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Profile: Peter Ross (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona)
Profile: Paul Ross (Bristol University)
  1. Peter W. Ross (forthcoming). Primary and Secondary Qualties. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    The understanding of the primary-secondary quality distinction has shifted focus from the mechanical philosophers’ proposal of primary qualities as explanatorily fundamental to current theorists’ proposal of secondary qualities as metaphysically perceiver dependent. The chapter critically examines this shift and current arguments to uphold the primary-secondary quality distinction on the basis of the perceiver dependence of color; one focus of the discussion is the role of qualia in these arguments. It then describes and criticizes reasons for characterizing color, smell, taste, sound, (...)
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  2. Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner (forthcoming). Problems of Existence in Philosophy and Science. Synthese.
    We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in terms of causal (...)
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  3. Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner (2013). Existence Problems in Philosophy and Science. Synthese 190 (18):4239-4259.
    We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in terms of causal (...)
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  4. Peter W. Ross (2012). Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
    Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The argument here will be that subjectivists’ problems with coordinating the metaphysics of perceived color and perceived location render color perception implausibly mysterious. Consequently, some version of color realism, the view that colors are (physical, dispositional, functional, sui generis, (...)
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  5. Peter W. Ross (2010). Fitting Color Into the Physical World. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.
    I propose a strategy for a metaphysical reduction of perceived color, that is, an identification of perceived color with properties characterizable in non-qualitative terms. According to this strategy, a description of visual experience of color, which incorporates a description of the appearance of color, is a reference-fixing description. This strategy both takes color appearance seriously in its primary epistemic role and avoids rendering color as metaphysically mysterious. I’ll also argue that given this strategy, a plausible account of perceived color claims (...)
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  6. Peter W. Ross (2008). Common Sense About Qualities and Senses. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316.
    There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about (...)
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  7. Patricia A. Ross (2007). The Truth Will Set You Free, or How a Troubled Philosophical Theory May Help to Understand How People Talk About Their Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (3):227-231.
  8. Patricia A. Ross (2007). The Fact Value Dichotomy in Demarcating Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 107-109.
  9. Peter W. Ross (2006). Empirical Constraints on the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. 125-144.
    With the success of cognitive science's interdisciplinary approach to studying the mind, many theorists have taken up the strategy of appealing to science to address long standing disputes about metaphysics and the mind. In a recent case in point, philosophers and psychologists, including Robert Kane, Daniel C. Dennett, and Daniel M. Wegner, are exploring how science can be brought to bear on the debate about the problem of free will. I attempt to clarify the current debate by considering how empirical (...)
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  10. Patricia A. Ross (2005). Sorting Out the Concept Disorder. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (2):115-140.
    . Current debates concerning the concept of mental disorder involve many different philosophical issues. However, it is not always clear from these discussions how, or whether, these issues relate to one another, or in exactly what way they are important for the definition of disorder. This article aims to sort through some of the philosophical issues that arise in the current literature and provide a clarification of how these issues are related to one another and whether they are necessary for (...)
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  11. Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner (2005). Sensibility Theory and Conservative Complancency. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):544–555.
    In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is no (...)
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  12. Philip Ross (2004). Globalization and the Closing of the Universe of Discourse: The Contemporary Relevance of Marcuse's “Marxism”1. The European Legacy 9 (4):455-467.
    This paper assumes that there is something in the logic of the capitalist mode of production such that, in the words of Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto, it ?must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere,? giving a ?cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.? It assumes, that is, that there is an inherent tendency in capitalism to seek to globalize. Further, it is argued that one can plausibly claim that the capitalist mode of production has succeeded, or (...)
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  13. Peter W. Ross (2003). Physicalism Without Unknowable Colors. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):789-789.
    Byrne & Hilbert (2003; henceforth B&H) do not adequately explain how it is that phenomenal colors are physical, as their physicalism claims. This explanation requires more characterization of the relationship between the epistemology and nature of color than B&H provide. With this characterization, we can see that a physicalist need not accept unknowable color facts, as B&H do.
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  14. Peter W. Ross (2002). Explaining Motivated Desires. Topoi 21 (1-2):199-207.
    I examine a dispute about the nature of practical reason, and in particular moral reason, generated by Thomas Nagel's proposal of an internalist rationalism which claims we can explain motivation in terms of reason and belief alone. In opposition, Humeans contend that such explanations must also appeal to further desires. Arguments on either side of this debate typically assume that a rationalist or Humean conclusion can be reached independently of a claim about the nature of moral judgment. I'll maintain, to (...)
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  15. P. Ross (2001). Qualia and the Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    In his classic paper, "Some Remarks about the Senses," H. P. Grice argues that our intuitive distinction among perceptual modalities requires that the modalities be characterized in terms of the introspectible character of experience. I first show that Grice's argument provides support for the claim that perceptual experiences have qualia, namely, mental qualitative properties of experience which are what it's like to be conscious of perceived properties such as color. I then defend intentionalism about experience, which rejects qualia, by showing (...)
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  16. P. W. Ross (2001). Michael Tye, Color, Consciousness, and Content. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):90-90.
     
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  17. Peter W. Ross (2001). Locating Color: Further Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):146-156.
    "The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism" response to commentators.
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  18. Peter W. Ross (2001). The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
    According to color subjectivism, colors are mental properties, processes, or events of visual experiences of color. I first lay out an argument for subjectivism founded on claims from visual science and show that it also relies on a philosophical assumption. I then argue that subjectivism is untenable because this view cannot provide a plausible account of color perception. I describe three versions of subjectivism, each of which combines subjectivism with a theory of perception, namely sense datum theory, adverbialism, and the (...)
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  19. Peter W. Ross (2001). Qualia and the Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    How should we characterize the nature of perceptual experience? Some theorists claim that colour experiences, to take an example of perceptual experiences, have both intentional properties and properties called 'colour qualia', namely, mental qualitative properties which are what it is like to be conscious of colour. Since proponents of colour qualia hold that these mental properties cannot be explained in terms of causal relations, this position is in opposition to a functionalist characterization of colour experience.
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  20. Mohan Matthen, C. Wade Savage, Zoltán Jakab, Nigel J. T. Thomas, Peter W. Ross, Joseph Glicksohn, PierCarla Cicogna, Marino Bosinelli, Kelly A. Forrest & Craig Kunimoto (2000). MT Turvey, Virgil Whitmyer, and Kevin Shockley. Explaining Metamers: Right Degrees of Free. Consciousness and Cognition 9:638.
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  21. P. Ross (2000). The Relativity of Color. Synthese 123 (1):105-130.
    C. L. Hardin led a recent development in the philosophical literature on color in which research from visual science is used to argue that colors are not properties of physical objects, but rather are mental processes. I defend J. J. C. Smart''s physicalism, which claims that colors are physical properties of objects, against this attack. Assuming that every object has a single veridical (that is, nonillusory) color, it seems that physicalism must give a specification of veridical color in terms natural (...)
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  22. Patricia A. Ross (1999). The Limits of Physicalism. Philosophy of Science 66 (1):94-116.
    Mark Wilson, in his 1985 paper entitled "What Is This Thing Called 'Pain'?: The Philosophy of Science Behind the Contemporary Debate," proposed an account of physicalism that departs significantly from standard approaches. One of the main points of his paper was to explain the flaws in arguments claiming that psychological properties cannot be shown to be physical because of their functional nature. However, the positive proposal that Wilson makes in this article bears further examination. I argue that it not only (...)
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  23. Peter W. Ross (1999). An Externalist Approach to Understanding Color Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):968-969.
    Palmer demarcates the bounds of our understanding of color experience by symmetries in the color space. He claims that if there are symmetries, there can be functionally undetectable color transformations. However, even if there are symmetries, Palmer's support for the possibility of undetectable transformations assumes phenomenal internalism. Alternatively, phenomenal externalism eliminates Palmer's limit on our understanding of color experience.
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  24. Peter W. Ross (1999). Color Science and Spectrum Inversion: A Reply to Nida-Rumelin. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.
    Martine Nida-Rümelin (1996) argues that color science indicates behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is possible and raises this possibility as an objection to functionalist accounts of visual states of color. I show that her argument does not rest solely on color science, but also on a philosophically controversial assumption, namely, that visual states of color supervene on physiological states. However, this assumption, on the part of philosophers or vision scientists, has the effect of simply ruling out certain versions of functionalism. While (...)
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  25. Peter W. Ross (1999). Color Science and Spectrum Inversion: Further Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):575-6.
    Martine Nida-Rümelin (1996) argues that color science indicates behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is possible and raises this possibility as an objection to functionalist accounts of visual states of color. I show that her argument does not rest solely on color science, but also on a philosophically controversial assumption, namely, that visual states of color supervene on physiological states. However, this assumption, on the part of philosophers or vision scientists, has the effect of simply ruling out certain versions of functionalism. While (...)
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  26. Peter W. Ross (1999). The Appearance and Nature of Color. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):227-252.
    The problem of the nature of color is typically put in terms of the following question about the intentional content of visual experiences: what’s the nature of the property we attribute to physical objects in virtue of our visual experiences of color? This problem has proven to be tenacious largely because it’s not clear what the constraints are for an answer. With no clarity about constraints, the proposed solutions range widely, the most common dividing into subjectivist views which hold that (...)
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  27. Peter W. Ross (1997). Trichromacy and the Neural Basis of Color Discrimination. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):206-207.
    I take issue with Saunders & van Brakel's claim that neural processes play no interesting role in determining color categorizations. I distinguish an aspect of color categorization, namely, color discrimination, from other aspects. The law of trichromacy describes conditions under which physical properties cannot be discriminated in terms of color. Trichromacy is explained by properties of neural processes.
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  28. Philip J. Ross (1994). Utility, Subjectivism and Moral Ontology. Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):189-199.
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  29. Peggy J. Ross (1985). A Commentary on Research on American Farmwomen. Agriculture and Human Values 2 (1):19-30.
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  30. Patrick L. Ross (1967). Accuracy of Judgments of Movement in Depth From Two-Dimensional Projections. Journal of Experimental Psychology 75 (2):217.
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  31. Philip Ross (1964). The Future of Botanical Research. Bioscience 14 (4):25-26.
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