116 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Paul Horwich [117]P. Horwich [3]Paul Gordon Horwich [1]
  1. Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   141 citations  
  2.  7
    Paul Horwich (1998). Truth. Clarendon Press.
    Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a prominent philosophical theory about truth, `minimalism'. His theory has attracted much attention since the first edition of Truth in 1990; he has now developed, refined, and updated his treatment of the subject, while preserving the distinctive format of the book. This revised edition appears simultaneously with a new companion volume, Meaning; the two books demystify central philosophical issues, and will be essential reading for all who work on the philosophy of language.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   132 citations  
  3.  50
    Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, the author of the classic Truth presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all contenders. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use. Meaning and its companion volume Truth (now published in a revised edition) together demystify two central issues in philosophy and offer a controversial but compelling view of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   92 citations  
  4.  81
    Paul Horwich (2005). Reflections on Meaning. Oxford University Press,Clarendon Press ;.
    Paul Horwich's main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world--that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is a groundbreaking development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a term is nothing more than its use. While the chapters here have appeared as individual essays, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   36 citations  
  5. Paul Horwich (2009). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? -- Varieties of deflationism -- A defense of minimalism -- The value of truth -- A minimalist critique of Tarski -- Kripke's paradox of meaning -- Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms -- Semantics : what's truth got to do with it? -- The motive power of evaluative concepts -- Ungrounded reason -- The nature of paradox -- A world without 'isms' -- The quest for reality -- Being and truth -- Provenance of chapters.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  6. Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich & Michael Williams (2013). Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Cambridge University Press.
    Pragmatists have traditionally been enemies of representationalism but friends of naturalism, when naturalism is understood to pertain to human subjects, in the sense of Hume and Nietzsche. In this volume Huw Price presents his distinctive version of this traditional combination, as delivered in his René Descartes Lectures at Tilburg University in 2008. Price contrasts his view with other contemporary forms of philosophical naturalism, comparing it with other pragmatist and neo-pragmatist views such as those of Robert Brandom and Simon Blackburn. Linking (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  7.  52
    Paul Horwich (1982). Probability and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
    Methodology Introduction This book is about scientific knowledge, particularly the concept of evidence. Its purpose is to explore scientific methodology in ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   60 citations  
  8. Paul Horwich (1990). Asymmetries in Time. Noûs 24 (5):804-806.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   45 citations  
  9. Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Paul Horwich presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all comers. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  10. Paul Horwich (2006). The Value of Truth. Noûs 40 (2):347–360.
  11. Paul Horwich (2001). A Defense of Minimalism. Synthese 126 (1-2):149 - 165.
    My aim in this paper is to clarify and defend a certain ‘minimalist’ thesis about truth: roughly, that the meaning of the truth predicate is fixed by the schema, ’The proposition that p is true if and only if p’.1 The several criticisms of this idea to which I wish to respond are to be found in the recent work of Davidson, Field, Gupta, Richard, and Soames, and in a classic paper of Dummett’s.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  12. Paul Horwich (1975). On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel. Journal of Philosophy 72 (14):432-444.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13. Paul Horwich (2008). Ungrounded Reason. Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):453-471.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  14. Paul Horwich (2008). Being and Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):258-273.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  15. Paul Horwich (2005). Reflections on Meaning. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Paul Horwich, one of the world's most distinguished philosophers, develops in this book his highly original deflationary conception of language. His main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world - that is, how words and sentences come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is an innovative development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  16.  39
    Paul Horwich (1989). Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Bradford Books.
    Time is generally thought to be one of the more mysterious ingredients of the universe. In this intriguing book, Paul Horwich makes precise and explicit the interrelationships between time and a large number of philosophically important notions.Ideas of temporal order and priority interact in subtle and convoluted ways with the deepest elements in our network of basic concepts. Confronting this conceptual jigsaw puzzle, Horwich notes that there are glaring differences in how we regard the past and future directions of time. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  17. Paul Horwich (1978). On the Existence of Time, Space and Space-Time. Noûs 12 (4):397-419.
  18. Paul Horwich (1995). Meaning, Use and Truth: On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning is Precluded by the Requirement That Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which It Ought to Be Applied. Mind 104 (414):355-368.
  19. Paul Horwich (2008). What's Truth Got to Do with It? Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (3):309-322.
    This paper offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good theory must (1) explain relations of entailment, (ii) show how the meanings of complex expressions derive from the meanings of their parts, and (iii) characterize facts of meaning in truth-theoretic terms. It then proceeds to criticize the orthodox conception of semantics that is articulated in these three desiderata. This critique is followed by a sketch of an alternative (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20.  28
    Paul Horwich (1984). Book Review:Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Saul Kripke. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-.
  21. Paul Horwich (1994). What is It Like to Be a Deflationary Theory of Meaning? Philosophical Issues 5:133-154.
    Russian translation of Horwich P. What Is It Like to Be a Deflationary Theory of Meaning? // Philosophical Issues, 5, 1994. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. Paul Horwich (1982). How to Choose Between Empirically Indistinguishable Theories. Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):61-77.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  23. Paul Horwich (2011). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. OUP Oxford.
    Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24.  3
    Paul Horwich (forthcoming). Is Truth a Normative Concept? Synthese:1-12.
    My answer will be ‘no’. And I’ll defend it by: distinguishing a concept’s having normative import from its being functionally normative; sketching a method for telling whether or not a concept is of the latter sort; responding to the antideflationist, Dummettian argument in favor of the conclusion that truth is functionally normative; proceeding to address a less familiar route to that conclusion—one that’s consistent with deflationism about truth, but that depends on the further assumption that meaning is intrinsically normative; and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  14
    Paul Horwich (1993). Gibbard's Theory of Norms. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):67 - 78.
  26. Paul Horwich (1975). Grünbaum on the Metric of Space and Time. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):199-211.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  75
    Paul Horwich (1991). On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment. Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-14.
    It is not uncommon for philosophers to maintain that one is obliged to believe nothing beyond the observable consequences of a successful scientific theory. This doctrine is variously known as instrumentalism, fictionalism, constructive empiricism, theoretical skepticism and the philosophy of "as if". The purpose of the present paper is to subject such forms of scientific antirealism to a two-pronged critique. In the first place it is argued that there is no genuine difference between believing a theory and being disposed to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  28.  22
    Paul Horwich (2004). From a Deflationary Point of View. Oxford University Press.
    "Deflationism" has emerged as one of the most significant developments in contemporary philosophy. It is best known as a story about truth -- roughly, that the traditional search for its underlying nature is misconceived, since there can be no such thing. However, the scope of deflationism extends well beyond that particular topic. For, in the first place, such a view of truth substantially affects what we should say about neighboring concepts such as "reality," "meaning," and "rationality." And in the second (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  29.  70
    Paul Horwich (1997). Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Aprior Knowledge. Noûs 31 (4):423-440.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  30.  83
    Paul Horwich (2007). The Quest for REALITY. Dialectica 61 (1):5–16.
    A widespread concern within philosophy has been, and continues to be, to determine which domains of discourse address real, robust, not‐merely‐deflationary facts, and which do not. But a threat to the legitimacy of this concern is the extreme lack of consensus amongst philosophers on the question of how to tell whether or not a given domain is oriented towards ‘robust reality’. The present paper criticizes Kit Fine’s attempt to settle that question. This discussion is followed by some considerations suggesting that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  31. Paul Horwich (1993). Scientific Conceptions of Language and Their Philosophical Import. Philosophical Issues 3:123-133.
    Russian translation of Horwich P. Scientific Conceptions of Language and Their Philosophical Import // Philosophical Issues, 3, 1993. Translated by Ekaterina Mejshutkova with kind permission of the author.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Paul Horwich (1999). The Minimalist Conception of Truth. In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Paul Horwich (2004). A Use Theory of Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):351–372.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  34. Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
  35.  43
    Paul Horwich (2014). Critical Notice of Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts, by R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye. [REVIEW] Mind 123 (492):1123-1139.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  54
    Paul Horwich (1994). The Essence of Expressivism. Analysis 54 (1):19 - 20.
    It is argued, in light of the deflationist conception of truth, that expressivism (emotivism, non-cognitivism) about ethical pronouncements should be formulated merely as the thesis that such pronouncements are expressions of desire, and should not incorporate the further thesis (traditionally associated with expressivism) that they have no truth value.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  37.  50
    Paul Horwich (2001). Deflating Compositionality. Ratio 14 (4):369–385.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  38.  36
    Paul Horwich (2000). The Sharpness of Vague Terms. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):83--92.
  39.  92
    Paul Horwich (1990). Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Nature of Meaning. Mind and Language 5 (2):105-121.
  40. Paul Horwich (2011). Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):524-533.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Paul Horwich (2012). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Paul Horwich presents an original interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings, arguing that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy--and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use--that lies at the foundation of his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion. He gives a clear account of Wittgenstein's hyper-deflationist view of what philosophy is, how it should be conducted, and what it might achieve; defends this view against a variety of objections; (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42.  63
    Paul Horwich (2013). Reply to Timothy Williamson's Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21 (S3):e18-e26.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  62
    Paul Horwich (1982). Three Forms of Realism. Synthese 51 (2):181 - 201.
  44.  45
    Paul Horwich (1997). The Composition of Meanings. Philosophical Review 106 (4):503-532.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  45.  11
    Paul Horwich (2006). A World Without Isms: Life After Realism, Fictionalism, Non-Cognitivism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press 188.
  46. Paul Horwich (2008). A Minimalist Critique of Tarski on Truth. In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. OUP Oxford
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  37
    Paul Horwich (2014). An Undermining Diagnosis of Relativism About Truth. Mind 123 (491):733-752.
    The view that the basic statements in some areas of language are never true or false absolutely, but only relative to an assessment-perspective, has been advanced by several philosophers in the last few years. This paper offers a critique of that position, understood first as a claim about our everyday concept of truth, and second as a claim about the key theoretical concept of an adequate empirical semantics. Central to this pair of critical discussions will be an argument that the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Paul Horwich (2010). Wittgenstein's Definition of 'Meaning' as 'Use'. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  65
    Paul Horwich (1985). Decision Theory in Light of Newcomb's Problem. Philosophy of Science 52 (3):431-450.
    Should we act only for the sake of what we might bring about (causal decision theory); or is it enough for a decent motive that our action is highly correlated with something desirable (evidential decision theory)? The conflict between these points of view is embodied in Newcomb's problem. It is argued here that intuitive evidence from familiar decision contexts does not enable us to settle the issue, since the two theories dictate the same results in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, there are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  50.  17
    Paul Horwich (1985). The Shape of Space by Graham Nerlich. Journal of Philosophy 82 (5):269-273.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 116