truth. Clarendon Press.
    Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a prominent philosophical theory about truth, `minimalism'. His theory has attracted much attention since the first edition of Truth in 1990; he has now developed, refined, and updated his treatment of the subject, while preserving the distinctive format of the book. This revised edition appears simultaneously with a new companion volume, Meaning; the two books demystify central philosophical issues, and will be essential reading for all who work on the philosophy of language.
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  42. Paul Horwich (1997). Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Aboutness. Philosophical Issues 8:95-106.
  43. Paul Horwich (1997). Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Aprior Knowledge. Noûs 31 (4):423-440.
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  44. Paul Horwich (1997). Response to the Comments on Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Aboutness. Philosophical Issues 8:139-140.
  45. Paul Horwich (1997). The Composition of Meanings. Philosophical Review 106 (4):503-532.
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  46. Paul Horwich (1997). The Nature of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):929 - 935.
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  47. Paul Horwich (1996). Comment on Dretske. Philosophical Issues 7:167-170.
  48. Paul Horwich (1996). Realism and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:187 - 197.
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  49. Paul Horwich (1996). Realism Minus Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):877-881.
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  50. Paul Horwich (1996). Review: Realism Minus Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):877 - 881.
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