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Profile: Philip Robbins (University of Missouri, Columbia)
  1. Wesley Buckwalter, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Chris Weigel & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online (1):81-92.
    Bibliography of works in experimental philosophy.
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  2. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.) (2008). The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge.
    Since its inception some fifty years ago, cognitive science has seen a number of sea changes. Perhaps the best known is the development of connectionist models of cognition as an alternative to classical, symbol-based approaches. A more recent - and increasingly influential - trend is that of dynamical-systems-based, ecologically oriented models of the mind. Researchers suggest that a full understanding of the mind will require systematic study of the dynamics of interaction between mind, body, and world. Some argue that this (...)
     
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  3.  46
    Philip Robbins (2009). Modularity of Mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  4. Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Tamler Sommers & Shaun Nichols (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Annual Review of Psychology 63 (50):72-73.
    Experimental philosophy is a new interdisciplinary field that uses methods normally associated with psychology to investigate questions normally associated with philosophy. The present review focuses on research in experimental philosophy on four central questions. First, why is it that people's moral judgments appear to influence their intuitions about seemingly nonmoral questions? Second, do people think that moral questions have objective answers, or do they see morality as fundamentally relative? Third, do people believe in free will, and do they see free (...)
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  5. Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2006). The Phenomenal Stance. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.
    Cognitive science is shamelessly materialistic. It maintains that human beings are nothing more than complex physical systems, ultimately and completely explicable in mechanistic terms. But this conception of humanity does not ?t well with common sense. To think of the creatures we spend much of our day loving, hating, admiring, resenting, comparing ourselves to, trying to understand, blaming, and thanking -- to think of them as mere mechanisms seems at best counterintuitive and unhelpful. More often it may strike us as (...)
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  6. Anthony I. Jack, Philip Robbins, Jared Friedman & Chris Meyers (2014). More Than a Feeling: Counterintuitive Effects of Compassion on Moral Judgment. Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind.
  7. Paul Robbins (2004). Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction. Blackwell Pub..
    The hatchet and the seed -- A tree with deep roots -- The critical tools -- A field crystallizes -- Destruction of nature -- Construction of nature -- Degradation and marginalization -- Conservation and control -- Environmental conflict -- Environmental identity and social movement -- Where to now?
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  8. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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  9.  64
    Anthony I. Jack & Philip Robbins (2012). The Phenomenal Stance Revisited. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):383-403.
    In this article, we present evidence of a bidirectional coupling between moral concern and the attribution of properties and states that are associated with experience (e.g., conscious awareness, feelings). This coupling is also shown to be stronger with experience than for the attribution of properties and states more closely associated with agency (e.g., free will, thoughts). We report the results of four studies. In the first two studies, we vary the description of the mental capacities of a creature, and assess (...)
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  10.  19
    Philip Robbins & Murat Aydede (2009). A Short Primer on Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 3--10.
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  11.  63
    Philip Robbins (2002). How to Blunt the Sword of Compositionality. Noûs 36 (2):313-334.
  12.  8
    Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian & Tamler Sommers (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Annual Review of Psychology 63 (1):81-99.
    Experimental philosophy is a new interdisciplinary field that uses methods normally associated with psychology to investigate questions normally associated with philosophy. The present review focuses on research in experimental philosophy on four central questions. First, why is it that people's moral judgments appear to influence their intuitions about seemingly nonmoral questions? Second, do people think that moral questions have objective answers, or do they see morality as fundamentally relative? Third, do people believe in free will, and do they see free (...)
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  13.  35
    Philip Robbins (2005). The Myth of Reverse Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 125 (2):251 - 275.
    In the context of debates about what form a theory of meaning should take, it is sometimes claimed that one cannot understand an intersective modifier-head construction (e.g., ‘pet fish’) without understanding its lexical parts. Neo-Russellians like Fodor and Lepore contend that non-denotationalist theories of meaning, such as prototype theory and theory theory, cannot explain why this is so, because they cannot provide for the ‘reverse compositional’ character of meaning. I argue that reverse compositionality is a red herring in these debates. (...)
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  14.  32
    Philip Robbins (2006). The Ins and Outs of Introspection. Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.
  15. Philip Robbins (2008). Consciousness and the Social Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2):15-23.
  16.  11
    Guy Cook, Elisa Pieri & Peter Robbins (2004). The Scientists Think and the Public Feels. Discourse Society 15 (4):433-49.
    Debates about new technologies, such as crop and food genetic modification, raise pressing questions about the ways ‘experts’ and ‘ nonexperts’ communicate. These debates are dynamic, characterized by many voices contesting numerous storylines. The discoursal features, including language choices and communication strategies, of the GM debate are in some ways taken for granted and in others actively manipulated by participants. Although there are many voices, some have more influence than others. This study makes use of 50 hours of in-depth interviews (...)
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  17.  34
    Pascal Boyer, Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2005). Varieties of Self-Systems Worth Having. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.
  18.  93
    Philip Robbins (2004). To Structure, or Not to Structure? Synthese 139 (1):55-80.
    Some accounts of mental content represent the objects of belief as structured, using entities that formally resemble the sentences used to express and report attitudes in natural language; others adopt a relatively unstructured approach, typically using sets or functions. Currently popular variants of the latter include classical and neo-classical propositionalism, which represent belief contents as sets of possible worlds and sets of centered possible worlds, respectively; and property self-ascriptionism, which employs sets of possible individuals. I argue against their contemporary proponents (...)
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  19. Philip Robbins (2013). Modularity and Mental Architecture. WIREs Cognitive Science 4 (6):641-648.
     
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  20.  20
    Kevin Bales & Peter T. Robbins (2001). “No One Shall Be Held in Slavery or Servitude”: A Critical Analysis of International Slavery Agreements and Concepts of Slavery. [REVIEW] Human Rights Review 2 (2):18-45.
    No international agreement has been completely effective in reducing slavery. This stems in part from the evolution of slavery agreements and the inclination on the part of the authors of conventions to include other practices as part of the slavery defintion, resulting in a confusion of the practices and definitions of slavery. What has been missing is a classification that is dynamic and yet sufficiently universal to identify slavery no matter how it evolves. We have attempted to build on theories (...)
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  21.  21
    Anthony I. Jack & Philip Robbins (2004). The Illusory Triumph of Machine Over Mind: Wegner's Eliminativism and the Real Promise of Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):665-666.
    Wegner's thesis that the experience of will is an illusion is not just wrong, it is an impediment to progress in psychology. We discuss two readings of Wegner's thesis and find that neither can motivate his larger conclusion. Wegner thinks science requires us to dismiss our experiences. Its real promise is to help us to make better sense of them.
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  22.  65
    Philip Robbins (2004). Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection. In Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic 129-143.
    Does the ability to know one's own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the 'theory theory' of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the 'monitoring theory', suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes , I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can (...)
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  23.  21
    Philip Robbins (2001). What Compositionality Still Can Do. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):328-336.
    Proponents of deflationism about meaning often claim that the principle of compositionality, when properly understood, places no constraint whatsoever on the nature of lexical meaning. This deflationary thesis admits of both strong and weak readings. On the strong reading, the principle does not rule out any theory of lexical meaning either alone or in conjunction with other independently plausible semantic assumptions. On the weak reading, the principle alone does not rule out any such theory. I argue that, though weak deflationism (...)
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  24.  36
    P. Robbins (2003). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):424-443.
  25.  15
    Guy Cook, Peter T. Robbins & Elisa Pieri, Words of Mass Destruction: British Newpaper Coverage of the Genetically Modified Food Debate, Expert and Non-Expert Reactions.
    This article reports the findings of a one-year project examining British press coverage of the genetically modified food debate during the first half of 2003, and both expert and non-expert reactions to that coverage. Two pro-GM newspapers and two anti-GM newspapers were selected for analysis, and all articles mentioning GM during the period in question were stored in a machine readable database. This was then analyzed using corpus linguistic and discourse analytic techniques to reveal recurrent wording, themes and content. This (...)
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  26. Philip Robbins (2008). Minimalism and Modularity. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press 303--319.
  27.  46
    P. Robbins (2008). Review: Alvin I. Goldman: Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1076-1079.
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  28.  9
    Peter Robbins & Farah Huzair (2008). Innovation in Central and Eastern Europe: An Editorial. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2 (2).
    This special issue explores an interdisciplinary topic that lies at the heart of Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology. The life science industry is increasingly recognised as a key sector in the growth and development of many economies. As it gains momentum, policymakers are confronted with the need to facilitate growth whilst dealing with important ethical and regulatory challenges arising from new technosciences addressing human health and the environment. Such activities present special opportunities and threats to emerging economies such as (...)
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  29.  17
    Farah Huzair & Peter Robbins (2008). Life Sciences Innovation in Central and Eastern Europe: Conceptual Frameworks and Contributions. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2 (2).
    This article outlines analytical frameworks for studying life sciences innovation in Central and Eastern Europe , based on national systems of innovation and the triple helix. The reflexive and evolutionary models of triple helix 1-3 help us in evaluating life sciences innovation in the shift from pre- to post-transition, and are useful in providing a systemic approach that emphasises social institutions over the role of the firm. While pre-transition CEE embodied a linear innovation model rooted in state ownership, after the (...)
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  30.  48
    Philip Robbins (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Ins and Outs of Introspection. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1100-1102.
    Philosophical interest in introspection has a long and storied history, but only recently – with the 'scientific turn' in philosophy of mind – have philosophers sought to ground their accounts of introspection in psychological data. In particular, there is growing awareness of how evidence from clinical and developmental psychology might be brought to bear on long-standing debates about the architecture of introspection, especially in the form of apparent dissociations between introspection and third-person mental-state attribution. It is less often noticed that (...)
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  31.  1
    Phillip Robbins (2002). What Domain Integration Could Not Be. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):696-697.
    Carruthers argues that natural language is the medium of non-domain-specific thought in humans. The general idea is that a certain type of thinking is conducted in natural language. It’ not exactly clear, however, what type of thinking this is. I suggest two different ways of interpreting Carruthers’ thesis on this point and argue that neither of them squares well with central-process modularism.
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  32.  40
    Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2006). An Unconstrained Mind: Explaining Belief in the Afterlife. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):484-484.
    Bering contends that belief in the afterlife is explained by the simulation constraint hypothesis: the claim that we cannot imagine what it is like to be dead. This explanation suffers from some difficulties. First, it implies the existence of a corresponding belief in the “beforelife.” Second, a simpler explanation will suffice. Rather than appeal to constraints on our thoughts about death, we suggest that belief in the afterlife can be better explained by the lack of such constraints.
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  33. Peter Robbins (1982). The British Hegelians, 1875-1925. Garland.
     
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  34.  21
    Philip Robbins (2009). Guilt by Dissociation: Why Mindreading May Not Be Prior to Metacognition After All. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):159-160.
    Carruthers argues that there is no developmental or clinical evidence that metacognition is dissociable from mindreading, and hence there is no reason to think that metacognition is prior to mindreading. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that these conclusions are premature at best.
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  35.  14
    Philip Robbins (1998). Will the Real Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist Please Stand Up? Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):265-287.
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  36.  1
    Guy Cook, Elisa Pieri & Peter T. Robbins, The Scientists Think and the Public Feels : Expert Perceptions of the Discourse of GM Food.
    Debates about new technologies, such as crop and food genetic modification, raise pressing questions about the ways ‘experts’ and ‘ nonexperts’ communicate. These debates are dynamic, characterized by many voices contesting numerous storylines. The discoursal features, including language choices and communication strategies, of the GM debate are in some ways taken for granted and in others actively manipulated by participants. Although there are many voices, some have more influence than others. This study makes use of 50 hours of in-depth interviews (...)
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  37.  1
    Philip Robbins (2005). The Myth of Reverse Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 125 (2):251-275.
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  38.  1
    Philip Robbins & Kenneth Shields (2014). Explaining Ideology: Two Factors Are Better Than One. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):326-328.
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  39. Michael Banner Philip Clayton, Wentzel van Huyssteen, Philip Clayton J. Wesley Robbins & Nancey Murphy Wentzel van Huyssteen (1992). Religion and Science Vol. 27, No. 2, June 1992. Zygon 27:129.
     
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  40. Anthony Jack, Philip Robbins & and Andreas Roepstorff, The Genuine Problem of Consciousness.
    Those who are optimistic about the prospects of a science of consciousness, and those who believe that it lies beyond the reach of standard scientific methods, have something in common: both groups view consciousness as posing a special challenge for science. In this paper, we take a close look at the nature of this challenge. We show that popular conceptions of the problem of consciousness, epitomized by David Chalmers’ formulation of the ‘hard problem’, can be best explained as a cognitive (...)
     
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  41. Philip Robbins (2017). Cognitive Architecture. Routledge.
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  42. Philip A. Robbins (2000). Content and Self-Consciousness. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    A naturalistic account of self-consciousness is developed within a general framework in which thought contents are structured by concepts but conceptual content need not be exhausted at the level of reference. To motivate the first feature of this framework, possible-worlds- and property-based theories of thought content, which eschew structure, are criticized for overestimating and/or underestimating the attitude stock of ordinary agents. To motivate the second feature, it is argued that neo-Russellian and neo-Fregean accounts, which incorporate structure but differ on the (...)
     
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  43. P. Robbins (2002). Review of Peter Gardenfors' Conceptual Spaces. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):200-202.
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  44. Philip Robbins (2005). Systematicity. In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier 12--440.
     
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