Search results for 'PERCEPTUAL CONTENT' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  2. Ayoob Shahmoradi (2016). Why Do We Need Perceptual Content? Philosophical Psychology:1-13.
    Most representationalists argue that <span class='Hi'>perceptual</span> experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that <span class='Hi'>perceptual</span> experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  32
    Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties. In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press
    Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism and philosophical aesthetics have it that aesthetic features or properties are perceived. However, there is a cast of reasons to be sceptical of the thesis. This paper defends the thesis—that aesthetic properties are sometimes represented in perceptual experience—against one of those sceptical opponents. That opponent maintains that perception represents only low-level properties, and since all theorists agree that aesthetic properties are not low-level properties, perception does (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Bence Nanay (2010). Attention and Perceptual Content. Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  5. Bence Nanay (2015). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6.  18
    Eva Schmidt (2015). Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):201-214.
    In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell. I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  61
    Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Bence Nanay (2015). Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press 153-167.
    A straightforward way of thinking about perception is in terms of perceptual representation. Perception is the construction of perceptual representations that represent the world correctly or incorrectly. This way of thinking about perception has been questioned recently by those who deny that there are perceptual representations. This article examines some reasons for and against the concept of perceptual representation and explores some potential ways of resolving this debate. Then it analyzes what perceptual representations may be: (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  70
    Jan Almäng (2014). Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments. Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  38
    Costas Pagondiotis (2005). “Can Perceptual Content Be Conceptual and Non-Theory-Laden?”. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science
  12.  85
    Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Content (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Four).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception?
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  67
    Mohan P. Matthen (1988). Biological Functions and Perceptual Content. Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.
    Perceptions "present" objects as red, as round, etc.-- in general as possessing some property. This is the "perceptual content" of the title, And the article attempts to answer the following question: what is a materialistically adequate basis for assigning content to what are, after all, neurophysiological states of biological organisms? The thesis is that a state is a perception that presents its object as "F" if the "biological function" of the state is to detect the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   64 citations  
  14. Colin McLear (2016). Kant on Perceptual Content. Mind 125 (497):95-144.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15.  30
    Robert J. Howell (2015). Epistemic Internalism and Perceptual Content: How a Fear of Demons Leads to an Error Theory of Perception. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2153-2170.
    Despite the fact that many of our beliefs are justified by perceptual experience, there is relatively little exploration of the connections between epistemic justification and perceptual content. This is unfortunate since it seems likely that some views of justification will require particular views of content, and the package of the two might be quite a bit less attractive than either view considered alone. I will argue that this is the case for epistemic internalism. In particular, epistemic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  88
    Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). Levels of Perceptual Content. Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.
    My main thesis is this paper is that, although Dretske's distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. I argue that what is needed in order to give a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2014). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18.  84
    Jan Almäng (2012). Time, Mode and Perceptual Content. Acta Analytica 27 (4):425-439.
    Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati’s position is initially presented. Three (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Jeff Speaks (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
    I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  20.  58
    Bence Nanay (2011). Ambiguous Figures, Attention, and Perceptual Content: Reply to Jagnow. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):557-561.
    I argued in Nanay 2010 that we cannot characterize perceptual content without reference to attention. Here, I defend this account from three objections raised by Jagnow 2011. This mainly takes the form of clarifying some details not sufficiently elaborated in the original article and dispelling some potential misunderstandings.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  8
    Ana Gavran Miloš (2015). Epicurean Perceptual Content. Prolegomena 14 (2).
    Epicurean epistemology is usually summarised in a controversial thesis according to which all perceptions are true. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that <span class='Hi'>Epicurus</span>’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but is supported with some serious arguments. In the paper, I examine the thesis according to which “all perceptions are true”, but my main focus is to analyse the content of Epicurean perception through the following (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  30
    René Jagnow (2008). Disappearing Appearances: On the Enactive Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):45-67.
    Many viewers presented with a round plate tilted to their line of sight will report that they see a round plate that looks elliptical from their perspective. Alva Noë thinks that we should take reports of this kind as adequate descriptions of the phenomenology of spatial experiences. He argues that his so-called enactive or sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content explains why both the plate’s circularity and itselliptical appearance are phenomenal aspects of experience. In this paper, I critique (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  23. John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.
    Representationalists who hold that phenomenal character can be explained in terms of representational content currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate perceptual content, such as in the case of objects seen blurrily by someone with poor eyesight, or objects seen vaguely in misty conditions. But this problem can be resolved via provision of a more sophisticated double content (DC) view, according to which the representational content of perception is structured in two nested levels. I start (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  32
    Jan Almäng (2014). Tense as a Feature of Perceptual Content. Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):361-378.
    In recent years the idea that perceptual content is tensed in the sense that we can perceive objects as present or as past has come under attack. In this paper the notion of tensed content is to the contrary defended. The paper argues that assuming that something like an intentionalistic theory of perception is correct, it is very reasonable to suppose that perceptual content is tensed, and that a denial of this notion requires a denial (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Jan Almäng (2008). Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):161-177.
    According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non-conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowell's position, Merleau-Ponty's notion of body schema and Gibson's notion of affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content, and that at least some affordances, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  34
    Damon Crockett (2014). Surface Colour is Not a Perceptual Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):303-318.
    In this paper, I consider a view that explains colour experience by the independent representation of surface and illumination. This view implies that surface colour is a phenomenal perceptual content. I argue from facts of colour phenomenology to the conclusion that surface colour is not a phenomenal perceptual content. I then argue from results of surface-matching experiments to the conclusion that surface colour is neither a perceptual content of any kind nor any sort of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  35
    Anna Marmodoro (2012). Aristotle on Complex Perceptual Content. The Metaphysics of the Common Sense. Philosophical Inquiry 34 (1/2):15-65.
    In his theory of perception Aristotle is committed to the principle that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a sensible quality, the modification of a sense organ by that quality, and the content of the perceptual experience of it. But on the basis of this principle, simultaneous perceptions of different sensible qualities give rise only to distinct perceptual contents. This generates the problem of how we become aware of complex perceptual content, e.g. in discerning red (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  62
    Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision, Evolution, and Perceptual Content. Synthese 104 (1):1-32.
    b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29. Paul Redding, McDowell and the Propositionality of Perceptual Content Thesis.
    In Mind and World and subsequent writings up to an essay first published in 2008 entitled “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”,1 John McDowell had insisted not only on the conceptuality of what is often discussed as “perceptual content” but also on the propositionality of that content. Many might find this puzzling. At the most intuitive level, one might think of the “content” of perception, what one perceives, as things— things with particular properties, and things arranged (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Casey O'Callaghan (2006). Cross-Modal Illusions and Perceptual Content: Lessons From Cross-Modal Illusions. Electroneurobiolog 14 (2):211-224.
    I argue that a class of recently-discovered cross-modal illusions gives reason to posit a dimension of content shared across perceptual modalities and to abandon the traditional view according to which perceptual content is exclusively constituted by discrete modality-specific contents.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Frederick R. Ablondi (2002). Kelly and McDowell on Perceptual Content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
    [0] In a recent issue of _EJAP_, Sean Kelly [1998] defended the position that perceptual content is non-conceptual. More specifically, he claimed that John McDowell's view that concepts involved in perception can be understood as expressible through the use of demonstratives is ultimately untenable. In what follows, I want to look more closely at Kelly's position, as well as suggest possible responses one could make on McDowell's behalf.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Sean D. Kelly (2002). What Makes Perceptual Content Non-Conceptual? Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  57
    Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.
  34. Martin Davies (1991). Individualism and Perceptual Content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.
  35. Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  36.  82
    John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.
    Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. Christopher Peacocke (1989). Perceptual Content. In J. Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  38. Michael R. Ayers (2002). Is Perceptual Content Ever Conceptual? Philosophical Books 43 (1):5-17.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39.  16
    Umit D. Yaluin (1997). Skepticism and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Papers 26 (2):179-194.
  40. York H. Gunther (1995). Perceptual Content and the Subpersonal. Conference 6 (1):31-45.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  14
    Albert Newen (forthcoming). Defending the Liberal-Content View of Perceptual Experience: Direct Social Perception of Emotions and Person Impressions. Synthese:1-25.
    The debate about direct perception encompasses different topics, one of which concerns the richness of the contents of perceptual experiences. Can we directly perceive only low-level properties, like edges, colors etc., or can we perceive high-level properties and entities as well? The aim of the paper is to defend the claim that the content of our perceptual experience can include emotions and also person impressions. Using these examples, an argument is developed to defend a liberal-content view (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  96
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of perceptual consciousness has been the representational theory, or representationalism. The idea is to reduce the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences to the representational content of those experiences. Most representationalists appeal specifically to non-conceptual content in reducing phenomenal character to representational content. In this paper, I discuss a series of issues involved in this representationalist appeal to non-conceptual content. The overall argument is the following. On (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Perceptual Content and Relations. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):49-55.
  45.  79
    William T. Wojtach (2009). Reconsidering Perceptual Content. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  94
    Frances Egan (1992). Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.
  47.  71
    Tyler Burge (2014). Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):485-501.
  48. Berit Brogaard (2009). Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth. Philosophical Books 50 (4):213-226.
    I will begin with a brief presentation of C & H’s arguments against nonindexical contextualism, temporalism, and relativism. I will then offer a general argument against the monadic truth package. Finally, I will offer arguments in favor of nonindexical contextualism and temporalism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Frank Jackson (2012). Michael Tye on Perceptual Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):199-205.
  50. Josefa Toribio (2008). State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):351 - 361.
    It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both (...) experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000