Search results for 'PERCEPTUAL CONTENT' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.score: 240.0
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience (...)
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  2. Bence Nanay (2010). Attention and Perceptual Content. Analysis 70 (2):263-270.score: 240.0
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  3. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies.score: 240.0
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
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  4. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.score: 222.0
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object (...)
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  5. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.score: 216.0
    A straightforward way of thinking about perception is in terms of perceptual representation. Perception is the construction of perceptual representations that represent the world correctly or incorrectly. This way of thinking about perception has been questioned recently by those who deny that there are perceptual representations. This article examines some reasons for and against the concept of perceptual representation and explores some potential ways of resolving this debate. Then it analyzes what perceptual representations may be: (...)
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  6. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Content (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Four).score: 210.0
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception?
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  7. Jan Almäng (2014). Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments. Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.score: 210.0
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and (...)
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  8. Costas Pagondiotis (2005). “Can Perceptual Content Be Conceptual and Non-Theory-Laden?”. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.score: 210.0
  9. Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). Levels of Perceptual Content. Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.score: 192.0
    My main thesis is this paper is that, although Dretske's distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. I argue that what is needed in order to give a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a (...)
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  10. Mohan P. Matthen (1988). Biological Functions and Perceptual Content. Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.score: 192.0
    Perceptions "present" objects as red, as round, etc.-- in general as possessing some property. This is the "perceptual content" of the title, And the article attempts to answer the following question: what is a materialistically adequate basis for assigning content to what are, after all, neurophysiological states of biological organisms? The thesis is that a state is a perception that presents its object as "F" if the "biological function" of the state is to detect the presence of (...)
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  11. Jan Almäng (2012). Time, Mode and Perceptual Content. Acta Analytica 27 (4):425-439.score: 186.0
    Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati’s position is initially presented. Three (...)
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  12. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Kant on Perceptual Content. Mind.score: 186.0
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the “Content View.” I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. (...)
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  13. Jeff Speaks (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.score: 180.0
    I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond (...)
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  14. Jan Almäng (2008). Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):161 - 177.score: 180.0
    According to John McDowell,<span class='Hi'></span> representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through.<span class='Hi'></span> This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non-conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills.<span class='Hi'></span> After a brief introduction to McDowell's position,<span class='Hi'></span> Merleau-Ponty's notion of body schema and Gibson's notion of affordance are presented.<span class='Hi'></span> It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content,<span class='Hi'></span> and that (...)
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  15. John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.score: 180.0
    Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a (...)
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  16. Paul Redding, McDowell and the Propositionality of Perceptual Content Thesis.score: 180.0
    In Mind and World and subsequent writings up to an essay first published in 2008 entitled “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”,1 John McDowell had insisted not only on the conceptuality of what is often discussed as “perceptual content” but also on the propositionality of that content. Many might find this puzzling. At the most intuitive level, one might think of the “content” of perception, what one perceives, as things— things with particular properties, and things arranged (...)
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  17. Bence Nanay (2011). Ambiguous Figures, Attention, and Perceptual Content: Reply to Jagnow. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):557-561.score: 180.0
    I argued in Nanay 2010 that we cannot characterize perceptual content without reference to attention. Here, I defend this account from three objections raised by Jagnow 2011. This mainly takes the form of clarifying some details not sufficiently elaborated in the original article and dispelling some potential misunderstandings.
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  18. Evan Thompson (1995). Colour Vision, Evolution, and Perceptual Content. Synthese 104 (1):1-32.score: 180.0
    b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do (...)
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  19. René Jagnow (2008). Disappearing Appearances: On the Enactive Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):45-67.score: 180.0
    Many viewers presented with a round plate tilted to their line of sight will report that they see a round plate that looks elliptical from their perspective. Alva Noë thinks that we should take reports of this kind as adequate descriptions of the phenomenology of spatial experiences. He argues that his so-called enactive or sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content explains why both the plate’s circularity and itselliptical appearance are phenomenal aspects of experience. In this paper, I critique (...)
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  20. Casey O'Callaghan (2006). Cross-Modal Illusions and Perceptual Content: Lessons From Cross-Modal Illusions. Electroneurobiolog 14 (2):211-224.score: 180.0
    I argue that a class of recently-discovered cross-modal illusions gives reason to posit a dimension of content shared across perceptual modalities and to abandon the traditional view according to which perceptual content is exclusively constituted by discrete modality-specific contents.
     
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  21. Frederick R. Ablondi (2002). Kelly and McDowell on Perceptual Content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.score: 180.0
    [0] In a recent issue of _EJAP_, Sean Kelly [1998] defended the position that perceptual content is non-conceptual. More specifically, he claimed that John McDowell's view that concepts involved in perception can be understood as expressible through the use of demonstratives is ultimately untenable. In what follows, I want to look more closely at Kelly's position, as well as suggest possible responses one could make on McDowell's behalf.
     
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  22. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2014). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.score: 174.0
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is (...)
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  23. Sean D. Kelly (2002). What Makes Perceptual Content Non-Conceptual? Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.score: 174.0
    the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in.
     
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  24. John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.score: 168.0
    Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. (...)
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  25. Martin Davies (1991). Individualism and Perceptual Content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.score: 162.0
  26. Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.score: 162.0
  27. Umit D. Yaluin (1997). Skepticism and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Papers 26 (2):179-194.score: 162.0
  28. Michael R. Ayers (2002). Is Perceptual Content Ever Conceptual? Philosophical Books 43 (1):5-17.score: 162.0
     
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  29. York H. Gunther (1995). Perceptual Content and the Subpersonal. Conference 6 (1):31-45.score: 162.0
     
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  30. Christopher Peacocke (1989). Perceptual Content. In J. Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press.score: 162.0
     
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  31. Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.score: 156.0
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of perceptual consciousness has been the representational theory, or representationalism. The idea is to reduce the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences to the representational content of those experiences. Most representationalists appeal specifically to non-conceptual content in reducing phenomenal character to representational content. In this paper, I discuss a series of issues involved in this representationalist appeal to non-conceptual content. The overall argument is the following. On (...)
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  32. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.score: 156.0
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's (...)
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  33. William T. Wojtach (2009). Reconsidering Perceptual Content. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.score: 156.0
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be (...)
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  34. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Perceptual Content and Relations. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):49-55.score: 150.0
  35. Frank Jackson (2012). Michael Tye on Perceptual Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):199-205.score: 150.0
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  36. Josefa Toribio (2008). State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):351 - 361.score: 150.0
    It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both (...) experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all. (shrink)
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  37. Jeff Speaks, A Quick Argument Against Phenomenism, Fregeanism, Appearance Property-Ism and (Maybe) Functionalism About Perceptual Content.score: 150.0
    A short paper which is pretty much what its title says it is.
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  38. Arindam Chakrabarti (2004). Seeing Without Recognizing? More on Denuding Perceptual Content. Philosophy East and West 54 (3):365-367.score: 150.0
  39. Berit Brogaard (2009). Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth. Philosophical Books 50 (4):213-226.score: 150.0
    I will begin with a brief presentation of C & H’s arguments against nonindexical contextualism, temporalism, and relativism. I will then offer a general argument against the monadic truth package. Finally, I will offer arguments in favor of nonindexical contextualism and temporalism.
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  40. Ruth G. Millikan (1991). Perceptual Content and Fregean Myth. Mind 100 (399):439-459.score: 150.0
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  41. Frances Egan (1992). Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.score: 150.0
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  42. Michael Madary (2008). Specular Highlights as a Guide to Perceptual Content. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):629 – 639.score: 150.0
    This article is a contribution to a recent debate in the philosophy of perception between Alva Noë and Sean Kelly. Noë (2004) has argued that the perspectival part of perception is simultaneously represented along with the non-perspectival part of perception. Kelly (2004) argues that the two parts of perception are not always simultaneously experienced. Here I focus on specular highlights as an example of the perspectival part of perception. First I give a priori motivation to think that specular highlights are (...)
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  43. Paul Redding (2012). Wilfrid Sellars's Disambiguation of Kant's "Intuition" and its Relevance for the Analysis of Perceptual Content. Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 30 (1):127–140.score: 150.0
  44. Tyler Burge (2014). Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):485-501.score: 150.0
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  45. John Kulvicki (2007). Perceptual Content is Vertically Articulate. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):357-369.score: 150.0
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  46. Richard Sorabji (1990). Perceptual Content in the Stoics. Phronesis 35 (1):307-314.score: 150.0
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  47. Gerald Vision (1998). Perceptual Content. Philosophy 73 (3):395-427.score: 150.0
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  48. Austen Clark, Comments on Bill Lycan, "More Layers of Perceptual Content&Quot.score: 150.0
    I'm very happy here to be sandwiched between Lycan and Millikan, two of the living philosophers from whom I've probably learned the most, and to whom I am the most grateful. Plus the intermediary position is appropriate for someone commenting on intermediary representations in vision. There's much to like in Bill's account of "layering" in visual representation. For one, it makes explicit and publicizes the notion that there are multiple layers of representation involved even in the seemingly simple achievement (...)
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  49. Anna Marmodoro (2012). Aristotle on Complex Perceptual Content. The Metaphysics of the Common Sense. Philosophical Inquiry 34 (1/2):15-65.score: 150.0
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  50. M. Davies (forthcoming). Externalism and Perceptual Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.score: 150.0
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