62 found
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  1. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1991). Deduction. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  2.  51
    Keith Oatley & P. N. Johnson-Laird (1987). Towards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions. Cognition and Emotion 1 (1):29-50.
  3.  1
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Bruno G. Bara (1984). Syllogistic Inference. Cognition 16 (1):1-61.
    This paper reviews current psychological theories of syllogistic inference and establishes that despite their various merits they all contain deficiencies as theories of performance. It presents the results of two experiments, one using syllogisms and the other using three-term series problems, designed to elucidate how the arrangement of terms within the premises affects performance. These data are used in the construction of a theory based on the hypothesis that reasoners construct mental models of the premises, formulate informative conclusions about the (...)
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  4.  3
    Jane Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird & Alan Garnham (1989). Believability and Syllogistic Reasoning. Cognition 31 (2):117-140.
    In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an (...)
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  5.  4
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1990). Meta-Logical Problems: Knights, Knaves, and Rips. Cognition 36 (1):69-84.
  6.  15
    Ruth M. J. Byrne & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2009). ‘If’ and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (7):282-287.
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  7.  14
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Fabien Savary (1999). Illusory Inferences: A Novel Class of Erroneous Deductions. Cognition 71 (3):191-229.
  8.  28
    Keith Oatley & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2014). Cognitive Approaches to Emotions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):134-140.
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  9.  2
    P. N. Johnson-Laird (1987). The Mental Representation of the Meaning of Words. Cognition 25 (1-2):189-211.
  10.  30
    Isabel Orenes & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2012). Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences. Mind and Language 27 (4):357-377.
    People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a (...)
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  11.  6
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley (1989). The Language of Emotions: An Analysis of a Semantic Field. Cognition and Emotion 3 (2):81-123.
  12.  9
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley (1992). Basic Emotions, Rationality, and Folk Theory. Cognition and Emotion 6 (3):201-223.
  13.  30
    Sangeet Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2013). The Processes of Inference. Argument and Computation 4 (1):4 - 20.
    (2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.
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  14.  9
    Walter Schaeken, P. N. Johnson-Laird & Gery D'Ydewalle (1996). Mental Models and Temporal Reasoning. Cognition 60 (3):205-234.
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  15.  3
    Alan Garnham, Jane Oakhill & P. N. Johnson-Laird (1982). Referential Continuity and the Coherence of Discourse. Cognition 11 (1):29-46.
    Two experiments were carried out to investigate the role of referential continuity in understanding discourse. In experiment 1, a group of university students listened to stories and descriptive passages presented in three different versions: the original passages, versions in which the sentences occured in a random order, and randomised versions in which referential continuity had been restored primarily by replacing pronouns and other terms with fuller and more appropriate noun phrases. The original stories were remembered better, and rated as more (...)
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  16.  8
    Geoffrey P. Goodwin & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2010). Conceptual Illusions. Cognition 114 (2):253-265.
  17.  15
    P. N. Johnson-Laird, Sangeet S. Khemlani & Geoffrey P. Goodwin (2015). Logic, Probability, and Human Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):201-214.
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  18.  36
    N. Y. Louis Lee, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2008). The Psychological Puzzle of Sudoku. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (4):342 – 364.
    Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty (...)
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  19.  9
    Niklas Kunze, Sangeet Khemlani, Max Lotstein & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2010). Illusions of Consistency in Quantified Assertions. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society
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  20.  5
    P. N. Johnson-Laird, Sangeet S. Khemlani & Geoffrey P. Goodwin (2015). Response to Baratgin Et Al.: Mental Models Integrate Probability and Deduction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (10):548-549.
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  21. R. N. Aslin, P. Barrouillet, P. Bloom, S. A. Gelman, T. JaČrvinen, P. N. Johnson-Laird, C. L. Krumhansl, J. F. Leca, M. J. Spivey & K. Sullivan (2000). Adi-Japha, E., 1 Ahn, W.-K., B35 Amsterlaw, JA, B35 Arnold, JE, B13. Cognition 76:297.
     
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  22. P. N. Johnson-Laird (2008). How We Reason: A View From Psychology. The Reasoner 2:4-5.
    Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning.
     
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  23.  28
    Carlos Santamaria & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2000). An Antidote to Illusory Inferences. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):313 – 333.
    The mental model theory predicts that reasoners normally represent what is true, but not what is false. One consequence is that reasoners should make "illusory" inferences, which are compelling but invalid. Three experiments confirmed the existence of such illusions based on disjunctions of disjunctions. They also established a successful antidote to them: Reasoners are much less likely to succumb to illusions if the inferences concern disjunctions of physical objects (alternative newspaper advertisements) rather disjunctions of the truth values of assertions. The (...)
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  24.  30
    Patricia Barres & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2003). On Imagining What is True (and What is False). Thinking and Reasoning 9 (1):1 – 42.
    How do people imagine the possibilities in which an assertion would be true and the possibilities in which it would be false? We argue that the mental representation of the meanings of connectives, such as "and", "or", and "if", specify how to construct the true possibilities for simple assertions containing just a single connective. It follows that the false possibilities are constructed by inference from the true possibilities. We report converging evidence supporting this account from four experiments in which the (...)
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  25.  16
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1999). Models Rule, OK? A Reply to Fetzer. Minds and Machines 9 (1):111-118.
  26.  31
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & A. Garnham (1980). Descriptions and Discourse Models. Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (3):371 - 393.
  27.  44
    P. N. Johnson-Laird (2002). Peirce, Logic Diagrams, and the Elementary Operations of Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (1):69 – 95.
    This paper describes Peirce's systems of logic diagrams, focusing on the so-called ''existential'' graphs, which are equivalent to the first-order predicate calculus. It analyses their implications for the nature of mental representations, particularly mental models with which they have many characteristics in common. The graphs are intended to be iconic, i.e., to have a structure analogous to the structure of what they represent. They have emergent logical consequences and a single graph can capture all the different ways in which a (...)
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  28.  4
    Keith Oatley & P. N. Johnson-Laird (1990). Semantic Primitives for Emotions: A Reply to Ortony and Clore. Cognition and Emotion 4 (2):129-143.
  29.  1
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. E. Barres (1994). When 'Or'means 'And': A Study in Mental Models. In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum 475--478.
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  30. B. C. Bara, P. N. Johnson-Laird & V. Lombarde (1994). Mental Models in Prepositional Reasoning. In Ashwin Ram & Kurt Eiselt (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Erlbaum 16--15.
     
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  31.  5
    Sangeet Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2010). Explanations Make Inconsistencies Harder to Detect. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society
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  32. Victoria A. Bell & P. N. Johnson-Laird (1998). A Model Theory of Modal Reasoning. Cognitive Science 22 (1):25-51.
    This paper presents a new theory of modal reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what may or may not be the case, and what must or must not be the case. It postulates that individuals construct models of the premises in which they make explicit only what is true. A conclusion is possible if it holds in at least one model, whereas it is necessary if it holds in all the models. The theory makes three predictions, which are corroborated experimentally. First, conclusions (...)
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  33. P. N. Johnson-Laird, Vittorio Girotto & Paolo Legrenzi (2004). Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency. Psychological Review 111 (3):640-661.
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  34.  2
    Geoffrey P. Goodwin & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2008). Transitive and Pseudo-Transitive Inferences. Cognition 108 (2):320-352.
  35.  2
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Bruno G. Bara (1984). Logical Expertise as a Cause of Error: A Reply to Boolos. Cognition 17 (2):183-184.
  36. M. R. Newsome & P. N. Johnson-Laird (1996). An Antidote to Illusory Inferences. In Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum 820.
     
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  37.  5
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1994). Models, Necessity, and the Search for Counterexamples. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):775.
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  38.  21
    P. N. Johnson-Laird, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & N. Y. Louis Lee (2011). The Psychological Puzzle of Sudoku. Thinking and Reasoning 14 (4):342-364.
    Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty (...)
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  39.  21
    Mary R. Newsome & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2006). How Falsity Dispels Fallacies. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (2):214 – 234.
    From certain sorts of premise, individuals reliably infer invalid conclusions. Two Experiments investigated a possible cause for these illusory inference: Reasoners fail to think about what is false. In Experiment 1, 24 undergraduates drew illusory and control inferences from premises based on exclusive disjunctions (“or else”). In one block, participants were instructed to falsify the premises of each illusory and control inference before making the inference. In the other block, participants did not receive these instructions. There were more correct answers (...)
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  40.  5
    P. N. Johnson-laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1995). A Model Point of View. Thinking and Reasoning 1 (4):339 – 350.
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  41. P. N. Johnson-Laird, Francesco Mancini & Amelia Gangemi (2006). A Hyper-Emotion Theory of Psychological Illnesses. Psychological Review 113 (4):822-841.
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  42. P. N. Johnson-Laird (2006). Mental Models, Sentential Reasoning, and Illusory Inferences. In Carsten Held, Markus Knauff & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.), Mental Models and the Mind: Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Elsevier
     
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  43.  5
    P. N. Johnson-Laird (2000). Illusions and Models: A Reply to Barrouillet and Lecas. Cognition 76 (2):175-178.
  44. V. Girotto, D. Osherson, R. de OverHastie, N. Pennington, S. Iwasaki, P. N. Johnson-Laird, J. Klayman, P. Legrenzi & E. Shafir (1993). Evans, J. St. BT, 165. Cognition 49:299.
     
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  45.  3
    P. N. Johnson-Laird (1978). The Correspondence and Coherence Theories of Cognitive Truth. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1):108.
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  46.  4
    P. N. Johnson-Laird (1983). Which Comes First: Logic or Rationality? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):252.
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  47. P. N. Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley (1988). Are There Only Two Primitive Emotions? A Reply to Frijda. Cognition and Emotion 2 (2):89-93.
  48.  12
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & A. Garnham (1980). Erratum. Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):157-157.
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  49. N. Braisby, G. N. Carlson, L. Cestnick, C. G. Chambers, M. Coltheart, J. Davidoff, A. Fernald, S. P. Johnson, P. N. Johnson-Laird & T. Jolliffe (1999). Baron-Cohen, S., 149 Bloom, P., B1. Cognition 71:291.
     
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  50.  8
    P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2000). Mental Models and Pragmatics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):284-285.
    Van der Henst argues that the theory of mental models lacks a pragmatic component. He fills the gap with the notion that reasoners draw the most relevant conclusions. We agree, but argue that theories need an element of “nondeterminism.” It is often impossible to predict either what will be most relevant or which particular conclusion an individual will draw.
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