Search results for 'PERCEPTUAL CONTENT' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.score: 90.0
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience (...)
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  2. Bence Nanay (2010). Attention and Perceptual Content. Analysis 70 (2):263-270.score: 90.0
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  3. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.score: 81.0
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object (...)
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  4. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.score: 78.0
    A straightforward way of thinking about perception is in terms of perceptual representation. Perception is the construction of perceptual representations that represent the world correctly or incorrectly. This way of thinking about perception has been questioned recently by those who deny that there are perceptual representations. This article examines some reasons for and against the concept of perceptual representation and explores some potential ways of resolving this debate. Then it analyzes what perceptual representations may be: (...)
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  5. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Content (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Four).score: 75.0
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception?
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  6. Costas Pagondiotis (2005). “Can Perceptual Content Be Conceptual and Non-Theory-Laden?”. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.score: 75.0
  7. Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). Levels of Perceptual Content. Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.score: 66.0
    My main thesis is this paper is that, although Dretske's distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. I argue that what is needed in order to give a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a (...)
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  8. Mohan P. Matthen (1988). Biological Functions and Perceptual Content. Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.score: 66.0
    Perceptions "present" objects as red, as round, etc.-- in general as possessing some property. This is the "perceptual content" of the title, And the article attempts to answer the following question: what is a materialistically adequate basis for assigning content to what are, after all, neurophysiological states of biological organisms? The thesis is that a state is a perception that presents its object as "F" if the "biological function" of the state is to detect the presence of (...)
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  9. Jan Almäng (2012). Time, Mode and Perceptual Content. Acta Analytica 27 (4):425-439.score: 63.0
    Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati’s position is initially presented. Three (...)
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  10. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Kant on Perceptual Content. Mind.score: 63.0
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the “Content View.” I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. (...)
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  11. Jan Almäng (2008). Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):161 - 177.score: 60.0
    According to John McDowell,<span class='Hi'></span> representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through.<span class='Hi'></span> This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non-conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills.<span class='Hi'></span> After a brief introduction to McDowell's position,<span class='Hi'></span> Merleau-Ponty's notion of body schema and Gibson's notion of affordance are presented.<span class='Hi'></span> It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content,<span class='Hi'></span> and that (...)
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  12. Jeff Speaks (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.score: 60.0
    I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond (...)
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  13. Paul Redding, McDowell and the Propositionality of Perceptual Content Thesis.score: 60.0
    In Mind and World and subsequent writings up to an essay first published in 2008 entitled “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”,1 John McDowell had insisted not only on the conceptuality of what is often discussed as “perceptual content” but also on the propositionality of that content. Many might find this puzzling. At the most intuitive level, one might think of the “content” of perception, what one perceives, as things— things with particular properties, and things arranged (...)
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  14. John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.score: 60.0
    Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a (...)
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  15. Bence Nanay (2011). Ambiguous Figures, Attention, and Perceptual Content: Reply to Jagnow. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):557-561.score: 60.0
    I argued in Nanay 2010 that we cannot characterize perceptual content without reference to attention. Here, I defend this account from three objections raised by Jagnow 2011. This mainly takes the form of clarifying some details not sufficiently elaborated in the original article and dispelling some potential misunderstandings.
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  16. Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision, Evolution, and Perceptual Content. Synthese 104 (1):1-32.score: 60.0
    b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do (...)
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  17. René Jagnow (2008). Disappearing Appearances: On the Enactive Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):45-67.score: 60.0
    Many viewers presented with a round plate tilted to their line of sight will report that they see a round plate that looks elliptical from their perspective. Alva Noë thinks that we should take reports of this kind as adequate descriptions of the phenomenology of spatial experiences. He argues that his so-called enactive or sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content explains why both the plate’s circularity and itselliptical appearance are phenomenal aspects of experience. In this paper, I critique (...)
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  18. Casey O'Callaghan (2006). Cross-Modal Illusions and Perceptual Content: Lessons From Cross-Modal Illusions. Electroneurobiolog 14 (2):211-224.score: 60.0
    I argue that a class of recently-discovered cross-modal illusions gives reason to posit a dimension of content shared across perceptual modalities and to abandon the traditional view according to which perceptual content is exclusively constituted by discrete modality-specific contents.
     
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  19. Frederick R. Ablondi (2002). Kelly and McDowell on Perceptual Content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.score: 60.0
    [0] In a recent issue of _EJAP_, Sean Kelly [1998] defended the position that perceptual content is non-conceptual. More specifically, he claimed that John McDowell's view that concepts involved in perception can be understood as expressible through the use of demonstratives is ultimately untenable. In what follows, I want to look more closely at Kelly's position, as well as suggest possible responses one could make on McDowell's behalf.
     
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  20. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2012). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.score: 57.0
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is (...)
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  21. Sean D. Kelly (2002). What Makes Perceptual Content Non-Conceptual? Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.score: 57.0
    the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in.
     
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  22. Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Image Content. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    The senses present their content in the form of images, three-dimensional arrays of located sense features. Peacocke’s “scenario content” is one attempt to capture image content; here, a richer notion is presented, sensory images include located objects and features predicated of them. It is argued that our grasp of the meaning of these images implies that they have propositional content. Two problems concerning image content are explored. The first is that even on an enriched conception, (...)
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  23. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.score: 54.0
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of perceptual consciousness has been the representational theory, or representationalism. The idea is to reduce the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences to the representational content of those experiences. Most representationalists appeal specifically to non-conceptual content in reducing phenomenal character to representational content. In this paper, I discuss a series of issues involved in this representationalist appeal to non-conceptual content. The overall argument is the following. On (...)
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  24. René Jagnow (2011). Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.score: 54.0
    Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the (...)
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  25. John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.score: 54.0
    Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. (...)
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  26. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception. Erkenntnis:1-12.score: 54.0
    Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of "being a wren." Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of "being a wren." I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one’s attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers (...)
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  27. Michael Madary (2013). Anticipation and Variation in Visual Content. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):335-347.score: 54.0
    This article is composed of three parts. In the first part of the article I take up a question raised by Susanna Siegel (Philosophical Review 115: 355–388, 2006a). Siegel has argued that subjects have the following anticipation: (PC) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will change as a result of this change. She has left it an open question as to whether subjects anticipate a specific kind of change. I take up this question and answer (...)
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  28. Francisco Pereira (2009). Conceptual Content and Unattended Visual Features. Ideas y Valores 140 (140):119-141.score: 54.0
    McDowell (1994) proposed a philosophical theory about perceptual content -call it "conceptualism"- that states that in every case the content of a visual experience necessarily involves concepts that fully specify every single feature consciously and simultaneously available during the experience. I..
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  29. David Bourget, A General Reply to the Arguments From Blur, Double Vision, Perspective, and Other Kinds of Perceptual Distortion Against Representationalism.score: 51.0
    This paper offers a general reply to arguments from perceptual distortion (e.g. blur, perspective, double vision) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that distorted and undistorted experiences are counterexamples to this thesis because they can share contents without sharing phenomenal characters. In reply, I suggest that cases of perceptual distortion do not constitute counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always (...)
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  30. Anders Nes (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 51.0
    The dissertation addresses a debate in the philosophy of perception between conceptualists and nonconceptualists. Its principal thesis is that the intentional content of a perceptual experience is the content of a thought that a reflective subject is in a position to think if she has the experience. I call this claim, endorsed by conceptualists, the thesis of content congruence. Two principal lines of argument are put forward for it. The first, ‘simple’ argument contends that a (...) experience is a state in which it perceptually appears to the subject that things are thus and so; that a reflective subject who has an experience is in a position to think that things are thus and so; and that the subject in question, in doing so, thinks a thought with the same content as her experience. The second line of argument appeals to the role of perceptual experience in intentional explanation of observational beliefs. It makes the case that such explanation presumes that there is a non-trivial, non-vacuous law linking perceptual experiences with observational beliefs, and argues that an adherent of content congruence is significantly better placed to formulate such a law (consistently with her view) than her ‘content nonconceptualist’ opponent. The thesis of content congruence has often been associated in the literature with the thesis of state conceptualism, i.e. the claim that the representational capacities in virtue of the activation of which a perceptual experience has the content it has are conceptual. I reject the latter, and explain why we should not expect the denial of that claim, i.e. state nonconceptualism, to be incompatible with content congruence. I defend moreover the thesis of content congruence against the objection that it confuses sense and reference, and the objection that it leads to a viciously circular or otherwise inadequate account of observational or demonstrative concepts. (shrink)
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  31. Josefa Toribio (2008). State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):351 - 361.score: 51.0
    It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both (...) experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all. (shrink)
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  32. Berit Brogaard (2010). Strong Representationalism and Centered Content. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.score: 51.0
    I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have (...)
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  33. Martin Davies (1991). Individualism and Perceptual Content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.score: 51.0
  34. Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.score: 51.0
  35. Boyd Millar (forthcoming). The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies:1-19.score: 51.0
    When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that to (...)
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  36. Umit D. Yaluin (1997). Skepticism and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Papers 26 (2):179-194.score: 51.0
  37. Michael R. Ayers (2002). Is Perceptual Content Ever Conceptual? Philosophical Books 43 (1):5-17.score: 51.0
     
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  38. York H. Gunther (1995). Perceptual Content and the Subpersonal. Conference 6 (1):31-45.score: 51.0
     
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  39. Christopher Peacocke (1989). Perceptual Content. In J. Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press.score: 51.0
     
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  40. Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.score: 48.0
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views (...)
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  41. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.score: 48.0
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's (...)
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  42. William T. Wojtach (2009). Reconsidering Perceptual Content. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.score: 48.0
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be (...)
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  43. Laura Duhau (2012). Perceptual Nonconceptualism: Disentangling the Debate Between Content and State Nonconceptualism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 48.0
    In this paper I argue, against recent claims by Bermúdez () and Toribio (), that within the debate about whether perceptual experiences are nonconceptual, ‘state nonconceptualism’ (or the ‘state view’) can be a coherent and plausible position. In particular, I explain that state nonconceptualism and content nonconceptualism, when understood in their most plausible and motivated form, presuppose different notions of content. I argue that state nonconceptualism can present a plausible way of unpacking the claim that perceptual (...)
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  44. Keith A. Wilson (2013). Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience. Dissertation, University of Warwickscore: 48.0
    Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this thesis I argue that the case against representationalism — the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational — that is set out in Charles Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004) (...)
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  45. Bill Wringe (2014). The Contents of Perception and the Contents of Emotion. Noûs 48 (1).score: 48.0
    Several philosophers think there are important analogies between emotions and perceptual states. Furthermore, considerations about the rational assessibility of emotions have led philosophers—in some cases, the very same philosophers—to think that the content of emotions must be propositional content. If one finds it plausible that perceptual states have propositional contents, then there is no obvious tension between these views. However, this view of perception has recently been attacked by philosophers who hold that the content of (...)
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  46. Sidney J. Segalowitz & Korri Lane (2004). Perceptual Fluency and Lexical Access for Function Versus Content Words. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):307-308.score: 48.0
    By examining single-word reading times (in full sentences read for meaning), we show that (1) function words are accessed faster than content words, independent of perceptual characteristics; (2) previous failures to show this involved problems of frequency range and task used; and (3) these differences in lexical access are related to perceptual fluency. We relate these findings to issues in the literature on event-related potentials (ERPs) and neurolinguistics.
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  47. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Perceptual Content and Relations. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):49-55.score: 45.0
  48. Vojislav Bozickovic (2008). Cognitive Significance and Reflexive Content. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):545-554.score: 45.0
    John Perry has urged that a semantic theory for natural languages ought to be concerned with the issue of cognitive significance—of how true identity statements containing different (utterances of) indexicals and proper names can be informative, held to be unaccountable by the referentialist view. The informativeness that he has in mind—one that has puzzled Frege, Kaplan and Wettstein—concerns knowledge about the world. In trying to solve this puzzle on referentialist terms, he comes up with the notion of cognitive significance as (...)
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  49. Mohan Matthen (2005). Visual Concepts. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):207-233.score: 45.0
    Perceptual content is conceptual. In this paper, some arguments against this thesis are examined and rebutted. The Richness argument, that we could not have concepts for all the colours, is queried: Doesn't the Munsell system give us such concepts? The argument that we can perceive colours and shapes without possessing the relevant concepts is rebutted: we cannot do this, but the kind of concept-possession that is relevant here is not intellectual but perceptual.
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  50. Frank Jackson (2012). Michael Tye on Perceptual Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):199-205.score: 45.0
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