Search results for 'Pain Asymbolia' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Treating Chronic Nonmalignant Pain (2008). Ethical Dilemmas in Treating Chronic Pain in the Context of Addiction. In Cynthia M. A. Geppert & Laura Weiss Roberts (eds.), The Book of Ethics: Expert Guidance for Professionals Who Treat Addiction. Hazelden.score: 180.0
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  2. Colin Klein, What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows.score: 156.0
    Pains motivate us. Must they? Motivationalists about pain say yes: motivational force is an intrinsic property of pains. Many disagree. The debate is partly empirical. Find someone who is entirely unmoved by pain, and motivationalism is threatened. Fail repeatedly to find such a case, and motivationalism gains credence.
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  3. Brendan O'Sullivan & Robert Schroer (2012). Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.score: 120.0
    It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect (i.e., the hurtfulness) of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way (...)
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  4. Colin Allen (2005). Deciphering Animal Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.score: 27.0
    In this paper we1 assess the potential for research on nonhuman animals to address questions about the phenomenology of painful experiences. Nociception, the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli, is widespread in the animal kingdom. Even rel- atively primitive animals such as leeches and sea slugs possess nociceptors, neurons that are functionally specialized for sensing noxious stimuli (Walters 1996). Vertebrate spinal cords play a sophisticated role in processing and modulating nociceptive signals, providing direct control of some motor responses to noxious (...)
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  5. Murat Aydede & D. Price (2005). The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies: The Experiential-Phenomenological Approach. In , Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Mit Press. 243--273.score: 27.0
    Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in (...)
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  6. Murat Aydede (2005). The Main Difficulty with Pain. In , Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. 123-136.score: 27.0
    Consider the following two sentences:
    (1) I see a dark discoloration in the back of my hand.
    (2) I feel a jabbing pain in the back of my hand.
    They seem to have the same surface grammar, and thus prima facie invite the same kind of semantic treatment. Even though a reading of ‘see’ in (1) where the verb is not treated as a success verb is not out of the question, it is not the ordinary and (...)
     
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  7. Barry Maund (2005). Michael Tye on Pain and Representational Content. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.score: 27.0
    Michael Tye argues for two crucial theses: (1) that experiences of pain have representational content (essentially); (2) that the representational content can be specified in terms of something like damage in parts of the body. (Different types of pain are connected with different types of damage.) I reject both of these theses. In my view experiences of pain carry nonconceptual content, but do not represent essentially. Rather they are apt to represent when the subject attends to them. (...)
     
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  8. Paul Noordhof (2005). In a State of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.score: 27.0
    Michael Tye and I are both Representationalists. Nevertheless, we have managed to disagree about the semantic character of ‘in’ in ‘There is a pain in my fingertip’ (see Noordhof (2001); Tye (2002); Noordhof (2002)). The first section of my commentary will focus on this disagreement. I will then turn to the location of pain. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be much more agreement between Tye and me. I restrict myself to three points. First, I argue that (...)
     
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  9. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.score: 24.0
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa (...)
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  10. Guy Kahane (2009). Pain, Dislike and Experience. Utilitas 21 (3):327-336.score: 24.0
    It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of (...)
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  11. Irwin Goldstein (1980). Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.score: 24.0
    Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed (...)
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  12. Colin Allen (2004). Animal Pain. Noûs 38 (4):617-43.score: 24.0
    Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain?1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind. Nociception—the capacity to sense noxious stimuli—is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996). Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such (...)
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  13. Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.score: 24.0
    In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics and in (...)
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  14. Irwin Goldstein (1983). Pain and Masochism. Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (3):219-223.score: 24.0
    That pain and suffering are unwanted is no truism. Like the sadist, the masochist wants pain. Like sadism, masochism entails an irrational, abnormal attitude toward pain. I explain this abnormality.
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  15. Adam Shriver (forthcoming). The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain To Animal Welfare (Penultimate Draft). Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.score: 24.0
    Utilitarianism, the ethical doctrine that holds in its most basic form that right actions are those that maximize pleasure and minimize pain, has been at the center of many of the ethical debates around animal welfare. The most well-known utilitarian of our time, Peter Singer, is widely credited with having sparked the animal welfare movement of the past 35+ years, using utilitarian reasoning to argue against using animals in invasive research that we aren’t willing to perform on humans. Yet (...)
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  16. Peter Alward (2004). Mad, Martian, but Not Mad Martian Pain. Sorites 15 (December):73-75.score: 24.0
    Functionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of mad painpain whose causes and effects diverge from those of the pain causal role. This is because what it is to be in pain according to functionalism is simply to be in a state that occupies the pain role. And the identity theory cannot accommodate the possibility of Martian painpain whose physical realization is foot-cavity inflation rather than C-fibre activation (or whatever physiological state occupies the pain-role (...)
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  17. David Bain (2010). Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, Edited by Murat Aydede. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (474):451-456.score: 24.0
    Review of Murat Aydede's edited collection, *Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study".
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  18. David Bain (2003). Intentionalism and Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.score: 24.0
    The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in (...)
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  19. Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.score: 24.0
    This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism (...)
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  20. Bennett W. Helm (2002). Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously (...)
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  21. Simon van Rysewyk (2013). Pain is Mechanism. Dissertation, University of Tasmaniascore: 24.0
    What is the relationship between pain and the body? I claim that pain is best explained as a type of personal experience and the bodily response during pain is best explained in terms of a type of mechanical neurophysiologic operation. I apply the radical philosophy of identity theory from philosophy of mind to the relationship between the personal experience of pain and specific neurophysiologic mechanism and argue that the relationship between them is best explained as one (...)
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  22. Barry Smith, Werner Ceusters, Louis J. Goldberg & Richard Ohrbach (2011). Towards an Ontology of Pain. In Proceedings of the Conference on Ontology and Analytical Metaphysics. Keio University Press.score: 24.0
    We present an ontology of pain and of other pain-related phenomena, building on the definition of pain provided by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP). Our strategy is to identify an evolutionarily basic canonical pain phenomenon, involving unpleasant sensory and emotional experience based causally in localized tissue damage that is concordant with that experience. We then show how different variant cases of this canonical pain phenomenon can be distinguished, including pain (...)
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  23. David Bain (2011). The Imperative View of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.score: 24.0
    Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this (...)
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  24. Terry Dartnall (2001). The Pain Problem. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):95-102.score: 24.0
    How can a pain wake you up? You were not dreaming, nor did any bodily stimuli filter into your consciousness. You did not just wake up and realize you were in pain, as you might wake up and realize it is Saturday. You were deeply, dreamlessly asleep, and suddenly you were awake, and in pain. How is this possible? If pain exists only inasmuch as it is experienced, it seems that the pain did not exist (...)
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  25. Donald F. Gustafson (1998). Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.score: 24.0
    This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “qualia” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: (1) looking at the history of the conception of pain; (2) raising questions from empirical research and (...)
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  26. Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.score: 24.0
    Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders (...)
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  27. Bernard E. Rollin (2011). Animal Pain: What It is and Why It Matters. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 15 (4):425-437.score: 24.0
    The basis of having a direct moral obligation to an entity is that what we do to that entity matters to it. The ability to experience pain is a sufficient condition for a being to be morally considerable. But the ability to feel pain is not a necessary condition for moral considerability. Organisms could have possibly evolved so as to be motivated to flee danger or injury or to eat or drink not by pain, but by “pangs (...)
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  28. Simon van Rysewyk (2014). Robot Pain. International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 4 (2):22-33.score: 24.0
    Functionalism of robot pain claims that what is definitive of robot pain is functional role, defined as the causal relations pain has to noxious stimuli, behavior and other subjective states. Here, I propose that the only way to theorize role-functionalism of robot pain is in terms of type-identity theory. I argue that what makes a state pain for a neuro-robot at a time is the functional role it has in the robot at the time, and (...)
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  29. Steven M. Duncan, Pain and Evil.score: 24.0
    In this paper I defend the thesis that, considered simply as certain sorts of bodily sensations, pleasure is not the good nor is pain intrinsically evil. In fact, the opposite is largely the case: pursuit of pleasure is generally productive of ontic evil, and pain, when heeded, directs us toward the ontic good.
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  30. Simon van Rysewyk (2009). Comment On: Unconscious Affective Processing and Empathy: An Investigation of Subliminal Priming on the Detection of Painful Facial Expressions [Pain 2009; 1–2: 71–75]. PAIN 145:364-366.score: 24.0
  31. E. Christian Brugger (2012). The Problem of Fetal Pain and Abortion: Toward an Ethical Consensus for Appropriate Behavior. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (3):263-287.score: 24.0
    This essay concerns what people should do in conflict situations when a doubt of fact bears on settling whether an alternative under consideration is legitimate or not. Its principal audience are those who believe that abortion can be legitimate when not having an abortion gives rise to serious harms that can be avoided by having one, but who are concerned that fetuses might feel pain when being aborted, and who believe that causing unnecessary pain should be avoided when (...)
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  32. Michele Farisco (2013). The Ethical Pain. Neuroethics 6 (2):265-276.score: 24.0
    The intriguing issue of pain and suffering in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs), particularly in Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome/Vegetative State (UWS/VS) and Minimally Conscious State (MCS), is assessed from a theoretical point of view, through an overview of recent neuroscientific literature, in order to sketch an ethical analysis. In conclusion, from a legal and ethical point of view, formal guidelines and a situationist ethics are proposed in order to best manage the critical scientific uncertainty about pain and suffering (...)
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  33. Kevin Reuter (2011). Distinguishing the Appearance From the Reality of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):94-109.score: 24.0
    It is often held that it is conceptually impossible to distinguish between a pain and a pain experience. In this article I present an argument which concludes that people make this distinction. I have done a web-based statistical analysis which is at the core of this argument. It shows that the intensity of pain has a decisive effect on whether people say that they 'feel a pain'(lower intensities) or 'have a pain' (greater intensities). This 'intensity (...)
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  34. Paul Noordhof (2001). In Pain. Analysis 61 (2):95-97.score: 24.0
    When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the.
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  35. A. Demertzi, E. Racine, M.-A. Bruno, D. Ledoux, O. Gosseries, A. Vanhaudenhuyse, M. Thonnard, A. Soddu, G. Moonen & S. Laureys (2013). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 6 (1):37-50.score: 24.0
    Pain, suffering and positive emotions in patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and minimally conscious states (MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically, we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimulation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g., smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuroimaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain which might influence decisions about treatment limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., withdrawal of (...)
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  36. Richard Gray (2014). Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.score: 24.0
    Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything by (...)
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  37. Kenneth J. Sufka & Derek D. Turner (2005). An Evolutionary Account of Chronic Pain: Integrating the Natural Method in Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):243-257.score: 24.0
    This paper offers an evolutionary account of chronic pain. Chronic pain is a maladaptive by-product of pain mechanisms and neural plasticity, both of which are highly adaptive. This account shows how evolutionary psychology can be integrated with Flanagan's natural method, and in a way that avoids the usual charges of panglossian adaptationism and an uncritical commitment to a modular picture of the mind. Evolutionary psychology is most promising when it adopts a bottom-up research strategy that focuses on (...)
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  38. Adam Swenson (2009). Pain's Evils. Utilitas 21 (2):197-216.score: 24.0
    The traditional accounts of pain’s intrinsic badness assume a false view of what pains are. Insofar as they are normatively significant, pains are not just painful sensations. A pain is a composite of a painful sensation and a set of beliefs, desires, emotions, and other mental states. A pain’s intrinsic properties can include inter alia depression, anxiety, fear, desires, feelings of helplessness, and the pain’s meaning. This undermines the traditional accounts of pain’s intrinsic badness. (...) is intrinsically bad in two distinct and historically unnoticed ways. First, most writers hold that pain’s intrinsic badness lies either in its unpleasantness or in its being disliked. Given my wider conception of pain, I believe it is both. Pain’s first intrinsic evil lies in a conjunction of all the traditional candidates for its source. Pain’s second intrinsic evil lies in the way it necessarily undermines the self-control necessary for intrinsic goods like autonomy. (shrink)
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  39. Daniel Kostic (2012). The Vagueness Constraint and the Quality Space for Pain. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.score: 24.0
    This paper is concerned with a quality space model as an account of the intelligibility of explanation. I argue that descriptions of causal or functional roles (Chalmers Levine, 2001) are not the only basis for intelligible explanations. If we accept that phenomenal concepts refer directly, not via descriptions of causal or functional roles, then it is difficult to find role fillers for the described causal roles. This constitutes a vagueness constraint on the intelligibility of explanation. Thus, I propose to use (...)
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  40. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.score: 24.0
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how (...)
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  41. Daryl Pullman (2002). Human Dignity and the Ethics and Aesthetics of Pain and Suffering. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (1):75-94.score: 24.0
    Inasmuch as unmitigated pain and suffering areoften thought to rob human beings of theirdignity, physicians and other care providersincur a special duty to relieve pain andsuffering when they encounter it. When pain andsuffering cannot be controlled it is sometimesthought that human dignity is compromised.Death, it is sometimes argued, would bepreferred to a life without dignity.Reasoning such as this trades on certainpreconceptions of the nature of pain andsuffering, and of their relationships todignity. The purpose of this paper (...)
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  42. Kenneth J. Sufka & Michael P. Lynch (2000). Sensations and Pain Processes. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):299-311.score: 24.0
    This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowledge regarding (...)
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  43. Donald F. Gustafson (2000). On the Supposed Utility of a Folk Theory of Pain. Brain and Mind 1 (2):223-228.score: 24.0
    What follows raises objections to some arguments that claimthat a principle of applicability of ordinary pain talkconstrains developments in the pain sciences. A more apt pictureof lay use of pain language shows its non-theoretic character.Since instrumentalism and eliminativism are philosophical viewsabout the status of theories of pain, neither is a threatto clinical use of standard pain lingo. Perfected pain theoryis likely to enhance and improve pain language in clinicalsettings, should such theory find its (...)
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  44. Paul Noordhof (2002). More in Pain. Analysis 62 (2):153-154.score: 24.0
    made with any ambitions for ontological reduction (e.g. denying that there are pains but only states of having pain). So I'm afraid that Tye's objections deriving from attributing to me such a view and pointing out that Representationalism is needed to capture, amongst other things, the fact that we experience pains in phantom limbs are all beside the point. Instead, the question is entirely a matter of whether the inferences mentioned in my original paper and Tye's reply fail because, (...)
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  45. Abraham Olivier (2006). The Spatiality of Pain. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):336-349.score: 24.0
    How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. (...)
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  46. Jay L. Garfield (2001). Pain Deproblematized. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):103-7.score: 24.0
    In this paper I demonstrate that the "pain problem" Dartnall claims to have discovered is in fact no problem at all. Dartnall's construction of the apparent problem, I argue, relies on an erroneous assumption of the unity of consciousness, an erroneous assumption of the simplicity of pain as a phenomenon ignoring crucial neurophysiological and neuroanatomical information, a mistaken account of introspective knowledge according to which introspection gives us inner episodes veridically and in their totality and a model of (...)
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  47. David B. Resnik & Marsha Rehm (2001). The Undertreatment of Pain: Scientific, Clinical, Cultural, and Philosophical Factors. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 4 (3):277-288.score: 24.0
    This essay provides an explanation and interpretation of the undertreatment of pain by discussing some of the scientific, clinical, cultural, and philosophical aspects of this problem. One reason why pain continues to be a problem for medicine is that pain does not conform to the scientific approach to health and disease, a philosophy adopted by most health care professionals. Pain does not fit this philosophical perspective because (1) pain is subjective, not objective; (2) the causal (...)
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  48. Thomas W. Polger & Kenneth J. Sufka (2005). Closing the Gap on Pain: Mechanism, Theory, and Fit. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.score: 24.0
    A widely accepted theory holds that emotional experiences occur mainly in a part of the human brain called the amygdala. A different theory asserts that color sensation is located in a small subpart of the visual cortex called V4. If these theories are correct, or even approximately correct, then they are remarkable advances toward a scientific explanation of human conscious experience. Yet even understanding the claims of such theories—much less evaluating them—raises some puzzles. Conscious experience does not present itself as (...)
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  49. D. Resnik (2000). Pain as a Folk Psychological Concept: A Clinical Perspective. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (2):193-207.score: 24.0
    This paper develops an instrumentalistic argumentagainst an eliminativist approach to using the folkconcept of pain in clinical medicine and draws someimplications for biomedical theories of pain. Thepaper argues that the folk concept of pain plays afundamental role in several aspects of clinicalmedicine, including the diagnosis and treatment ofdiseases and symptoms, relieving human suffering, andthe doctor-patient relationship. Since clinicians mustbe able to apply biomedical theories of pain inmedical practice, these theories should not stray toofar from pain's (...)
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  50. Donald F. Gustafson (2000). Our Choice Between Actual and Remembered Pain and Our Flawed Preferences. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):111-119.score: 24.0
    In Stephanie Beardman's discussion of the empirical results of Kahneman and Tversky and Kahneman, et al. on pain preference and rational utility decision she argues that an interpretation of these results does not require that false memory for pain episodes yields irrational preferences for future pain events. I concur with her conclusion and suggest that there are reasons from within the pain sciences for agreeing with Beardman's reinterpretation of the Kahneman, et al. data. I cite some (...)
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